concurring in the judgment:
*366If one conceptualizes the initial investigatory detention of Brugal and Trooper Lawson’s subsequent request that Brugal pull his car to the side of the road as two separate and distinct seizures, as did the district court and as do the appellees, or if one views the events in question as but one single seizure and Trooper Lawson’s request as a continuation of that one seizure beyond the completion of the routine investigatory stop, as does the plurality herein, then I do not believe that there existed reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the so-called second seizure or the continuation of the investigatory stop. In other words, contrary to the view of the plurality, I do not believe that the circumstances identified by the government and accepted by the plurality as confirmatory of reasonable suspicion in fact support such a suspicion. However, based upon the actual record testimony in this case, it is clear not only that there were not two separate and distinct seizures, but also that the single seizure that did occur was, throughout its duration, a valid investigatory stop, for which no reasonable suspicion was necessary. For this reason, and not for that relied upon by the plurality, I am satisfied that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore no need for suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the indisputably voluntary consensual search of Brugal’s vehicle.
The appellees and the plurality contend, and the district court may have believed (although it did not so find), that the purposes of the investigatory stop had been fulfilled, and thus that reasonable suspicion was necessary to justify any further detention, at the time Trooper Lawson asked Brugal to pull from the middle of the lane of traffic and onto the shoulder of the road. Based upon the record testimony, however, it is plain that the initial investigatory detention, which, it bears repeating, the appellees themselves concede was lawful, remained in progress until Trooper Lawson returned the rental agreement to Brugal — well after Lawson asked Brugal to pull to the side of the road.
The investigatory detention began, as must any routine traffic stop, with Trooper Lawson asking Brugal for his driver’s license and registration. See J.A. 34.1 Bru-gal produced his driver’s license, but “was having difficulty finding a registration.” J.A. 35. Trooper Lawson saw that Brugal had a rental agreement for the car, however, and informed him that the agreement would be sufficient. See J.A. 35 (“I told him the rental agreement would be fine, instead of a registration.”).
Having determined that Brugal’s New York, driver’s license appeared valid, Trooper Lawson promptly returned the license to Brugal. See J.A. 35. However, having noticed that the rental agreement showed that a car had been rented in Miami, Trooper Lawson retained the rental agreement, a document that is considerably more difficult to examine at a glance in the middle of a lane of traffic, and asked Brugal to pull his car over to the shoulder of the exit ramp. See J.A. 35 (“I noticed at that time that he had ... rented the vehicle out of Miami. I asked him to pull over to the side there and I returned his driver’s license to him at that time, but I kept the rental agreement. He pulled over.”).2
*367Trooper Lawson was never asked below why he retained the rental agreement, but returned the driver’s license — presumably the very opposite of what he would do if he had concluded at that moment that he either was possessed, or would imminently be possessed, of reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed. However, the most (if not the only) reasonable inference given the otherwise counter-intuitive return of the driver’s license but retention of the rental agreement, is that Lawson had remaining questions about the validity of that document, the legitimacy of Bru-gal’s possession of that document, or the legality of Brugal’s possession of the car itself in light of the information that appeared on that document — none of which would necessarily have been answered by the facts that Brugal was able to produce a facially valid driver’s license and a rental agreement — and that he was understandably unwilling to attempt to resolve these questions while standing in the pitch dark, in the middle of an exit ramp, exposed to moving traffic. As the government poignantly explains:
It seems obvious why Lawson asked Brugal to pull his vehicle off the exit ramp and onto the adjacent grassy area. Although it was late and there was little traffic, other vehicles had exited the ramp. It was dangerous for Lawson to be in the middle of the road with Bru-gal’s vehicle during early morning hours. No doubt, Lawson could have told Bru-gal to pull off the road immediately after approaching the vehicle for his safety, as well as that of Brugal and. his passengers.
Appellant’s Br. at 11 n. 7.
That Trooper Lawson asked Brugal to pull out of the lane of traffic for the specific purpose of completing the limited investigatory stop is confirmed by two significant facts. First, the question that Trooper Lawson asked Brugal immediately after asking him to pull off the road, but before returning the rental agreement to him, was designed to elicit further information relevant to the rental agreement, specifically whether Brugal had in fact rented the car in Miami, as the documentation showed: “I asked him where he was ... coming from_” See J.A. 35. And, second, of utmost significance, once Trooper Lawson asked this follow-up question and, from Brugal’s answer to that question, determined that there was nothing to suggest that the rental agreement was anything other than genuine and valid, Lawson promptly returned the rental agreement to Brugal, see J.A. 36, as he had earlier returned Brugal’s driver’s license, freeing Brugal to continue on his way,3
Although for some reason the plurality is, itself, absolutely convinced that Trooper Lawson had completed the investigatory stop before he asked Brugal to pull over to the side of the road, it cannot and does not contend that the district court so found. The plurality maintains only that the dis-*368triet court must have believed that the stop was completed. See ante at 362-63 (“The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the district court’s analysis is that the district court was of the opinion that the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled before the second seizure began.”) (emphasis added); ante at 363 (calling “inexorable” and “irrefutable” the conclusion that the purposes of the checkpoint were fulfilled before Trooper Lawson ordered Brugal to pull off the road). And notwithstanding the plurality’s confidence in its ability to discern the unstated view of the district court, the district court simply did not make any finding as to when the purposes of the stop 'were fulfilled; the district court stated only that “Trooper Lawson saw that Brugal had rented the car in. Miami and was in full compliance with the terms of the rental contract.” J.A. 379. The footnote to that sentence recites specifically what the district court found that Trooper Lawson had observed:
Specifically, the contract was fully paid, was valid until November 6, 1997, listed Brugal as the only authorized. driver, and required that the car be returned to Miami.
J.A. 379 n. 3. The district court thus most certainly did not find that the purposes of the investigatory stop had been completed. And just as with the question whether the district court found that Trooper Lawson acted on a “hunch” that the defendants were drug couriers, it bears emphasis that, on the question whether the stop had ended, form and substance merge. That is, because the district court did not find that the stop had ended before Trooper Lawson ordered Brugal to pull off the road, we are not bound by anything the district court might have thought, even if we could divine such.
Moreover, the “equally plausible” explanations offered by the plurality to account for Trooper Lawson’s decision to return Brugal’s license, but to retain his rental agreement, see ante at 364, are anything but “equally” plausible. The plurality posits that, because it is a common practice for drug dealers to fly to Miami, rent a car there, and drive north with drugs, Trooper Lawson may have retained Brugal’s driver’s license, and asked his follow-up question, to ascertain whether 'Brugal was a drug courier. See ante at 364. However, contrary to the plurality’s representations, this account in no way explains the decision to return the license but to retain the rental agreement. It is true that the rental agreement goes to one element of drug courier behavior noted above: renting a car in Miami. But the driver’s license was equally relevant to ascertaining whether Brugal fit that profile, as it showed that he most likely traveled to Miami from somewhere else — New York. Moreover, if Trooper Lawson’s concern was simply to detain Brugal because he suspected illegal behavior, he presumably would not have returned Brugal’s driver’s license. If the retention of any one document was more likely to keep Brugal from fleeing, surely that one document was the license, and not the rental agreement.
Because it is apparent that Trooper Lawson asked Brugal to pull out of the lane of traffic for‘the limited purposes of examining Brugal’s rental agreement and asking any necessary follow-up questions relevant to that document — and appellees do not even suggest that these purposes were pretextual — it is evident that the investigatory stop did not end until Trooper Lawson returned Brugal’s rental agreement, having determined that all was in order with respect to that document. At that moment, and not before, did the traffic stop conclude.
Appellees wisely (because the record would not support such) and tactically (because to do so would direct attention to the single factor that establishes the continuity of the stop) do not even contend that the investigatory stop ended, and that they were seized again, constructively, when Trooper Lawson returned Brugal’s driver’s license but withheld return of the rental agreement. To hold, as appellees *369do urge, that the lawful investigatory stop ended upon Trooper Lawson’s return of Brugal’s driver’s license and that a second unlawful seizure began simply because Lawson asked Brugal to pull to a safe location out of the lane of traffic in order to examine Brugal’s vehicle documentation, would be not just to withhold from law enforcement officers the very authority they must have to effectuate the purposes of the investigatory stop — the authority to pose those questions necessary to determine that the vehicle is in full compliance with the law — but the authority they must have to ensure that compliance without jeopardy to their own life or limb.
Of course, following Lawson’s return of the rental agreement to Brugal, Brugal was not even arguably further detained without his consent. After returning the rental agreement, Trooper Lawson did ask Brugal whether there were any weapons or drugs in the car. See J.A. 38 (“I returned his rental agreement and asked him if he had any drugs or weapons in the vehicle.”). At that point, however, by all objective measures, Brugal was not being detained and was free to leave, and there is nothing in the record that even hints that Brugal himself did not understand as much. And it was immediately after this question that Trooper Lawson asked Bru-gal — who obviously still remained free to leave — for permission to search the ear, and, in response, twice received Brugal’s unequivocal consent. See J.A. 39 (“I asked him since you don’t have any drugs or weapons in your vehicle do you mind if we search your vehicle?.... He said, no problem. I asked him a second time. He said, no problem.”).
Accordingly, given that Trooper Lawson never exceeded the permissible scope of a lawful investigatory stop and that the drugs at issue were discovered as a result of a consensual search of Brugal’s car which was conducted at a time when the appellees were unquestionably free to leave, it is apparent that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred and that the drugs were, therefore wrongfully suppressed by the district court. For these reasons would I reverse the judgment under review.
And lest the more casual reader be confused by the plurality’s ironically impassioned critique of my analysis (in contrast, the plurality does not even as much as mention the dissent), it bears reminding that, were the plurality to prevail in its efforts to convince me that the investigatory stop had indeed ended before Trooper Lawson asked Brugal to pull over to the side of the road, I would not, as the plurality evidently believes, join its opinion. I would instead join Judge Murnaghan’s dissent, because, as I state above, I am firmly of the view that reasonable suspicion did not exist to justify any further detention beyond that necessary to complete the lawful investigatory stop.
Judge Williams joins in this opinion.
. All citations to the joint appendix refer to the testimony of Trooper Lawson, unless otherwise noted.
. The district court never focused on whether Trooper Lawson asked or directed Brugal to pull to the side of the road. The court variously stated that Trooper Lawson "asked,” see J.A. 380, and "ordered,” see J.A. 382, Brugal to pull off the road. Trooper Lawson testified that he merely "asked” Brugal to pull his car out of the lane of traffic. See J.A. 35. Given Trooper Lawson’s unrebutted testimony and the absence of any contrary finding by the district court, I think that the better supported conclusion is that Lawson merely asked Brugal to pull over and that Brugal was, at that point, free to leave. However, my analysis does not hinge on the fact that Trooper Lawson merely requested that Brugal pull over. Given that the investigatory stop *367was still underway at the time Brugal pulled off the road, even an order directing him to do so would have been justifiable as necessary to the safe and complete fulfillment of the purposes of such a stop.
. The plurality apparently believes that the district court’s remark that "[Trooper Lawson] acted on a hunch that these defendants were 3 'mules' transporting drugs,” J.A. 390, constitutes a "finding concerning Trooper Lawson's motivation,” ante at 363; see also ante at 356 n.3. Read in context, however, it is plain that the district court’s statement on which the plurality relies is not a factual finding to which we owe deference, as the plurality suggests. The statement is nothing more than a summary observation following the district court's legal analysis, not a finding of fact. And, insofar as an appellate court is concerned, it is the absence of a finding per se on this question that is significant; it is not for us to make inferences concerning the district court's subjective state of mind in the absence of findings.
In any event, and more importantly, that Trooper Lawson may have been possessed of a hunch regarding the defendants says nothing at all as to whether he did or did not have further questions that fell within the scope of a permissible investigatory stop at the time he ordered Brugal to pull off the road.