Opinion by Judge RYMER; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT.
RYMER, Circuit Judge:Theodore John Kaczynski, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction. In that motion, Kaczynski alleges that his guilty plea to indictments returned against him as the “Unabomber” in the Eastern District of California and in the District of New Jersey, in exchange for the United States renouncing its intention to seek the death penalty, was involuntary because his counsel insisted on presenting evidence of his mental condition, contrary to his wishes, and the court denied his Faretta request to represent himself.2 Having found that the Faretta request was untimely and not in good faith, that counsel could control the presentation of evidence, and that the plea was voluntary, the district court denied the § 2255 motion without calling for a response or holding a hearing.
This court issued a certificate of appeal-ability. The government submits that Kaczynski is foreclosed from raising the voluntariness of his plea on collateral review because he did not do so on direct appeal, but we conclude on the merits that the district court did not err. Therefore, we affirm.
I
The facts underlying Kaczynski’s arrest (April 3, 1996) and indictment for mailing or placing sixteen bombs that killed three people, and injured nine others, are well known and we do not repeat them here. Rather, we summarize the pre-trial proceedings that bear on the voluntariness of Kaczynski’s plea.
The California Indictment (returned June 18, 1996) charged Kaczynski with four counts of transporting an explosive in interstate commerce with intent to kill or injure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(d); three counts of mailing an explosive device with intent to kill or injure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1716; and three counts of using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The New Jersey Indictment (returned October 1, 1996) charged one count of transporting an explosive device in interstate commerce with intent to kill or injure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(d); one count of mailing an explosive device with intent to kill or injure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1716; and one count of using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).3 The government gave notice of its intent to *1111seek the death penalty under both indictments on May 15,1997.
The California Indictment was assigned to the calendar of the Hon. Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Quin Denvir, the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of California, and Judy Clarke, the Federal Public Defender for Eastern Washington and Idaho, were appointed to represent Kaezynski. They filed motions to suppress evidence in March, 1997, which were denied.
On June 24, 1997, Kaezynski filed a notice under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2(b) of his intent to introduce expert testimony of his mental condition at trial.4 According to his § 2255 motion, Kaezynski consented to the notice reluctantly and only to allow evidence relating to his “mental condition” — not to a “mental disease or defect.” He also avers that the purpose of the notice was to allow psychologist Julie Krie-gler, who did not think that he suffered from serious mental illness, to testify.
Jury selection began November 12. Six hundred veniremen were summoned, and 450 questionnaires were filled out. Voir dire of 182 prospective jurors took sixteen days over the course of six weeks.
Kaezynski alleges that he learned in the courtroom on November 25 that his attorneys intended to portray him as suffering from major mental illness (schizophrenia), but that he was deterred from bringing his conflict with counsel to the court’s attention as counsel were in plea negotiations with the government.5 Evidently by December 17" it had become clear that Kae-zynski would not go for an unconditional plea and the government would not accept a conditional one. In the meantime, Kae-zynski was giving thought to whether he wanted Tony Serra, a San Francisco lawyer whom he believed would not employ a mental state defense, to represent him. On December 16, he received a letter indicating that Serra would be available, but on December 17 Serra withdrew from consideration.
On December 18, Kaezynski’s counsel gave the district court three letters in which Kaezynski explained that he had a conflict with his attorneys over the presentation of a mental status defense. The next day the court held an ex parte, in camera conference with Kaezynski and counsel, as a result of which he and they undertook to confer over the weekend. On December 22, Clarke and Denvir advised the court that a compromise had been worked out: They agreed to withdraw the Rule 12.2(b) notice and not to present any expert mental health testimony at the guilt phase of the trial, while Kaezynski accepted their control over the presentation of evidence and witnesses to be called, including mental health expert witnesses and members of Kaezynski’s family, in order to put on a full case of mitigation at the penalty phase. Kaezyn-ski told the court that he was willing to proceed with his attorneys on this basis, and that “the conflict at least is provisionally resolved.” In response to the court’s query, Kaezynski also said that he did not want to represent himself. Jury selection was then completed and (to allow for the holidays) opening statements were set to begin January 5,1998.
On January 5, Kaezynski told the court that he wished to revisit the issue of his relations with his attorneys. He said that he had learned from a preview of the opening statement the evening before (January 4) that counsel intended to present non-expert evidence of his mental state in the guilt phase. Clarke and Denvir *1112explained that they intended to introduce evidence of Kaczynski’s physical state, living conditions, lifestyle, and writings to show the deterioration of his mental state over the 25 years he lived in Montana. Kaczynski also raised for the first time with the court the possibility that he might want to have Serra replace Denvir and Clarke. The district court continued the trial to January 8, and appointed Keven Clymo as “conflicts” counsel for Kaczynski.
Another hearing was held January 7. Kaczynski withdrew his January 5 request for Serra to represent him because Clymo had convinced him it would not be in his best interests; however, later the same day, Serra “faxed” a letter indicating that if Kaczynski’s present lawyers were re-cused, he was willing to substitute in. Kaczynski told the court that he would like to be represented by Serra, but said: “As to the question of when he would be able to start, he stated that, of course, he will not be able to start trial tomorrow. He would need a considerable time to prepare.” The court refused to allow Serra to take over because of the delay it would cause. After discussing Kaczynski’s continuing differences with counsel over mental status evidence, the court also ruled that counsel could control the defense and present evidence of his mental condition over Kaczynski’s objection. Again in response to a question from the court, Kac-zynski said that he did not want to represent himself. He explained that “if this had happened a year and a half ago, I would probably have elected to represent myself. Now, after a year and a half with this, I’m too tired, and I really don’t want to take on such a difficult task. So far I don’t feel I’m up to taking that challenge at the moment, so I’m not going to elect to represent myself.”
However, the next day (January 8), Kac-zynski’s counsel informed the court that Kaczynski wanted to proceed as his own counsel. Clarke explained that Kaczynski believed he had no choice, given presentation of a mental illness defense which he “cannot endure.” Clarke also indicated that Kaczynski had advised her that he was prepared to proceed pro se that day, without delay. Both sides thought that a competency examination should be conducted, given defense counsels’ view that his mental condition was Kaczynski’s only viable defense. The court also noted that it had learned from the U.S. Marshals office that Kaczynski might have attempted suicide the night before. Accordingly, it ordered a competency examination, to be completed before ruling on the Faretta request. The trial was continued to January 22. A court-appointed psychiatrist examined Kaczynski and concluded that he was competent. All parties agreed on January 20 that this resolved the issue.
On January 21, Kaczynski again asked to represent himself.6 The court denied the request on January 22, finding that it was untimely because it came after meaningful trial proceedings had begun and the jury had been empaneled. The court also found that Kaczynski’s request to represent himself was a tactic to secure delay and that delay would have attended the granting of the motion given the complexity of the capital prosecution. Although Kaczynski did not request a continuance, the court found “it was impossible to conceive” that he could immediately assume his own defense without considerable delay for preparation of an adequate defense. This, in turn, would risk losing jurors and having again to go through the arduous process of selecting a new jury. The court also found that Kaczynski’s conduct was *1113not consistent with a good faith assertion of his right to represent himself, as he had long known of his attorneys’ intention to present mental health evidence and had agreed on December 22 that they could do so at the penalty phase. Accordingly, the court concluded, Kaczynski’s conflict with counsel turned solely on the moment when mental evidence would be presented. Finally, the court declined to exercise its discretion to permit Kaczynski to represent himself in spite of the untimely request, noting that to do so would result in Kaczynski’s foregoing “the only defense that is likely to prevent his conviction and execution.”7
Immediately after the Faretta request was denied from the bench, Denvir informed the court that Kaczynski would unconditionally plead guilty to both the California and New Jersey Indictments if the government would withdraw its notices of intent to seek the death penalty. (Kac-zynski alleges that this condition was counsels’ idea, not his.) A written plea agreement was entered into shortly thereafter, and the plea was taken by the court the same day.
Kaczynski was sentenced May 4, 1998 to four consecutive life sentences, plus 30 years imprisonment. He was ordered to pay $15,026,000 in restitution to his victims. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, Kaczynski did not appeal.
On April 23, 1999, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction. The district court denied the motion without calling for a response or holding a hearing. It also denied a certifícate of appealability. This appeal followed. We certified three issues: (1) whether Kaczynski’s guilty plea was voluntary; (2) whether Kaczynski properly was denied the right to self-representation; and (3) whether a criminal defendant in a capital case has a constitutional right to prevent his appointed defense counsel from presenting evidence in support of an impaired mental state defense at trial.
II
We must first consider whether Kaczynski is barred from raising these claims in a collateral attack under § 2255, for the government argues that he procedurally defaulted by failing to raise them on direct appeal. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (“[Ejven the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct review. Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.”) (internal quotations omitted). Kaczynski counters that the government waived its right to raise the issue of procedural default by having not done so in the district court. We disagree, because the district court summarily denied Kaczynski’s § 2255 motion without giving the government an opportunity to be heard. As the government had no chance to argue default, we allow it to do so now. Cf. United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (government’s failure to raise petitioner’s procedural default in district court waives the defense in the absence of extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the omission should be overlooked).
Kaczynski acknowledges that his § 2255 motion raises only one claim — that his guilty plea was involuntary. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider default with respect to his Faretta request or control over the mental state defense. These issues are only points upon which Kaczynski relies to show that his guilty plea was involuntary; he does not now (nor, as he also recognizes, could he) raise these claims independently. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. *11141602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (criminal defendant who has admitted guilt in guilty plea may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to entry of plea),
Kaczynski argues that even if he did procedurally default his voluntariness claim, there were two causes to excuse it: first, that he waived the right to appeal in the plea agreement, and second, that his attorneys failed to consult with him about the possibility of direct appeal. The government maintains that the plea agreement waiver cannot justify bypassing direct review of his current claims, see United States v. Pipitone, 67 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1995) (so holding with respect to agreement not to appeal a sentence within the guideline range), but it fails to argue how we can resolve counsels’ possible ineffectiveness without a more fully developed record. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621-22, 118 S.Ct. 1604; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942) (per curiam) (coercion of plea appropriately raised on collateral review when facts relied on are dehors the record and not open to consideration and review on direct appeal). Accordingly, we cannot say that Kaczynski procedurally defaulted his involuntariness claim without cause.
Ill
On the merits, Kaczynski contends that his plea was involuntary because he was improperly denied his Faretta right, or because he had a constitutional right to prevent his counsel from presenting mental state evidence. Even if neither deprivation suffices, still the plea was involuntary in his view because it was induced by the threat of a mental state defense that Kaczynski would have found unendurable.
It goes without saying that a plea must be voluntary to be constitutional. We review whether it was de novo, United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2000), and the district court’s findings for clear error. United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1988).
The general principles are well settled. To determine voluntariness, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir.1986). A plea is voluntary if it “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences ... must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). In sum, “a guilty plea is void if it was ‘induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act.’ ” Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)).
A
Here, the plea was both written and oral. In the written agreement, Kaczynski admitted guilt on each of the offenses charged in both indictments and agreed to plead guilty “because he is in fact guilty”; waived his constitutional trial and appellate rights;8 acknowledged he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving these rights, that his attorney had explained both the rights and the consequences of his waiver, and that he freely *1115and voluntarily consented to the waiver; and agreed to waive all rights to appeal the plea and sentence including legal rulings made by the district court. In a separate, “approval” section of the plea agreement, Kaczynski affirms that he had reviewed the agreement with his attorneys, and that “I understand it, and I voluntarily agree to it and freely acknowledge that I am guilty of the crimes charged.” Also, that: “No other promises or inducements have been made to me, other than those contained in this agreement. In addition, no one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this Plea Agreement. Finally, except as otherwise reflected in the record, I am satisfied with the representation of my attorneys in this case.”9
During the Rule 11 colloquy, Kaczynski stated under oath that he was “entering [the] plea of guilty voluntarily because it is what [he] want[ed] to do”; that he was satisfied with his attorneys’ representation, except for the mental defect defense as reflected in the record; and that no one had forced or threatened him to plead guilty. He stated that he was willing to proceed for sentencing with present counsel. The district court found that “the defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea and that his plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offense.”
In its order denying the § 2255 motion, the court found that Kaczynski was aware of the basis on which his motion challenged the plea at the time of the plea colloquy, yet affirmatively answered the court’s inquiry about whether he was entering his guilty plea voluntarily and responded negatively when asked whether anyone had attempted to force or threaten him to plead guilty. The court noted that Kac-zynski specifically referred to the disagreement with his attorneys about a mental status defense, but did not suggest in any way that he believed this disagreement affected the voluntariness of his plea. Further, the court found that Kaczynski showed no signs of anxiety or distress when he stated that he was voluntarily entering into the plea; that nothing about his demeanor indicated he endured any coercion; that he admitted the charges with no sign of reservation; and that his sworn plea statements were “lucid, articulate, and utterly inconsistent with his present claim that he did not voluntarily plead guilty.”
We give “substantial weight” to Kaczynski’s in-court statements, United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir.1991), and we accept the district court’s findings as we are not firmly convinced they are wrong. Kaczynski was clearly aware of the consequences of his plea (and does not contend otherwise). The decision to plead guilty in exchange for the government’s giving up its intent to seek the death penalty and to continue prosecuting him was rational given overwhelming evidence that he committed the Unabomb crimes and did so with substantial planning and premeditation, lack of remorse, and severe and irreparable harm. While Kaczynski does contend that his attorneys deceived him about their intentions to present a mental status defense, he knew what they planned to do before deciding to plead guilty, and he does not claim that he was persuaded to plead guilty by threats or misrepresentations of his attorneys, the government, or the court. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that his decision to plead guilty was influenced by improper threats, promises, or deceits, and no reason not fully to credit Kaczynski’s sworn statements in the plea agreement, as well as during the plea colloquy, that he was pleading voluntarily.
This would normally end the inquiry, for being forced to choose between *1116unpleasant alternatives is not unconstitutional. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750, 90 S.Ct. 1463. However, since the district court ruled on Kaezynski’s § 2255 motion, we held in United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.2000), that the erroneous denial of a Faretta request renders a guilty plea involuntary.10 We reasoned that wrongly denying a defendant’s request to represent himself forces him “to choose between pleading guilty and submitting to a trial the very structure of which would be unconstitutional.” Id. at 626. Because this deprives the defendant “of the choice between the only two constitutional alternatives — a plea and a fair trial,” we concluded that a district court’s improper Faretta ruling “imposed unreasonable constraints” on the defendant’s decision-making, thus making a guilty plea involuntary. Id. at 627. Therefore, we must consider whether Kaezynski’s plea was rendered involuntary on account of a wrongful refusal to grant his request for self-representation.
B
Following Faretta, our court has developed the rule that “[a] criminal defendant’s assertion of his right to self-representation must be timely and not for purposes of delay; it must also be unequivocal, as well as voluntary and intelligent.” Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 620 (summarizing prior law).
Kaczynski argues that there must be an affirmative showing that he intended to delay the trial by asking to represent himself, and that none was made here. See Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir.1982). Rather, he asserts, the facts show that his purpose was to avoid the mental state defense. Kaczynski also contends that his Faretta request was timely, which we assume (without deciding) that it was for purposes of appeal.11 This leaves only the question whether he had bona fide reasons for not asserting his right of self-representation until he did. In making this determination, a court may consider the effect of delay as evidence of a defendant’s intent, along with events preceding the motion, “to determine whether they are consistent with a good faith assertion of the Faretta right and whether the defendant could reasonably be expected to have made the motion at an earlier time.” Id. at 784-85.
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but we have not yet clarified whether denial of a Faretta request is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. See United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 937, 116 S.Ct. 351, 133 L.Ed.2d 247 (1995). We conclude that under either standard, the propriety of denying Kaezynski’s request necessarily follows from the district court’s finding that he asserted the right to represent himself as a tactic to delay trial proceedings and lacked bona fide reasons for failing to assert it before January 8,1998.
The court found that Kaczynski “clearly and unambiguously permitted his lawyers to adduce mental status evidence at trial, and his complaints to the contrary, asserted on the day trial was set to commence, evidence his attempt to disrupt the trial *1117process.” Further, the court found that although Kaczynski contended he made his January 8 request to represent himself only because he could not endure his attorneys’ strategy of presenting mental status evidence in his defense, the record belied this contention because Kaczynski had authorized its use. The court also found that Kaczynski was well aware before January 8 that evidence of his mental status would be adduced at trial. In addition to the December 22 accord, Kaczynski was present during all but one day of the seventeen days of voir dire, during which the court observed that he conferred amicably with his attorneys while they openly and obviously selected jurors appearing receptive to mental health evidence about him. Finally, the court found that Kaczynski could not have immediately assumed his own defense without considerable delay, given the large amount of technical evidence and more than 1300 exhibits that the government intended to offer.
These findings are well grounded in the record, and support the court’s conclusion that Kaczynski’s request for self-representation was tactically made for dilatory purposes. Kaczynski knew from at least November 25 that he and his attorneys disagreed about a mental status defense, but he agreed on December 22 to let Den-vir and Clarke proceed with both expert and lay testimony on his mental condition in the penalty phase so long as they presented no such expert testimony in the guilt phase. Although he knew then that evidence of his mental condition would be presented, Kaczynski expressly said that he did not want to represent himself. As he agreed to evidence of his mental state, it cannot be for this reason that he later invoked the right; otherwise, he could have done so on December 22.12 Instead, on January 5, when opening statements were supposed to start, Kaczynski renewed complaints about the mental status evidence his counsel planned to present in the guilt phase and mentioned to the court for the first time his interest in being represented by Tony Serra. This caused the trial to be continued to January 8. On January 7 Kaczynski said that he would like Serra to represent him, knowing that it would take Serra months to get ready. When the court refused to substitute Serra because of the substantial continuance that would be required, and ruled that appointed counsel could control the timing of when mental status evidence was introduced, Kaczynski repeated that he did not want to represent himself. However, that evening he may have attempted suicide and the next day (when the continued trial was set to start), Kaczynski informed the court that given presentation of a mental illness defense which he could not endure, he wanted to go forward as his own counsel. This triggered a competency examination and another delay in the start of trial, until January 22.
Kaczynski contends that he could not have been influenced by delay, given that he was incarcerated for the long haul in any event. However, the district court found that he was simultaneously pursuing strategies to delay the trial, to project a desired image of himself, and to improve his settlement prospects with the government. Kaczynski also argues that it should not matter whether he agreed to let evidence of his mental state be presented in the penalty phase, because the trial might never have gotten that far. We disagree, for Kaczynski never did — and does not now suggest — that he is actually *1118innocent or that there was any realistic chance that the jury would not unanimously find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
As the events preceding Kaczynski’s Faretta request show, he knew about and approved use of mental state evidence without invoking his right to represent himself. Accordingly, the court could well determine that Kaczynski’s avowed purpose of invoking the right in order to avoid a defense he could not endure was not “consistent with a good faith assertion of the Faretta right,” and that he “could reasonably be expected to have made the motion at an earlier time.” Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784-85. Having found that the request for self-representation was for tactical reasons and not for any good faith reason other than delay, the court properly denied Kaczynski’s Faretta request. His Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. Thus, his guilty plea was not, on this account, rendered involuntary under Hernandez.
C
For essentially the same reasons, neither was Kaczynski’s plea rendered involuntary on account of the threat of a mental state defense that he did not want presented. The government argues that Kaczynski’s guilty plea waived his right to challenge the district court’s ruling that his attorneys could put on mental state evidence at the guilt phase, and it unquestionably does. United States v. Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir.2000) (unconditional guilty plea “cures all antecedent constitutional defects”) (quoting United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir.1997)). Kaczynski does not contend otherwise, but instead argues that he was coerced into pleading guilty by his counsel’s insistence on a mental state defense, that his counsel deceived him in order to gain his cooperation with some such defense, and that he was induced to plead guilty by a choice (being unable to represent himself or to proceed without the mental state defense) that was constitutionally offensive.
Even if Kaczynski were misled by his counsel about the degree to which evidence of his mental state would be adduced in the guilt phase, he learned for sure what their plans were on January 4 when they previewed their opening statement for him and he does not allege, nor does the record show, that they in any way threatened or misled him with respect to the plea or its consequences. Cf. Iaea, 800 F.2d at 867-68 (attorney’s threat to withdraw if defendant continued to refuse to plead guilty may, along with other factors, have coercive impact on voluntariness of plea). Kaczynski hypothesizes that counsel may have used mental state evidence as a threat to pressure him into an unconditional plea bargain as a means of saving him from the risk of a death sentence, but admits that this is speculative and that no proof for it is possible. Beyond this, he contends that the Hernandez rationale applies also to the right to proceed to trial without the presentation of mental state evidence. He points out that “the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983), and argues that evidence about mental status is of the same order of magnitude. The government, on the other hand, submits that it is equally “clear that appointed counsel, and not his client, is in charge of the choice of trial tactics and the theory of defense.” United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir.1987); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659, 664, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (“the lawyer has — and must have — full authority to manage the conduct of the trial”) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988)). We need not decide where along this spectrum control of a mental defense short of insanity lies, because Kaczynski agreed that his counsel could control presentation of evidence and witnesses to be called (including expert witnesses and members of his family who would testify that he was mentally *1119ill) in order to put on a full case of mitigation at the penalty phase. Thus, as the district court found, Kaezynski’s claim that his plea was involuntary due to his aversion to being portrayed as mentally ill is inconsistent with his willingness to be so portrayed for purposes of avoiding the death penalty. This leaves only the pressure that Kaczynski personally felt on account of his wish to avoid the public disclosure of evidence about his mental state sooner rather than later. We agree with the district court that this does not transform his plea into an involuntary act. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-50, 90 S.Ct. 1463.
Accordingly, as Kaezynski’s guilty plea was voluntary and was not rendered involuntary on account of the wrongful denial of his Faretta request or because of anticipation of evidence about his mental condition, his habeas petition was properly denied.13
AFFIRMED.
. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (recognizing a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to represent himself).
. The New Jersey Indictment was transferred to the Eastern District of California under Fed.R.Crim.P. 20(a) pursuant to Kaczynski’s plea agreement.
. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2(b) provides:
If a defendant intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt, the defendant shall ... notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk.
. As Kaezynski’s January 21 letter to the court states, he agreed to his counsel’s recommendation to defer calling the conflict to the court's attention so that his counsel could use their conflict “as a lever to persuade the U.S. Justice Department to agree to a conditional plea bargain that would allow Kaezynski to appeal his Motion to Suppress Evidence.”
. In a letter to the court, Kaczynski wrote:
Your Honor, I recognize that you are an unusually compassionate judge, and that you sincerely believe yourself to be acting in my best interest in seeking to prevent me from representing myself. In an ordinary case your course would be the most compassionate one, and the one most likely to preserve the defendant’s life. But I beg you to consider that you are dealing with an unusual case and an unusual defendant and that preventing me from representing myself is not the most compassionate course or the one most likely to preserve my life.
. The district court issued another order May 4, 1998, the day of sentencing, in which it further detailed its reasons for finding that Kaczynski was competent (not at issue on appeal) and had not asserted his request for self-representation in a timely manner or consistent with a good faith invocation of the Faretta right.
. Specifically, the constitutional rights to a public and speedy trial; to a jury trial, presumption of innocence, and unanimous verdict; to confrontation of witnesses; to compulsory process; to the privilege against self incrimination; to appeal conviction after trial; and to the representation of counsel.
. There is no dispute this refers only to the disagreement about presentation of mental state evidence.
. The government submits that Hernandez was incorrectly decided, but this, of course, is for the court sitting en banc, not for this panel, to say.
. We have held that a Faretta request is timely if made “before meaningful trial proceedings have begun,” United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir.1986), and have also held that a request is timely if made “prior to jury selection,” and "before the jury is empaneled.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir.1991). The district court found that Kaezynski’s first unequivocal request for self-representation was untimely because it occurred after the jury was empaneled on December 22, when strikes had been exercised and jurors were selected. The parties dispute whether the jury was “selected” or "empaneled” and whether "meaningful trial proceedings” could have begun before the jury was sworn, but we do not need to resolve these issues because we assume that Kaezynski’s request was not untimely unless it was made for purposes of delay.
. Although Kaczynski correctly points out that the district court had once indicated that he might have reasonably believed that his attorneys’ withdrawal of the 12.2(b) notice meant that no lay evidence would be presented on his mental status during the guilt phase of the trial, the court subsequently found that, "after reflecting upon Kaczynski’s general acuity, the content of the agreement itself, which was known to him, his awareness of the questions his attorneys asked jurors during voir dire, and his expression and demean- or during voir dire that showed his clear approval of his lawyers’ effort to use that defense to save his life, I became convinced that Kaczynski knew that his lawyers intended to offer mental status evidence during the guilt phase of trial.” Order of May 4, 1998 at 18, n. 20 (citations to record omitted).
. Given our disposition there is no need to reach Kaczynski's request for a different judge on remand.