dissenting.
Because I conclude that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to the defendant, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse that order and remand the case for trial. The district court found that the plaintiff had not established unlawful discrimination based upon direct evidence, but that he had made out a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence. The court also found that the defendant had provided a legitimate business reason for failing to promote Hopson — specifically, that other applicants were better qualified than the plaintiff for the positions in question. Thus, the dispositive question becomes whether the plaintiff can establish pretext on the part of the defendant in relying upon this justification for its actions.
The majority concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the record to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact on the question of pretext, based solely on a combination of supervisor Slater’s opinion that racial discrimination accounted for the company’s actions with regard to Hopson and statistical evidence showing a disparity between minority representation in the work force and that in the ranks of man*440agement. I cannot agree with this conclusion, primarily because the evidence cited is simply insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact, and because the plaintiff has otherwise failed to show that the legitimate business reason put forward by the defendant is pretextual.
The majority agrees with the district court that Slater’s testimony does not constitute direct evidence “that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in Da-imlerChrysler’s actions,” pointing out that Slater “had no involvement in the decision-making process with respect to the particular jobs at issue.” In this regard, the majority also notes that Slater “did not reveal the basis for his opinion” that “Hop-son’s race was a factor in the company’s decision to deny him the promotions for which he applied.” For this reason, Slater’s opinion may well be inadmissible for lack of a foundation, an outcome that, in my judgment, severely undercuts the majority’s later determination that Slater’s apparently groundless opinion nevertheless “constitute[s] circumstantial evidence of discrimination.”
The district court also discounted the plaintiffs statistical evidence, finding that the disparity between the percentage of African-American security guards and that of African-American managers could not be used to establish pretext, because there was no evidence “to show the number of African-American applicants for those [management] jobs or their qualifications.” The fact that the statistical evidence was thus legally “incomplete,” as the district court correctly described it, is simply not addressed by the majority, although the statistics are cited as a basis for concluding that the defendant’s proffered reason for its actions was pretextual.
Hence, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to send the case to a jury based merely on Slater’s opinion, which may be wholly speculative, and on the questionable statistical testimony offered in this case. In addition, I find another compelling basis for concluding that summary judgment was appropriate. In four of the five actions taken by the defendant that are in contention on appeal, the defendant determined that an applicant other than Hopson was better qualified for the position in question not only on the basis of academic credentials and experience within the company, but also on the basis of annual performance evaluations that were superior to the plaintiffs. The majority indicates that testimony regarding the evaluations should be discounted because, in each case, the defendant “failed to indicate the extent to which [the applicant’s] evaluations were better than Hop-son’s.” But this ruling turns the McDonnell Douglas analysis on its head. That analysis clearly and unequivocally places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the performance evaluations were being used as a pretext when the actual reason for the company’s actions was racial discrimination. There is in this record, however, no indication whatever that the defendant’s reliance on the evaluations in question was other than legitimate. Nor is there any reason to disbelieve the company’s assertion that the fifth and last candidate had management experience with the company that was superior to Hopson’s. Again, it was Hopson’s burden to prove that the business reasons cited by the defendant for its decisions were pre-textual, not the other way around.
As the majority concedes, our circuit precedent recognizes that “Title VII does not diminish traditional management prerogatives in choosing among qualified candidates.” Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir.1987). In my judgment, it was the exercise of that prerogative that led to the defendant’s actions in this case. *441Certainly, I can see no genuine issue of material fact that would lead to the opposite conclusion. Unlike the majority, my credulity is not “strained” by this record. There was obviously heated competition for the positions in question- — in no case were there fewer than 15 applicants for promotion, and in one case there were 38 applicants. Undoubtedly, many of these applicants were at least minimally qualified for promotion, but only one could be chosen in each instance, and it was the company’s prerogative to determine which among those qualified to promote. Hop-son had been the beneficiary of at least three such promotions between 1989 and 1997. Perhaps after some 30 years with the company he had advanced to the limit to which his abilities could carry him, as we all do at some point in our careers. That conclusion is as sound, based on this record, as the majority’s speculation that his failure to advance farther was somehow the product of unlawful discrimination.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.