concurring and dissenting.
I concur but dissent as to the remedy. I would require a new hearing for Furnari’s application for parole. This is a case where denial of parole appears to rest on unreliable information.
As Chief Judge Becker observed, the Appeals Board expressly denied Furnari a de novo parole hearing on the basis that “the evidence you have presented does not persuade the Commission that the information it has relied upon is inaccurate.” Op. at 254.
Not only is the statement of the Appeals Board contrary to law as demonstrated by Chief Judge Becker’s opinion, but it is contrary to the principle that testimony of a convicted criminal presented to prosecutors to gain some benefit for the declarant is notoriously unreliable. Thus, Casso’s testimony as well as similar hearsay statements from D’Arco and others who may have sought some benefit to themselves in singing to the prosecutor may well have been singing off-key.
The testimony of Casso and others underlying the denial of parole cannot be taken at face value. To accept the charge against Furnari made by his former associates for an apparent personal gain clearly requires a statement of reasons, not merely conclusions. It must reveal reasoning. See Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943 (3rd Cir.1988).
I agree with the discussion and reasoning of the majority opinion here. I would conclude, however, that the law entitles Furnari to a new hearing as a matter of right, rather than as a matter of discretion. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(b) as applicable herein reads: “The Commission shall furnish the eligible prisoner with a written notice of its determination not later than twenty-one days, excluding holidays, after the date of the parole determination proceeding. If parole is denied such notice shall state with particularity the reasons for such denial.”
Since the Parole Commission did not state reasons for denial of parole in light of supplementary information presented to it, Op. at 252, any additional statement of reason from the Commission’s determination will not comply with the twenty-one day rule.
The statute requires that “[t]he Commission shall furnish the eligible prisoner with a written notice of its determination not later than twenty-one days, excluding holidays, after the date of the parole determination proceeding. If parole is denied such notice shall state with particularity the reason for such denial.” 18 U.S.C. § 4206(b)(emphasis added). The statute does not authorize the Commission to develop its reasoning in proceedings before the district court, let alone the court of appeals. The reasons must be furnished in writing, to *259the prisoner, within twenty-one days of the parole hearing.
Marshall, 839 F.2d at 943 (emphasis in original).
Furnari ought not be compelled to spend his obviously few remaining years in prison based on self-serving, highly suspect charges made by criminals who speak for personal gain. I believe the requirements of fair and effective judicial administration and the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4206(b) require a new haring and a fair determination of all relevant evidence in either granting or denying parole for Furnari.
Accordingly, I concur' in the majority opinion but dissent as to the remedy.
. This judge served on the appellate panel affirming the conviction of Furnari and others. United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2nd Cir.1989).