concurring specially.
I join in the opinion of the Court. I subscribe to the entire opinion including, inter alia, the holding and reasoning that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. Although I agree that judicial restraint cautions against the court’s addressing constitutional issues unless necessary, it does not seem inappropriate for me in light of the extensive dissents, to discuss my own views about the likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional issues.
I. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
A. Standard of Review
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish the following four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that its own injury outweighs the injury to the nonmovant; and (4) that the injunction would not dis-serve the public interest. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir.1991).
I note at the outset that the scope of this review of the district court’s denial of in-junctive relief is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion. See Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir.1999) (“The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is a decision within the sound discretion of the district court.”). The district court must exercise its discretion “in deciding upon and delicately balancing the equities of the parties involved.” United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting Tatum v. Blackstock, 319 F.2d 397, 401-02 (5th Cir.1963)). In this review, I adopt the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but I review de novo jurisdictional issues and issues of law. See SEC v. Unique Financial Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1198 (11th Cir.1999). “Because a preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy,’ its grant is the exception rather than the rule, and plaintiff must clearly carry the burden of persuasion.” Lambert, 695 F.2d at 539 (quoting Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1975)).
B. Constitutional Delegation of Authority to the States
The Constitution delegates to the states the authority to establish and implement procedures for selecting Presidential electors. The Constitution provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors_” U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 2.1 The United States Code *1180provides that the timely appointment of Presidential electors pursuant to state law is conclusive. See 3 U.S.C. § 5.2 The Supreme Court has confirmed this broad delegation of power to the states, subject to the limitation that a state may not exercise this power in a manner that violates specific provisions of the Constitution of the United States. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 18 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1573 n. 18, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (stating that “[t]he Constitution expressly delegates authority to the States to regulate the election of Presidential electors,” but that this does not give states the power to impose unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 9, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (stating that the extensive powers granted to the states to pass laws regulating the selection of electors is subject to the limitation that these powers “may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution”); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 699 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (stating that while the Constitution provides no guarantee against innocent irregularities in the administration of state elections, in rare situations where state election procedures undermine the basic fairness and integrity of the democratic system, a constitutional violation exists).
While the unconstitutional exercise of state power is prohibited, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state’s regulations governing the electoral process will inevitably impact, in a manner that may burden or restrict, its citizens’ exercise of their right to vote. See Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that such restrictions are necessary “if [elections] are to be fair and honest .... ” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). In the context of a Presidential election, the Supreme Court has confirmed that a state’s interest in conducting an orderly and fair election is “generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiseriminatory restrictions.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1570.
To preserve the essential balance between states’ power to govern elections and voters’ constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has developed a flexible standard to use in assessing constitutional challenges to a state’s regulation of elections. The Supreme Court described this standard succinctly in Burdick:
[W]hen [First and Fourteenth Amendment] rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiseriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State’s *1181important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.
Id. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Our Circuit’s precedent addressing constitutional challenges to state election processes has reflected comparable deference to state regulation of elections. We have held that the scope of voters’ exercise of their right to vote is restricted in the state election context by'considerations of “[t]he functional structure embodied in the Constitution, the nature of the federal court system and the limitations inherent in the concepts both of limited federal jurisdiction and the remedy afforded by section 1983 .... ” Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 452-53 (5th Cir.1980);3 see also Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1314 (11th Cir.1986) (“Although federal courts closely scrutinize state laws whose very design infringes on the rights of voters, federal courts will not intervene to examine the validity of individual ballots or supervise the administrative details of a local election. Only in extraordinary circumstances will a challenge to a state election rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.”) (internal citation omitted); Duncan, 657 F.2d at 701. We have emphasized that federal court intervention is not appropriate in “garden variety” disputes over election irregularities, but that redress of alleged constitutional injuries is appropriate if “the election process itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness .... ” Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Curry, 802 F.2d at 1315).
These principles guide my analysis of the Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in their constitutional challenges to Florida’s election laws. The Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred by refusing to enjoin the post-election manual recounting of ballots in four Florida counties, because they allege that these recounts violate the constitutional rights of the state’s voters. The Plaintiffs advance two arguments, an equal protection argument and a substantive due process argument. I discuss each in turn and cannot conclude based on the sparse record before this Court that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. I believe that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish with sufficient clarity a severe burden or impact on the rights of Florida voters. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990) (“Preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments — because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits — must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution.”). Rather, the alleged impacts are reasonable and are justified by their furtherance of the state’s important regulatory interests in ensuring accurate and complete election results. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs fail to make the requisite showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, and the district court thus did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a preliminary injunction.
C. Equal Protection Claim
The Plaintiffs claim that Florida’s statutory manual recount provision as applied in this case violates the rights of all voters to be treated equally because the manual recounts are limited to four heavily Democratic counties. The crux of the Plaintiffs’ equal protection argument is that some ballots in counties not conducting manual recounts will not be counted despite the voters’ intent, because the ballots are not machine-legible, while identical ballots in *1182counties conducting manual recounts will be counted.4 The argument boils down to this: there is greater certainty in some counties than in others that every voter’s intent is effectuated. I conclude that this argument fails to state a violation of the equal protection clause.
Under the framework developed by the Supreme Court, when a state election law severely burdens voters’ constitutional rights, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest; however, lesser burdens trigger less exacting review, and a state’s important regulatory interests are typically enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063).
The first step in this analysis, then, is to determine whether Florida’s manual recount provision severely burdens the rights of those voters in counties not conducting manual recounts, because their ballots receive less scrutiny than those of voters in counties conducting manual recounts. I believe that it does not.
In reaching this conclusion, I note first that the Plaintiffs could not credibly argue that the mere availability of manual recounts in some counties, but not in others, places an inequitable burden on their right to vote. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion would lead to the untenable position that the method of casting and counting votes would have to be identical in all states and in every county of each state. For example, if one state counted ballots by hand while another counted by machine, there inevitably would be some ballots in the manual-recount state that were counted notwithstanding the fact that the identical ballot in the machine-count state would not be counted. The only apparent way to avoid this disparity would be for every state to use an identical method of counting. No court has held that the mere use of different methods of counting ballots constitutes an equal protection violation. Such a position would be manifestly inconsistent with the command of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, that Presidential electors are to be appointed in the manner directed by each state legislature. Accord Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. at 1573 n. 18; Williams, 393 U.S. at 29, 89 S.Ct. at 9, 21 L.Ed.2d 24. Moreover, there is nothing uncommon or unusual in a state statute permitting and regulating recounts. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that recount procedures are a common and practical means of ensuring fair and accurate election results. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25, 92 S.Ct. 804, 810-11, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). In Roudebush, the Supreme Court noted with approval that Indiana, along with many other states, had made vote recounts available to guard against irregularity or error in the tabulation of votes, and the Court stated that such recount provisions are “within the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I, § 4.” Id.
The Plaintiffs attempt to bolster their treat-every-ballot-alike argument by suggesting that partisan influences have tainted the operation of Florida’s manual recount procedures in this case. The Plaintiffs allege that partisan influences have intruded in two ways: (1) that the Florida Democratic Party selectively requested manual recounts in a few popu*1183lous counties that indicated significantly more Gore votes than Bush votes in order to gain political advantage; and (2) that the lack of statutory standards guiding the canvassing boards’ decisions to grant manual recounts permitted partisan influences to influence those decisions.
The statute itself provides several safeguards against the kind of abuses suggested by the Plaintiffs. Pursuant to the statute, a candidate or party can only request, not mandate, a manual recount, and the decision is made by a county canvassing board composed of three statutorily designated officials, including a county court judge, none of whom is an active participant in the candidacy of any candidate. See Fla. Stat. § 102.141. The canvassing board’s discretion is not standardless, but rather is guided by a statutory purpose of determining the intention of voters and correcting “an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election.” Id. § 102.166(5). Florida law further provides that canvassing board meetings must be open to the public. See id. § 286.0105(1). Finally, a canvassing board’s decision to grant or deny a manual recount is subject to judicial review. See Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So.2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Once a manual recount has been authorized, statutory safeguards are provided to ensure that the results are fair and accurate and untainted by partisan manipulation.5 The combination of the composition of the canvassing boards, the statutory standards guiding their discretion, and the availability of judicial review provides meaningful checks on the exercise of discretion by canvassing boards and reduces the risk of partisan influences tainting the process.
Especially with respect to the Plaintiffs’ concern that political candidates can select particular counties, but also relevant to the Plaintiffs’ concern about the discretion of canvassing boards, any candidate has an equal right and an equal opportunity to request manual recounts in any county. See Fla. Stat. § 102.166(4)(a). The Florida statute clearly placed the political parties in this case on notice of this right and opportunity.6 Other safeguards relevant to both of the Plaintiffs’ concerns include: the fact that both the request and decision must be guided by the statutory standards of determining voters’ intent and correcting error which could affect the outcome, see id. § 102.166(5), (7)(b); the fact that the decision is made, not by an ad hoc board, but by an existing board composed of statutorily designated officials, including a county judge, who are not active participants in the candidacy of any candidate, see id. § 102.141; the fact that canvassing board meetings and any manual recounts must be open to the public, see id. §§ 102.166(6), 286.0105(1); and the fact that a canvassing board’s decision is subject to judicial review. See Broward County Canvassing Bd., 607 So.2d at 508.
In assessing the severity of the impact on the right to vote, the scarcity of evidence in the instant record is also significant. On the sparse record in this appeal, I cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have made the showing requisite for relief at this preliminary judgment stage. I cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have established actual partisan manipulation or fraud. The Plaintiffs do not claim that any canvassing board unfairly refused to conduct a manual recount. They argue on appeal that canvassing board officials may have a strong personal interest in the outcome of *1184the election; however, such a vague allegation of a possible manipulative or discriminatory motive does not rise to the level of severity required to merit strict scrutiny of the Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.
Applying a reasonableness standard, therefore, to judge the constitutionality of Florida’s manual recount provision, see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063, I would conclude that the state has sufficiently strong interests to justify the manual recounting of votes within the established statutory framework. As provided by the plain language of the statute, the manual recount provisions are designed to remedy errors in the vote tabulation “which could affect the outcome of the election” and to arrive at the true “voters’ intent.” Fla. Stat. §§ 102.166(5), (7)(b). Florida has a strong interest in ensuring that the results of an election accurately reflect the intent of its voters. A manual recount provision as a supplement to mechanical counting provides a valid method to discern the will of voters, where doubt is raised as to the validity of a machine count.
With respect to the county-by-county differences which the Plaintiffs allege violate their equal protection rights, the state legislature expressly delegated to each county the decision-making authority regarding whether and how to conduct manual recounts, within the context of the statutory standard and procedures, and subject to the statutory restraints and safeguards, all as discussed above. There are strong and obvious state interests, both practical and administrative, supporting Florida’s decentralization of this function to the county level. I cannot conclude that the Constitution would require that any manual recount be conducted statewide.7 A statewide requirement would impose a very significant administrative burden, and an often unnecessary one, as there are innumerable circumstances in which a manual recount would be warranted only in a single county. The decision to decentralize is both reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Indeed, in doing so, Florida is merely exercising the power expressly delegated in Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and it is exercising that power by following the same pattern of federalism reflected in the Constitution itself. Further, with respect to Florida’s designation of candidates and parties as the entities authorized to request a manual recount, this would seem to be a natural and reasonable choice. They are the ones most likely to be alert to problems with a machine tally.8 Permitting only candidates, political parties and committees, but not individual voters, to request recounts is a common practice among the states.9 I believe that Florida’s interest in the efficient administration of elections is sufficient to justify its decision to provide for the implementation of its *1185manual recount provision on a decentralized, localized basis.
My conclusion that the deprivation of rights alleged by the Plaintiffs does not merit strict scrutiny is supported by the contrast between this case and cases in which the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny: those cases have involved a complete deprivation of the right to vote or a differential weighting of votes based on impermissible classifications. In O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 94 S.Ct. 740, 38 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974), the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a state electoral scheme that completely denied individuals the right to vote based on arbitrary distinctions. See id. at 533, 94 S.Ct. at 745 (invalidating a New York absentee ballot statute that operated to deny otherwise eligible prisoners the right to vote, based solely on the prisoner’s county of incarceration). The reasoning of O’Brien does not apply here, however, as the Plaintiffs do not assert that they have been denied the right to vote or to have their vote counted; rather, they assert that them votes have received unequal treatment in the post-election counting process.
In the one-person, one-vote cases, the Supreme Court has held that states’ weighted voting systems, which arbitrarily and systematically granted a lesser voice to some voters based on their geographic location, violated the voters’ right to equal protection. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1496, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1382, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 709-10, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 1458, 12 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80, 83 S.Ct. 801, 808, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963). The facts presented by those cases are different from the facts here, however. The ballots of voters in Florida counties conducting manual recounts are not receiving greater weight than are votes elsewhere in Florida. The additional scrutiny of ballots afforded under Florida’s manual recount procedures does not weigh the value of votes; it merely verifies the count. Unlike the foregoing cases which have held that the systematic unequal weighting of votes is unconstitutional, here there is no automatic, inevitable, or systematic granting of greater weight to the choices of any voter or class of voters.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Constitution itself, in Article II, § 1, cl. 2, contemplates that each state will direct its own (potentially different) method of appointing Presidential electors. Within each state, federal courts have acknowledged that diverse methods of voting may be employed. See Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 710 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir.1983) (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 775, 777, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965)). The Supreme Court has confirmed that recounts are well within the ambit of a state’s authority, see Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 25, 92 S.Ct. at 810-11, and the manual counting of ballots has been commonplace historically. In the light of the constitutional delegation of authority to the states, confirmed by case law, I believe that manual recounts in some counties, while identical ballots in other counties are counted and recounted only by machine, and the inevitable variances that this will produce, do not in themselves severely burden the right to vote.
Florida’s statutory manual recount provision does not limit the Plaintiffs’ ability to cast their votes, nor significantly undermine the certainty that their votes will be counted. While the statute permits enhanced scrutiny to be given to ballots in counties where the candidates or parties have requested and the canvassing boards have authorized a manual recount, the statute provides ample safeguards to ensure that the decision to conduct manual recounts, and the manner in which-the recounts are conducted, is open, fair, and accurate. While there is some potential for the statute to be manipulated by those with partisan interests, the sparse record here does not in my opinion establish a *1186clear showing of partisan fraud or misconduct that would be required in this preliminary injunction stage. Nor does the record reveal concrete evidence of substantial or uncorrected errors in manual counting that have generated erroneous vote tabulations. Therefore, I conclude that at this stage the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently demonstrate a severe impact on their equal protection rights, so that heightened scrutiny of Florida’s manual recounts is not merited. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. I believe that Florida’s important regulatory interests are sufficient to justify the reasonable, nondiscriminatory impact the Plaintiffs have shown to their voting rights.10
For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection claim.
D. Substantive Due Process Claim
The Plaintiffs argue that the counting procedures used by counties conducting manual recounts are arbitrary and rife with irregularities that constitute a denial of due process. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the standards used to decide which marks or punches on a ballot are counted as votes differ from county to county and further that these standards have been changed mid-count in one county. I believe that the record evidence fails to establish that the alleged unreliability or inaccuracy of manual recounting rises to the level of a severe burden on the right to vote.
In Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir.1986), we refused to find a constitutional violation in a state gubernatorial eandi-*1187date’s argument that election officials had miscounted ballots. See id. at 1319. We stated that, in order for the election process to reach the point of “patent and fundamental unfairness,” the “situation must go well beyond the ordinary dispute over the counting and marking of ballots.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 703 (5th Cir.1981)). In Curry, we emphasized that a federally protected right is implicated only “where the entire election process — including as part thereof the state’s administrative and judicial corrective process — fails on its face to afford fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1317 (quoting Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1078).
These principles resonate in numerous federal cases holding that disputes over human or mechanical errors in ballot counting, absent a showing of intentional manipulation, do not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. See Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 802 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that human errors resulting in the miscounting of votes, the presence of ineligible candidates on ballot, and the late delivery of voting machines to some polling places, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because adequate state remedies existed); Bodine v. Elkhart County Elec. Bd., 788 F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th Cir.1986) (concluding that voter-plaintiffs failed to state a constitutional claim where mechanical and human error resulted in errors in counting votes, but where there was no allegation that the defendants acted with intent to undermine the election); Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir.1980) (concluding that allegations of negligent vote counting did not state a constitutional claim); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864-65 (7th Cir.1975) (stating that while due process rights would be implicated on a showing of “willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected,” no constitutional guarantee protects against inadvertent errors or irregularities; instead, state law must provide the remedy); Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir.1973) (refusing to intervene in a controversy over whether illegally cast ballots were mistakenly counted by local election officials); Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir.1970) (concluding that no federal remedy existed for human error resulting in non-party members mistakenly allowed to vote in congressional primary).
Despite these precedents, in reliance on our opinion in Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir.1995), the Plaintiffs argue that post-election changes in ballot-counting procedures are fundamentally unfair and thus rise above the level of “garden variety” election disputes to constitute a substantive due process violation. In Roe, a state court order would have forced Alabama election officials to count absentee ballots that had been rejected pursuant to a state statute and in accordance with previous state practice.11 See id. at 578. We concluded that such a post-election departure from the state’s statutory mandate and previous election practice would undermine the fundamental fairness of the election. See id. at 581. As we explained in Roe, our decision was based on the fact that such a change would disenfranchise those people who would have voted absentee, but were deterred from doing so by the burden of complying with the statutory requirements for completing absentee ballots. See id.; see also Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078-79 (1st Cir.1978) (finding fundamental unfairness in a state’s unforeseeable invalidation of absentee ballots which resulted in the disqualification of ten percent of the total votes cast in a primary election). Cf. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.1998) (rejecting a substantive due process challenge to Hawaii’s decision to count blank ballots as votes *1188against convening a state constitutional convention, where there was no suggestion that voters in favor of the constitutional convention had relied on the state’s previous practice of disregarding blank ballots in a constitutional convention vote); Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Barreto Perez, 639 F.2d 825, 828 (1st Cir.1980) (holding that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s decision to count mismarked ballots where the intent of the voter was clear did not violate due process, because there could have been no detrimental reliance by any voter on the assumed invalidity of mis-marked ballots).
Our decision in Roe is distinguishable from the instant case in at least two significant ways. First, at this stage of the litigation, the record does not establish the requisite showing of a significant post-election departure from Florida’s manual recount practices before this election.12 Unlike the circumstance in Roe, where the post-election change of procedure violated a statutory mandate, in this case Florida’s statute expressly provides for manual recounts and establishes the voter-intent standard to be used in conducting the recounts. While the Plaintiffs have alleged that various canvassing boards have used different standards or have changed their standards with respect to the analysis of particular physical attributes of ballots, the Plaintiffs have not alleged that any board has departed from a good-faith attempt to determine the voters’ intent. Thus, the Plaintiffs have failed to show any departure from statutory mandate or from a pre-election procedure that rises to the level of fundamental unfairness.
Second, Roe is distinguishable because this record does not show detrimental reliance by voters. In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that a voter in any county failed to adequately punch or mark a ballot in reliance on a belief that a vote in some other county would not be counted if a ballot were only partially punched, i.e., in reliance on an anticipated lack of a manual recount. Indeed, it would be manifestly unreasonable to suggest such reliance. Quite the contrary, the statute expressly puts voters on notice of the possibility of a manual recount. As a corollary to this obvious lack of reliance, this ease involves no disenfranchisement of voters, unlike the disenfranchisement in Roe of people who failed to vote absentee because of the inconvenience imposed by the statutory notarization/witness requirement.
In addition to the lack of detrimental reliance by voters on Florida’s previously established election procedures, the record before us is not sufficient to conclude that the district court was clearly erroneous in declining to find purposeful, systematic discrimination in the manual recounting procedures employed. In fact, the manual recount statute mandates procedures to ensure fairness and accuracy in the conduct of any manual recount. Any manual recount must include at least one percent of the total votes cast and at least three precincts. See Fla.Stat. § 102.166(4)(d). A manual recount must be open to the public, and counting teams must have at *1189least two members who are, when possible, members of at least two political parties. See id. § 102.166(6), (7)(a). Determination of the voter’s intent is the statutory standard. See id. § 102.166(7)(b). Florida law provides that the decisions and actions of county canvassing boards are subject to judicial review, not only with respect to their decision on whether to conduct a manual recount, as discussed above, but also with respect to the general validity of their counting procedures. See Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So.2d 720 (Fla.1998); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So.2d 259 (Fla.1975). State courts have authority to review election challenges, whether brought by a candidate or party as a protest under Fla. Stat. § 102.166, or brought by a candidate, qualified voter, or taxpayer as a contest under Fla. Stat. § 102.168. A court may void a challenged election result based on a finding of substantial irregularities that raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the election results express the will of the voters. See Beckstrom, 707 So.2d at 725. These statutory safeguards are calculated to protect against the risk of the abuses that the Plaintiffs fear. In this case, the Plaintiffs have failed to persuade me that these safeguards were ineffective. The district court found, based on the evidence stipulated at the hearing, that “no evidence has been demonstrated that these recounts have generated erroneous tabulations.” Based on my review of the evidence, I cannot conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous.13
Under these circumstances, I am not persuaded that Plaintiffs have made the requisite showing of a severe impact on their right to vote. On this record, they have failed to prove that this case rises above a “garden variety” dispute over the counting of ballots to reach the level of fundamental unfairness. Because Florida’s strong state interests, as discussed above, justify a decentralized vote-counting process, I conclude that the Plaintiffs fail to show a likelihood of success in proving their substantive due process claim. Because the Plaintiffs fail to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims, they fail to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for preliminary injunctive relief.14
*1190II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success warranting federal court intervention on either equal protection or due process grounds. The conclusion of a majority of this court that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to establish a substantial likelihood of irreparable harm, and my conclusion in this concurring opinion that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success, are supported by the lack of evidentiary development in this case and by the preliminary injunction posture of the case. Especially significant in our consideration of this case is the sparse record on which Plaintiffs have chosen to proceed.15 The record before us is without the benefit of discovery or evidentiary hearing. Where, as here, a party has chosen to forego an evidentiary hearing, it is not entitled to have its disputed representations accepted as true. See Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.1998). The scant evidence in this record has not been tested by the adversarial process, notwithstanding the fact that material and relevant facts are in dispute. In addition, the preliminary injunction posture of this case cautions against federal court intervention. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (“Preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments — because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits — must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution.”). I cannot conclude that Plaintiffs on this sparse record have demonstrated a clear showing, either with respect to the likelihood of success or irreparable injury, and thus have not made a clear showing that an injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, I thus specially concur, in addition to joining the opinion of the court.
. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides:
*1180Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
. 3 U.S.C. § 5 provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.
. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.
. For example, the Plaintiffs point to the fact that some ballots that are imperfectly punched will be counted in at least one manual-recount county, while an identical ballot would not be machine-counted, and thus would not be counted in a county not conducting manual recounts. In Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-11078, 2000 WL 1728721 (Fla. Palm Beach Co. Cir. Ct., Nov. 22, 2000), Circuit Judge Jorge Labarga held that the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board could not follow a policy of per se exclusion of any ballot, but that each ballot must be considered in light of the totality of circumstances and that where the voter’s intent could be *1183fairly and satisfactorily ascertained, that intent should be given effect.
. These provisions are described infra at 1188-89.
. The Plaintiffs do not claim to have lacked timely actual notice that manual recounts were requested by the Florida Democratic Party in the four counties at issue in this case. Indeed, the record reveals that the manual recounts were requested on Thursday, November 9, 2000, and that the Republican Party representatives in Miami-Dade County and Broward County filed responses opposing the manual recounts on the same day, well within the 72-hour statutory deadline for making requests in other counties, i.e., midnight on Friday, November 10, 2000.
. Many states decentralize this process without requiring statewide recounts.
. There are obvious and powerful reasons not to permit individual voters to trigger a manual recount; their interests are adequately represented by the candidates and parties, and individual voter participation would likely lead to administrative nightmares.
. Many states permit a recount to be triggered only upon the request of a candidate, political party and/or a political committee, but not upon the appeal of an individual voter. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-319 (candidate); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-10.5-106 (candidate); IDAHO CODE § 34-2301 (candidate); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-11-1 (candidate or political party's county chairperson); IOWA CODE § 50.48 (candidate); LA. REV. STAT. § 1451 3-12-11-1 (candidate or political party); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 737-A (losing candidate); MD. CODE. ANN., Elections § 12-101 (losing candidate); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.553 (candidate); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:28-1 (candidate); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 8-111 (candidate); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.161 (candidate, political party or county clerk); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 212.023 (candidate); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-800 (candidate); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.64.010 (candidate or political party); W. VA. CODE § 3-6-9 (candidate); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01 (candidate); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-16-109 & 110 (losing candidate or county canvassing board).
. Much of Plaintiffs' argument focuses on the assumption that a candidate's self-interest in selecting counties likely to produce more undervotes for him introduces an invidious and unconstitutional discrimination. My discussion in text reveals the weaknesses which I see in this argument. In summary, a candidate can only request, not mandate, a recount. The decision is made by a county canvassing board with several built-in statutory safeguards — including the composition of the board (preordained county officials, including a county judge, none of whom can be active in any candidacy), statutory standards to guide the board’s discretion (relating to the intention of voters and an error in the mechanical tabulation), and the fact that the board’s meetings must be open and are subject to public scrutiny and court review. Strong state interests support county-level decentralization; mandating statewide recounts in every instance would impose severe administrative burdens. Rather than invidious discrimination, I suggest that the statute contemplates that candidates or parties are the appropriate entities to make such request because their self-interest prompts them to be alert to problems in a machine tally which might make a recount appropriate. Like the statutory contemplation, a requesting candidate would also contemplate that any opposing candidate would be alert to problems in counties favorable to him. There is an equal right and an equal opportunity in that respect, as stated clearly in the statute. Nothing in the statute suggests that only a candidate losing in a particular county can make a request in that county; the statutory standard is an error in the vote tabulation that could affect the outcome of the election. Nothing suggests that the statute means the "outcome” in that particular county; rather, the statute says "outcome of the election” itself. Nothing suggests that a canvassing board may not consider the potential effects of other recounts in its own decision to authorize a manual recount. Nothing prevents a candidate or a party requesting a manual recount from notifying a canvassing board of the fact that other counties may authorize or have authorized manual recounts which may change the vote totals. As applied here, the record before this Court does not reveal a motive by the Democratic Party to deprive the Republican Party of its opportunity to request manual recounts. The requests challenged here were not strategically delayed; rather, the requests were made on November 9, 2000, more than 24 hours before the 72-hour deadline, leaving ample time for the opposing candidate to make requests in response. Permitting candidates to request recounts is a reasonable way to promote the state's legitimate and strong interest in ensuring a full and accurate count of ballots where the voters' intention can be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained, especially so when any request is circumscribed by the statutory safeguards provided here. Indeed, many states permit candidates or political parties to request such recounts; if Plaintiffs' arguments prevail, the status of many state election laws, and many elections, would be constitutionally suspect.
. The applicable Alabama statute required absentee voters to send their ballots accompanied by an affidavit which was either notarized or signed by two witnesses. It was undisputed in Roe that the previous practice in Alabama, as mandated by statute, had been to disregard absentee ballots that were mailed in without the required affidavit.
. There remain in the present record sufficient disputed facts as to any significant change of practice that I cannot conclude with the necessary clarity that any significant number of votes was counted pursuant to a changed practice.
My opinion would not change, even assuming that there may have been a change of practice — i.e., from counting only partially detached chads to counting ballots that were not partially detached, but under the totality of the circumstances the intention of the voter could be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained. See Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, No. 00-11078, 2000 WL 1728721 (Fla. Palm Beach Co. Cir. Ct., Nov. 22, 2000). The statutory standard— i.e., the determination of the voter's intent within the Canvassing Board’s discretion, subject to judicial review — has remained constant. Even assuming some change with respect to the discretionary interpretation of particular physical attributes of ballots, there is no evidence in this record that a practice has been implemented which is inconsistent *1189with the plain statutory standard, as was the case in Roe.
. While this record reveals isolated observations of acts from which a fact finder might infer an effort to dislodge a chad, I cannot conclude that the district court was clearly erroneous. I see little or no evidence of actual intent to dislodge a chad, or that ballots were counted when they were not already partially dislodged. I also note that the presence of Republican and Democratic observers, in addition to the intense public scrutiny, helps to ensure the integrity of the process.
. The Plaintiffs also allege a First Amendment violation, essentially arguing that Florida's statute grants county canvassing board members unlimited discretion to impinge on voter’s rights through arbitrary decisions regarding whether to conduct manual recounts. In another articulation of their argument, the Plaintiffs argue that the canvassing board’s decisions are governed by no standards. The Plaintiffs argue that the right to vote is protected by the First Amendment. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (stating that the right to vote is entitled to similar constitutional protections as the First Amendment right of association); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (holding that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause). They argue that the Constitution prohibits the overbroad exercise of discretion by officials over First Amendment rights and, therefore, that Florida’s statute violates the Constitution. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (stating that an "impermissible risk of suppression of ideas” exists where "an ordinance ... delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker”).
Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ argument, cases implicating First Amendment standards have involved claims that pure speech might be chilled or prevented altogether. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129-30, 112 S.Ct. at 2401; City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d at 1285 (citing Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1189 (11th Cir.1983) and Deerfield Med. Ctr., 661 F.2d at 338). This is not such a case. Instead, the constitutional right to vote, and the principle of equality among voters, is protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the *1190Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1505, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980)(citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)). I conclude that the Florida manual recount statute satisfies equal protection because it contains constitutionally sufficient standards to constrain the discretion of canvassing board officials. I describe the statutory and judicially imposed constraints on these officials’ discretion supra at 1171-73. Based on these constraints, I conclude that the challenged provisions of Florida election law do not permit officials to exercise overly broad discretion over voters’ rights.
I thus conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to show a severe burden on their voting rights; instead, the statutory safeguards ensure only reasonable, nondiscriminatory burdens. I conclude that Florida’s important interests in ensuring accurate, complete election results, and the state's strong interest in its established system of decentralized administration of elections, justify the reasonable, nondiscriminatory impact of Florida's manual recount statute on voters' rights. The Plaintiffs thus fail to establish a First Amendment violation.
. We noted in our November 27, 2000, Order that Plaintiffs’ motion for permanent in-junctive relief has remained pending in the district court, and that court has remained available for further factual development.