dissenting.
This is a close and difficult case, but I must disagree with the conclusion of my colleagues that the district court clearly erred in finding that Mr. Georgia knowingly “created a substantial risk of death or bodily injury” in this case. The court correctly points out that the risk in this case was probably less than in the large majority of cases where this enhancement was litigated at the appellate level and upheld. On the other hand, the court cites no cases, and I have been unable to find any, where an application of this enhancement was reversed in circumstances comparable to this degree of danger.
As the Guidelines point out (§ 2K1.4, n. 2), the risk must be “something more than simply responding to the fire.” It seems to me that this case does involve more than simply responding to any fire (which would include, for example, leaf fires, outhouses, isolated shacks, etc.).
The court correctly emphasizes that the professionalism of the firemen ameliorated the degree of risk, but in my opinion this does not by itself mean that the risk was not still substantial. When firemen respond to a fire in a significant public structure such as a church, even if it is isolated and unused at the time, the risk to the firemen from structural collapse is, by its nature, substantial. Georgia had done construction work at the church, and had *392been paid to burn the church by the pastor. There is thus little question that he knew of the nature of the church’s construction and of the heavy structures on the roof.
On balance, it simply seems to me that it was not clear error to say that this degree of danger was indeed “a substantial risk ... of bodily injury.” While that degree of risk may not have been unusual for a fire in a commercial-type structure that a professional fire department would respond to, I am reasonably confident that the firemen in question did not feel quite as sanguine about the risk as does the court. Because the risk of bodily injury in this case was substantial compared to the general run of arson (even if not compared to the general run of arson of moderate-sized commercial-type structures), I would affirm the judgment of the district court. I therefore respectfully DISSENT.