dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The less than overwhelming evidence of Werts’ guilt, combined with persistent prosecutorial misconduct, coalesced to deny Werts the fundamental fairness that the Constitution guarantees. One can not read the transcript of Werts’ trial without having grave misgivings about the integrity of the verdict. Accordingly, I think that it is clear that the district court erred in denying Werts’ petition for habeas relief. In fact, the district court did not even consider Werts’ most meritorious claim.
I.
I agree with my colleagues’ discussion of the standard of deference which must be afforded under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). However, as the majority notes, the state courts did not adjudicate Werts’ due process claim on its merits. Therefore, the deference we would normally afford a prior state adjudication on ha-beas review is, to a great extent, not implicated here. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), and Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 73, 145 L.Ed.2d 62 (1999). Moreover, to the extent that the state courts decided Werts’ claim on collateral or direct review and ruled against him, I think it is clear that the state court adjudication is both “contrary to [and] an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, ... as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Although, as the majority correctly notes, the Supreme Court has cautioned that we must review state court judgments with “utmost care,” Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1511, the Court has also emphasized that we are not to afford erroneous state court rulings such deference that we abandon our constitutional obligation to ensure the fundamental fairness of verdicts obtained in criminal proceedings.
In sum, [AEDPA] directs federal courts to attend to every state-court judgment with utmost care, but it does not require *207them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge on the content of federal law. If, after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state court’s judgment, a federal court is convinced that a prisoner’s custody ... violates the Constitution, that independent judgment should prevail.
Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1511.
A careful review of the entire record in this case, as is required by Werts’ due process claim, Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1239 (3d Cir.1992), clearly establishes that the prosecutor’s unjustified and unethical conduct so seriously undermined the fairness of Werts’ trial as to have resulted in a denial of due process.
“[E]rrors that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication certainly justify the issuance of the federal writ.” Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1503. Quite frankly, after reviewing the entire record here I simply do not understand how one can objectively have confidence in this jury’s verdict. Given what happened during the course of this trial, it is a miscarriage of justice to let this verdict stand.
II.
“A MARKED MAN COMMENT”
During his closing the prosecutor argued:
Now, if Tyrone Moore had indicated he was going to testify against him and sent back to the Detention Center with these other individuals, he would be sent back as a marked man. We do not want to have Tyrone Moore wind up hanging from the top of a cell. So we let him sign his own bail so he could leave ...1
App. at 144.
As the majority notes, Werts argued on direct appeal that the prosecutor’s “marked man” comment denied him the due process of law. That due process claim was not addressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court simply stated in a footnote that the trial court did not err “in not declaring a mistrial on the grounds the prosecutor made an allegedly prejudicial remark during his summation.... ” Commonwealth v. Werts, 483 Pa. 222, 226, n. 2, 395 A.2d 1316, (1978). It is apparent from the brief that Werts submitted to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the remark the Court was referring to was the prosecutor’s “marked man” comment. The PCRA court could not address this claim of error because it had been raised on direct appeal. See, 19 P.S. § 1180-4(a)(3) (1966).2 Accordingly, as my colleagues conclude, Werts properly exhausted his contention that the remark denied him due process, and we may review the merits of that portion of his due process claim.
As the majority also correctly notes,, “in evaluating whether the remarks of the prosecutor rise to the level of a constitutional violation, we are required to examine those remarks in the context of the whole trial.” Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1239 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)). However, after correctly stating the test, my colleagues apply the technical restrictions of exhaustion in such a way as to undermine the due process analysis re*208quired by the test they purport to apply. The “context of the whole trial” is lost. Accordingly, it is imperative to examine the record of the trial in some detail.
The trial court concluded that these remarks were motivated in part by conduct and statements of defense counsel in his closing statement to the jury, and the majority agrees. The majority’s attempt to sustain a transgression that it concedes “overstepped [the] bounds,” Maj. Op. at 200, is based in part upon the majority’s conclusion that “[t]his single wayward statement amounts to an ordinary trial error, which is insufficient to constitute a denial of due process.” My colleagues emphasize that, “[t]he prosecutor never stated that Werts threatened Moore or that Werts would have Moore killed if he was sent back to the detention center.” Id. at 200. Indeed, I agree that the prosecutor did not specifically argue that Werts threatened Moore, or that Werts would have Moore killed if Moore was sent back to the Detention Center. However, the prosecutor didn’t have to. Subtle suggestion can speak just as loudly as the kind of precise utterance that the majority seems to require as a condition precedent to a denial of due process. The prosecutor skillfully placed the dots upon the page and allowed the imagination of the jurors to connect them. Moreover, as I will discuss, this remark can not be dismissed as a “single wayward statement” without rewriting this transcript and ignoring the fabric of this entire trial. The single statement was but one of the many threads that comprise that fabric.
The majority also notes that “[w]hile the trial court made clear that it did not condone the remarks of the prosecutor, it nonetheless found that those remarks were motivated, at least in part, by the conduct and statements of defense counsel in his closing statement to the jury.” Maj. Op. at 198. But what is the “opening salvo” that my colleagues find so offensive as to justify the prosecutor’s misconduct? The majority suggests that it is the following portion of defense counsel’s closing:
Now, later on that day he [Moore] was supposed to have given a second statement, and we submit it was kind of difficult to get out of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, Mr. Moore and also Detective Dougherty, as to what occurred in the second statement because at [sic] the second statement is some hours later and we submit perhaps after Mr. Moore had time to recollect or somebody had said something to him or whatever, he said [in the second statement] the man who was seated on the passenger’s side of the car was James Johnson, and he picked out his photograph.
Now, we submit though when Mr. Moore took the stand because of what had been said at the time he entered the plea, because of the fact he knew why he was out, his bail had been changed so he could get out without putting out money, a Federal Detainer had been lifted, he knew he, he testified, he had to say something against the man who is seated here (indicating the defendant), who he described as the defendant ... Mr. Moore knew he had to testify in a manner to frame Mr. Werts in [sic] even though we submit he probably did not know who was seated in that car in view of the amount of liquor he had consumed that day, and the fact that he said that the people who were in the car he had never seen before in his life....
Maj. Op. at 198-99, n. 16.
I see nothing improper about that argument, and I do not understand how it could possibly invite or license the prosecutor’s unethical conduct. There was some discussion during Moore’s testimony about whether he had given a second statement wherein he purportedly identified someone other than Werts as the person in the front passenger seat of the car. This was, of course, before Werts testified and conceded that he was in the car. It *209was clearly appropriate for defense counsel to question Moore about his prior identification of someone other than Werts. Defense counsel said nothing in his closing that opened the door to the prosecutor’s unsupported insinuation that Moore would be harmed if he remained housed in the Detention Center after agreeing to testify against Werts.
Defense counsel did nothing more than argue that Moore was living up- to his end of his bargain with the prosecution, and that his deal included getting released from custody. Moreover, given the risk of flight that is obviously present whenever a murder suspect is released from custody, common sense suggests (and experience confirms) that the prosecution could simply arrange to have Moore housed separately from any of the defendants in this case if it was merely trying to protect him. It was not necessary to arrange his release to the street and allow him to return to the same neighborhood where the conspirators presumably had friends. However, we do not need to speculate about the commonwealth’s reasons for arranging Moore’s release, even though the prosecution’s insinuation certainly invited the jurors to speculate.
Despite the majority’s concern with defense counsel’s argument that Moore’s deal included getting out of jail, the record establishes that that was part of the deal. Yet, rather than concede that the government’s deal with Moore included lifting his detainer, the prosecutor attempted to explain Moore’s release by arguing that it was a necessary precaution because his testimony against Werts placed him in danger. A closer examination of the record illustrates just how unfounded the majority’s use of the “invited response” doctrine is. The following exchange occurred during the trial in the presence of the jury:
MR. MARGOLIN: At this time, the Commonwealth calls Atlee Tyrone Moore.
As required by rules of court, Mr. Moore is here represented by counsel, Mr. Jack Myers. Furthermore, I would make known at this time that Mr. Moore, on October 24, 1975 before your honor, entered a plea of guilty to murder generally and conspiracy.
In return for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed that it would recommend serious consideration for leniency if he testified against the codefendants.
N.T. 11/26/75 at 39.
During cross examination, defense counsel questioned Moore about the government’s efforts to reduce his bail and have his detainer lifted so that he could be released. Id. at 79-80. A side bar conference occurred to explain some of the confusion about the amount of Moore’s bail. During that conference the prosecutor stated:
“the only thing, he had a federal detain-er on him for a charge in Federal court. I do not know what the charge was. I do not know what he was convicted of. All I know, he had a detainer in Federal court and we got the detainer lifted.”
MR. CHAPPELLE: when did you get the detainer lifted?
MR. MARGOLIN: Before he signed his own bail to get him out.
Id. at 82.
On October 23, 1975, Moore changed his plea and entered a guilty plea to charges related to this robbery/homicide. He walked out of the Detention Center the next day. Following the aforementioned side bar conference, defense counsel used a portion of the transcript of Moore’s change of plea colloquy to cross examine him in an attempt to establish bias. That testimony was as follows:
Q: now has anyone made any promises or any agreement in return for your entering a guilty plea, and if so, I want you to tell me.
MR. MARGOLIN: for the record, ... there is an understanding between the defense and the Commonwealth in this case, and I will make that statement for *210the record and in return for the defendant’s pleading guilty, number 1, and number 2, truthfully testifying against the codefendants, four of them in this case, the Commonwealth will at the sentencing proceeding as to this defendant recommend leniency in your Honor’s sentencing....
Secondly, we will recommend that the defendant be permitted to sign his own bail at this time so that he may be released from custody.
N.T. 11/26/75 at 95-6 (emphasis added). The detainer had to be lifted before Moore could “be released from custody” and the Commonwealth caused that to happen. Pure and simple; his release was part of the quid pro quo. It was not a cautionary measure to protect him from retribution.
Moreover, and what is far more important, it is clear that Moore understood that the detainer was lifted in return for his cooperation. Moore testified that he had been incarcerated from May 7, 1975 to October 24, 1975 but that he was able to walk out of prison one day after changing his plea. He understood that the Commonwealth was offering his release, as well as a recommendation of leniency, in return for his testimony. Id. at 93, 98. Moore responded as follows when questioned about his release:
Q: someone had taken steps to have the detainer lifted; is that correct?
A: as far as I know.
Q: in your investigations with the district attorney’s office, was there any talk about the detainer being lifted?
A: yes.
Q: was it part of the agreement with the DA’s office that the detainer be lifted?
A: yes.
Q: along with recommending to the judge that you be able to sign your own bail; is that correct?
A: yes....
Q: That was in return for your plea in this case and also for you to testify in this case against other young men; is that correct?
A: yes.
Id. at 93-94 (emphasis added).
Thus, if there was any truth whatsoever to the suggestion that Moore was a “marked man” who may end up hanging from his cell because he testified against Werts, the prosecutor had every opportunity to explore that during Moore’s testimony in response to defense counsel’s suggestion of bias based upon the plea agreement. The prosecutor did not attempt to elicit any information from Mr. Moore to justify lifting the detainer other than Moore’s testimony that it was done in return for his cooperation. In retrospect, the prosecutor’s omission was a wise one. Rather than pose questions to Moore that may simply have reinforced what Moore was promised, the prosecutor was able to use suggestive sleight of hand to get the jury thinking that Moore was released for his own safety. The prosecutor did not have to worry about what Moore might say if asked anything further about the detainer being lifted, and he could use the suggestive image of Werts’ retaliation, instead of evidence, to portray Werts as a killer. The prosecutor’s decision is now vindicated. We today join the state courts in rationalizing away the prosecutor’s totally unjustified and prejudicial remarks by ruling that they were somehow “invited.” That untenable conclusion can only be reached by an unreasonable application of both state and federal law that is entirely inconsistent with this record.
Clearly, had defense counsel not cross-examined Moore about the plea agreement, counsel would have been rendering ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Baston, 242 Pa.Super. 98, 363 A.2d 1178 (1976) (defense counsel ineffective for failing to cross-examine prosecution witness about agreement with prosecution for favorable treatment); Commonwealth v. *211Wilson, 422 Pa.Super. 489, 619 A.2d 1063 (1992) (reversible error for trial court to not allow cross-examination of government’s witness as to witness’ expectation of favorable treatment in return for testimony). In concluding that the prosecutor’s remarks did not deny Werts due process in the context of this trial we place defense counsel on the horns of a Kafkaesque dilemma. Had counsel not explored the possible bias here, his stewardship would have fallen short of that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. However, having made an appropriate (indeed required) inquiry into the circumstances of Moore’s release, the majority concludes that defense counsel invited the prosecutor’s highly improper and prejudicial “reply.”
The fallacy in this reasoning is all the greater, and the prosecutor’s conduct all the more egregious, because the prosecutor here could have rebutted the argument of bias by simply omitting the “marked man” comment and emphasizing the timing of Moore’s cooperation. In his closing, the prosecutor did argue that Moore voluntarily cooperated with police from the very start, before any promise of leniency. He did not have to go further and project the shadow of Moore dangling from the ceiling of his cell in order to meet the argument of bias.
The majority rests its denial of this component of Werts’ due process claim in large part upon United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). However, the circumstances in Young differ dramatically from the circumstances of Werts’ trial. In Young, the Supreme Court concluded that any harm caused by the prosecutor’s remark “was mitigated by the jury’s understanding that the prosecutor was countering defense counsel’s repeated attacks...” 470 U.S. at 17, 105 S.Ct. 1038. Defense counsel there argued in his closing that not even the prosecutor believed his client was guilty. In response, the prosecutor shared his personal belief about the defendant’s guilt, and told the jurors that he (the prosecutor) thought that defense counsel and the defendant were really hoping for a conviction on a lesser charge. In reviewing this tit for tat, the Supreme Court reasoned that a prosecutor should be given more leeway when a response is “invited” by defense counsel’s remark and goes no further than is necessary to “right the scale.” Id. at 12-13, 105 S.Ct. 1038. As noted above, the prosecutor’s remark here did not “right the scale;” it kicked the scale over.
Secondly, the prosecutor’s transgression in Young did not suggest that the government’s prosecution was based upon any information that was outside of the record. It was merely an exchange of personal beliefs; one triggered by the tendering of the other. That is not so here. The prosecutor’s “marked man” remark did suggest evidence outside of the record. It suggested that Moore had received threats and that something more than was disclosed to the jury caused the government to have Moore’s bail lowered and his detainer lifted. This does not require any conjecture on our part. It is exactly what the prosecutor told the jurors. Even though the jurors were cautioned that the attorneys’ arguments do not constitute evidence, it is hard to imagine how the smell could be ignored once the prosecutor deftly tossed that skunk into the jury box.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court in Young noted that the defendant’s guilt was established by “substantial and virtually uncontradicted evidence” of his criminal intent, and intent was the only real issue. The Court stated, “the prosecutor’s remarks, when viewed in context, [could not] be said to undermine the fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 20, 105 S.Ct. 1038. That is certainly not the case here. The evidence of Werts’ guilt was neither “substantial” nor “virtually uncon-tradicted.” The majority partially concedes as much. My colleagues state: “we further find that while not overwhelming, the state trial record contains ample evi*212dence of Werts’ guilt, which further mitigates the possibility that the jury was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper comment.” Maj. Op. at 200. The majority states that this “ample evidence” is comprised of “Werts’ confession and trial testimony, as well as the testimony of Moore, a co-defendant, and several other witnesses,” and then attempts to summarize the additional “ample evidence.” Maj. Op. at 200-01.
The majority greatly overstates the quality and quantity of the evidence here. The only evidence of the defendant’s guilt comes from Moore’s courtroom testimony, the defendant’s confession (which he insists was coerced by Detective McMillan), and the denials of Detective McMillan. Although such evidence seems, at first blush “ample,” examination of the totality of the circumstances here makes it far less impressive. I will say more about the circumstances of Werts’ statement below. For now, in order to better assess the quality of the evidence against Werts I will set forth a summary of the testimony of each of the witnesses.
A. DETECTIVE DOUGHERTY
The prosecution first called Detective Dougherty. Dougherty is a homicide detective who initially testified generally, giving a description of the crime scene and an explanation about his processing of it. N.T. 11/26/75 at 35. He was subsequently recalled by the prosecution to detail the circumstances surrounding the taking of Werts’ statement and to explain the chronology which the homicide detectives keep when interviewing and questioning a suspect. N.T. 11/28/75 at 133-4. He also testified that he gave Werts his Miranda warnings, and he testified about the circumstances of those warnings. He answered some questions about his interrogation of Moore, identified Moore’s statement, and was asked about Moore’s identification of someone other than Werts. N.T. 12/1/75 at 39-40.
As my colleagues note, Detective Dougherty also testified about the fresh “brush burns” that he observed on Werts upon the latter’s arrival at the police station. My colleagues conclude that a jury could find that those injuries “were consistent with what you would expect to see when a shirtless individual is pulled through a two-foot by two-foot opening, ... as opposed to injuries sustained in a beating.” Maj. Op. at 201. Dougherty also testified that Werts appeared normal, “did not complain to him of any physical ailments, and refused medical treatment when asked if he wanted it.” Id. However, Werts admitted that he had hid in a two-foot crawl space when the police came for him (though he stated he came out under his own power once police grabbed him by the arm). N.T. 12/1/75 at 152-3. Werts testified that he did ask Dougherty for medical treatment upon arriving at police headquarters, but that Dougherty refused to get him treatment because Werts wouldn’t sign a statement that had been prepared. Id. at 160-2.
I will separately discuss below the issues that arise from the prosecutor’s subsequent vouching for the police testimony. That vouching takes on added significance because of the discrepancies between Werts’ testimony about the circumstances of his arrest and interrogation, and the homicide detectives denials of coercion and abuse. For now I will simply note that if the jury doubted the veracity of the police officer’s denials there was precious little to convict Werts. The only other evidence that was introduced against him came from alleged coconspirator, Altee Moore.3
*213B. ALTEE MOORE
The prosecution’s next witness was Al-tee Moore. The majority accurately summarizes Moore’s testimony. It is significant, however, that Moore’s testimony could be summarized as saying that Werts was present in the car with three other individuals and Moore when they drove to the speakeasy. Moore agrees that Werts did not go into the speakeasy and did not drive the car. Moore did, however, testify that other individuals in the car mentioned robbing the speakeasy in Werts’ presence. Even accepting Moore’s testimony that the others mentioned the robbery in Werts’ presence, the quality of Moore’s testimony is such that it may well not have overcome a “mere presence” defense. Without more, it certainly would have entitled Werts to a “mere presence” instruction. See Commonwealth v. Fields, 460 Pa. 316, 333 A.2d 745 (1975). The only real difference between the testimony of Moore and the testimony of Werts is that Moore did not specifically say that Werts was asleep while he sat in the car prior to the robbery. Moore did not say whether Werts was awake or asleep.
The majority stresses Moore’s failure to specify if Werts was awake or asleep in their rejection of my position that Moore’s testimony would have supported a mere presence charge under Pennsylvania law. Surprisingly, my colleagues argue “[n]either the prosecutor nor defense counsel chose to clarify [whether Werts was asleep].” Maj. Op. at 200, n. 19 (emphasis added). I find this surprising because the prosecution obviously has the burden of proof, and I don’t understand how we can expect defense counsel to clarify a crucial point that the prosecution fails to prove. I submit that no defense counsel worth his or her salt would “clarify this point. What is significant is not that defense counsel chose not to clarify the point, but that the prosecutor failed to prove it. However, here again, the prosecutor’s decision to not inquire is vindicated just as his decision not to ask Moore about the terms of the plea agreement is vindicated.
C. ISRAEL WRIGHT
The prosecution next called Israel Wright who was inside the speakeasy at the time of the robbery. Wright’s testimony simply corroborated the uncontested fact that the speakeasy had been robbed and that Mr. Bridgeman had been shot during the course of that robbery. N.T. 11/26/75 at 112-121. Wright’s testimony added nothing to the case against Werts.
D. OFFICER CARROL ADAMS
The Commonwealth’s next witness was Police Officer Carrol Adams. Adams drove the emergency patrol wagon that responded to a police radio call about the robbery at the speakeasy. Officer Adams also described the crime scene and what he saw upon entering the speakeasy, and he testified about taking the gunshot victim to the hospital. Id. at 124. Officer Adams’ testimony also added nothing to the case.
E. DR. ROBERT SEGAL
Dr. Robert Segal, medical examiner, testified about forensic pathology generally, and, more specifically, the details of his autopsy of the victim. N.T. 11/28/75 at 3 and 4.
*214F. OFFICER JOHN O’ROURKE
Police Officer John O’Rourke was called as a firearms specialist and was asked about his examination of a .22 caliber bullet fragment taken from the victim during Dr. Segal’s autopsy. Id. at 12-14.
It is evident from this summary that, thus far, the only testimony that incriminated Werts came from Mr. Moore, and Moore’s testimony was not nearly as incriminating as the majority seems to conclude. It places Werts in the car that drove to and from the speakeasy. Moore didn’t say that Werts participated in any other way. He didn’t even say Werts was awake. As noted above at n. 3 that testimony was not inconsistent with the defense of “mere presence” under Pennsylvania law even assuming Werts was awake. See Fields, supra.
G. DETECTIVE McMILLAN
The prosecution next called Detective Roseborough McMillan who testified about the details of his arrest of the defendant. McMillan testified that he and several uniformed officers and other detectives went to the defendant’s house on June 8, 1975. He described the circumstances of their search for, and apprehension of, Werts inside the house. He also described a struggle with the defendant that could have explained some of the marks or injuries that the defendant sustained. During his testimony, the detective was also asked, “and then what happened?” Detective McMillan responded as follows: “we proceeded to search the house, search for a weapon, and during the search for the weapon I found several articles of clothing that had been reported stolen.” N.T. 11/28/75 at 21. A defense objection was sustained. Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial, but that was properly denied because the trial court immediately gave a curative instruction. Id. at 23.
The detective testified about some abrasions and possible injuries that he observed on the defendant and explained that, to the extent that they were inflicted by the police at all, they were inflicted as a result of trying to drag Werts from his hiding place, and subdue him. Id. at 61-3. The detective also offered some rather bizzare testimony that after police subdued Werts and handcuffed him, he (Detective McMillan) ordered that the handcuffs be removed. Werts would testify that McMillan had the handcuffs removed as part of an overture to fight. N.T. 12/1/75 at 157. McMillan explained that he wanted the handcuffs removed so that Werts would be free to walk around the room and point to where a shotgun was hidden. N.T. 11/28/75 at 83. McMillan specifically denied that he wanted the handcuffs removed so that he could fight with Werts. He testified that he told Werts “ T wouldn’t hit you. If I did, I’d rip your head off, or words to that affect[.]” Id. at 119, and he denied using threats, force or intimidation to coerce Werts’ statement.4
H. DETECTIVE VERRUGGHE
The prosecution next called Detective Arthur Verrugghe who testified about finding a white 1965 Ford Falcon outside of the defendant’s residence. He also testified that he searched that car on June 8, 1975. Id. at 128. The car that took the perpetrators to the speakeasy had been described as a white Ford Falcon. However, Werts didn’t deny that he was in this car. His testimony, as the majority notes, was that he paid someone else to drive him home because he was drunk.
My colleagues argue that Detective Verrugghe’s testimony that the Ford Falcon was found parked outside Werts’ house the day after the shooting is very significant because “[i]t defies logic to suggest that Werts paid someone just to drive him home because he was drunk when the *215white Ford Falcon was still parked outside Werts’ residence the day after the shooting. Detective Verrugghe’s testimony lends credibility to Werts’ confession as opposed to his later denial ... of his participation in the robbery.” Maj. Op. at 30. However, there is nothing in this record to establish where Vann (the one who was driving the car) lived. Moreover, Werts’ car was connected to a homicide. It is not all that surprising that Vann did not want to have the car parked in front of his own home, and there is nothing here to suggest that he could not have driven Werts home and then walked to his own home, or taken public transportation.
So that I am clear, I do not for a minute suggest that the evidence here is not sufficient to convict Werts. It clearly is. I do submit, however, that it is nowhere near as compelling as the majority suggests, and that the quality of the Commonwealth’s evidence is relevant to our assessment of Werts’ due process claim. In that regard, I submit that testimony about the location of the car does not “defy logic” nearly as much as Detective McMillan’s testimony that he wanted Werts’ handcuffs removed so that Werts (whom McMillan believed to be a killer) could wander around his bedroom and point to where a (presumably loaded) shotgun was hidden. To that extent, logic suggests that McMillan’s testimony corroborates Werts’ claim that McMillan threatened him. However, as I discuss below, McMillan, and the other police officers had the advantage of an Assistant District Attorney vouching for their honesty, and integrity.
I. WILLIE BRIDGEMAN
Finally, the prosecution called Willie Bridgeman, the decedent’s brother. Bridgeman merely testified that his brother had been alive prior to the time of the robbery. This fact was never in contention.
J. DEFENSE WITNESSES
The other witnesses that the jury heard from included the defendant, who testified that he was drunk, had paid someone to drive him home, and that he was sitting in the front passenger seat asleep when the speakeasy was robbed, and that he knew nothing of the robbery until after it was over. Werts admitted signing a statement that the police prepared, but said the police prepared it based upon what others had already told them. He said that he only signed it as a result of the combined effect of police coercion, force and intimidation; and the heroin withdrawal he was undergoing. The jury also heard from various members of the defendant’s family who- testified about the circumstances of his arrest.
Werts also said that Detective Dougherty welcomed him to the police station by saying, “[y]ou already had some trouble with McMillan and what he did, he is going to get nasty, ...” N.T. 12/1/1975 at 159, and that McMillan said, “ ‘[w]ait until I get you down at the police station[ ]’ ” when Werts was being taken from his home for interrogation. Id. at 157.
The defense also called Detective Dougherty as its own witness to testify that Moore had initially identified someone other than the defendant as being in the front passenger seat of the car that drove to and from the robbery. N.T. 12/1/75 at 38-40. Finally, the defense called an expert to testify about the impact of heroin withdrawal in order to corroborate the defendant’s testimony about the circumstances in which he gave his statement. That testimony established the pain and discomfort that someone with a heroin habit the size of the defendant’s would have been enduring at the time Werts was taken into custody and questioned by police.
Thus, I am at a loss to understand what “several other witnesses” in addition to the testimony of Moore, and Werts’ confession could amount to such overwhelming evidence as to negate the seed that was plant*216ed in the jury’s mind by the prosecutor’s image of Mr. Moore hanging from his cell. However, if the “marked man” comment was the only impropriety here I would agree that the question of a due process denial is a far closer call. My conclusion that “the fairness of the trial” was .undermined and that the prosecutor’s actions “contributed to a miscarriage of justice[.]” Young, 470 U.S. at 20, 105 S.Ct. 1038, is based upon much more.
III.
THE PROSECUTOR’S OPENING STATEMENT
Within minutes of the jury being sworn, before any testimony had been offered, and days before defense counsel delivered the closing that supposedly “invited” the prosecution’s misconduct, the prosecutor gave his opening statement. During his opening statement, he told the jury: N.T. 11/26/75 at 13 (emphasis added). That uninvited, inappropriate, unsubstantiated, and highly prejudicial comment is also part of the context of the trial that must be examined to properly consider Mr. Werts’ due process argument.
[T]here is something more interesting about this case. Atlee Tyrone Moore is one of the co-defendants. And Atlee Moore will testify here and tell you how this was planned and what happened. And make no mistake about it, Atlee Tyrone Moore pled guilty to murder generally....
In accordance with the American Bar Association standards relating to criminal justice, the Commonwealth agreed, in return for Atlee Moore’s testimony, we would recommend that His Honor be lenient. His Honor exercise and give serious consideration to leniency because Mr. Moore is obviously going to put his life in his hands by testifying.
The majority concludes that Werts has waived his right to challenge this comment because trial counsel did not object at trial, and it was not included as a basis for a due process denial in Werts’ direct appeal. However, trial counsel’s failure to object was one of the grounds for Werts’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the subsequent PCRA petition. The PCRA court ruled that Werts’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritless because counsel had a sound strategic reason for not objecting. During a hearing that was held on Werts’ PCRA petition, trial counsel explained that he did not object to this portion of the prosecutor’s opening because he thought that the prosecutor’s insinuation that Moore was putting himself in danger “cut both ways” and that it would backfire. See N.T. 4/29/82 at 38-9. Defense counsel explained that he “thought it was going to backfire against him because I knew we were going to present evidence that they had a deal and really that this guy was never in fear of his life.” Id. at 39.
I agree that counsel’s failure to object was rooted in sound strategy that defeats that portion of Werts’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, that does not explain why trial counsel did not include the “life in his hands” comment as part of the circumstances which denied Werts due process of law on direct appeal. The Pennsylvania courts evaluate inflammatory remarks in context with the entire trial just as we do.5 Strategy that justifies *217not objecting (and therefore waiving that omission as part of a Sixth Amendment claim) does not justify not including the prosecutor’s opening as part of the circumstances that denied Werts the due process of law on direct appeal. The remark was as uncalled for and inflammatory as the “marked man” statement that was challenged on direct appeal as part of a due process claim.
Werts’ guilt was based solely upon vicarious liability and the law of conspiracy. With the exception of the denials of Detective McMillan, the prosecutor’s unsupported innuendo said much more about Werts’ involvement in this robbery/homicide than the evidence that was presented from the witness stand. The prosecutor’s opening planted the idea that Moore’s life was in danger because he dared to testify against a killer — Werts. That suggestion lay just beneath the surface from the very beginning of the trial until the prosecutor detonated it with his unethical “marked man” closing. Thus, although I agree that trial counsel’s failure to object to the opening was not ineffective assistance of counsel, I can not agree that we are free to ignore the prosecutor’s opening as part of our analysis of Werts’ due process claim. That issue is separate and apart from the issue of competence of counsel. Failure to include the prosecutor’s opening as part of the due process violation alleged on direct appeal is just as surely as ineffective as the failure to object was strategic.6 Therefore, we would have to consider the prosecutor’s opening to properly evaluate the context of the “marked man” comment even if Werts could not show cause and prejudice to excuse the omission from the due process claim. Werts can, however, show “cause” for not exhausting that component of his due process claim. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 166 n. 20 (3rd Cir.2000) (“a successful challenge to the effectiveness of counsel’s representation on direct appeal under Strickland can establish the necessary cause to excuse a procedural default”). The “cause” is counsel’s ineffectiveness in not arguing the proper context of the closing. The prejudice that he also must establish to excuse the default ought to be evident on this record. See Coleman, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640; Lines, 208 F.3d at 159. Werts also alleges that his statement was obtained as a result of Detective McMillan’s coercion. That claim, in the light of all the circumstances, can not be lightly dismissed.7 The prosecutor’s handling of McMillan’s testimony is yet another part of the web of misconduct that adds up to a denial of due process in the circumstances here.
IV.
THE PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER VOUCHING FOR DETECTIVE McMillan
As noted above, the evidence against Werts boiled down to the testimony of *218Altee Moore, and Detective McMillan’s denial of Werts’ charge that McMillan used force, intimidation, and coercion to obtain Werts’ confession.8 If the jury doubted the veracity of the police who testified, and believed instead that McMillan had coerced Werts into signing a false statement, the case would boil down to Werts’ denial of criminal intent and testimony (much of which Werts himself offered) placing Werts in the car under circumstances that were less than compelling insofar as they were offered to establish Werts’ involvement in the conspiracy to rob the speakeasy. As I have previously stressed, it was the challenged statement wherein Werts purportedly told police that he helped dispose of a gun after the robbery that unequivocally established vicarious liability for William Bridgeman’s murder by establishing that Werts was part of the conspiracy.
It is against this background that the prosecutor saw fit to vouch for Detective McMillan’s credibility, and that of the other detectives in the case. In his summation, the prosecutor responded to Werts’ testimony that McMillan used force and threats of force to extract the statement as follows:
Now, let me first comment on defense’s allegation that the police had certain attitudes. Now, you heard Detective Dougherty and you saw him. Detective McMillan and you saw him. Detective Gerard and you saw him. These men are assigned to a homicide division of the Philadelphia Police Department, top division department. They are professionals. They have worked in the police department for a number of years. They have testified to that. They have been employed as policemen for a number of years. If they had certain attitudes to color their thinking in cases, they would not be in the homicide division. They have to be professionals in work. They can not bring in people and beat them every time they come in to get statements out of them. It just does not work like that. Their job does not mean they could stand there and beat defendants every time they bring a defendant in.
N.T. 12/2/75 at 106-7.
In U.S. v. Young, the Supreme Court explained the danger of this kind of prosecutorial vouching. The Court stated:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges ... and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.
470 U.S. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038.
Here, there is reason to believe that both of these dangers undermined the fairness of Werts’ trial. First, the insinuation that Moore’s life was in jeopardy certainly suggested that there was evidence beyond that which was admitted at trial that supported the charges and which established that Werts was a killer. Secondly (and more directly insofar as the vouching argument is concerned), the prosecutor was telling the jury that these “professionals” thought that Werts was guilty, and that “professionals” would not obtain a statement by coercion. The jury may well have been lulled into trusting those professionals more than their own independent view of the evidence. This latter danger is amplified here because the prosecutor also argued that McMillan thought that Werts was a killer during the course of his closing argument. Although I do not think that remark establishes a due process violation by itself, it certainly exacerbated the danger that jurors would base their verdict *219more on McMillan’s view of Werts than on the strength of the evidence against him. The government placed its imprimatur upon McMillan’s experience and professionalism, and the prosecutor suggested that Moore’s life was in danger because he testified.
Given the purported threats, the fact that the trained professionals in the city’s “top division” thought Werts was a killer, and the fact that McMillan had told the jury that police found stolen clothing in Werts’ bedroom, I can not understand how the majority can so confidently conclude that Werts’ conviction is not so seriously undermined by prosecutorial transgressions as to deny Werts the due process of law. Also, no immediate curative instruction was offered to cure the prosecutor’s improper vouching because trial counsel failed to object.9
Moreover, the prosecutor’s enthusiasm for the professionalism of the homicide detectives, and his haste to vouch for their credibility is even more questionable than appears at first blush. As noted above, Detective McMillan managed to gratuitously inject in his testimony that he had found articles of stolen clothing in the defendant’s bedroom. Given the countless times Detective McMillan must have testified during his 19 years on the police force, it is inconceivable that he did not know that it was highly improper to mention that stolen clothing. Nevertheless, he proceeded to do it. The prosecutor then negated the cautionary instruction that had been given by embroidering the remark during his closing and admonishing the jurors that they ought not to believe a heroin addict and a thief. N.T. 12/2/75 at 34. He argued, “if you want to believe a dope addict and a thief, you can, but ....” The only evidence I have been able to find on this record that Werts was a thief came from Detective McMillan. An objection to that testimony was sustained, and a cautionary instruction was immediately given, but that did not stop the prosecutor from adding that poisoned arrow to his quiver, and launching it as part of his summation.
In United States v. Rodarte, 596 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1979) the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the prosecutor’s suggestion that there was no reason for drug enforcement agents to come into court and make up a big story was improper. However, based partly on the strength of the government’s case, the court reasoned that a new trial was not warranted. Id. at 146. In United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.1979) the government’s case rested heavily on the testimony of a confidential informant and an undercover agent. When speaking of the agent in his opening, the prosecutor stated:
And there isn’t any reason in the world why [the agent] would take that stand. He’s a professional man. He has been in this a long time. And if he *220wasn’t good at it over there when he was doing it for the San Antonio Police Department, if he wasn’t doing his job right over there, do you think he would ever have gotten on with the Drug Enforcement Agency.
Id. at 659. The prosecutor continued on this theme by stating that the agent and the confidential informant had no reason to point out that the defendant was the guilty person, unless they believed it. In rebuttal, after defense counsel’s closing, the prosecutor asserted that the motives of both the informant and the agent were as “pure as the driven snow. Their motives are to get out and make this world a better place to live in.” Id. at 662. Even though defense counsel failed to object to the comments at trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that the comments constituted “plain error” and granted habeas relief. Id. at 666. In both cases, the courts based their decisions in large part upon the strength of the government’s evidence, just as the Court did in Young. The court in Garza granted relief because it believed that the remark had a substantial impact on the outcome of the trial while in Young and Rodarte overwhelming evidence of guilt was sufficient to overcome the impact of the prosecutor’s improper conduct.
In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) the Court upheld a conviction despite a prosecutor’s improper remark in closing in part because the trial court “took special pains to correct any impression that the jury should consider the prosecutor’s statements as evidence in the case.” Id. at 644, 94 S.Ct. 1868. In doing so, however, the court warned that curative instructions will not always be sufficient. “Although some occurrences at trial may be too clearly prejudicial for such a curative instruction to mitigate their effect, the comment in this case is hardly of such character.” Id. As noted above, in Donnelly the prosecutor simply told the jury what he believed the defense team was hoping with regard to a jury’s verdict. Here, rather than remedying the problem, the court’s final instruction may well have exacerbated the prosecution’s assurances about Detective McMillan and negated its initial cautionary instruction about the stolen clothing. The court’s jury charge included the following:
[i]t should not be inferred from what I have said that you are to ignore or disregard the comments of the District Attorney or defense counsel in what they have said to you in their respective addresses. It is not only your right, but it is your duty to consider these arguments and to view the evidence in light of the arguments presented to you, but you have the right to reject any or all of the arguments.
App. at 158. Such an instruction on the heels of the prosecution’s declaration of Detective McMillan’s professionalism, and the prosecutor’s reminder that the detective thought Werts (the “thief’) was a killer may well have caused the jurors to believe that they had a duty to consider the conflicting testimony of Werts and McMillan in that light. We routinely state that we assume that jurors follow a court’s instruction when we affirm a conviction. Can we now ignore that principle because it undermines a conviction? Even though the court told jurors they did not have to accept arguments of counsel, the presumption that they followed the court’s charge certainly suggests that they did resolve conflicts between Werts and McMillan by considering the latter’s professionalism, job assignment, and personal belief that Werts was a killer. After all, the prosecutor reminded the jury that Werts was a thief and therefore not worthy of belief anyway. See Young, supra.
The power and force of the government tend to impart an implicit stamp of believability to what the prosecutor says. The same power and force allow him, with a minimum of words, to impress on the jury that the government’s vast investigatory network, apart from the orderly machinery of the trial, knows that the accused is guilty or has non-judicial*221ly reached conclusions on relevant facts that tend to show he’s guilty.
Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir.1969).
As if that were not enough, there is a sad irony here that even more graphically illustrates how misleading and dangerous this kind of vouching can be. The heart of Werts’ defense was that Detective McMillan coerced a false inculpatory statement by using force, intimidation and coercion, and that the other detectives played on Werts’ fear of McMillan. Despite the prosecutor’s guarantee that McMillan was a professional assigned to a top division in the department and that [homicide detectives] could not be so assigned if they had “certain attitudes to color their thinking in cases” because “they have to be professionals at work” and “cannot bring in people and beat them up... ”, Detective McMillan was subsequently convicted of doing exactly that in an investigation which he conducted within months of his interrogation of Werts. It is as tragic as it is ironic that Detective McMillan, along with five other members of the homicide division of the Philadelphia Police Department, was subsequently convicted of violating the civil rights of witnesses during the course of a homicide investigation they were involved in during October of 1975. We subsequently affirmed that conviction in a published opinion, see United States v. Ellis, et al., 595 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.1979). That opinion is, of course, a matter of public record and I will take the liberty of referring to it.
In Ellis, we summarized the evidence insofar as it pertained to Detective McMillan as follows:
[a]fter [the suspect] had gone over his statement four or five times, maintaining his innocence throughout, [two other detectives] were joined in the interrogation room by defendant McMillan. The latter told [the suspect] that there were three or four counts of murder against him and that the police had an eyewitness. McMillan then punched [the suspect] in the chest. As [the suspect] fell to the floor from the blow, McMillan, who then weighed over three hundred pounds, slapped him across the side of the face with tremendous force. As McMillan left the room, he said to [the other detectives] that if they needed him he would return and deliver a punch which would stop [the suspect’s] heart.
Id. at 157.
That evidence has an eery resemblance to some of Werts’ description of how the detectives interacted with him and McMillan here. McMillan’s subsequent, unrelated conviction for various civil rights violations does not establish the veracity of Werts’ allegations here. However, I submit that it ought to give us additional pause before we assume that Werts’ claim is as unjustified as the vast majority of countless similar claims that arise in petitions for habeas relief. The government’s successful prosecution of McMillan is also noteworthy because it demonstrates how misleading the kind of vouching that occurred here can be, and why courts have expressed so much concern about the tactic. It is an example of what can happen to the proverbial “search for truth” when adversarial zeal enlists platitudes and cliches to vouch for a witness rather than reasoned analysis based upon the evidence.
Sadly, as if all that I have pointed to were not enough, there is yet one more remark that can not be ignored. In that remark, the prosecutor pulled the genie of racial bias out of the bottle.
V.
THE PROSECUTOR’S ASSERTION THAT “THIS IS THE WAY PEOPLE ARE UP THERE”
As the majority notes, during his closing argument the prosecutor sought to explain why people would be sitting around drinking and decide to commit a robbery “out of the clear blue.” He argued:
*222Moore testified that it was May 6 in the evening, ... he was at home drinking and they came to the house and Butch Jones came up to him and they went outside and Butch Jones was looking for a place to rob. Bear in mind, this is the way people are up there. They are sitting at home doing nothing and they decide to rob a place just out of the clear blue.
App. at 145, Maj. Op. at 205 (emphasis added).
The majority deftly parries this blatant appeal to bias by concluding that the “remark of the prosecutor appears to be a fair comment on the evidence presented at trial, which established that Werts’ accomplices were at Moore’s house on the day of the crime, trying to decide on a place to rob.” Id. Had the prosecutor argued: “this is the way those people are up there,” I would hope that my colleagues would better be able to recognize this remark for what it was. I hope that they would concede that the latter is nothing more than a cheap, highly inappropriate attempt to exploit the fact of the defendant’s race and class. Werts (as will be evident to most from the prosecutor’s comment) is Black, and the neighborhood where Moore lives is an impoverished Black neighborhood in North Philadelphia. I can not imagine that the prosecutor would have ever made such a remark if Moore lived in an area in northern Philadelphia that is predominately White and upper class. Chestnut Hill is such a neighborhood, and it strains credulity to the breaking point to suggest that the prosecutor would have argued that “this is the way people are up there ” had the same set of circumstances occurred in Chestnut Hill. Yet, that community is no less “up there” than North Philadelphia.10
Yet, even casting aside what I believe to be a naive assessment of this remark, the majority’s conclusion that this reference to “those people” is a “fair comment on the evidence” is still as regrettable as it is inaccurate. The evidence here shows as much. Despite the prosecutor’s comment that testimony about idle drinking while plotting a robbery is the way people are in that neighborhood, Israel Wright testified about what some of “those people up there” were doing at the time of the robbery. He was inside the speakeasy speaking with the decedent. Wright testified that just before the robbery occurred he and the decedent were “talking about each others’ family and asked about what we was doing. [The decedent] started explaining that he was learning computer programming and he had finished the first stage and he was going into the second state of computer programming and he was telling us how he go about doing it.” N.T. 11/26/75 at 115-6. That is what some of the people “up there” were doing, and that is the way some of the people “up there” are. Yet, the majority can somehow conclude that the prosecutor’s blatant condemnation of the character of an entire neighborhood is a “fair comment on the evidence.” Apparently because 4 or 5 people in that neighborhood were engaged in a criminal conspiracy.
This kind of insinuation and tactic ought not to be dismissed as mere adversarial hyperbole. It is something that the law forbids and society can ill afford. It is a not-so-subtle appeal to the subconscious bias that has absolutely no place in any courtroom, let alone one where a man stands accused of murder. “The introduction of this irrelevant material prejudiced appellant by casting him in the eyes of the jury as a member of a group with values allegedly alien to the rest of society, therefore, implying that it was more likely that he committed the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Tirado, 473 Pa. 468, 472, 375 *223A.2d 336 (Pa.1977)(ordering new trial because of admission of evidence purporting to show character trait specific to Puerto Rican males which implied a greater likelihood of commission of the crime charged). See also United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1212-3 (8th Cir.1994)(holding that prosecutorial arguments associating members of a particular ethnicity and from a particular geographic region with the commission of drug-related offenses violated the defendant’s constitutional rights); United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.1973).
The majority notes that Werts’ claim that this comment was a racially motivated attempt to inflame jurors was never presented to the state courts, and that we can not now consider it. Maj. Op. at 205. However, appellate counsel seeks to establish the prerequisite “cause” by arguing that failure to make that argument was ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent that it was not presented to the state courts in the context in which it is now argued. See App. Br. at 24 and 31.
Appellate counsel notes that trial counsel’s only explanation for failing to object to this comment was that he was too embarrassed to do so. App. 154. Clearly, that is not adequate. It is clearly not an omission based on a reasonable defense strategy. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that “cause and prejudice” does not exist to excuse the failure to challenge the comment earlier, the context of that statement remains part of the background of the trial that the state court would have considered to properly adjudicate Werts’ claim that the prosecutor’s conduct deprived him of a fair trial. But the state court did not even address Werts’ due process claim outside the context of a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I do not think we are free to ignore it in that context merely because it wasn’t addressed in the same light that we are asked to view it. See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 109, 176 A.2d 421 (1962) (the Court rejected defendant’s assertion that “certain conduct and statements of the district attorney during trial deprived him of a fair trial” by noting “[a] careful study of the record in its entirety disclosed no real merit to this contention”).
It is difficult for me to imagine any context other than a racial one that would cause someone to refer to residents of a poor urban Black neighborhood north of central Philadelphia by saying: “this is the way people are up there.” This was particularly true given the racial polarity that existed in this city at the time. See generally, Chuck Stone, Hating Blacks as Sick as Hating Cops, Phila. Daily News, March 3, 1976, at 10 (speaking generally of the harsh racial climate existing in Philadelphia during the mid-1970’s). Use of that stereotype was blatantly improper, and (unlike my colleagues) I can find no justification for it. “Appeals to racial or religious prejudice are especially incompatible with the concept of a fair trial because of the likelihood that reason would be dethroned and that bias and emotion will reign.” Tirado, 473 Pa. at 472, 375 A.2d 336.
VI. CONCLUSION
No one can now conclude to a mathematical certainty that an innocent man has been convicted here. However, mathematical certainty is not the test. Rather,
“[w]e consider the scope of the objectionable comments and their relationship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, ‘a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context.” ’
U.S. v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc) (quoting U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038).
*224Given the nature and frequency of the transgressions that occurred during this trial I am concerned that one reading the majority opinion may conclude that we simply put on blinders, ignored the dictates of fundamental fairness and the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Young, got out a rubber stamp, and stamped this conviction and the denial of Werts’ petition, “affirmed.” Moreover, I fear that if Werts is not entitled to habeas relief, there is precious little left of the “Great Writ.” Our failure to grant relief in the face of this record licenses the very kind of misconduct that we continually purport to condemn. We are vindicating the misconduct by allowing this verdict to stand. Although Werts may not be able to establish that a denial of due process resulted from any one of the asserted grounds for error, the aggregate of what happened in context with the government’s evidence is what we must consider.
“Our review of a prosecutor’s conduct in a state trial on application for a writ of habeas corpus is limited to determining whether the prosecution’s conduct so infect[ed] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1239 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618) (internal quotations omitted). The district court clearly erred in denying Werts’ petition without even addressing his due process claim, and we are placing the final nail in that error by affirming the district court’s judgment. This case clearly establishes a violation of the fundamental fairness that is the bedrock of the due process of law that ought to be afforded everyone in a criminal trial, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Accordingly, I must forcefully, but respectfully, dissent.
. In an objection at side bar, defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor was referring to an incident that had recently received a great deal of publicity. Werts' attorney told the court:
I would move for a mistrial at this time. I believe the Assistant District Attorney made very inflammatory comments that are obviously directed at the Price sentence that has been highly publicized. Price was the one that was killed and Kevin Hunter was later on killed who had been in jail. I think it was very inflammatory. Your Honor, and I do not think there was any justification for it at all.
N.T. 12/2/75 at 144.
. As noted by my colleagues, this version of the PCHA was repealed effective June 26, 1982 and replaced by the PCRA, 42 Pa C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq. as amended 1988 and 1995. See majority opinion at page 18, n. 11.
. My colleagues argue that Werts’ claim that his confession was coerced “cannot weigh in our decision here’’ because it was rejected by the jury and the state courts. Maj. Op. at 200, n. 19. I do not suggest that the jury should have accepted Werts’ claim of coercion or that the state courts erred in rejecting that claim. That is clearly not for us to determine. However, under Young, we must assess Werts' claims in the context of the entire record. The record contains a confession wherein Werts purportedly told police that he *213disposed of weapons after the robbery/homicide. I submit that if the record contained only that evidence, there would be precious little to suggest a denial of fundamental fairness or cause one to question the conviction. The record contains more. It includes an explanation of that statement which we must at least consider in determining if the integrity of this conviction has been undermined by the assertions in Werts' habeas petition. Moreover, as I will note below, there are additional factors here which I believe impugn the integrity of this conviction to an even greater extent than might otherwise be the case.
. The record establishes that the Detective was over six feet tall, and weighed more than 300 pounds.
. See Commonwealth v. Dennis, 552 Pa. 331, 715 A.2d 404, 413 (1998) ("It is fundamental that, ‘in order to evaluate whether [the prosecutor’s] comments were improper, we must look to the context in which they were made” ’) See also Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 109-110, 176 A.2d 421 (1962) (The court noted that it evaluated the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s closing argument denied him the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process of Law by noting, "a careful study of the record in its entirety disclosed no real merit to this contention.” The court added, "[e]mphatically the district attorney should always bear in mind his proper role in a trial of such great import, and religiously refrain from conduct unbecoming such a responsible trust.... We cannot urge upon district attorneys too strongly the need for refraining from such conduct.”)
. Counsel’s failure to include it as part of his direct appeal is all the more unreasonable because the sidebar exchange that followed the prosecutor's closing suggests (the only on-the-record reference about anyone fearing for their safety) that it was actually Werts who was concerned about threats. At side bar defense counsel told the trial court that he had informed Judge Savitt that the defendant was fearful of his life. We can not, of course, determine the veracity of that representation at this time, nor does the record reflect anything more about the reason for Werts’ purported concern. It is significant, however, because it further suggests that trial counsel’s failure to include the prosecutor’s opening as a basis for a claimed due process deprivation was unreasonable.
. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Werts' claim that his "confession was the product of physical and mental coercion” was waived on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Werts, 483 Pa. at 226, n. 2, 395 A.2d 1316. However, to the extent that it was waived, it is obvious that Werts can establish the ineffective assistance of counsel necessary to excuse the default under Coleman. In addition, we can not ignore that claim now because (as appellate counsel asserted at argument before us, and as I discuss further below) the prosecutor's vouching for the homicide detectives was an important part of the context of this trial.
. According to Werts' testimony, the coercion was amplified because Werts was undergoing heroin withdrawal at the time of his interrogation.
. The majority finds that “Werts is excused from the exhaustion requirement as to the vouching statements.” Maj. Op. at 193. My colleagues conclude, however, that we are still unable to review the merits of that claim because it is procedurally defaulted and Werts has not established "either cause and prejudice” or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. However, I disagree. At page 25 of Appellant's brief, present counsel notes that "the prosecutor also vouched openly for the credibility of the homicide detectives.... ” Appellant's Br. at 25. Appellant then notes the only explanation given for "his failure to object to the prosecutor’s remark in closing argument,” which counsel acknowledged were " ‘very egregious’" was that counsel professed being too embarrassed to do so. Id. at 31. Appellant then argues that trial counsel’s failure to seek curative instructions as well as failure to challenge the prosecutor’s remarks in closing on "direct appeal” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and that it limited the review on appeal to "plain error due to counsel’s failure to properly preserve the claim” Id. at 33. However, even assuming that trial counsel’s failure to object to something as egregious as vouching for one of the main witnesses against his client was reasonable, the prosecutor’s vouching for the homicide detectives must also still be considered as part of the fabric of the context when we evaluate Werts' due process argument.
. This concern is not mitigated by the fact that Detective McMillan is himself Black. The jury would not associate Detective McMillan as being like the people who lived "up there.” Moreover, the prosecutor had already improperly vouched for Detective McMillan’s veracity by assuring the jury that he would not hold the position that he held but for his professionalism and, (inferentially) integrity and credibility.