dissenting in part.
The recent decisions from the Supreme Court on the subject of workplace harassment emphasize the importance of the policy on harassment that a company adopts and maintains, when liability for the actions of a supervisor are at issue. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). When an employee who complains of sexual or other forbidden harassment from a supervisor can point to a tangible employment action, the employer is subject to vicarious liability no matter what policy it has on the books. If the complaining employee has not suffered from a tangible employment action, however, the employer is liable unless it can establish the two elements of a new affirmative defense. Those elements are (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care both to prevent and to correct promptly any sexually (or, as here, racially) harassing behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities that were provided by the employer or otherwise available. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
Louise Hill’s case arose before either Faragher or Ellerth was decided, and so it is hardly surprising that the district court *646did not follow the language of those opinions chapter, book, and verse. Nevertheless, it is our duty now, on de novo review from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant American General Finance (AGF), to decide whether the company is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The majority has found that the record is sufficiently developed to permit this court to apply the new legal standards and to affirm the district court’s judgment. With respect, I cannot agree. Significant facts remain to be developed on both parts of the employer’s affirmative defense — a defense, it is important to remember, on which the defendant bears the burden of proof, not the plaintiff. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to Hill, as we must, I cannot find that AGF has succeeded in meeting that burden.
Like the majority, I find no serious dispute over the question whether Hill suffered any tangible employment action, such as discharge. There is no hint of that in the record. I also agree that the Faragher/Ellerth approach applies to cases based on racial harassment in the workplace, just as it does to sexual harassment. See Allen v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405, 411 (6th Cir.1999); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 593 (5th Cir.1998); Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir.1998). The central question is thus whether it is clear beyond dispute that AGF has, on the basis of undisputed facts, established its affirmative defense.
Unlike the majority, I begin with an analysis of AGF’s policy against workplace harassment — a policy that the majority concedes left some “room for improvement.” Ante at 643. One document to which AGF points did no more than to say that it was AGF’s policy to comply with laws regarding equal employment without regard to race, and to mention that questions with respect to this policy were to be directed to the group manager of employee and field relations. What kind of policy is this? Was AGF trying to communicate to its employees that it had decided not to be a scofflaw? Employees would have had a right to assume that their employer was not deliberately setting out to violate relevant federal and state statutes. This policy accomplishes nothing, unless we are giving employers credit for stating the obvious and for giving a telephone number for further inquiries. Its unsatisfactory nature is apparent when we compare it to the careful policies so many employers have adopted, both before and since the decisions in Faragher and Ellerth. Those policies take care to define for employees what kinds of behavior are forbidden, to underscore the fact that even supervisory employees must treat everyone with respect, to set forth alternate ways to voice complaints (in case one route is effectively blocked because the harassing supervisor would get in the way), and to stress the importance of preventive measures. Careful policies describe the disciplinary measures the company might use in a harassment case, encourage employees to make complaints, state unequivocally that retaliation will not be tolerated, and explain that complaints will be examined in a confidential manner. In addition, policies should describe the responsibility of supervisors (and employees) who learn of harassment through informal channels. See, e.g., Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir.1999); Shaw v. AutoZone Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir.1999); Fenton v. HiSAN Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 833 (6th Cir.1999); Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir.1998); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1066 (10th Cir.1998). A second policy on which AGF relied addressed sexual harassment specifically. The majority describes it, and so I will not repeat every detail. Even though it goes into somewhat greater detail about the kind of behavior the policy addresses, it too does not meet the standards that have been found to be satisfactory. Yet another memorandum outlines a four-step complaint procedure.
*647Even if we were to agree that the latter two policies somehow met the legal requirements that the Supreme Court had in mind, however, more is necessary. Critically, the employer has the burden not only to show that it has enacted an adequate policy, but also that it has taken reasonable care (1) to prevent and (2) promptly to correct any harassing behavior. If the employees do not know that a policy exists, then even the most admirable policy will not accomplish either of those goals. And it is on this point that AGF is most vulnerable. Hill claimed that she did not recall ever receiving those policies. AGF did not try to refute this testimony by showing, as many employers do, that Hill signed for receipt of the policies when she joined the company, nor did it introduce evidence indicating when the policies were first released to the workforce. It did not do this because, at least as the record shows so far, that never happened. Instead, the best AGF could do was to assert that the policies were buried in some notebooks that were themselves located in a “public access area” and accessible to employees. If this is all it did (and we must so assume at this stage of the proceedings), I would find it to be insufficient to show the required reasonable care for purposes of the affirmative defense. Cf. Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 932-33 (7th Cir.1999) (sexual harassment policy posted, with instructions on how to report harassment); Montero, 192 F.3d at 862 (handbook with harassment policy distributed to all employees as well as a separate memorandum and two pamphlets describing that policy); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 809 (copy of harassment policy given to each employee in employee handbook and training provided periodically to managers on the company’s sexual harassment policies and guidelines). Employees cannot be expected to go around opening up all sorts of unmarked binders, to see if by any chance they might contain the company’s harassment policy.
Because AGF in my view fails the first of the two required showings for the affirmative defense, it is not entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court indicated in Faragher and Ellerth that the two factors were independent criteria, both of which had to be satisfied. Thus, even if the majority is correct and the uncontested facts showed that Hill had some idea how to complain, I would regard the summary judgment as incorrect. In fact, however, the uncontested facts do not show that she knew what to do. Granted, she did not follow the procedures prescribed in the collection' of policies and memoranda on which AGF is now relying (undoubtedly because she did not know what they said). This failure on her part cannot be called unreasonable as a matter of law, since the measures the company took to bring the proper procedures to her attention are subject to dispute.
I concur in the majority’s rejection of Hill’s retaliation claim, which does not rest on the kinds of disputed facts that should allow her to proceed on the harassment claim. I would, however, reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand Hill’s harassment claim for further proceedings, and to that extent I respectfully dissent.