dissenting.
The court has concluded that the arbitration clause is unenforceable because it preempts certain rights McCaskill has under Title VII. At some point this could be a valid issue on appeal, but not yet. Although the district court granted the SCI’s motion to compel arbitration, it neither dismissed nor stayed the pending action. The court acknowledges that the parties initially challenged appellate jurisdiction, and notes that the issue has been resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp.—Alabama, et al. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000). Reasoning that the district court “could only have dismissed the case,” it concludes that we have jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision that dismisses a case after ordering the parties to arbitrate. It then proceeds to address the merits of this case. After carefully reviewing the district court’s opinion, it is clear to me that the district court did not dismiss this case, and therefore its order is not a final decision under Green Tree and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Longstanding federal policy strongly favors arbitration. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91, 121 S.Ct. 513 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs appellate review of arbitration orders. It provides, in relevant part, that an appeal may be taken from “a final decision with respect to an arbitration ....” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). In addition, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order “compelling arbitration ....” 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3). The FAA does not define the term “final deci*628sion.” In Green Tree, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase according to its well-established, plain meaning, i.e., a decision which “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” 531 U.S. at 86, 121 S.Ct. 513 (citations omitted). In addressing a district court’s order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case with prejudice, the Supreme Court held that such an order is a “final decision” and thus is immediately appealable pursuant to the FAA. Id. The Court noted, however, that if a district court enters a stay instead of a dismissal, that order is not a final, appealable decision under the FAA. Id. at 87, n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 513.1 See Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.2002) (order compelling arbitration and dismissing without prejudice was an appealable decision under the FAA); ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher’s, Inc., 280 F.3d 1091 (6th Cir.2002) (order staying proceedings pending arbitration not ap-pealable under the FAA); Interactive Flight Tech., Inc. v. Swissair Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 249 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir.2001) (order compelling arbitration and dismissing case without prejudice appeal-able under the FAA); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2001) (order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case deemed appealable under the FAA).
Here, notwithstanding the court’s assumption to the contrary, the district court did not actually dismiss the case. The court maintains that a remand in this case is “pointless because all parties agree that the district court dismissed the case.” See ante at 625. But the district court did not dismiss the case. Nevertheless, the court concludes that because the appellees requested the district court to compel arbitration and dismiss the case, and because neither party requested that the case be stayed, “the [district] court could not have intended to grant a stay; in compelling arbitration, it could only have dismissed the case." Id. Not so. The district court clearly could have ordered a stay. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Yet, this court’s conclusion appears to suggest that, notwithstanding the absence of any language in the district court’s opinion indicating an intention to dismiss the suit, we, as the reviewing court, should infer the district court’s intent to dismiss solely because a litigant requested that such an action be taken. Given the Supreme Court’s recent (and heightened) sensitivity to jurisdictional issues, it is inappropriate to assume the finality of a district court decision when there is no basis for doing so. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (holding that “ ‘[without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ ”) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, neither Kaplan v. Shure Bros., Inc., 153 F.3d 413 (7th Cir.1998), nor Spitz v. Tepfer, 171 F.3d 443 (7th Cir.1999), supports the court’s decision to assume jurisdiction in this case. These cases are entirely distinguishable from the situation before us on appeal. In Kaplan *629and Spitz, the district courts’ opinions provided some basis for inferring dismissals in those cases. See Kaplan, 153 F.3d at 417 (no amendment to complaint possible); Spitz, 171 F.3d at 447-48 (counterclaim dismissed, other issues final). In this case, there is nothing in the district court’s opinion that would allow us to infer that the court intended to dismiss the case. SCI filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case. The district court’s order, however, merely compelled arbitration. The order does not address, in any manner whatsoever, SCI’s request for a dismissal of the case. While it is true that SCI’s attorney stated at oral argument that the district court’s opinion effectively dismissed the case, it is well settled that parties cannot agree to jurisdiction, nor can an attorney’s assertion at oral argument create appellate jurisdiction. See ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 235 F.3d 360, 363 (7th Cir.2000). Rather, we have consistently held that “[i]t is our threshold and independent obligation to make that determination even [when] both parties agreeably [consider an] order to be final and appealable.” ITOFCA, 235 F.3d at 363 (citations omitted).
Finally, the court’s interpretation of our decision in ITOFCA is incomplete. As we indicated in that case, litigants can impact this court’s determination of appellate jurisdiction by representing to the court that they would not refile their claims (thereby effecting a voluntary dismissal with prejudice). That decision to forego further proceedings is entirely within their control and discretion (an agreement the ITOFCA litigants refused to make). Of course an agreement before this court not to refile would be irrevocable once relied upon in the appellate opinion. A litigant’s representations are irrelevant, however, when an appellate court is seeking to determine whether a district court dismissed a lawsuit, an action that is solely within the control and discretion of that court.
Without a dismissal of the underlying case, the district court’s order compelling arbitration remains an interlocutory order under Section 16(b)(3) of the FAA. Under Green Tree, we are not permitted to exercise jurisdiction over this case until the district court enters a dismissal. Of course, as previously noted, the district court may also grant a stay under Section 3 of the FAA, in which case we would not have jurisdiction since it would not be ap-pealable. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 87 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 513.2 In any case, it is incumbent upon district courts to fully address and clearly dispose of a motion filed by a litigant for the parties’ benefit, to conserve its own judicial resources and to aid this court on review. See Salim Oleochemicals, 278 F.3d at 93 (urging “district courts in these circumstances to be as clear as possible about *630whether they truly intend to dismiss an action or mean to grant a stay ... or whether they mean to do something else entirely.”). See also Dustrol, Inc. v. Champagne-Webber, Inc., 2002 WL 122500, * 4 (N.D.Tex. Jan.24, 2002) (citing Green Tree, district court clearly states that “the court dismisses this case because there are no longer any unadjudicated claims presently before the court.”).
Accordingly, I conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction over this case and would have therefore remanded the case back to the district court for further disposition or clarification of its order. Without jurisdiction, we may not proceed to opine on the validity of the arbitration agreement.
. In resolving questions of finality, we have asked whether an appeal is from an "embedded” (those involving a request for arbitration and other relief) or "independent” (a request to order arbitration solely) proceeding. Previously, an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding was appealable, whereas one in an embedded proceeding was interlocutory. See Napleton v. General Motors Corp., 138 F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir.1998). The Supreme Court, however, rejected this distinction in Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 88, 121 S.Ct. 513.
. I pause to take note of an issue left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Green Tree, i.e., whether a district court may dismiss a case under the FAA at all. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 87 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 513 (declining to address whether district court should have entered a stay rather than a dismissal). The plain language of the FAA gives a court only the power to grant a stay. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. In contrast, nothing in the FAA refers to the district court's power to dismiss a case. See also Stephen H. McClain, Under a New Supreme Court Decision, Litigants Seeking Arbitration of a Dispute can Control the Timing of an Appeal, 48-Aug. Fed. Law. 22, 25 (2001) (noting that, during oral argument of Green Tree, some of the justices questioned whether or not a stay was required under the FAA). This court has also questioned whether there is any statutory authority for dismissing a case when compelling arbitration. See Kroll v. Doctor’s Assoc., Inc., 3 F.3d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir.1993). The uncertainty surrounding a district court’s ability, or authority, to dismiss a case under the FAA, is yet another reason to decline jurisdiction over this appeal.