Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I am not entirely convinced that Neder v. United States, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), answers the question here, ie., whether harmless error review applies to a claim that the jury instructions inappropriately shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove an element of thé offense. I do not believe, however, that this case requires further analysis of the review standard because the denial of Spicer’s habeas petition can be affirmed on the ground that the state court decisions at issue are not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of’ “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Although “forcible compulsion” and “consent” have some conceptual overlap, lack of consent is not an element of second degree rape, and requiring the defendant to prove consent in this context does not run afoul of due process. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); State v. Camara, 113 Wash.2d 631, 781 P.2d 483 (1989).