I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it improperly second-guesses the district court’s grant of equitable estoppel. Decisions to grant or deny equitable estoppel are reserved to a district court, and must not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See Hoefler v. Babbitt, 139 F.3d 726, 727 (9th Cir.1998). Here, the majority purports to apply the abuse of discretion standard, but in effect substitutes its own judgment for that of the district court. The effect of the majority decision is to invalidate a jury award in favor of the plaintiff in this disability discrimination case.
Under the doctrine of equitable estop-pel, an employer is estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense if the employer “misrepresented or concealed ‘facts necessary to support a discrimination charge.’ ” Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Division, 927 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.1991); see also Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir.1981) (“Equitable modification of the limitations period may be appropriate when misleading conduct of the defendant has induced the plaintiff to delay filing notice of intent to sue.”).
Here, the district court found that Pac-Bell made a material misrepresentation when it told Santa Maria that Dr. Larson consented to Santa Maria’s work conditions, and that PacBell fraudulently concealed evidence—namely, the contents of Dr. Larson’s letter—that would have led Santa Maria to recognize that he had a claim for discrimination under the ADA. The jury heard evidence supporting Santa Maria’s allegation that PacBell misled him into believing that it was following his doctor’s orders in the design of the “improvement program,” and decided in Santa Maria’s favor, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. The district court acknowledged that Santa Maria’s testimony at trial “supported the allegations of fraudulent concealment.” Maj. Op. at 1175.
The majority opinion implicitly accepts the district court’s finding of fraudulent concealment when it analyzes whether Santa Maria had reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation. However, in conducting the reasonableness inquiry the majority takes a peculiar leap of logic. It holds that it was unreasonable for Santa *1180Maria to rely upon PacBell’s representations about its treatment of Santa Maria as in accord with Dr. Larson’s advice, even though PacBell fraudulently concealed key information. The majority would have Santa Maria play the sleuth to dig up the truth. In effect, the majority would require Santa Maria to investigate his employer’s statement regarding the letter from Dr. Larson as a precondition to his disability discrimination claim. And, the majority holds, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to hold otherwise. I strongly disagree. An employee should be able to rely upon his employer’s statements regarding correspondence between the employer and the employee’s doctor. Although we now know that Santa Maria should have been suspicious of Pac-Bell’s underhanded dealings, we must not rule based on our 20-20 hindsight.
I submit that the record supports the district court’s application of equitable es-toppel, and that the district court should be affirmed on this point. But we do not have to agree with the district court to affirm its decision. Where, as here, we are reviewing the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, we must uphold the determination if it “falls within a range of permissible conclusions.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Edüd 359 (1990). Here, the district court’s determination was well within that “range of permissible conclusions.” Under the circumstances, I believe the majority not only commits error but also does an injustice by reversing the district court and throwing out a jury verdict holding PacBell liable for discriminating against Santa Maria.