dissenting.
In 1993, Delaware departed from its role as solely a regulatory body of the three horse racing tracks in the state and decided to mount joint enterprises with each of *248them. Therefore, the expulsion without a hearing of the Crissmans, “licensees in good standing with the Harness Racing Commission for the State of Delaware,”1 after about twenty-five years as horse trainers and horse owners at the Dover Downs race track fairly may be attributed to the State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I.
The courts have never succeeded in formulating and applying a precise test for the recognition of state action under the Equal Protection Clause. In “sifting [the] facts and weighing [the] circumstances,” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), the entrepreneurial involvement of the State in the formerly private operations of Dover Downs is evident. Fortunately, the facts are transparent and undisputed.
The majority concludes that the regulations and flow of funds do not equate to the facts in Burton and do not otherwise support the exclusion of the Crissmans from the Dover Downs race track as “fairly attributable to the state of Delaware.” (Maj. op. at 233). The majority is correct that the facts do not equate to Burton. The facts here are not only distinct from Burton but far more impressively support state action.
Dover Downs attempts to portray a relationship with the State at the time the Crissmans were expelled as simply regulatory. I agree that a regulatory relationship alone clearly is insufficient to constitute state action. The Supreme Court so held in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974), and we have so held in Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 596 (1979). Nonetheless, we noted in Fitzgerald that:
Where a private enterprise stands, in its operations, as a veritable partner with the state, then it seems proper to hold such enterprise subject to the same constitutional requirements to which the state is accountable.
Id. at 595 (quoting Braden v. Univ. of Pittsburgh (Braden II), 552 F.2d 948, 958 (1977)).
Similarly, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvin, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972), the Supreme Court in essence held that extensive and detailed regulation of a private club generally is insufficient to convert it into a state actor. Id. at 176-77, 92 S.Ct. 1965. The Supreme Court, however, also observed that although the Moose Lodge was heavily regulated, it could not be said to be “a partner or even a joint venturer in the club’s enterprise,” id. at 177, 92 S.Ct. 1965, thus implying that a partnership, or even a joint venture relationship between the State and a private enterprise, as we have here, might bring different consequences.
In this case, the record demonstrates that when Delaware enacted the Horse Racing Redevelopment Act (HRRA) in 1993 to rejuvenate a declining state horse-racing industry and, at the same time, enhance its own revenues, it augmented its regulatory relationship. The State and Dover Downs became joint entrepreneurs *249in a lottery and race track enterprise. The slot machines used by Dover Downs were the property of, or leased by, the State, not Dover Downs. The State exercised control over the slot machines by directly connecting them to the central computer system at the State Lottery Office. To this enterprise, the race track contributed its race track premises, its infrastructure, its organization, and its operating capital. In this joint enterprise fashioned and molded by the State, the State acts in a business capacity, not as a regulatory force. Dover Downs is a licensed state lottery agent.
The record also reflects that the state joint video lottery is inextricably linked with harness-racing. The State of Delaware’s avowed purpose in creating the video lottery was to provide “assistance in the form of increased economic activity and vitality for Delaware’s harness and thoroughbred horse racing industries, which activity and vitality will ... cause increased employment.” 29 Del.Code Ann. tit. 29, § 4801(b)(1). Under Delaware law, Dover Downs would not be permitted to operate a video lottery if it did not conduct harness racing meets. Id. § 4819(a).
Another purpose of the state-created lottery was to establish a joint venture with state race tracks to provide Delaware with additional income. To effectuate this purpose, Delaware shares a portion of the lottery’s revenue with Dover Downs to be applied to Dover Downs’s harness racing purses under the direction of the Harness Racing Commission. Id. § 4815(b)(3)b.2. Thus, the recipients of harness racing purses are direct beneficiaries of money derived from the video lotteries jointly operated by the State and the race track. Furthermore, the State and Dover Downs also share jointly, although not equally, in the earnings generated by the video lottery.
Because of the entrepreneurial relationship that Delaware has established with Dover Downs, the State stands to gain and indeed receives substantial revenue. The direct stake of Delaware in the financial arrangements it established in 1993 with its race tracks is undisputed.
Finally, it must be noted that the State of Delaware is involved in Dover Downs’ harness racing activities. There are many positions that Dover Downs is not permitted to fill without State approval. The Harness Racing Commission requires no fewer than 14 harness racing officials to be licensed3 and it reserves the right to designate other positions that require licenses. Although Dover Downs pays and supervises these officials, the Commission’s rules describe their duties and responsibilities in detail. Most importantly, the Commission’s rules require Dover Downs not only to abide by, but also to “enforce the [Harness Racing] Act and the rules and orders of the Commission.” (emphasis added).
In Jackson, the Supreme Court stated that the petitioner’s case for state action would have been stronger if the private actor had “exercise[d] ... some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty.” 419 U.S. at 352-53, 95 S.Ct. 449. The power to enforce laws is one such power, the delegation of which renders Dover Downs an arm of the Commission. Of course, heavy state regulation of a private entity alone does not necessarily give rise to a joint venture relationship. However, the undisputed *250facts here show a deliberate entwining and interdependence between the State and Dover Downs, not only in the operation of the State Lottery but also in the harness racing operations at the track. Since 1993, the State’s concerns for the “economic activity and vitality” of the racetrack operation is a matter of statutory expression. The overall involvement of the State in the race track’s affairs is manifest.
The majority analyzes the Burton rationale and concludes, especially in light of the Supreme Court decision in Brentwood, decided after the District Court’s opinion and panel opinion in this case, that Burton must be limited to its unique facts. I find no fault with such limitations, especially since the Brentwood court carefully refrained from citing Burton. However, the facts in this case bear no resemblance to Burton. This is a much stronger case for the fair attribution of state action than was the case in Burton. Here, we have a joint venture of the State and Dover Downs in the operation of the video lottery and the harness racing track, not merely a symbiotic relationship.
This court has defined a joint venture as “an association of persons or corporations who by contract, express, or implied, agree to engage in a common enterprise for their mutual profit.” Richardson v. Walsh Constr. Co., 334 F.2d 334, 336 (3d Cir.1964). The Richardson court further described the essential elements of a joint venture as: “(a) a joint proprietary interest in, and a right to mutual control over, the enterprise; (b) a contribution by each of the parties of capital, materials, services or knowledge; and (c) a right to participate in the expected profits.” Id. A joint venture relationship may exist where parties engage in an undertaking without entering upon their business undertaking “as strict partners, but engage in a common enterprise for their mutual benefit.” First Mechs. Bank v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 91 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir.1937); accord Plant-Erickson v. Ditter, 131 N.J. Eq. 163, 24 A.2d 379, 381 (1942). A modern definition of a joint venture and some of its incidents is set forth in the current edition of Williston on Contracts:
“A joint venture is a special combination of two or more persons, whether corporate, individual or otherwise, formed for some specific venture in which a profit is jointly sought without the parties designating themselves as an actual partnership or corporation. The essence of the contract among the joint venturers is that it binds the coventurers. While, as between the parties themselves, a contract is essential for the creation of a joint venture, this is not necessarily so as to third persons; although the parties may never have intended to become joint venturers, under certain circumstances, they may be held estopped to deny their participation in a joint venture, and all members of the joint venture will be held jointly and severally liable on its contracts.”
12 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 36:9 (4th ed.1999) (footnotes omitted). Thus, in Tompkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 F.2d 396 (4th Cir.1938), the Court of Appeals applied essentially the same definition and held that an arrangement between a partnership and a corporation in a specific transaction constituted a joint venture between the partnership and the corporation. The court concluded that the agreement between the partnership and corporation “fulfilled all the requisites of a joint venture although informal and [ ] never reduced to writing.” Id. at 399.
In Irvis, the Supreme Court observed that although Pennsylvania engaged in extreme and detailed regulation of private clubs, this was insufficient to make the *251Moose Lodge a state actor. 407 U.S. at 177, 92 S.Ct. 1965. However, it intimated that had the relationship between the Lodge and the State been a partnership or joint venture, its decision would be different. Id. (“[The regulations cannot] be said to make the State ... a partner or even a joint venturer.”).
Similarly, in Fitzgerald, we did not find that the heavy state regulation of race tracks amounted to a symbiotic relationship between the race track and the state, but we noted that the result would have been different had the race track in its operations been a “veritable partner with the state.” 607 F.2d at 595. Under such circumstances, “it seems proper to hold such enterprise subject to the same constitutional requirements to which the state is accountable.” Id. (quoting Braden, 552 F.2d at 958). We have such a situation here.
The majority draws a comparison between Fitzgerald and this case. The only basis for comparison is that both involve horse harness racing activities that are state regulated. The majority notes that in Fitzgerald we concluded that the state was not a “joint venturer.” However, Fitzgerald is vastly different from this case. Fitzgerald did not have slot machines; there was no sharing of profits; the track was not a state agent in the operation of the slot machines, in the collection of the proceeds and in transmitting them to the state; the state and the race track did not commit their separately owned property to the joint enterprise; the state did not use monies generated by the video lottery to cross-fertilize the horse racing activities; and there was no lottery and no joint venture.
The majority acknowledges “that Dover Downs’ video lottery and racing activities should be considered together.” (Maj. op. at 287). However, the majority ignores the financial structure created by the HRRA. The majority summarily concludes that “Delaware was not conducting any operation together with the race track at Dover Downs. It was not operating a mutually beneficial business there.” (Maj. op. at 243). These conclusions are the backbone of the majority’s decision but the facts and the HRRA are to the contrary.
Delaware transformed the regulatory structure of its relationship with Dover Downs in 1993 when it enacted the Horse Racing Redevelopment Act. One purpose of the Act is “to establish a state-operated lottery ... which will produce the greatest income for the State.” DeLCode Ann. tit. 29, § 4801(a). A second purpose is to provide “nonstate supported assistance in the form of increased economic activity and vitality for Delaware’s harness and thoroughbred horse racing industries, which activity and vitality will enable the industry to improve its facilities and ... cause increased employment.” Id. § 801(b)(1) (emphasis added).
The HRRA authorizes harness race tracks such as Dover Downs to operate slot machines on their premises. As I have stated above, the race track provides its premises, infrastructure, and organization for the enterprise, and the State provides the slot machines. The race tracks, as “video lottery agents,” are responsible for securing and operating the machines and are free to determine the number of machines they choose to house, up to the statutory maximum of 1000. Id. § 4820.
The HRRA also provides for the distribution of the profits generated by the race tracks in the operation of the slot machines. Dover Downs is required to send all monies generated by the machines, net of payments to patrons, to an account controlled by the State Lottery Office. Id. § 4815(b). The monies received by this account are then distributed in accordance *252with the HRRA. First, the State pays the administrative costs associated with the operation of the lottery, including the salaries of state lottery personnel. Next, Gamblers Anonymous and similar programs receive a share. The State then splits the balance with Delaware race tracks, including Dover Downs. A large percentage of the remaining funds is distributed to racetracks such as Dover Downs “to be applied under the direction of the Delaware Thoroughbred Racing Commission for races conducted at such agent’s racetrack.” Id. § 4815(b)(3)b. Finally, Dover Downs, as a video lottery agent, receives a statutorily designated “commission.” Id. § 4815(b)(3)e. The State general fund receives the most substantial share of the profits. The flow of funds from the race track to the State is generated by the business arrangement under the HRRA between Delaware and the race track, not by state regulation of the industry. The relationship established is one that was obviously “mutually beneficial” and “conducted together.” The majority’s assertion to the contrary has no record support.
Under Delaware law, an arrangement between two individuals and a corporation to which each party made a definite contribution to the enterprise, shared in the profits, and had a proprietary interest in the venture, constitutes a joint venture. J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Conner, 156 A.2d 499, 503 (Del.1959). The State and Dover Downs are joint venturers, a “widely recognized legal relationship ... of modern origin,” id. at 502, in the operation of the race tracks.
More recently, in In re McKinney-Ringham Corp., No. Civ.A. 15071, 1998 WL 118035 (Del.Ch. Feb.27, 1998), a Delaware court found a relationship between one general partner and six limited partnerships a joint venture because they shared a community of interest between the managing entity, a right of each party to share in any profits, and a duty to share in the losses of the entity. The majority in this case baldly states that “the state was in [no] way putting its support behind the conduct of the private entity.” (Maj. op. at 243). This ignores HRRA legislation specifically devised to rejuvenate the horse racing industry and enhance the State’s Treasury. Operating the video lottery was indeed “a mutually beneficial business.” In 1997, the net proceeds generated by the slot machines were $298.1 million, of which Delaware received $152.3 million and Dover Downs received $90.13 million. In 1998, the net proceeds were $350.82 million, of which Delaware received $206 million and Dover Downs received $113.12 million. In the first ten months of 1999, the Delaware race tracks netted $351.67 million. With tens and hundreds of millions of dollars in proceeds raised annually by the State of Delaware and Dover Downs, they both enjoyed significant mutual benefits from the joint venture that enriched their coffers.
The majority’s description of the financial arrangement between the State and the race tracks as a “subsidy” is inaccurate. This inaccuracy is highlighted by the HRRA which states that one of the purposes of the Act is to provide “nonstate supported assistance.” See onte p. 251. A subsidy is a grant made by the government to any enterprise whose promotion is considered to be in the public interest. Blaok’s Law Dictionary 1442 (7th ed.1999). Delaware did not grant funds here. The payment of the administration expenses and salaries, the charitable contributions, and the split between the race tracks and the State of the monies earned in the enterprise were profits, not subsidies. The funds generated by Dover Downs are therefore “earned,” (maj. op. at 238) not subsidized. Nor is there any basis for the *253majority’s equivocal characterization of Dover Downs’s relationship to the State “like a government contractor.” (Maj. op. at 287).
In Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.1984), we again reviewed our decisions and recent decisions by the Supreme Court relating to state action. We concluded that Braden was still good law, that the Supreme Court had not developed a uniform test for ascertaining state action and had even questioned whether such a unitary test was possible. Id. at 98. As in Braden, we held that the University was “in name and in fact” an instrumentality of the State. Id. at 103.
The majority concludes that our decisions in Krynicky and Braden “have limited relevance” to this case. I disagree. The majority reaches its conclusion because these decisions predate the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement and because they involved universities that we held to be “instrumentalities” of the state. (Maj. op. at 245). Essentially, the issue there, although in an academic ambience far removed from horse racing tracks, was whether the participation of a state in an otherwise private activity was so significant that the acts of the seemingly private enterprise should be considered state action. That is the issue before us except that in this instance the relationship has more of the characteristics of the partnership asserted by the Crissmans rather than a private entity acting as a state instrumentality.
The Braden court observed that Burton and Jackson stand as two separate models of state action analysis designed by the Supreme Court. 552 F.2d at 958. What emerges from Braden and Krynicky is another model for state action, “state in-strumentalities.” The cases stand for the proposition that where a private enterprise stands as a “veritable partner” with the state in the operation of an educational institution, the enterprise is subject to the same constitutional requirements as the state. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001), is yet another model. The applicability of each approach “rest[s] on the type of setting which may be present.” Braden, 552 F.2d at 958.
Summarizing, the State of Delaware and Dover Downs engaged in a joint enterprise as a result of the relationship structured between them by the HRRA. Delaware’s participation in and the financial benefits it derives from the operations are so significant that the acts of this seemingly private enterprise must be deemed state action for the purposes of Section 1983. Therefore, even though the State did not participate in the decision to expel or exclude the Crissmans, its relationship to Dover Downs as a joint venturer subjects the act of expulsion to constitutional standards. Accordingly, I would reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand this case for trial.
II.
Finally, the Crissmans ask this court to reverse the District Court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. A court ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction must consider the following four factors:
whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits;
whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief;
whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and
whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.
*254Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d Cir.1996) (en banc)). We review the denial of a preliminary injunction only for “an abuse of discretion, a clear error of law, or a clear mistake on the facts.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
I believe the Crissmans have a reasonable chance of succeeding on the merits because the State and Dover Downs are joint venturers, and the substantial evidence presented by the Crissmans supports their claim that they were denied due process of law.
All of the above factors cut in favor of the Crissmans. The Crissmans have suffered irreparable harm due to the denial of the injunction “because the nature of harness racing is such that no adequate remedy exists at law to compensate [them] for losses to income and reputation sustained from an unlawful suspension.” Fitzgerald, 607 F.2d at 601. There is no evidence that Dover Downs would be harmed if the Crissmans, who are licensees in good standing with the Delaware Harness Racing Commission, were allowed to race. Finally, there is no evidence that the public would be adversely affected if the Criss-mans were reinstated at Dover Downs. Thus, the District Court’s denial of the Crissmans’ motion for preliminary injunc-tive relief should be reversed.
III.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, summary judgment in favor of Dover Downs, Inc. should be reversed and the case remanded to the District Court, with directions to grant plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and for such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.
Judge MCKEE joins in this dissent.
. Paragraph 2, Stipulation of Undisputed Facts.
. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any . .. regulation ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or any other proper proceeding for redress.”
. The following individuals must be licensed by the HRC: state steward, board of judges, racing secretary, paddock judge, horse identifier and equipment checker, clerk of the course, official starter, official charter, official timer, photo finish technician, patrol judge, program director, State veterinarian, and LA-SIX veterinarian. (App. at 59).