dissenting.
There being no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court, I respectfully dissent. I also respectfully dissent from the reasoning of the concurrence that finds an incompatibility between the five-factor test this circuit adopted in Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494, 495-96 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam) and the fee-awarding presumption the court earlier adopted in Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1356 (8th Cir.1980). Indeed, it seems to me that this case demonstrates perceptible compatibility. In spite of this, if the matter were presently open for decision, I would reject the Landro presumption for the reasons stated by the District of Columbia Circuit in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., 59 F.3d 201, 206-07 (D.C.Cir.1995), although I agree with Eddy that in assessing the discretion vested in the district court we should “necessarily seek to focus decision-making on the underlying statutory purpose [of ERISA] while affording appropriate leeway for the district court’s case-by-case determinations.” Id. at 207.
ERISA’s fee-shifting provision unambiguously gives the district court discretion whether or not to award attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g). A district court abuses its discretion when *680there is a lack of factual support for its decision, or when it fails to follow applicable law. Richards v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 108 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir.1997). Nothing of the sort occurred in this case.
In Landro, we acknowledged that the prevailing plaintiff was entitled to a presumption in favor of a fee award — limited by the losing defendant’s ability to show special circumstances in support of denying an award. 625 F.2d at 1356. We noted that the losing defendant had the burden of proving those special circumstances. Id. at 1356 n. 19. Then in West-erhaus we identified a five-factor test designed to aid the district court in making its determinations. 749 F.2d at 495-96. See also Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., 933 F.2d 652, 659 (8th Cir.1991) (stating that court should consider the enumerated Westerhaus factors in exercising its discretion concerning whether to award attorney fees).
Lutheran Medical Center v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters and Engineers Health and Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 623-24 (8th Cir.1994), appears to be the first case in which we referred to the five-factor test and the presumption in the same analysis. In Lutheran we affirmed the district court’s decision to award fees, and noted that “the Plan has not shown any special circumstances. Moreover, the district court exhaustively considered all five factors set forth in Jacobs.” Id. at 624. Also, in Stanton v. Larry Fowler Trucking, Inc., 52 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir.1995), we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff. In Stanton, we again noted that the defendant bore the burden of showing special circumstances to preclude an attorney fees award, and credited the district court’s consideration of the five-factor test in its decision to award fees to the plaintiff. Id. at 729-30. See also Milone v. Exclusive Healthcare, Inc., 244 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir.2001) (referring to both the special circumstances presumption and five-factor test).2
Here the district court clearly recognized the Landro presumption and then found that the plan fully cooperated in expediting the exhaustion of plan administrative remedies, the presentation of a stipulated record to the district court, agreeing to a simultaneous briefing schedule, and finally, did not appeal the district court’s adverse position, but instead complied and certified coverage — resulting in Martin’s lung being transplanted within six months after her case was filed. The district court also noted that Martin would not have prevailed but for a procedural irregularity in the plan’s decision-making process. Thus, to summarize, the court noted the operative presumption, applied the five-factor test and found that an award was not merited under the circumstances. There is factual support for this decision. Thus, the district court fully followed the applicable law of this circuit that the defendant must show special circumstances to preclude an attorney’s fee by utilizing the five-factor test to guide such determination. See, e.g., Lutheran Med. Ctr., 25 F.3d at 624 (recognizing the special circumstances presumption and utilizing the five-factor test in making fee determination). Accordingly, I fail to see how the district court abused its discretion.
*681Likewise, I fail to see any inherent incompatibility in the two formulations. The concurring opinion states that the district court relied upon the five-factor test, but failed to find special circumstances to overcome the presumption. I disagree with that reading of the district court’s opinion. It seems to me the district court’s opinion can just as easily be read to say that in light of its findings under the five-factor test, special circumstances did exist, warranting the denial of the fee request.3
I particularly disagree with the concurrence, quoting the Cornell Law Revieiv article, that applying the five-factor test to determine if special circumstances exist will “practically nullify” the presumption. Instead, what applying the five-factor test will do is ensure that in the unusual situation where there are special circumstances (as we have here), the losing defendant will not automatically be charged with paying the plan participant’s attorney fees. The article, and the concurring opinion by incorporation, seem to suggest that there should be a presumption of almost irre-buttable status. I disagree that this is, or should be, the law of this circuit.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s decision to deny fees in this case because special circumstances were established by the defendant.
. I note that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits utilize both the five-factor test and the special circumstances presumption in conducting the discretionary attorney fee analysis without questioning the compatibility of the two tests. See S.A. McElwaine v. U.S. West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.1999); Little v. Cox’s Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 644 (7th Cir.1995).
. The record discloses the following statement by the presiding judge:
The Court is mindful that ERISA is remedial legislation, to be broadly construed, and that a plan participant or beneficiary who prevails should ordinarily recover an attorneys’ fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.1980). On balance, however, consideration of the Lawrence factors leads the Court to believe that plaintiffs • are not entitled to shift their attorneys’ fee onto the shoulders of defendant in this matter.
Martin v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, No. 00-5035, order at 3 (W.D.Ark. filed Sept. 5, 2000).