concurring.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I write separately because I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Ohio State Univer: sity based upon the law of the case doctrine.
“The law of the case ... prevents a litigant from resurrecting an issue that has already been decided by a lower court and that has gone unchallenged on appeal.” Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir.1998). Which is to say, “[u]nder the doctrine of the law of the case, findings made at one point in the litigation become the law of the case for subsequent stages of *512that same litigation.” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 250 (1st Cir.1993)). “A complementary theory, the mandate rule, requires lower courts to adhere to the commands of a superior court.” Moored, 38 F.3d at 1421 (citing Bell, 988 F.2d at 251).
The elements of a Title IX claim based upon sexual harassment following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) have been set forth as follows:
Under the holding in Gebser, plaintiffs may proceed on a claim under Title IX if they have sufficiently alleged that: (1) they were subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment or subjected to a sexually hostile environment; (2) they brought the situation to the attention of an official at the educational institution receiving Title IX funds who had the “authority to take corrective action” to remedy the harassment; and (3) that the institution’s response to the harassment amounted to “deliberate indifference.”
Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir.1998) (citation omitted); see also Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258 (6th Cir.2000) (articulating the same elements of Title IX claim post-Gebser for student-on-student sexual harassment).
In the matter at hand, Plaintiffs allegations of sexual harassment were based upon Crawford’s conduct. Plaintiff did not appeal the district court’s order granting Crawford summary judgment on Plaintiffs allegation of sexually hostile environment, nor did she appeal the jury verdict in Crawford’s favor on Plaintiffs allegation of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Accordingly, under the law of the case doctrine, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first essential element of her Title IX claim, and her case is thus barred ixom appellate review. See Field, 157 F.3d at 40 (“The law of the case ... prevents a litigant from resurrecting an issue that has already been decided by a lower court and that has gone unchallenged on appeal.”) In other words, in order for this Court to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the University and remand the ease, the Court must determine that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial that Plaintiff was sexually harassed by Crawford. However, the issue of whether Plaintiff suffered sexual harassment at the hand of Crawford under either a quid pro quo or sexually hostile environment theory has been decided in Crawford’s favor, and has gone unchallenged by Plaintiff on appeal. Therefore, Plaintiffs Title IX claim against the University brought on the basis of Crawford’s alleged sexual harassment is barred under the law of the case. See id.; see also Moored, 38 F.3d at 1421.
The order rendered by a previous panel of this Court, that Plaintiffs claim on appeal was not moot because “[t]he question of whether the plaintiff could still prevail on a Title IX claim against OSU in light of the final judgment in favor of Crawford on the § 1983 sexual harassment claims is intertwined with the merits of the appeal and should not be decided by motion prior to complete briefing[,]” see Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., No. 98-3951 (6th Cir. Aug.4, 2000) (unpublished order), does not preclude dismissal based upon the law of the case at this time where, upon further briefing and analysis, it is now clear that Plaintiffs claim is barred by this doctrine.