dissenting:
The majority opinion effectively eliminates the statute of limitations on sex discrimination cases. It does this in the face of a Supreme Court decision emphatically reinforcing the short statutory limitations period. Anger at how Fielder’s fellow employees allegedly treated her and at her being criticized for helping her mother onto the airplane cannot justify disregarding the law. The practical consequence of the majority opinion is to keep alive incidents of claimed sexual harassment permanently, with no statute of limitations at all.
The statute of limitations is “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”1 Fielder filed on May 9, 1995. The date 300 days before Fielder’s filing date is July 14, 1994. The statute thus requires us to see what sexual harassment (or employer discrimination for making a sexual harassment charge) occurred during that period. None did, because Fielder was not even there. Her last day of work was April 20, 1994, before the 300 day period even started. She did not work a single day during the 300 day period, so there was not even an opportunity for sexual harassment or employer retaliation to take place, let alone evidence that any did.
Judge Aldisert writes an emotionally stirring summáry of Fielder’s allegations about M.C.’s unwanted sexual invitations between mid-1992 and February 1993. Everything with M.C., all the unwelcome sexual conduct, stopped dead in February 1993. In February 1993, over two years before Fielder filed her charges in this case, Fielder complained to her supervisor, Mr. Bibler, and to the police, about M.C. Her supervisor, Mr. Bibler, immediately and firmly disciplined M.C. and changed M.C.’s assignment, so that he would not do anything like this again and would be separated from Fielder. Bibler counseled M.C. on appropriate behavior and placed him on “final notice.” United Airlines’ policy is verbal warning, then written warning, then final notice, then termination, but Bibler skipped over the first two steps of progressive discipline so that M.C. would be fired without further warning if he sexual*991ly harassed Fielder again. Fielder was asked in her deposition whether there was “anything that Mr. Bibler should have done at that meeting that he didn’t do?” and answered “No.” The district attorney’s office did not prosecute M.C. criminally, as Fielder had sought, but they had him sign a “diversion agreement” in lieu of prosecution for “telephonic harassment,” under which he had to avoid contact with Fielder for a year, pay a $100 fine, and continue mental health counseling. Fielder admits that M.C. never again made an unwelcome sexual overture or remark to her after Bibler’s discipline of M.C. She has many criticisms of M.C.’s and United’s subsequent conduct, e.g., she once saw M.C. in the airport returning a rental car when she was there, and he once “growled” as though angry when he saw her, and sometimes she called management to take him off her shift when they both bid for the same shift (they always removed him at her request). But she has absolutely no allegations that M.C.- ever again made any sexual remarks or overtures to her after she complained about them in February 1993.
The 300-day statute of limitations has been interpreted by the Supreme Court quite strictly. In Delaware State College v. Ricks,2 the Supreme Court held that the time ran from when the discriminatory act occurred, denial of tenure, not from the later date when the complainant’s job ended. The Court held that this is what the statute means when it says within the time period “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” “It is simply insufficient for Ricks to allege that his termination ‘gives present effect to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuates the consequences of forbidden discrimination.’ The emphasis is not upon the effects of earlier employment decisions; rather, it ‘is [upon] whether any present violation exists.’ ”3 “It should not be forgotten that time-limitations provisions themselves promote important interests; ‘the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.’ ”4 Ricks expressly rejected the proposition that the unlawful employment practice was a “continuing violation” so that the limitations period would not start until the job ended.5
Today’s majority strains to find something within the 300 days preceding filing, and comes up with two events: (1) not granting her a transfer; and (2) telling Fielder that it was not a good idea to board the plane with her mother. Fielder lost her case on summary judgment, not on a 12(b)(6) motion, so it is not enough that some good claim can be imagined on the basis of her complaint. She needs sufficient evidence so that a reasonable jury could find that these occurrences were sex discrimination or company retaliation for bringing a sexual harassment claim earlier.6 She lacks it.
Fielder has absolutely no evidence that United’s failure to grant her request for a transfer (the majority refers to “United’s refusal to transfer Fielder” but the record shows no refusal during the 300 days) was sex discrimination or retaliation for filing a sex discrimination complaint. Fielder was not at work at all, not for a single day, during the three hundred day period. United transferred another woman during the 300 days who had also complained about sexual harassment by M.C., so even if there had been a refusal to transfer, Fielder would lack evidence that the refusal to transfer her was retaliation for com*992plaining about M.C. The majority refers to the “brute fact that a person with less seniority received the transfer,” as though that meant something. It does not. What means something is that the transfer went to a woman who was going to work every day, not one who was gone with no assurance of return, and who had also made a sexual harassment complaint about M.C. Fielder submitted no evidence whatsoever to support her accusation that United’s failure to transfer her was somehow a discriminatory or retaliatory act.7
Nor did Fielder submit any evidence that United knew during the three hundred day period that she even wanted to be transferred. She testified in her deposition that about a year before the three hundred day period began, she had complained about the situation to a sexual harassment trainer who was visiting, and that “at that point, I had transfer requests in” which “were active.” She submitted no evidence whatsoever that she had any transfer request pending during the three hundred days. Indeed, her friend, the one who also complained of sexual harassment by M.C. and who got the transfer, testified at her deposition that Fielder’s talk about a transfer was “short-lived,” “she did not want to leave Medford,” and she said that “[t]hey are not going to force me out of my home.” Thus there is no evidence that Fielder wanted a transfer during the 300 *993days, and uncontradicted, plausible evidence that she did not want a transfer.8 The majority is simply making up facts, simply making them up, to concoct a reason to get around the statute of limitations, when it says that “United’s refusal to transfer Fielder” during the 300 days was one of “two overt acts” within the 300 days that would “trigger the operation of a continuing violation theory.” It is ridiculous to treat an employer as retaliating by refusing a transfer when the employee did not want the transfer and was no longer working, and the employee who got the transfer did exactly the same thing that the “refusal” was supposed to be “retaliation” for. This is result-oriented decision making at its worst. It is also a frightening harbinger for employers making hiring decisions.
The other supposed “overt act” is what the majority characterizes as “discipline” when Mr. Bibler “reprimanded Fielder in public in retaliation for making complaints against M.C.” Again, the majority opinion needs correction from the record. The record shows that it was not “public,” not a “reprimand,” and not employer “retaliation.” Fielder has no evidence from which a jury could decide that Fielder’s employer publicly reprimanded her in retaliation- for her sexual harassment complaint against M.C.
Though the majority suggests that Fielder’s supervisor dressed her down in public, both Fielder and the supervisor testified that he spoke to her alone in his office with the door shut: Where a supervisor talks to an employee in his office with the door shut, it is not “public.” It is as private as he can make it. Fielder says in her deposition that she thought it was possible that someone could overhear him if they were right outside his closed door, and that two employees were near his closed door, but she does not even allege that he raised his voice. This evidence does not establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mr. Bibler spoke to her publicly; it establishes without contradiction that he spoke to her privately.
Nor is there any evidence whatsoever that this conversation was, as the majority characterizes it, a “reprimand” by which Fielder was “disciplined.” Two people were there, Bibler and Fielder. Here is what Mr. Bibler, the supervisor, testified to about what he said:
Q Some time around September of ’94, do -you recall a situation where you had requested that Joanne come off of a plane and talk with you in your office?
A Yes, I do recall that.
Q Could you tell me how you came to know that she was even on the premises?
A Either two or three employees came into my office saying that Joanne [Fielder] was — I don’t recall the specific dates — but Joanne [Fielder] was seeing her mother off on a trip. I wanted her to realize how frustrating it is for them. Number one, they routinely do not go on airplanes. And number two, she hadn’t been to work for a number of weeks. They were just frustrated by that process.
Q Was one of those individuals Stan Reynolds?
*994A No.
Q Do you recall who they were?
A Liz, I believe was one. And I believe the other one was Anita Hat-ton. And if there is a third one, I can’t recall. Those are the two that I remember.
Q Did they come together or separately?
A I think they were together. There were two or three employees in my office at once. It was just a passing comment.
Q And what if anything did you do at that point?
A Joe [Rossi] was working at the time, and I said — you know, because of Joanne [Fielder] — I said, I know it’s very awkward, but if she has a moment or two, I’d really like to talk to her. And Joanne [Fielder] came to my office after her mother left, I believe. And I said, you know, I recognize your rights Joanne [Fielder], but, you know, it is a very sensitive issue in the office, and just be aware. And she got very defensive, and the conversation basically ended. I think it was probably only a minute or two long and she left the office very upset.
Q What is the practice when an employee of United Airlines has a relative who may be disabled or may need assistance? What is the practice with that?
A I didn’t know her mother was disabled. Is she? I don’t know.
Q Well, in general, say, for example.
A I don’t know of any employee in the office — it is not a practice to go on the airplane and talk to relatives, that I’m aware of. To say it’s never happened, I don’t know.
Q Is it a practice to assist relatives onto the plane, just assist?
A Not that I’m aware of.
Q And did Joanne [Fielder] ever admit to you that she had been just sitting there talking to her mother on the airplane? Did she tell you what she had been doing?
A Yes. She was talking to her mother is what she said, seeing her mother off.
Q Were your concerns more that other people were upset or that Joanne [Fielder] was violating some policy that you thought—
A My concern was more with the sensitivity of trying to get this employee group to work together and try and understand one another, as opposed to a violation. I’m sure other employees had probably done similar things, and so forth, but I was just concerned about the process.
Q Is there a policy against assisting?
A A policy? No. I would say that there is — there is certainly not a policy to do it. To say that it’s never been done or that it has been done, I can’t say. But it’s certainly not a policy to do it routinely.
Bibler further described the occurrence in his affidavit:
I did have a conversation with Joanne Fielder in my office, with the door closed, regarding her being at the airport to assist her mother on a flight while being off work on medical leave. While Joanne was on medical leave, she was allowed to bid her shift. Inasmuch as she was not at work, that shift was one employee short. Her presence at the airport caused concern to other employees in that she was able to come to the airport to assist her mother onto a flight, however, claimed not to be able to work. I discussed the need for sensitivity in regard to co-workers feelings in this matter with Joanne. She was not reprimanded for assisting her mother onto a flight.
This evidence establishes that Mr. Bibler acknowledged that Ms. Fielder was within her “rights” (“I recognize your rights”), but asked her to “be aware” that her going onto the plane was “a very sensi*995tive issue in the office.” Far from reprimanding her, he asked her to respect “the need for sensitivity in regard to co-workers feelings,” because they were working one person short on her shift while she was staying out on medical leave. She did not agree on “the need for sensitivity in regard to co-workers feelings,” which he conceded was within her “rights.”
Fielder’s testimony does not establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether she received a disciplinary reprimand in this conversation. Here is her deposition testimony:
Q Your complaint also alleges that you were disciplined for filing the criminal action against [M.C.]. How were you disciplined?
A I was pulled off of an airplane. I was told that my presence at the airport was causing upheaval among my coworkers, and that I showed poor judgment in coming out to the airport at all. Even though I never once approached the ticket counter to encounter my fellow employees. I proceeded directly to the gate, cleared my access to the aircraft with the gate agent, and then once, again, while wearing my badge at all times, cleared with the A flight attendant on board.
Since I was told by Mr. Bibler that my presence at the airport was causing such an upheaval, I have not stepped one foot in the Medford Jackson County Airport. I travel now out of Eugene, out of Portland, and out of Redding, whenever I want to go anyplace. I have been denied the right and privilege of flying out of Medford Airport by United Airlines.
Q When you say “denied,” this is based on your conversation with Mr. Bibler resulting from the day when you were assisting your mother?
A That is correct. And also the hostile environment that I know still exists at United Airlines against me, which I know that I would not be- — I do not feel that I could check baggage or check into a flight and board an aircraft free from sabotage, interference, derogatory comments, or other harm.
Q All right. The comments Mr. Bibler made to you on that day, where were you at the time he spoke with you?
A In his office.
Q Was there anybody else in the office?
A No.
Q Was the door open or closed?
A Closed, I believe. I’m sure it was.
Q Because your complaint alleges that you were publicly reprimanded and harassed for assisting your disabled mother onto the airline.
A Well, Stan and Ron and Anita Hat-ton had gone to Ted. They all saw me go in there to talk to Ted. The walls are thin. When I came out, Ron and Dave, I believe were standing within two or three feet of the door. You can hear through the door.
Q So even though you were in an office with a closed door, you feel you were publicly reprimanded and harassed?
A Yes, because I was publicly pulled off of that airplane in front of other passengers, whom I knew. And in front of my mother, who was very upset by that incident. That was very embarrassing. And in front of the flight attendant that I had gained access from. Yes.
Q And Mr. Rossi is the one who came and spoke to you?
A He came and told me that Ted wanted to see me in his office. That I was to leave the airplane. That I was causing — that there was some trouble with my coworkers with me being on the airplane.
Q Mr. Rossi made all of those statements while he was on the airplane?
*996A That’s correct. In front of my mother and the other passengers.
The Mr. Rossi that Fielder refers to is not the supervisor who allegedly reprimanded her; he was her former coworker whom she was dating and living with at the time of the incident. Bibler is the supervisor whom she claims reprimanded her in public.
The difference between Fielder’s account and Bibler’s is tone, not substance. Her own testimony about what Bibler said (as opposed to what she felt) was that he said her presence “was causing upheaval” and “showed poor judgment.” There is no genuine issue of fact. She does not deny that he acknowledged her “rights” to do just what she did. Nor does she testify that he characterized what he said as a disciplinary reprimand. All she claims he did was tell her that the other workers were unhappy about her showing up, while they were a hand short and she was on sick leave, to escort her mother onto a plane. This evidence does not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Fielder suffered an adverse employment action, consisting of a public disciplinary reprimand, within the 300 days.9 Yet that is required to make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the statute.10 The record establishes the absence of a genuine issue of fact, and consistent evidence that she was spoken to privately about offending other worker’s feelings, while acknowledging her rights.11
Finally, the majority can point to no evidence at all that this private discussion about sensitivity to others’ feelings was retaliation by the company for Fielder’s sexual harassment complaint. Instead, the majority rests on sheer implausible speculation: “It is unlikely that they objected only to the act of escorting her mother” so “[i]t is an issue of material fact whether” the employees who complained “were retaliating for her protected activity.”
Actually, there is no evidence whatsoever that the employees who went to Bibler’s office to complain, “Liz,” “Anita Hatton,” and possibly a third, were trying to cause trouble for Fielder because she had accused M.C. of sexual harassment, nor would it matter if they were. The record is uncontradicted that the other workers were upset because Fielder was out on what was supposed to be some sort of medical leave, her shift was a person short because she was holding onto her slot despite being out on medical leave, and the employees resented her showing up and taking advantage of an employee’s privilege when she was not showing up to help them do the work. There is nothing at all “unlikely” about that. People who work *997hard commonly resent it if they feel that a fellow employee is not pulling her share of the load.
Fielder did not put any deposition testimony in the record from the people who went to 'Bibler about why they went to Bibler; thus, she established no genuine issue of fact as to anyone’s retaliatory motivation. Bibler said in his affidavit that even though Fielder was on medical leave, she was allowed to hold onto her shift, so “that shift was one employee short.” He said in his affidavit that the other employees’ concern was “that she was able to come to the airport to assist her mother onto a flight,” while at the same time she “claimed not to be able to work.” Thus, there is not even a genuine issue of fact about whether the other employees’ complaints to Fielder’s supervisor were an attempt to retaliate for her sexual harassment complaint.
Our cases make it clear that what Fielder offers is not enough to raise a material issue of fact. When an employer has offered legitimate business reasons for its actions, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present evidence of pretext that is “ ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of sex.”12 Our case law shows that “substantial” means quite a bit. In Nesbit v. PepsiCo, Inc.,13 we held that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on his age discrimination claim even though a supervisor had commented that “we don’t necessarily like grey hair” and the company president had said that “we don’t want unpromotable fifty-year olds around.”14 Likewise, in Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp.,15 we held that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on a retaliation claim despite a showing that the District Supervisor had said he “intended to get rid of all the ‘old timers’ because they would not ‘kiss my ass.’ ” 16 If the plaintiffs in Nidds and Nesbit, with significant evidence of discriminatory intent, cannot survive summary judgment, then it follows a fortiori that Fielder, who offers far less, cannot either.
So where does the majority get its genuine issue of fact? From imagined facts combined with two errors of law, with likely pernicious consequences for the law and for employers and workers. The majority supposes that (1) some coworkers thought Fielder was cruel and unfair in what she did to M.C.; (2) some coworkers expressed their feelings in spiteful interactions (all long before the 300 day period) with Fielder after she caused management to give M.C. a (genuine) disciplinary reprimand, a “final warning,” and removed him from Fielder’s shift; (3) a jury could conclude that the employees who went to Bibler when Fielder boarded the plane with her mother, “Liz” and “Anita Hatton,” did so to retaliate for Fielder’s having made a sexual harassment complaint; (4) a jury could conclude that Bibler’s supposed public reprimand was retaliation for making a sexual harassment complaint.
The retaliation statute says that it is an unlawful employment practice for “an employer” to discriminate against an employee because the employee has made a discrimination charge. There is absolutely no evidence, none whatsoever, that Bibler’s motivation in talking to Fielder about her showing up to put her mother on the plane was to discriminate against Fielder for filing sexual harassment charges against M.C. He had taken unsparing action against M.C. at the time, and it worked. Another employee who also made a sexual harassment complaint against M.C. obtained the transfer that Fielder now claims *998she should have received. The uncontra-dicted evidence is that Bibler spoke to Fielder because the two women who came into his office were upset that they were a person short because of Fielder’s claimed disability, for which she was getting sick leave and workers’ compensation, yet she was well enough to come to the airport and put someone on the plane. Fielder presented no evidence that Bibler, her supervisor, ever did any of the nasty things she accuses her coworkers of.
So, in the absence of any evidence that Bibler was retaliating against Fielder for her having charged M.C. with sexual harassment, how does the majority convert their conversation into a discriminatory labor practice? It creates a new rule, “[s]o long as the conduct has the capacity of being considered retaliatory, it becomes an issue for the fact finder.”17 That conflicts with the controlling rule in cases like this one that requires “specific” and “substantial” evidence.18 If the majority’s rule were the rule, Nidds and Nesbit would have gone the other way. The majority compounds this legal error with the theory that maybe Fielder’s coworkers would not have spoken to Bibler but for their remaining hostility to her. It is the coworkers whom the majority thinks a jury could find were retaliating.
The law does not provide for a remedy against the company for coworkers’ negative sentiments. It does where the coworkers retaliate, management knows about it, and management does nothing. Had Fielder claimed and produced evidence to show that, within the 300 day period, coworkers had done such things as not providing ordinary mutual assistance with heavy loads, that she complained to management, and that management had allowed the retaliation to go on, then she would have a case that could go to a jury. That is what a coworker retaliation claim is about. But Fielder presents no such claim or evidence.
Fielder’s claim, which the majority seems to accept, is that there was a “continuing violation” under Draper v. Coeur Rochester Inc.19 because it was a fair inference that some coworkers still did not like her and M.C. had not been fired. Perhaps they did not, but that is not enough. The “continuing violation” doctrine is sharply limited by Ricks. There the Supreme Court held that there was no continuing violation, even though the complainant was still on the job within the limitations period, and even though his employer could have changed its position and kept him instead of terminating him at the end of his terminal contract. Fielder’s argument, that the discrimination continues even when she is not there because the “passive hostile conditions created by [M.C.’s] looming and unrestricted presence ... continued,”20 cannot be reconciled with Ricks. The majority relies on Draper, but it has no bearing on this case. In Draper, we held that the plaintiff could sue for a continuing violation because she had presented sufficient evidence that the harassing conduct continued until the date of discharge, which fell within the limitations period.21 Here the harassment did not continue into the limitation period; it stopped long before the 300 day limitations period started, and Fielder did not work at any point during the limitations period.
The majority also relies on Draper to find a constructive discharge. Again, it has no bearing on this case. In Draper, the plaintiff complained twice to management about her supervisor’s sexual harassment, but it did not stop, so she felt forced to quit; we held that she could sue for constructive discharge where the construc*999tive discharge occurred in the 300 day limitations period. Fielder established no genuine issue of fact on her constructive discharge complaint, because M.C.’s harassment that she said made her job intolerable had stopped long before the 300 day period. So had the coworkers’ alleged retaliatory acts that she claimed made the workplace intolerable, because she did not work there at all during the 300 day period. She did not resign while working with the allegedly retaliating coworkers. She resigned when her workers’ compensation disability pay and her medical pay ran out, and continued to hold her slot on her shift until then. Yet nothing during that period could establish the requirements for constructive discharge, because she was not at work or subject to any working conditions that were so intolerable that she was forced to quit.
Our decisions on constructive discharge emphasize that the decision to leave work must occur while the intolerable working conditions exist. In Montero v. Agco Corp., 22 we held that an employee could not bring a claim for constructive discharge when she had left work four months after the harassing behavior had ceased. Likewise, in Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 23 we held that an employee could not bring a claim for constructive discharge when the employer had fired the alleged harasser two and one-half months prior to her resignation. “[I]n order to constitute constructive discharge, harassment must be intolerable ‘at the time of the employee’s resignation.’ ” 24
Fielder formally resigned on May 10, 1995, after she had been away from the alleged hostile work environment for over a year. Her last day of work was April 20, 1994, and her last physical presence at the airport was when she boarded the plane with her mother, the previous September, eight months before. On May 10, 1995, she was not subject to “intolerable conditions” at her workplace. She was not subject to any conditions at her workplace, because she was not even there. Fielder, unlike the plaintiff in Draper, could not have decided when she quit that “she can’t take it anymore.” She had not been “taking it” for over a year. Fielder cannot reinstate her right to sue for constructive discharge by an official resignation more than a year after she had left work because of the alleged intolerable working conditions. The decision to leave work must coincide with the intolerable working conditions.
As a practical matter, a sexual harassment complaint is likely to generate some ill feeling from the coworker accused of it and others who think the complaint was ill founded. The short statute of limitations Congress imposed advances the important purpose of labor peace. So long as a sexual harassment complaint is pending, the individuals in the workplace are likely to be talking about it at work, avoiding coworkers whom they think are “on the other side,” stirring their side up with long, intense, night-time phone calls, worrying about the litigation, and building files to advance their positions. Promotion of labor peace motivates much of National Labor Relations Act jurisprudence.25 Likewise getting discrimination cases done with promotes labor peace. Effectively repealing the statute of limitations, as the majority does in this factually and legally strained decision, will cause cases to fester and generate friction in the workplace for years, because the claim is never barred. Any contact between the employee and the workplace, even after she has quit working there, establishes a genuine issue of fact for a retaliation claim on the basis that the *1000coworkers probably still do not like her, under today’s decision. The majority’s decision is contrary to the statute, and contrary to the Supreme Court’s construction of the statute in Delaware State College v. Ricks.26
The majority’s decision creates the risk of tremendous unfairness to employers. An employer can be held liable for long past unlawful conduct that it had absolutely nothing to do with. The 300 days does not run so long as some employees may have bad feelings about the complainant under today’s “continuing violation” theory.
The majority’s strained decision also imposes extraordinary, and possibly unconstitutional, burdens on workers at a company accused of sexual harassment. Today’s decision treats their unfriendliness toward a complainant as retaliation (all the refusal to assist, etc., was long before the 300 days). The majority points to such things as their not wanting the complainant to sit with them in the coffee shop during a break. The only thing management can do to protect itself from the law as so construed is to require the employees to socialize equally with a sexual harassment complainant, regardless of how they feel, and not to say how they feel. Government enforcement agencies will compel management to do that, under today’s decision.
The First Amendment entitles people to be free to say what they think about a complainant and to associate with whom they like. Certainly the government can require their employers to prohibit retaliation in the course of workplace duties, such as helping with heavy loads, or refusing to talk to her when the job requires communication. But when they are not performing workplace duties, employees’ free speech and associations! rights cannot constitutionally be sacrificed by government compulsion to serve the goal of preventing retaliation.27 The government is not entitled to make people act as though they like each other.
A hypothetical case illustrates why not. Suppose a racist complainant falsely charged a black man with sexual harassment, and told her coworkers that she had filed the false charges to get him out of there because of his race. In any decent workplace, her coworkers would tell her what a terrible person they thought she was, refuse to sit with her at lunch or invite her to social events, and shun her except where work required contact. The statute says that “the employer” cannot retaliate against her “because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing,”28 but nowhere does it say that the other employees have to pretend they still like her, lie about their feelings, and continue to socialize with her as though she had not done the evil act. Nor could it under the Constitution. Yet under today’s opinion, civil rights enforcement agencies will compel private employers to require that coworkers treat the hypothetical complainant with as much social warmth as they treat other coworkers.
Elimination of the statute of limitations is also another heavy weight piled onto people who want to get jobs. Until the companies are very sure that prospective employees are not dangerous to them, they are likely to avoid hiring them. Employers have done that in the past few years by hiring people as “temps,” and treating them as employees of temporary employment agencies, or hiring them for purportedly temporary jobs that end automatically, but are really long probation periods. By increasing the litigation risk to employers today, we further discourage companies from making offers of genuine, full, secure employment. Our decision today *1001-1003teaches practical employers to hire temps or contract the work out.
By inventing facts, and inventing law, we have done considerable harm. I dissent.
. Delaware State College v. Rides, 449 TJ.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1981).
. Id. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 498.
. Id. at 259-60, 101 S.Ct. 498.
. Id. at 257, 101 S.Ct. 498.
.See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Cline v. Industrial Maintenance Engineering & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Anderson ).
. Judge Fletcher argues that the transfer of Fielder’s friend, Johnson, over Fielder supports a claim for retaliation because "Johnson's ... 'complaints’ [of harassment] were intended to support Fielder’s case, not to press her own.” The record does not support this claimed distinction, even if it would make a difference, which is doubtful. Here is Johnson's deposition testimony:
Q Did [M.C.] ever touch you in a way that made you feel uncomfortable?
A Yes.
Q Would you describe that please?
A There were several occasions when I would be sitting at the desk, and he would come up behind me to rub my neck, and then move his hands down the front of my chest.
Q Did you describe this to Ted Bibler?
A Yes, I think I did.
Q Do you remember when you told Ted Bibler about this?
A No, I don't have a date. I know it was after this had gone pretty far, and it actually looked like nothing was being done. It seemed like everything was being swept under the rug. And I wanted to make sure that Ted did not think that Joanne [Fielder] was just making it up.
This testimony establishes that Johnson complained to get something "done” about M.C.’s harassment of the two of them, and complained specifically about M.C.’s improper conduct toward herself. Bibler’s response to Johnson’s complaint shows that United regarded her complaints as personal in nature. Johnson testified that "His [Bibler's] reaction was: Has he done anything to you recently? And I said, not recently. And he said, I want to know if he does anylhing to you ever again."
Judge Fletcher also argues that Johnson, unlike Fielder, did not "push[ ] the issue,” so that "a reasonable jury could conclude that United transferred Johnson rather than Fielder because Fielder had complained vigorously and vociferously about sexual harassment while Johnson had not.” But Johnson says she complained about M.C. because "it actually looked like nothing was being done” and "[i]t seemed like everything was being swept under the rug.” That is "pushing the issue.” She complained about M.C.’s misconduct directed at herself, and the misconduct toward her stopped. In this regard, she was similarly situated to Fielder, who also did not experience any further harassment from M.C. after she complained and he was disciplined. Nor was this Johnson’s first complaint about her male co-workers. She, like Fielder, had complained previously to Bibler about male coworkers “sabatoging” female coworkers by forcing them to lift heavy bags off the belt. Johnson, like Fielder, made multiple complaints about the behavior of her male coworkers toward her. Thus, Johnson’s success in getting , the transfer is highly probative of the absence of any retaliatory reason for not transferring Fielder, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
United had a legitimate business reason for transferring Johnson, but not Fielder. Johnson got the transfer because she was working every day during the relevant time period. Fielder was on sick leave with no guarantee of ever returning, and it was not clear that Fielder’s old transfer request was still pending. Fielder bears the burden of presenting specific and substantial evidence that this reason was pretextual, and has no such evidence.
. Judge Fletcher's concurring opinion argues that we must treat the transfer requests as being active during the limitations period because of our obligation to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. But such an inference is not reasonable in light of Johnson’s uncontradicted testimony that Fielder's interest in the transfer was "short-lived.'' Our duty to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party does not permit us to draw an inference in the face of undisputed evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (noting that inference drawn must be reasonable in light of competing inferences); In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.1999); Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvert Cty, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir.1995). Once Fielder developed the feeling that "they are not going to force me out of my home” by transferring her, the only reasonable inference is that her transfer request was dead.
.See Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 875 (holding that a supervisor's "scolding ... and threatening to transfer or to dismiss” are not adverse employment actions and explaining that "[m]ere threats and harsh words are insufficient”). See also Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that a supervisor's criticism and threat that the complainant would be "fifed, for any subsequent exercise of poor judgment " was not enough for an adverse employment action (emphasis added)); Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools, 164 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that a supervisor’s oral threats and “ageist” remarks "did not rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action”); Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that an employee had not suffered an adverse employment action when "she was unfairly reprimanded for conduct she either did not engage in or should not have been responsible for”); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3rd Cir.1997) (holding that " 'unsubstantiated oral reprimands’ and ‘unnecessary derogatory comments' " following a sexual harassment complaint did not “rise to the level of the 'adverse employment action' required for a retaliation claim”); Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that “an employer's criticism of an employee, without more,” is not an adverse employment action).
. See, e.g., Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir.1997); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1987).
. I must disagree with Judge Fletcher’s observation that “Fielder and United tell dramatically different versions of that episode.” The difference is in what Fielder claims to have felt, not in what was said.
. Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 546 (9th Cir.1998).
. Nesbit v. PepsiCo, Inc., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1993).
. Id. at 705.
. Nidds v.. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912 (9th Cir.1996).
. Id. at 915, 920.
. A Slip Opinion at 986.
. See, e.g., Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 546 (9th Cir.1998); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir.1994).
. Draper v. Coeur Rochester Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.1998).
. A Plaintiff's Brief at 23.
.Draper, 147 F.3d at 1109.
. Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir.1999).
. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir.1994).
. Id. (quoting Brady v. Elixir Industries, 242 Cal.Rptr. 324, 328, 196 Cal.App.3d 1299 (Ct.App.1987) (emphasis in original)).
. See Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785, 116 S.Ct. 1754, 135 L.Ed.2d 64 (1996).
. Delaware Slate College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980).
. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082, 1092-93 (9th Cir.2000).
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).