concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that Wilson’s petition for habeas corpus is untimely. However, because I would reach that same conclusion by following a different route, I concur in the judgment.
The majority’s decision is based on the premise that there are separate judgments of conviction for each count in a multiple-count criminal case. The majority therefore treats Wilson’s convictions for the offenses of CCE, drug conspiracy, and fire*221arms use as separate judgments even though the convictions are set forth in a single judgment order. I start from a different premise. There is, as a general rule, only one judgment of conviction in a multiple-count criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.2000) (recognizing that the defendant’s convictions for a drug conspiracy count and three aiding and abetting counts constituted a single judgment of conviction). The “judgment of conviction” is a unified document because it “must set forth ... the [jury’s] verdict or findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(d)(1). See also Colvin, 204 F.3d at 1224 & n. 3. Wilson’s original judgment of conviction in this case conformed to the rule. The document is entitled “Judgment in a Criminal Case,” and it sets forth both the adjudication of guilt on the three counts of conviction and the sentence. As a general proposition, the judgment of conviction does not become final until direct review of the conviction and sentence is concluded. See United States v. Torres, 211 F.3d 836, 839 (4th Cir.2000).
Wilson appealed his judgment of conviction, and we decided that his conspiracy conviction had to be set aside, but we affirmed his CCE and firearms convictions. We remanded for the district court “to vacate his [conspiracy] conviction (and its accompanying sentence) on that one count.” United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 307 (4th Cir.1998). Wilson applied to the Supreme Court for review of our decision affirming his CCE and firearms convictions, and the Court denied his petition for certiorari on May 26, 1998. Later, on September 24,1998, the district court, pursuant to our remand order, conducted a resentencing hearing for Wilson. That court on November 16, 1998, entered an order that amended the original judgment (1) by vacating Wilson’s conviction and sentence on the conspiracy count and (2) by ordering that “[t]he remainder of [Wilson’s] previously imposed sentence [would] remain the same.” Because Wilson did not file an appeal from the order amending his judgment (he had ten days to do so under Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)), his amended judgment became final on November 26, 1998. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir.1999) (“If a defendant does not pursue a timely direct appeal to the court of appeals, his or her conviction and sentence become final, and the statute of limitation begins to run, on the date on which the time for fifing such an appeal expired.”). If we had no other statute or rule to take into account, I would say that Wilson’s judgment of conviction did not become final until the time for appealing the amended judgment had passed. Thus, Wilson would have had one year from November 26, 1998, to file a § 2255 motion attacking any aspect of his judgment of conviction, and his motion filed on September 13, 1999, would have been timely. There is more to consider, however.
A reading of other applicable provisions, specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(b), 3742(f)(1), and Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a), reveals that Wilson’s § 2255 petition was filed too late. Section 3742(f)(1) of Title 18 provides that if “the court of appeals determines that [a defendant’s] sentence — (1) was imposed in violation of law ... the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate.” Rule 35(a) then empowers the district court to correct the sentence on remand. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) (“The court shall correct a sentence that is determined on appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to have been imposed in violation of law....”). Section 3582(b) of Title 18, however, dictates that the correction of a sentence pursuant to § 3742(f)(1) and Rule 35(a) *222does not otherwise affect the finality of a judgment of conviction. See United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plain text of § 3582(b) “clearly states” that a modification of a sentence does not affect the date on which a defendant’s judgment of conviction becomes final). Section 3582(b) states:
(b) Effect of finality of judgment. — Notwithstanding the fact that a sentence to imprisonment can subsequently be — ...
(2) corrected pursuant to the provisions of rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3742; ...
a judgment of conviction that includes such a sentence constitutes a final judgment for all other -purposes.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) (emphasis added).
Because we held in Wilson’s direct appeal that his conspiracy conviction had to be set aside, his sentence on the conspiracy count was therefore “imposed in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). On remand, pursuant to our instructions, the district court corrected Wilson’s sentence pursuant to § 3742(f)(1) and Rule 35(a) by vacating his conspiracy sentence and by reconfirming his original sentence on the remaining counts. Under the clear language of § 3582(b) the district court’s correction of Wilson’s sentence did not affect the date on which his judgment of conviction became “a final judgment for all other purposes.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b). In Wilson’s case the phrase, “a final judgment for all other purposes,” means that his judgment of conviction became final for purposes of his CCE and firearms convictions on May 26, 1998, the day on which the Supreme Court denied his petition for review of our decision affirming those convictions. See United States v. Torres, 211 F.3d 836, 839 (4th Cir.2000) (“[F]or a defendant who files a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, the conclusion of direct review occurs when the Supreme Court either denies his petition or decides his case on the merits. After the Supreme Court does either of these two things, the defendant’s judgment of conviction is final because literally nothing more occurs on direct review.”). Because Wilson’s judgment of conviction became final on May 26, 1998, for all purposes other than correction of his sentence on the conspiracy conviction, his petition challenging the validity of his CCE and firearms convictions is time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He filed his petition on September 13, 1999, which was more than one year from the date on which his judgment of conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Wilson’s habeas petition is untimely, I concur in the judgment affirming the dismissal of his petition.