dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Our task as an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence but to uphold the jury’s verdict so long as substantial evidence supports it. The fact that we would have decided the case differently is irrelevant.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we may reverse the jury’s verdict only if no reasonable jury could have concluded that Mark Poehlman was not legally entrapped. See United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.1988). Because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the government did not induce Poehl-man to commit the crime, the jury’s verdict should be upheld.
Entrapment as a matter of law was not established in this case. Entrapment as a matter of law requires undisputed evidence establishing that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime and that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. See United States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir.1995).
*706Poehlman failed to present “ ‘undisputed evidence making it patently clear that an otherwise innocent person was induced to commit, the illegal act.’ ” United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted); see United States v. Manante, 44 F.3d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) (defining inducement as “government conduct that creates a substantial risk that an otherwise law-abiding person will commit a crime”). Even though during the first two weeks of Poehlman’s email communications with the government agent posing as “Sharon” Poehlman revealed no sexual interest in children, Poehlman soon began to interpret purposely vague e-mails from Sharon as containing sexual undertones. But cf. United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that the district court should have given an entrapment instruction based in part on the government’s improper inducement and the government’s first mentioning of children as sex objects). While the government sent Poehlman messages, it did not first suggest sexual relations with children nor propose any specific sexual acts. Moreover, the government’s e-mails never forced Poehlman to respond and, in fact, offered Poehlman many opportunities to end the communications if he were interested in a relationship with Sharon and not the kids or if he were at all uncomfortable. The majority contends that the “clear implication of Sharon’s messages” suggested that Poehlman have sex with the children, but, so long as ambiguous evidence requires inferences to be made, it is the role of the jury to draw such inferences. See United States v. Goode, 814 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir.1987).
A reasonable jury could also have found that Poehlman was predisposed to commit the crime. We generally rely upon five factors in determining predisposition: (1) the defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether the government first suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant profited from the activity; (4) whether the defendant demonstrated reluctance; and (5) the nature of the government’s inducement. See Citro, 842 F.2d at 1152. The defendant’s reluctance generally receives the greatest weight. See United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.1997).
Poehlman’s character and the absence of a profit motive are two factors that weigh heavily in Poehlman’s favor. Poehlman does not have a history of a sexual interest in children, and his e-mail communications with Sharon never revealed an interest in profiting from any sexual relationship. The other predisposition factors, however, tip in favor of the government. During the undercover operation, the government constructed purposely vague e-mail messages. While Poehlman claims that the government initiated the sexual conversation when Sharon wrote about the lessons for her children from a “special man teacher” and her desire to watch the lessons, Poehlman conceded at trial that Sharon “never came out and said that [he] have sex with the kids.” Poehlman first introduced sexual remarks in his reply to the government’s message stating Sharon’s interest in finding a “special man teacher” for her children.
Although Poehlman’s e-mail messages during the first two weeks of his communication with Sharon appeared free of sexual allusions directed toward her children, his communications for the next roughly h-k months detailed sexual acts that he would perform with Sharon’s three children, even asking Sharon to put the two older girls on birth control. Moreover, just prior to Poehlman’s arrest, a female undercover agent, posing as Sharon, presented Poehl-man with a child pornography magazine and pointed to a particular picture depicting a child in a sexual act. When the officer asked Poehlman whether he thought the children “will be ready for this,” Poehlman responded, “God, I hope so.” Poehlman also remarked that he has “always looked at little girls.” Although Poehlman at trial stated that he meant women over the age of eighteen, a reason*707able jury could have concluded that he revealed a predisposition toward having sexual relations with young children.
At trial, the government established that Poehlman first mentioned having sex with the children, and each proposed sexual act originated from him. Even though this case is not as clear cut as a case in which a defendant, for example, exemplifies predisposition by owning a library of explicit materials before the commencement of a sting operation, the jury heard enough evidence for it to reasonably conclude that Poehlman in fact had a predisposition to commit the crime.
As the majority acknowledges, the district court properly instructed the jury,1 and Poehlman does not contend otherwise. What we are left with is a case in which the jury followed the court’s correct instructions, considered the evidence, and simply rejected the defense. I would affirm the conviction.
. The district court followed the Ninth Circuit Manuel of Model Jury Instructions 6.2.1 (1997) in instructing the jury that the government must prove the following:
1. The defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before being contacted by government agents, or
2. The defendant was not induced by the government agents to commit the crime.
Where a person, independent of and before government contact, is predisposed to commit the crime, it is not entrapment if the government agents merely provide an opportunity to commit the crime.