concurring and dissenting:
I concur and join in Part VII of the majority’s decision that the judgment of the District Court be reversed with respect to the sanctions imposed under the court’s inherent power. Because the evidence does not show that Malakoffs actions vexatiously and unreasonably prolonged the litigation in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and there is no evidence of or findings that he acted in wilful bad faith, the sanctions under that statute also should be reversed. I therefore respectfully dissent from the imposition of any sanctions.
I.
Because of the many lawyers involved and their adversarial interests, the underlying case was destined to sail on stormy waters. Despite some tensions and occasional aberrations in civility, but with considerable judicial patience and skill, the case had reached a point for settlement consideration. Regrettably, as later resulting proceedings revealed, because of a lack of precise information and a misreading of the sense and scope of some of the ex parte conferences, Malakoff filed a motion for Judge Wolin’s recusal. Until that moment, no motion, complaints, or judicial warnings had been even addressed to Ma-lakoff. His motion triggered sanction proceedings which are now the aftermath of lengthy underlying litigation which has long been settled, appealed, and closed.
Malakoff substantively challenges the monetary sanctions on the ground that he always acted in this litigation in good faith and did not multiply the proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously. As a lawyer at the bar for approximately thirty years, experienced in class action practice and never previously sanctioned,1 he contends that the motions he filed were reasonably warranted. Even the Magistrate Judge (MJ) in assessing the sanction, stated that “[w]hen viewed individually, each single instance of misbehavior by Mr. Malakoff might not warrant the sanction arrived at by the Court. But considered as a whole, his transgressions evidence a pattern of obfuscation and mean spiritedness.” (Maj. Op. at 189). This sweeping statement, however, is not supported by a single finding of fact and does not support the conclusion that Malakoff multiplied the proceedings vexatiously and acted wilfully in bad faith. Obfuscation and mean spiritedness, even if true, are indeed not commendable, but they do not amount to a violation of § 1927.
The District Court correctly stated that the purpose of § 1927 is to deter intentional and unnecessary delay and that in imposing sanctions, a court must find: “(1) a multiplication of the proceedings by an attorney; (2) by conduct that can be characterized as unreasonable and vexatious; with a(3) resulting increase in the cost of proceedings; and (4) bad faith or intentional misconduct.” In re Prudential, 63 *195F.Supp.2d 516, 520 (D.N.J.1999). There is no evidence whatsoever that Malakoff filed the motion to recuse Judge Wolin for the purpose of intentionally or unnecessarily delaying the proceedings. Malakoff argued to the MJ that his motion to recuse, which prompted Lead Counsel’s first motion for sanctions, was not filed in bad faith and in fact had a colorable basis. Judge Walls concluded that any reasonable attorney would have understood that Judge Wolin could permissibly engage in ex parte communication in a complex class action such as In re Prudential. Id. The Court also rejected Malakoffs contention that even if ex parte communication was permissible, he was entitled to notice of the meetings and an opportunity to object. The Court reasoned that Malakoff had consented to the Court’s ex parte communication pertaining to settlement long before his recusal motion, and the alleged communications between counsel and the court involved settlement of the nationwide class action in which Malakoffs clients did not wish to be involved. Id.
Initially, it should be noted that a review of Malakoffs December 3, 1996, recusal motion reveals that his objection was not directed to communication between Judge Wolin and Lead Counsel. His concern was that the judge met ex parte with Prudential’s Chairman, Arthur F. Ryan, and that he met with Select Insurance Regulators about the proposed settlement without advance notice to Kettle/Krell, Ma-lakoffs clients. Malakoff also believed that those meetings went beyond the scope of his original consent. Malakoff also complained, inter alia, about the Court’s failure to allow discovery pertaining to the fairness of the proposed settlement.2
Malakoff may have misconceived the extent of the District Court’s authority and its justifiable necessity in meeting with officers of Prudential in effectuating this complex settlement. Malakoff also may not have shown good judgment in his motion to recuse, but mistake of judgment is not uncommon among lawyers or even judges. A mistake of judgment does not per se constitute wilful bad faith. Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 209 (3d Cir.1985). Judge Walls made no specific finding that Malakoff filed the motion in bad faith but only concurred in the MJ’s “conclusions” rejecting Malakoffs contention that the motion was objectively reasonable and filed in good faith. In re Prudential, 63 F.Supp.2d at 521. Understandably, Judge Walls only referred to the MJ’s conclusions because the MJ, too, made no fact finding of bad faith with respect to Malakoffs recusal motion.
In addition to the foregoing reasons, Malakoffs motion for recusal was based on three additional grounds. A fair and balanced reading of these grounds, however, renders questionable at best any finding of intent to delay, vexatiousness, or bad faith. To sanction an attorney for questionably egregious conduct unfairly burdens legitimate, zealous advocacy, especially in a massive national class action, which in itself is sui juris and requires, as in this case, innovative and resourceful procedures.
In the Pennsylvania proceedings in Rutt v. Prudential, Prudential’s attorney informed the state judge that Judge Wolin was “receptive to a discussion” with the state judge regarding potential ethical im*196proprieties regarding Rutt’s counsel. Ma-lakoff reasonably may have believed that Prudential’s suggestion to contact Judge Wolin implicated Judge Wolin in an improper plan to aid Prudential in delaying state court trials like Rutt until the class action settled. Malakoff believed that evidence produced at the state court in Rutt and other state cases could “be crucial in evaluating the fairness of the proposed settlement” in the federal court. Although later developments revealed that Malakoff erred on this basis for recusal, such an error is not a violation of § 1927. An attorney who reasonably believed in the merits of a motion when filed should not be sanctioned. To do so subjects every litigating lawyer whose motion is denied the risk of sanctions.
Malakoff also based his recusal motion on alleged ex parte contacts between Judge Wolin and David Gross, Esquire, counsel for a former Prudential employee named David Fastenburg who was accused of destroying material Prudential documents. During an October 21, 1996, hearing, Judge Wolin appeared to refer to a personal conversation with Mr. Gross by stating, “I know Mr. Fastenburg’s lawyer ... [a]nd Mr. Gross vehemently denies on behalf of Mr. Fastenburg that any document was ever destroyed by Mr. Fasten-burg.” The Judge’s comments come in connection with charges (later proven) that Prudential had destroyed material documents. Prudential fired Fastenburg for allowing the destruction of documents in the office he supervised. In response, Fastenburg sued for wrongful termination. In re Prudential, 148 F.8d 283, 343 (3d Cir.1998). Although it became clear to some by mid-December, 1996, that Judge Wolin had a legitimate basis for his October statement3 and that he had not engaged in improper ex parte communications with Mr. Gross, Malakoff already had filed his recusal motion on December 3, 1996, well before his belief was challenged.
Malakoff believed that Judge Wolin had engaged in improper ex parte communications because the legitimate sources of information cited by Judge Wolin never mentioned a “vehement” denial by Mr. Gross, and Judge Wolin never denied speaking privately to Mr. Gross.4 Hence, while five years later it is clear that Mala-koffs perception concerning Gross was misplaced, it was not unreasonable or made in bad faith. Again, there is no evidence that Malakoff s interpretation of these proceedings intentionally or vexatiously extended or delayed the proceedings.
Lastly, Malakoff claims he based his recusal motion on the District Court’s comments at the October 16, 1996, conference with state insurance regulators. Malakoff cites statements made by the Judge that this was “my settlement,” that all of those present must “hang together” so that they could accomplish what they wanted to accomplish for their respective interests, and the Judge’s comment that “although I wasn’t in all the negotiations, I wasn’t just a pretty face.” In the underlying appeal of the settlement on the merits, the Court reviewed the claims that these statements of Judge Wolin demonstrated his bias in favor of the settlement. In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 340-45. Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that the District Court made it clear at the same conference that it had not yet made any decision regarding *197the proposed settlement or the proposed settlement class.
Whether the foregoing incident offered a colorable basis for a motion to recuse maybe arguable, but there is nothing about it that warrants the imposition of sanctions under § 1927. Malakoff only needed a single reasonable, non-vexatious, non-bad faith basis for his recusal motion. Mala-koff had several colorable bases for the motion. Focusing on the District Court’s opinion imposing sanctions, there is an absence of specific findings of intentional misconduct, of bad faith or of any delay or extension of the proceedings. The record reasonably supports the conclusion that Malakoff had a colorable basis for his recu-sal motion. Moreover, in this high profile class action, Malakoffs motion probably served a very useful public purpose in removing any mis-perception of the impartiality of the court on the part of any of the policy holders, including Malakoffs clients and the many others who filed objections to the fairness of the proposed settlement. There is no evidence that the recusal motion justified sanctions under § 1927 and no findings of wilful bad faith to support it. Punishment under this statute is “sparingly applied” and requires “a detailed finding that the proceedings were both ‘unreasonable and vexatious.’ ” FDIC v. Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir.1994). In this case, there is an absence of detailed findings and an absence of a “sparing” application of punishment.
In reviewing the District Court’s opinion, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between sanctions imposed under § 1927 and those imposed under the inherent power of the court. The distinction is crucial, because we hold that the disciplinary conduct sanctions under the court’s inherent powers violated due process. Sanctions under § 1927 are compensatory in nature and are intended to compensate opposing counsel for vexatious and unreasonable conduct that unnecessarily delayed or extended the litigation. Yet, in considering “Additional Bases for Sanctions” under § 1927, the District Court stated that the MJ “concluded that Mr. Malakoff abused the privilege of practicing before this Court. His behavior since his arrival on the scene in this litigation has been deplorable.” In re Prudential, 63 F.Supp.2d at 521. This sweeping assessment of the attorney’s conduct, even if it were unchallenged, does not support a violation of the statute. This unsupported, conclusory statement reflects a mindset of the inherent power of the court that colored the District Court’s judgment with respect to the motion for sanctions under § 1927.
The majority points to the rejection of Malakoffs argument on the recusal motion on the appeal to this court from the fairness hearings. This court rejected the argument but it never suggested or stated that the motion for recusal was made in bad faith or may have otherwise violated § 1927.
II.
Among the subsequent tag-along allegations filed by Lead Counsel to bolster their § 1927 cross-motion for sanctions was Ma-lakoffs criticism of the fee examiner. This Court considered the issues on the appeal of the underlying litigation and reiterated Judge Wolin’s conclusions that Malakoff had “misunderstood the fee examiner’s role” and had advanced “hypertechnical arguments” in support of his motion for disqualification. Judge Walls, in reviewing the imposition of sanctions, concluded that Malakoff “may have been entitled to object to Mr. Greenberg’s ultimate conclusion.” In fact, the objection resulted in a remand by the Court of Appeals for further consideration of attorneys’ fees. Judge Walls, *198however, concluded that Malakoff had no basis for objecting to the appointment. However, such an objection in no way violated § 1927; Judge Walls made no finding that it did, and neither did the MJ. There is no evidence that the objection unreasonably prolonged the litigation or that it was made in bad faith. In light of this Court’s remand to the District Court for further consideration of the attorneys’ fees, the objection arguably had merit. Whether it did or not is insignificant at this point; what is significant is that there is no evidence that the objection unreasonably multiplied the litigation in violation of § 1927.
Judge Walls then turned to the MJ’s observations that Malakoff had failed to provide Judge Wolin with courtesy copies of his motions before releasing them to the media. Malakoff responded that he was advised for the first time in Judge Wolin’s December 1996 hearing of the judge’s desire for courtesy copies; up until that point, Malakoff had filed pursuant to the local rules and provided copies to the media only upon filing. Judge Walls concluded that even if the Court were to accept Malakoffs response that he never released copies of his motions to the press before their filing, he “should have known that the media would contact Judge Wolin’s chambers upon receipt of any motion papers. As an experienced attorney, he should have realized that the clerk’s office would not deliver courtesy copies to chambers immediately.” Id. at 521-522. Judge Walls asserted that Malakoffs failure to accord Judge Wolin the same respect as the media was unacceptable “and indicates that he acted in bad faith.” Id. at 522.
The failure, however, to provide copies of the motion papers to the Court may have been arguably thoughtless or even discourteous, but clearly not a violation of § 1927. The Court did not find that the failure to supply copies of Malakoffs motions to Judge Wolin at the time of filing multiplied or prolonged the litigation. It could not have done so. In no way did this conduct delay the litigation or add to the burden of Lead Counsel as to warrant compensatory sanctions under § 1927. Neither the District Court nor the MJ could or did make such a finding.
The District Court then examined Mala-koffs 23rd and 24th affidavits, both filed within three days of each other and subsequent to Malakoffs motion for recusal. Malakoff claimed that the affidavits were warranted. He argued that the 24th affidavit was intended to supplement and correct the legal and factual bases for motions then pending before the District Court. The District Court, however, concluded that the affidavits merely restated arguments previously rejected, and repeated allegations of impropriety on the part of the trial judge initially presented in Mala-koffs recusal motion. Quoting the MJ, Judge Walls found that they “evidence[d] no purpose other than to embarrass the Court.” Id. This is an arguable conclusion. However, there is no evidence that they violated § 1927 and the court made no findings that they multiplied the proceedings and were filed in bad faith.5
As for Malakoffs problems with the discovery process, the MJ in his Report and Recommendation pointed to two incidents which he concluded caused “colossal time delays and monumental obstacles to the *199orderly settlement of this action.” These two incidents consisted of: (1) a reluctance to review the thousands of documents in the proceedings and instead requesting a keyword search of precedential documents in New York; and (2) a disregard of Judge Wolin’s order to parties seeking to present evidence at a fairness hearing to examine the evidence at the movant’s offices. The MJ found that Malakoff demanded charts summarizing the evidence. Malakoff, in his defense, argues that he only requested a “keyword” search when he saw the enormous volume of material at the document depository, amounting to hundreds of thousands of documents. As for the charts, Malakoff argues that he moved to compel their production only after Lead Counsel refused his request that they fax them at Malakoff s expense. Judge Walls concluded that this conduct “unreasonably multiplied the straightforward discovery process and delayed the ultimate settlement of the case.” In re Prudential, 63 F.Supp.2d at 522.
Judge Walls relies on the MJ’s conclusions as to the effect of these two incidents. Neither he nor the MJ explain, however, how an effort on the part of a lawyer to simplify and expedite the discovery process by requesting a “keyword” search and a chart of the enormous mountain of documents multiplied or prolonged the proceedings. It is incomprehensible that a request for a “keyword” search of precedential documents intentionally multiplied, delayed, or extended the litigation. No explanation is given how it did do so. The “keyword” search was denied. Had it been granted, it would have expedited discovery rather than delayed it or the settlement. Similarly, it is not understandable why the request for charts summarizing the evidence or for the “keyword” search resulted in “colossal time delays and monumental obstacles” in the settlement of the litigation. Id. Again, no finding or explanation is given. The requests may have been presumptuous, but they could not have violated § 1927. By no stretch of the imagination could such requests have unreasonably “multiplied the straightforward discovery process and delayed the ultimate settlement of the case,” as the Court concluded. Id. In fact, until Lead Counsel endeavored to reinforce their motion for sanctions with their tag-along filings, no one had ever complained of Malakoff s conduct during discovery and no one had ever invoked Rule 11 for sanctions. The supplementary motion is a belated and unreasonable effort to support the motion for § 1927 sanctions, and there is no finding that these two requests were made in wilful bad faith.
Finally, we review the action of the District Court with respect to Malakoff s Rule 11 and § 1927 motions. Judge Walls noted in his opinion that the MJ had examined the two motions and had concluded that they were identical, only refuted Lead Counsel’s December 1999 cross-motion, did not present an affirmative ground for sanctions, and improperly side-stepped Rule ll’s twenty-one day safe harbor provisions. Id. at 523. The District Court saw no merit to Malakoff s objections to these conclusions, although it acknowledged that Malakoff was entitled to pursue his § 1927 motion. The Court did not, however, believe that Malakoff was “entitled to cut- and-paste his Rule 11 motion and transform it into a § 1927 motion.” Id. The District Court ultimately concluded that the two motions were identical, baseless, and filed in bad faith.
On appeal, Malakoff contends that he was entitled to seek both § 1927 and Rule 11 sanctions for the same conduct, and was entitled to pursue the § 1927 sanctions, regardless of whether Lead Counsel took advantage of Rule ll’s safe harbor in withdrawing the offending documents. He ar*200gues that the legal standard for § 1927 sanctions is different and far more stringent than for Rule 11 sanctions. He asserts that § 1927 sanctions are warranted against a party who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings and that a finding of bad faith is necessary. On the other hand, Rule 11 sanctions require a more lenient standard of proof, no requirement of bad faith, and aims at a party who has made unsupported or frivolous arguments in the filings. He reasonably believed that the two motions satisfied the requisite standards because they alleged:
Liaison and Lead Counsel’s motion [for sanctions], supporting briefs, affidavits and other papers referred to herein were filed unreasonably and vexatiously in order to multiply the proceedings. Further, these motions and other papers were frivolous. Finally, these papers were filed solely to intimidate Michael P. Malakoff who is objecting to the settlement procedures used, the settlement, and the request for $90 million in attorneys’ fees.
(A-2617).
Malakoff concedes that the motions are largely identical because they are based on the same conduct. This, he argues, does not necessarily render them improper. The standards and purposes of each differ. He also denies that his motions only refute the cross-motion of Lead Counsel. On the contrary, he argues his motions explicitly state that Lead Counsel’s motion for sanctions was filed frivolously in bad faith for an improper purpose, and unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings.
We do not need to decide whether the motions were identical, whether they contained affirmative grounds for sanctions, or whether the § 1927 motion was for the purpose of side-stepping Rule ll’s safe harbor provision. We must determine whether the District Court erred when it “conclud[ed] that these identical motions were baseless and filed in bad faith.” Id. at 523. The District Court made no findings in this respect; it merely announced its conclusion. Id. We do not know from this conclusory statement whether the motions were baseless in law or in fact, and have no explanation of how they violated § 1927.6
In summarizing the sanctions imposed on Malakoff under § 1927, the District Court “adopt[ed] Magistrate Judge Pisa-no’s conclusion that ‘it is clear that, after viewing his entire course of conduct over more than three years before this Court, Mr. Malakoff takes an impractical, hyper-technical, and unreasonable approach to litigation.’” Id. The purpose of § 1927, however, is not to alter the style, personality, practicality, or even the judgment of a trial lawyer. It empowers the punishment of a lawyer who, in wilful bad faith, unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings.
Significantly, the MJ recommended “that pursuant to § 1927, Mr. Malakoff should pay to Class Counsel the sum of $100,000 and this amount of money is justifiably significant and will require Mr. Ma-lakoff to suffer sacrifices in order to pay.” *201In formulating this harsh and draconian sanction, it is obvious from reading the MJ’s Report and Recommendation that he ignored the statute. The statute does not empower a court to fine a lawyer for poor lawyering or even misconduct. The statute provides for sanctions in the form of compensation for provable loss of time and additional expenses incurred by the offended lawyer as a result of the alleged unreasonable delaying action. The record here is devoid of any evidence proving “the excess costs, expenses and attorney’s fees” reasonably incurred because of Malakoff.
The majority acknowledges that Judge Walls did not make express findings of bad faith and did not rely upon any of “the above-specified conduct in particular, [but] based his finding of the requisite bad faith and vexatious conduct on the totality of the campaign Malakoff waged during the course of this litigation.” (Maj. op. at 189). Notwithstanding, it adopts the “conclusion” reached by the MJ and the District Court. (Maj. op. at 190). However, Mala-koff and his clients were captives of the order consolidating their state cases in the New Jersey federal court.7 Malakoff respectfully and professionally satisfied the procedures and tools for objection provided by statute and the rules of court. Falling back on the “totality of the campaign” in lieu of specific findings of wilful bad faith and evidence of excess costs and time incurred by Lead Counsel is not, in my opinion, an acceptable basis for sanctions under a penal statute and ignores the “detailed finding” required under FDIC v. Calhoun, supra at 197.
It appears clear that the MJ was influenced by his mindset on the inherent power of the court. This is shown by his statement just prior to the MJ’s determination to impose monetary sanctions pertaining to Malakoffs behavior. Yet, the MJ acknowledges that “[wjhen viewed individually, each single instance of misbehavior by Mr. Malakoff might not warrant the sanction arrived at by the Court.” (Maj. op. at 189) Also significant, Lead Counsel never introduced evidence of increased costs and time to support their cross-motion for sanctions. Moreover, this court has stated that before a court can order the imposition of attorneys’ fees under § 1927, it must find bad faith on the part of the offending attorney that is wilful. Zuk v. EPPI of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 297 (quoting Williams v. Giant Eagle Mkt., 883 F.2d, 1184, 1191 (3d Cir.1989)). There are no such findings and no basis for them.
III.
Finally, I think a reviewing court should carefully note the role of an objecting lawyer, especially in as complex and massive class action as was this. Malakoff opposed a large battery of lawyers intent on reaching a settlement and the payment of huge fees. Class actions are unique, each is different, and here many state and federal actions were consolidated for disposition. An objecting lawyer should not be expected to be a quiescent, listless'participant in the proceedings without expressing contrary view or theories; the lawyer should have reasonable leeway for expression and argument.8 In another class action, this *202Court recently noted some of the uncertainties and difficulties that beset the court in litigation where most of the parties are not personally represented. We stated that there is a recognition
that in the class action context there is no way for “the class” to select, retain, or monitor its lawyers in the way that an individual client would, and because of doubts that a typical lead plaintiff ... is a terribly good agent for the class.
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir.2001).
Because of the conflicting interests between Lead Counsel and this extremely large class over fees to be derived from the settlement, there is a high degree of professional responsibility that they owe a largely absent class who depend on lawyers they never saw or retained. The degree of responsibility is further enhanced in this case because the class consists of ordinary policy holders and not sophisticated institutions or investors. Therefore, a lawyer with objector status plays a highly important role for the class and the court because he or she raises challenges free from the burden of conflicting baggage that Class Counsel carries. The objecting lawyer independently can monitor the proposed settlement, costs, and fees for Class Counsel and, thus, aid the court in arriving at a fair and just settlement for the members of the class who individually are largely unrepresented.
When objecting counsel raises pertinent questions concerning the conduct of Lead Counsel, the terms of the proposed settlement, and the costs and fees to be paid from the settlement fund, he or she not only renders a service to the class, but also aids the court. The record reasonably supports the conclusion that Malakoff s objector status had the wholesome effect of providing a careful scrutiny of the fairness of a gigantic settlement affecting millions of policyholders nationwide. He indisputably enhanced the amount of the settlement, and secured a reconsideration of class counsel fees.
After all, Class Counsel has very little communication with the members of the class and knows little about them individually. The members of the class play little or no role in the selection of lead or liaison counsel. Defendants’ counsel and Class Counsel reach a point where they are cooperating in an effort to consummate the settlements. Even the court at this point may be inclined to favor settlement of a huge, complex action, and the general atmosphere becomes largely cooperative.
Under such circumstances, the motions and arguments of an objecting lawyer understandably may be discordant and disagreeable, but not necessarily unreasonable. The objections may be worthy and, at least useful because, as the distinguished historian, Allan Nevins, wrote many years ago,' from the conflict of ideas comes crystallization of thought. Objections serve a highly useful vehicle for the members of the class and the public generally; they require consideration by the court and its disposition of them usually provides reassurance that the settlement and the fees approved are fair and just.
Thus, I believe that as counsel for objecting plaintiffs, Malakoff played a useful and even constructive role in this litigation. He may have been overzealous and tenacious, but Lead Counsel, as experienced, *203seasoned class action lawyers, are no shrinking violets. They do not complain that Malakoff was deceptive or mendacious. On the other hand, his services, acknowledged by Lead Counsel, enhanced the class settlement by $50 million, and he succeeded in having this Court on appeal remand for further consideration the $90 million fee provided by the settlement.
For the reasons set forth above, I would also reverse the imposition of the severe sanctions imposed on Malakoff under § 1927.
. Malakoff claims that he practiced law for thirty years and has a substantial professional interest in class action procedures. He asserts that he was a member of this Court’s 1985 Task Force on Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees, and, as a founding member and board member of the National Association of Consumer Advocates, he contributed to the Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Class Actions. See 176 F.R.D. 375 (1987). He also states that he is a frequent contributor to and faculty member of the Practising Law Institute, the National Consumer Law Center, and that his legal rating in Martindale-Hubbell is AV.
. Malakoff was not the only person to object to the fairness of the proposed settlement. The docket entries show that there were many others, including the Insurance Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Texas Department of Insurance, the Commissioner of Insurance for California, and the state of Florida. Malakoff, however, was the only one who filed a motion for Judge Wolin to recuse.
. Mr. Gross's denial was reported in some newspapers.
. Malakoff alleged improper ex parte communications, and those communications, if true, would have been a valid basis for recusal regardless of the District Court's further orders against Prudential.
. The majority offers no explanation how the affidavits multiplied the litigation and why they justify compensatory compensation to Lead Counsel as sanctions under § 1927. Class Counsel, including Lead Counsel, already were awarded fees in the sum of $45 million by the District Court, conditional on another $45 million in the event 330,000 claims were filed by June 1, 1997. In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 332.
. Judge Walls held that both motions were only defenses to Lead Counsel's § 1927 motion and advanced no coherent legal argument as to why they should be sanctioned; that by submitting identical papers on the two sanctioned motions Malakoff abused the sanctions process. Id. The motions are different in that Rule 11 does not require a finding of bad faith. Even though they may have been filed as a defense to Lead Counsel’s motion for sanctions, it is arguable that this constituted an abuse of the sanctions process. Moreover, there is no evidence or finding that they prolonged the proceedings and were made in violation of the Statute,
. Prudential's conduct had been under investigation for several years. Malakoff filed suit in behalf of his clients in two state courts. Malakoff did not appear in the New Jersey District Court until after the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized all the cases before Judge Wolin on August 3, 1995.
. Malakoff concedes that he was a zealous advocate but denies that he acted in bad faith. Amicus Curiae Public Citizen Litigation Group argues that objectors like Malakoff play a vital but difficult role in class action settlements. Public Citizen argues that objectors should be encouraged, not chilled, be*202cause of the beneficial role they play. Objectors and their counsel pursue legitimate and important goals by seeking to block or significantly improve class settlements. "Objecting is often the only way to protect some class members' interests, even if class members have the opportunity to opt out of the class.” Amicus Br. at 10-11.