I concur in the per curiam opinion. I write separately only to express my view on a question we did not reach because we chose to rely on an alternate ground.
The district court dismissed WJC’s complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cognizable Bivens claim. I conclude that the district court erred in relying on that rationale.
The government contends that a Bivens remedy is not available to compensate WJC for the alleged constitutional injuries it incurred as a result of a tax audit that WJC asserts was launched to harass it for exercising its First Amendment rights. WJC contends that the audit was ordered in retaliation for its funding of investigative journalism critical of the Administration. Assuming (as we must) that the facts as stated by WJC are correct,1 I conclude, contrary to the district court, that a Bivens remedy is available.
The government claims that this case falls within the exception to Bivens recognized in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (holding that no Bivens remedy is available when “Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur”). Under its theory, the government would be insulated against liability for its attempt to suppress the type of criticism that forms the very core of speech protected by the First Amendment. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). As a result, those voices it seeks to silence would be without a legal remedy.
The government reads Schweiker too broadly. In Schweiker, which concerned the denial of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, after surveying the extensive remedial provisions of the Social Security Act, the Court determined that “Congress ... has not failed to provide meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights or persons situated as [the plaintiffs] were.” Id. at 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460. While the Court agreed that the restoration of back benefits afforded by the statute would not fully remedy the plaintiffs, it held that the statutory relief sufficed, and therefore it would not judicially create a supplemental form of relief. Id. at 428-29, 108 S.Ct. 2460.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). In Bush, the plaintiff, a federal employee, alleged that he was demoted for exercising his First Amendment rights by making statements to the press that were critical of the government. See id. at 369-70, 103 S.Ct. 2404. He exercised his statutory right to challenge this action before the Civil Service Commission, was reinstated to his previous position, and received back pay. See id. at 370-71, 103 S.Ct. 2404. He also sought damages in state court for violation of his First Amendment rights. See id. at 371, 103 S.Ct. 2404. On appeal from this *1159second action, the Supreme Court explained that:
[t]he question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that had been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue. Id. at 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404.
Answering this question in the negative, the Court declined' to augment the remedy available to Bush. See id. at 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404.
In this case, unlike in Schweiker and Bush, WJC argues that no relief at all would be available to it, and therefore in the absence of a Bivens remedy “the wrong ... would ... go unredressed.” Id. at 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999. In Schweiker, plaintiffs could recover the denied benefits. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 428, 108 S.Ct. 2460. In Bush, the plaintiff could be reinstated and receive back pay. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 370-71, 103 S.Ct. 2404. Schiueiker and Bush hold that when Congress affords a remedy for the constitutional violation, even if the remedy does not afford complete relief, a court may not judicially create an additional remedy. Those cases do not, however, stand for the proposition that when Congress has created no remedy at all, a Bivens remedy may not be afforded to those whose constitutional rights have been violated simply because Congress affords other remedies for unrelated violations that occur in the course of administering the government program or activity involved.
When considering a factual circumstance materially different from the one presented here, the use of unconstitutional tactics when collecting taxes, we held that because the plaintiff has “the right to sue the government for a refund of taxes unlawfully collected,” the additional remedy of a Bivens action is not also available. Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir.1990); National Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521, 1532 (10th Cir.1994); Cameron v. IRS, 773 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir.1985); cf. Shreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir.2000) (no Bivens remedy available where IRS officials violated constitutional rights when making a tax assessment). However, unlike in Wages and Shreiber, in which the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides a mechanism for the taxpayer to be compensated for the wrongful collection of taxes and the wrongful determination of the amount of taxes owed, in this case, the Code does not authorize any relief (other than a declaratory judgment, see 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a)); nor does that Code preclude relief for the type of injury alleged here — harassment by means of a retaliatory audit on account of the expression of one’s political views.
If the IRS actually conducts audits of organizations to retaliate against them for exercising their First Amendment right to criticize government officials, courts certainly have the authority to intervene. The Bivens remedy is a powerful tool against such governmental abuse, and must be available in appropriate cases.
The Tenth Circuit has explained that, in cases in which the Code does not provide any mechanism for compensation, IRS officers are not shielded from liability simply because the Code contains remedies for other, unrelated violations. National Commodity & Barter Ass’n, 31 F.3d at 1530 (Bivens remedy against IRS officials proper to redress injury to First Amendment rights caused by seizure of organization’s membership lists); cf. id. at 1532 (no Bivens remedy to redress harm caused by jeopardy assessment, because the Code provides a mechanism to remedy wrongful collection of taxes). I agree with the Tenth Circuit that a Bivens remedy is available in First Amendment cases involving the type of IRS harassment alleged here.
For the above reasons I conclude that the district court erred in dismissing *1160WJC’s complaint for failure to state a Bivens claim, as well as in failing to dismiss that action because it was barred by the statute of limitations.
. As made clear in the opinion for the court, for the purposes of our opinions, the facts must be assumed to be as alleged by WJC. The plausibility or lack of plausibility of the factual allegations is not before the court at this stage of the proceeding. See Tworivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999).