concurring.
With all respect, I do not agree with the unqualified proposition that “holding a firearm establishes possession as a matter of law” in the context of § 922. I think we must recognize that there may be circumstances in which a jury should find that momentary holding would not constitute forbidden possession.
As we noted in United States v. Wilson, 922 F.2d 1336, 1338 (7th Cir.1991), not every instance of “holding” or “touching” necessarily demonstrates “possession.” Suppose a felon looking for her keys discovers them underneath her husband’s handgun on the kitchen counter. In order to get her keys, the woman lifts the gun, pushes it aside, and grabs her keys. In this scenario, even though she picked up the gun, she was not asserting control— momentarily holding the gun was merely incidental to obtaining her keys. Should this woman be guilty of possession under § 922(g)? Or consider the hypothetical considered by this court in Wilson in which a felon snatches a gun from the grasp of a child to protect the child. See id. Should he be guilty of possession under § 922(g)? Or suppose a disabled person drops his gun and a felon momentarily handles it while restoring it to him? These examples, among an endless array of instances of momentarily holding a gun without asserting control, see id., demonstrate that the distinction between “holding” a gun and “obtaining control” over it to establish possession is hardly “academic.” Slip op. at 718-19.
Under our precedents, forbidden possession is demonstrated if a person has physical control over an object. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir.1995) [It seems to me that there must be an assertion or exercise of control as well as an ability]. Until today we have not limited that standard to the possession of drugs. Indeed, this circuit’s pattern jury instructions defining “possession” of drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and “possession” of a firearm under § 922(g) are identical (stating that possession is the ability to control) and specifically cross-reference each other. See Fed.Crim. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, Nos. 841(a)(1), 922(g) (1999).
The court says we do not address whether touching a gun mandates the same result as holding one. Slip op. at 6. This suggests a vague distinction, confusing to apply. If a felon “inspects” or “handles” or “moves” a gun, did he in every circumstance “possess” it as a matter of law? The court does not succeed in stating a “bright-line” rule.
I do, however, concur in the result reached by the court. Lane’s holding the gun to inspect it cannot be disassociated from his negotiation and his decision to make the purchase, albeit on behalf of someone else. I can agree that his handling of the gun was an incident of his purchase and an assertion of physical control. Lane argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that momentarily holding the gun does not necessarily constitute possession. But under these circumstances, the instructions com*723plained of were not prejudicial because Lane asserted physical control over the gun.