dissenting.
The majority has done a masterful job of trying to make sense of a guideline provision, which, in the context of these facts, is counterintuitive at best, and is penologieally nonsensical at worst. As explained by the majority, Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines establishes the base level offense for defendants who agree or conspire to sell narcotics, based upon the quantity of drugs involved. Application Note 12 to § 2D1.1 addresses the method for determining the appropriate quantity. Specifically, it requires that the agreed-upon quantity of a controlled substance shall be used to determine the offense level unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 12 (1998).
Although not explicitly addressed by Application Note 12, I agree with the majority that a seller/seller agreement is sufficient to meet this test. We diverge, however, thereafter. According to the majority, the District Court erred by holding that a seller/seller agreement was consummated that more accurately reflected the scale of the offense. I disagree. ■ I believe that although Yeung and Zheng only sold and delivered an ounce, they agreed to sell the unit. Further, I believe the District Court properly exercised its discretion in holding that the unit more accurately measured the scale of the offense. Because I conclude that Yeung’s *328sentence should instead reflect the unit (680 grams) of drugs that he repeatedly-offered to Nguyen, I respectfully dissent.
It is undisputed that Yeung and Zheng wanted to sell a unit of drugs to Nguyen. Accordingly, the first question is whether this unit was the amount negotiated or agreed upon. If so, we must determine whether this unit more accurately reflects the scale of the offense than the amount delivered. The majority concludes that Yeung and Zheng never agreed to sell a unit, that Nguyen never agreed to buy a unit, and that the ounce Yeung deliver ed, rather than the unit he wanted to sell, more accurately reflects the scale of his offense. In arriving at this conclusion, the majority holds that Application Note 12 requires a further scheduled drug delivery or, at the very least, an agreement to deliver more drugs before a sentencing court can consider a negotiated drug quantity to measure the scale of an offense. Maj. Op. at 325.
According to the majority, rejected but repeated offers do not constitute negotiations.1 Instead, the seller and buyer must schedule a further delivery of a specified quantity of drugs. Maj. Op. at 324, 325 - 27. Therefore, because Nguyen resisted Yeung’s attempts to sell more than one ounce and never scheduled any further deliveries, the majority concludes that there is insufficient evidence to show an agreement to sell the unit. In my view, this interpretation and application of Note 12 is incorrect and reflects neither the gravity of the offense nor the culpability of the appellant.
I note first that the plain language of Application Note 12 does not require a scheduled future delivery in order for a quantity of drugs to be considered “negotiated or agreed upon.” Nor does Application Note 12 require scheduled future deliveries to use a negotiated or agreed upon quantity of drugs, instead of the amount delivered, to measure the offense level. In one of its examples, Application Note 12 simply notes that a lack of further deliveries is a factor to consider. It states: “a defendant agrees to sell 500 grams of cocaine, the transaction is completed by delivery of the controlled substance-actually 480 grams of cocaine, and no further delivery is scheduled. In this example, the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense.” U.S. Sentenoing Guidelines MaNüal § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 12 (1998) (emphasis added).
Although this example suggests that a future scheduled delivery is germane to an offense level determination, it is not an absolute requirement nor does it control every factual scenario. The facts of the present case are distinguishable from the example and, therefore, the lack of scheduled future delivery is neither controlling nor even helpful.
In the Application Note’s example, the defendant controlled the amount delivered. The defendant ultimately delivered a smaller amount based upon his own decision. Here, however, the amount delivered clearly does not reflect Yeung’s and Zheng’s intent because they did not control the amount delivered. Instead, the amount was controlled by the informant and reflects his purchasing limitations. Yeung and Zheng sold one ounce only because the informant refused to buy more. It had nothing to do with Yeung’s and Zheng’s intention, capability, or agreement to sell more. The record reveals that Yeung and Zheng not only repeatedly offered to sell the entire unit, but continually insisted upon doing so. Had the informant wanted to purchase more, Yeung and Zheng would have sold it to him.
For example, during their first meeting, Yeung and Zheng told Nguyen that they would only sell unit and half-unit quantities; therefore, “an ounce would not do.” Appellant’s Br. at 4-5. In short, Yeung and Zheng were insistent, ready, willing, *329and able to sell the unit of drugs. This conduct amounts to more than “mere discussions” as the majority contends. It constitutes an agreement between Yeung and Zheng to sell the unit of drugs, despite Nguyen’s resistance and his resulting refusal to accept a larger amount or schedule future purchases. Although this agreement did not involve a buyer, it is an agreement nonetheless. Accordingly, I believe that Yeung’s and Zheng’s attempts to sell the unit were negotiations, that their obvious desire to sell the larger amount is incontrovertible evidence of an agreement, and that the unit that they agreed to sell more accurately reflects the scale of Yeung’s offense, even in the absence of a plan for future delivery.
United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.1999), supports my position. In Gomes, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s determination that a defendant charged with conspiracy and two counts of distribution was responsible for one kilogram of cocaine. The defendant had arranged a sale with a buyer, who was an undercover agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Before the meeting, the defendant advised the seller that the potential buyer wanted a kilogram of cocaine. At the meeting, however, the buyer surprised the defendant and seller by requesting a one ounce sample before buying the kilogram; he assured them that if it was good, he would contact them. No later sale was made, however. Nonetheless, the District Court found that the defendant arranged and aided and abetted a sale of a kilogram of cocaine. See Gomes, 177 F.3d at 84.
The Court of Appeals began its review of the District Court’s holding with the language of Application Note 12. It noted, as I believe, that the language was not absolute. It did not require courts always to use the amount delivered. See id. at 85. Rather, it established a presumption that the agreed upon amount governed “unless” a sale occurred and the quantity sold more accurately reflected the scale of the offense. See id. Moreover, the Note’s example, in which a defendant, who agrees to sell 500 grams but then delivers only 480 grams, was responsible for only 480 grams is not a “universal requirement.” The example involved similar amounts and a defendant, rather than a buyer, who decided to deliver less than promised. In addition, the example did not involve a defendant who, like Yeung, “independently conspired] with or aid[ed] an accomplice in the sale.” Accordingly, the Court held that because the defendant conspired to sell a kilogram and yet failed only because the buyer refused to accept the full amount, the kilogram and not the ounce actually delivered “more accurately reflect[ed] the scale of the offense.” Id. at 85.
The Gomes court stressed that the buyer rather than the defendant controlled the amount of drugs sold. As in the present case, the defendant and the seller would have sold a larger amount if not for the buyer’s resistance. The only “plan” for a “future delivery” in Gomes was the buyer’s assurance that he would contact the seller for more cocaine if it was “good.” In essence, the agreement in Gomes is the same as the one in this case. The defendant in Gomes agreed and arranged to make a sale of a kilogram of drugs (the larger amount) just as Yeung and Zheng agreed and attempted to arrange a sale of the unit. As such, the majority’s attempt to distinguish Gomes from the present case is misplaced.
Finally, I would like to note that in my view, we should review the District Court’s decision (that the quantity agreed upon rather than delivered “more accurately reflects the scale of the offense”) for an abuse of discretion. The majority does not reach this issue because it concludes that the agreed upon amount and the amount delivered were the same. However, because I believe there was an agreement to deliver a greater quantity, I must necessarily discuss our standard of review.
*330Our review under an abuse of discretion standard is quite narrow. A finding of abuse is appropriate only where the “judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir.1977). Stated differently, discretion is abused only where “no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir.1976).
With this deferential standard in mind, it can hardly be said that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that the unit that Yeung and Zheng agreed to sell, rather than the ounce they delivered, more accurately reflects Yeung’s culpability and hence the scale of his offense. The record overwhelmingly supports the District Court’s conclusion. As noted above, Yeung wanted and was fully prepared to sell the full unit. The fact that he only sold the ounce had nothing to do with his intentions or capability. Rather, the informant limited the amount delivered and bought. Therefore, Yeung should be held responsible for the larger amount since this is the amount he intended to sell. To hold otherwise would ignore this reality, and essentially allow an informant’s limitations to dictate the culpability of a defendant — an outcome that belies common sense and could not have been intended by the Sentencing Commission.
In sum, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Application Note 12. I believe that the District Court’s sentence was a proper exercise of its discretion, and would affirm its judgment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. This approach would likely surprise labor negotiators, who often negotiate for extended periods of time and make hundreds of offers before a contract is executed.