concurring.
I concur with the court’s decision to affirm the district court’s denial of Kapa-dia’s petition for habeas corpus. But under the circumstances of this case, there is no need to explore the question of whether Kapadia was motivated by religious or national origin bias when he committed the burglary and arson. Evidence of one’s beliefs and associations is admissible where it is relevant to the statutory aggravating factors. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949-50, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983). Kapadia’s bias was demonstrated in statements made after his conviction and before sentencing. As the trial judge noted, he took the vitriolic comments into consideration at sentencing because he had to “consider ... the possibility of reformation of the defendant.... [H]is virulant anti-semitism is indicative of the fact that he is not likely to change his ways. He is not likely to become a productive member of society.” R. 1, Ex. C. at C25-28. And as the Illinois appellate court indicated, this was an appropriate consideration for sentencing. It concluded that Kapadia’s racial and religious slurs “provided insight into defendant’s character, mentality, attitude, lack of remorse, and rehabilitative potential.” People v. Kapadia, 281 Ill.App.3d 714, 217 Ill.Dec. 488, 667 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1996). This court’s opinion notes that nothing in the Constitution prevents the court “from *649factoring a defendant’s statements into sentencing” when those statements are relevant to legitimate sentencing considerations. Because these are relevant factors to consider upon sentencing, it is unnecessary to explore whether Kapadia was motivated by religious bias when committing his crimes.