concurring in the judgment.
This case involves a challenge under federal and state law to a local ordinance regulating the use of public rights-of-way by payphone service providers. The majority bases its decision on federal law, *248holding that the ordinance is invalid because it is preempted by the Federal Telecommunications Act' of 1996. While I agree that the ordinance in question is invalid, I arrive at this conclusion for different reasons.
It is well established that, when possible, federal courts should generally base their decisions on non-constitutional rather than constitutional grounds. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958) (“In keeping with our duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case, we look first to petitioners’ nonconstitutional claim that respondent acted in excess of powers granted him by Congress.”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); United States v. Serafini, 167 F.3d 812, 815 n. 7 (3d Cir.1999) (“Longstanding practice calls for federal judges to explore all non-constitutional grounds of decision before addressing constitutional ones.” (quoting United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.1998))). Indeed, reaching constitutional issues in advance of non-constitutional ones may be reversible error. See, e.g., Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Association, 975 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School District, 457 U.S. 594, 595, 102 S.Ct. 2612, 73 L.Ed.2d 245 (1982)); WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 878 F.2d 906, 910 n. 4 (6th Cir.1989); Beeson v. Hudson, 630 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir.1980).
In Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 49 F.Supp.2d 805 (D.Md.1999), a case very similar to the one now before us, the district court held that the Federal Telecommunications Act preempted a local ordinance that regulated the use of county-owned rights-of-way by telecommunications companies doing business in the county. The district court did not address the state-law issues raised. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had committed reversible error by deciding the constitutional question of preemption before considering the state-law questions upon which the case might have been decided. See Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir.2000). The Fourth Circuit reasoned as follows: (1) courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions unless they are essential to the disposition of' a case; (2) determining whether a federal statute preempts a state statute is a constitutional question implicating the Supremacy Clause; (3) disposition of the state-law questions raised by Bell Atlantic could have disposed of the case; (4) therefore, the district court committed reversible error by deciding the constitutional question of preemption before considering the state-law questions. See id. at 865-66. The Fourth Circuit reiterated this reasoning in MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Virginia, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir.2001), and the Eleventh Circuit took a similar approach in BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir.2001).
The majority opinion addresses the preemption question fust and does not reach the state-law arguments. The District Court acknowledged the Fourth Circuit decision in Bell Atlantic-Maryland, but disagreed with its approach. New Jersey Payphone Association Inc. v. Town of West New York, 130 F.Supp.2d 631, 634 (D.N.J.2001). The District Court reasoned that it was appropriate to address the preemption issue first because preemption is a constitutional issue only in the indirect *249sense that the authority for preemption rests on the Supremacy Clause. See id. at 634-35.
It is clear, however, that preemption is a constitutional issue. See Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981) (“[Determining whether a statute is preempted by federal law] ‘is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict.’ ”) (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971)).
The rationales behind the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions except as a last resort are grounded in fundamental constitutional principles — the “great gravity and delicacy” of judicial review, separation of powers, the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication, the case or controversy requirement, and principles of federalism. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 571, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947); Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345-46, 56 S.Ct. 466 (Brandeis, J., concurring). In this case, two factors mitigate the applicability of these principles: (1) we are striking down a local ordinance, not a federal law, and (2) the basis for doing so is preemption by federal statute, not direct violation of the federal Constitution. The former factor reduces the significance of concerns about separation of powers and the finality of judicial review because we are not invalidating an act of Congress, and our interpretation of the statutes at issue does not foreclose a response by the state or federal legislature. The latter factor diminishes the relevance of the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication as it applies to this case because we are not engaging in constitutional interpretation or declaring constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, the limitation on Article III courts to adjudication of actual cases or controversies counsels us to dispose of cases on the narrowest possible ground, which in this case is the state-law ground. Indeed, this seems to be the basis for Justice Brandeis’s prudential rules regarding constitutional adjudication as set forth in his Ashwander concurrence. 297 U.S. at 345-47, 56 S.Ct. 466 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Moreover, the federalism rationale is pertinent here because we have the option of avoiding invocation of federal supremacy over local laws. Therefore, resolving this case on state-law grounds does less violence to principles of federalism and dual sovereignty. In sum, the principles underlying the prudential rules set forth in Ashivander are sufficiently applicable here as to counsel that we begin our analysis of this case with the state-law claim.
On the state-law claim, it is clear that the Ordinance violates N.J.Stat § 54:30-124(a), which prohibits a municipality from imposing any fees or assessments “in the nature of a local franchise” against telecommunication companies. It is well established in New Jersey law that a municipality may not raise revenue beyond what is required to meet regulatory expenses. See, e.g., Taxi’s Inc. v. Borough of East Rutherford, 149 N.J.Super. 294, 373 A.2d 717, 723 (1977) (“A municipality may not, under the enabling legislation, pass a valid ordinance for revenue purposes only, but it may exact a fee commensurate with the cost of regulation and even in excess thereof if within reasonable limits.” (citations omitted)). West New York offers no contrary arguments on the state-law issues. Indeed, the only argument that could conceivably be made by the Town in support of the Ordinance is that its revenue-raising *250is “within reasonable limits.” See, e.g., Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. 432, 120 A.2d 114, 117 (1956) (holding that a municipality lacks general revenue-raising power, but that it may collect license fees “which may, at least within reasonable limits, exceed the regulatory costs”). This is not a plausible claim in this case, however, because the fees in the Ordinance are tied explicitly to the revenue generated by the payphone service provider. That is, the municipality will earn a proportion of the profits, and therefore, the fee scheme cannot honestly be considered to be an attempt to defray regulatory expenses. Thus, the Ordinance is in violation of N.J.Stat § 54:30-124(a).
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment, but for reasons grounded in state law rather than federal law.