concurring:
I concur in the result and in Parts I, II, IV, and V of Judge King’s opinion, except, perhaps, n. 11, maj. at 320, and will explain below.
*324Finding that the exclusion of the testimony of the witness was reversible error, I believe it unnecessary and thus do not express an opinion on the matters addressed in Part III of the opinion.
I should add that asking, in terms, one witness to comment on the testimony of another witness is a practice so uniformly disapproved as not to bear citation. See n. 11, maj. at 320. So the real prejudicial error in the decision of the district court, as Judge King’s opinion points out, was preventing the defense attorney from discussing the substance of the previous testimony with the upcoming witness, not the form of the question, which, as the government and n. 11 point out, could easily have been avoided by simply changing the wording of the question, a matter of no more moment than changing the form of a leading question by substituting the fa.mil-iar “State whether or not.... ”
So far as this concurrence may be at odds with it, then, I may not agree with n. 11.