concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s opinion-except as to Part 4. In my view, the majority fails to adhere to the Supreme Court’s guidance in analyzing punitive damages.1 Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part 4 and from the remand for further proceedings.
A. Standard of Review
In civil cases, we generally review de novo the question whether a jury instruction misstates the applicable law. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 944 (9th Cir.2001), cert denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2623, 153 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002). We generally review the particular formulation of civil jury instructions for abuse of discretion. Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., 108 *1021F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.1997); Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995); Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1481 (9th Cir.1992). “In evaluating jury instructions, prejudicial error results when, looking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly covered.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir.2001) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1018, 122 S.Ct. 1609, 152 L.Ed.2d 623 (2002).
Our civil eases appear to be inconsistent in describing what standard of review applies to the denial of a requested jury instruction. Compare Neibel, 108 F.3d at 1129 (reviewing for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to deliver the defendant’s requested instruction), with Ortiz v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 852 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir.1988) (stating that a “defendant is entitled to an instruction if it is supported by law, and the failure to submit a proper jury instruction is a question of law which we review de novo” (citations omitted)). However, those cases can be reconciled by reviewing de novo any questions of law that are involved in the failure to give a requested instruction, for example, whether the requested instruction states the law incorrectly and whether its absence results in a misleading statement of the law. Other questions involved in the failure to give a requested instruction are reviewed for abuse of discretion, for example, whether the party’s theory is adequately covered by other instructions.
B. The Punitive Damages Instructions
The court gave the following instruction on punitive damages:
Members of the jury, you’ve now heard the evidence of the financial condition of the defendant Ford Motor Company.
Because you have answered yes to special verdict question number fifteen,2 you may, in your discretion, award punitive or exemplary damages against defendant Ford for [the] sake of example and by way of punishment.
Your discretion should be exercised without passion or prejudice.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to consider the following: One, the reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant; two, the amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of defendant’s financial condition.
That instruction is the Nevada pattern instruction, Nev. J.I. 10.20, with the appropriate modifications to identify the defendant.
The court refused to give the following instruction, requested by Defendant:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, that is necessary for punishment and deterrence, you may consider only Defendant’s wrongful conduct that has had an impact on the citizens of Nevada. You may not award any punitive damages for the purpose of punishing Defendant relative to the sale of vehicles in other States, or for the purpose of punishing or deterring Defendant’s conduct outside the State of Nevada.
It is the court’s refusal to give that particular “non-extraterritoriality” instruction on which the majority relies to reverse and remand for a new trial.
*1022C. Nevada Law
Because this is a diversity case, the first step in the analysis is to examine the fit between the instructions given and the substantive law of Nevada. “In a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where -state law provides the basis of decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law.” Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989).
The majority errs by analyzing the sufficiency of the instructions as a matter of federal substantive law in the first instance. (Majority Opinion at 1012-13, 1016.) Defendant does argue that, even if a non-extraterritoriality instruction is not constitutionally required, it is required by general federal-law principles pertaining to jury instructions. However, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Browning-Ferris, when it declined to hold that the federal common law provides a basis for finding a punitive damages award to be excessive in a diversity case. 492 U.S. at 278-80, 109 S.Ct. 2909.3
The district court here sufficiently informed the jury of Nevada law on punitive damages. The court used the standard pattern instruction for Nevada. Although there are no Nevada cases analyzing whether the pattern instruction is consistent with Nevada law, a review of Nevada cases demonstrates that it is.
In Nevada, “[t]he proper end of punitive damages is to punish and deter culpable conduct.” Ace Truck & Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132, 134 (1987). Specifically, Nevada Revised Statute § 42.005 allows a plaintiff to recover punitive damages “in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied, ... for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(1).
“The amount of punitive damages appropriate to the stated purpose of punishment and deterrence lies in the discretion of the fact-finder.” Ace Truck, 746 P.2d at 134. Nevertheless, the fact-finder’s discretion is not “unbridled.” Id. Instead, it is subject to post-verdict scrutiny by the trial and appellate courts for “legal excessiveness”:
Punitive damages are legally excessive when the amount of damages awarded is *1023dearly disproportionate to the degree of blameworthiness and harmfulness inherent in the oppressive, fraudulent or malicious misconduct of the tortfeasor under the circumstances of a given case. If the awarding jury or judge assesses more in punitive damages than is reasonably necessary and fairly deserved in order to punish the offender and deter others from similar conduct, then the award must be set aside as excessive.
In arriving at the ultimate judgment of where excessiveness begins, courts can legitimately take into account any circumstances which relate to the limits of punishment and deterrence that can be properly imposed in a given case. Relevant circumstances included such matters as the financial position of the defendant, culpability and blameworthiness of the tortfeasor, vulnerability and injury suffered by the offended party, the extent to which the punished conduct offends the public’s sense of justice and propriety, and the means which are judged necessary to deter future misconduct of this kind.
Id. at 136-37 (footnote omitted).
In view of the statute and case law, the pattern instruction adequately informed the jury of the Nevada law on punitive damages. It explained that the statutory purpose of such damages is to set an example and to punish the defendant. It clarified that the damages were not mandatory, but instead could be awarded by the jury in its discretion, a discretion that should not include passion or prejudice. The pattern instruction then identified some of the factors germane to postverdict excessiveness review, thereby limiting the jury’s discretion. The instruction drew the jury’s attention to the blameworthiness of Defendant’s conduct and the manner in which Defendant’s conduct offended the public’s sense of justice and propriety by focusing on “reprehensibility.” The instruction also informed the jury that the amount needed to deter Defendant should be set by reference to its financial condition.
By contrast, the instruction requested by Defendant was neither required nor supported by Nevada law. First, Defendant’s statement that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages does not state Nevada law accurately. As summarized above, Nevada law requires a punitive damages award to be “reasonably necessary” to punish the defendant for the challenged conduct and to deter others from engaging in like conduct. That is, the reasonable relationship is between the amount of punitive damages and the challenged conduct, not between the amount of punitive damages and the award of compensatory damages.
Second, Defendant’s requested extraterritoriality instruction is not required by Nevada law. Nevada law does not prohibit the jury from considering a defendant’s out-of-state conduct; indeed, it explicitly authorizes the jury’s consideration of a defendant’s financial condition, a piece of information that has an out-of-state component in many cases. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(4).
Because the instructions accurately and sufficiently summarized Nevada law, I turn next to the more difficult issues raised by Defendant: whether the Nevada instructions comply with federal due process standards. These are constitutional questions, rather than questions of instructional error. And as to such questions — • including “those issues involving the proper review of the jury award by a federal district court and court of appeals” — federal law controls. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 278-79, 109 S.Ct. 2909.
*1024D. Procedural Due Process
In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), the Supreme Court articulated a standard for determining whether the procedures governing an award of punitive damages comply with due process. The Court held that Alabama’s system of jury instructions, trial-court review, and appellate review — taken together — protected a civil defendant’s due process interests. Id. at 20-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032.
The Court first reviewed the Alabama trial court’s jury instructions on punitive damages.4 It concluded that “[t]he instructions ... enlightened the jury as to the punitive damages’ nature and purpose, identified the damages as punishment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained that their imposition was not compulsory.” Id. at 19, 111 S.Ct. 1032. Consequently, the instructions imposed “reasonable constraints” on the jury’s discretion, satisfying the requirements of procedural due process. Id. at 20, 111 S.Ct. 1032.
Second, the Court examined the Alabama procedures for post-verdict review by the trial court. Id. at 20, 111 S.Ct. 1032. In Alabama, the trial courts are required “to reflect in the record the reasons for interfering with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the damages.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Factors relevant to that determination included (1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the need to discourage others from similar conduct; (3) the effect on the parties; and (4) other factors, including the effect on third parties. Id. The Court concluded that Alabama’s system for review provided a “meaningful and adequate” check on the jury’s discretion. Id.
Third, the Court found that the Alabama Supreme Court’s review of awards of punitive damages “provide[d] an additional check on the jury’s or trial court’s discretion.” Id. at 20-21, 111 S.Ct. 1032. The Alabama Supreme Court uses a two-step process to review an award of punitive damages. First, it engages in a comparative analysis of the award. It then applies the “detailed substantive standards it has developed for evaluating punitive awards.”5 Id. at 21, 111 S.Ct. 1032. The *1025Court held that the Alabama Supreme Court’s method of review supplied a “sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding punitive damages.” Id. at 22, 111 S.Ct. 1032.
In short, Haslip stands for the proposition that procedural due process is satisfied with respect to an award of punitive damages if procedures that provide a “definite and meaningful constraint” on the factfinder’s discretion are in place to ensure that the amount of any award is reasonably related to the state’s legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence. Has-lip also makes clear that jury instructions need not limit the jury’s discretion, beyond clarifying that punitive damages are discretionary and explaining their purpose, provided that postverdict review procedures are available to ensure that an award is not excessive.
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), the Court confirmed that post-verdict review of punitive damages awards, rather than jury instructions, provides the most constitutionally significant constraint on a jury’s discretion. There, the Court held that Oregon’s system for awarding punitive damages violated procedural due process because it did not permit meaningful post-verdict review of punitive damages awards. Id. at 434-35, 114 S.Ct. 2331. In so holding, the court rejected the argument that the detailed jury instructions required by Oregon law adequately constrained the jury’s discretion. Id. at 433, 114 S.Ct. 2331; see also id. at 440-43, 114 S.Ct. 2331 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the jury instructions required by Oregon law).
Respondent’s final safeguard, proper jury instruction, is a well-established and, of course, important check against excessive awards. The problem that concerns us, however, is the possibility that a jury will not follow those instructions and may return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict.
Id. at 433, 114 S.Ct. 2331.
Read together, Haslip and Honda teach that, while due process imposes some requirements on how a jury must be instructed on punitive damages, those requirements are minimal and general. Instead, it is the availability of post-verdict review of punitive damages awards that provides the most substantial procedural check on punitive damages.
Although the Supreme Court approved the general jury instructions in Haslip in the context of reviewing a state court’s award of punitive damages, there is no principled reason why jury instructions in a diversity case in federal court have to be more detailed. That is because the Supreme Court has established that punitive damages awards in federal court are subject to post-verdict scrutiny for compliance with both state law and the federal constitution.
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 *1026S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001), the Court outlined the proper procedures for federal post-verdict review. When a jury-awards punitive damages based on state law,
the role of the trial judge is “to determine whether the jury’s verdict is within the confínes set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered.” If no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review the trial court’s “determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Id. at 433, 121 S.Ct. 1678 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 279, 109 S.Ct. 2909).
However, a federal appellate court must review de novo the trial court’s determination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award. Id. at 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678. Because “the jury’s award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of ‘fact,’” this higher standard of review does not implicate the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 437, 121 S.Ct. 1678. The Supreme Court has directed federal appellate courts to review the constitutionality of punitive damages awards under the criteria established in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996):
(1) the degree or reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the disparity between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440, 121 S.Ct. 1678.
Those post-verdict review procedures provide at least the same level of protection as the procedures approved by the Court in Haslip. A punitive damages award is subject to review by both the district court and the appellate court for compliance with state law, and the amount of the award is subject to de novo review to ensure that it falls within the bounds of substantive due process. Because those post-verdict procedures are at least as protective of defendants as those approved in Haslip, it follows that the jury instructions on punitive damages in a diversity case in federal court need to meet only the standard articulated in Haslip to comply with procedural due process.
Thus, in general, the instructional requirements are modest. Indeed, this fact has frustrated Justice O’Connor. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474-75, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, while it is not necessarily unconstitutional for a jury to “receive only vague and amorphous guidance” on punitive damages, “it cannot be denied that the lack of clear guidance heightens the risk that arbitrariness, passion, or bias will replace dispassionate deliberation as the basis for the jury’s verdict”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 43, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the jury instructions approved by the majority were unconstitutionally vague).
The Nevada instructions meet the standards articulated by Haslip: they informed the jury that punitive damages were discretionary, that their purpose is to punish and to set an example, and that the amount must bear some relation to the blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct. Consequently, the jury instructions met the requirements of procedural due process.
E. The Role of Ouh-of-State Conduct
In Gore, the Court again considered the due process limitations on awards of puni*1027tive damages. According to the Court, substantive due process requires that the amount of a punitive damages award be reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence. 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
The first step in analyzing whether a given award is reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interests is determining the scope of those interests. Id. In the context of defining Alabama’s legitimate interests, the Court discussed the role of a defendant’s out-of-state conduct in the punitive damages calculus. Id. at 568-74, 116 S.Ct. 1589. The Court concluded “from ... principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its law with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.” Id. at 572, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Instead, an award of punitive damages “must be supported by the State’s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own economy.” Id. That does not mean, however, that a jury may not consider at all the out-of-state conduct of a defendant when setting a punitive damages award. To the contrary, the Court stated explicitly that a defendant’s out-of-state conduct can inform the jury’s evaluation of the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 574 n. 21, 576-77, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
In view of the Court’s discussion in Gore of the proper role of out-of-state conduct, the “non-extraterritoriality” instruction requested by Defendant is wrong as a matter of law. Gore simply does not require that the jury “consider only Defendant’s wrongful conduct that had an impact on the citizens of Nevada” (emphasis added), as the Defendant’s instruction proposed.
Additionally, the Nevada pattern instructions did not invite the jury to consider Defendant’s out-of-state conduct in an inappropriate manner. Rather, the instructions directed the jury to consider factors such as Defendant’s reprehensibility and financial position — factors that may be informed by Defendant’s out-of-state conduct, but that are nonetheless proper for the jury to consider when setting a punitive damages award.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ comment during closing arguments that Defendant had faded to warn 884,000 people in North America about the roll-away risk posed by its vehicles did not require the court to instruct the jury to ignore Defendant’s out-of-state conduct. Defendant’s counsel did not object to that aspect of Plaintiffs’ closing arguments6 and, as the Court held in Gore, that information was relevant to the jury’s assessment of the reprehensibility of Defendant’s conduct in failing to warn of the product defect.
The question remains, however, whether Gore required the court to give some form of non-extraterritoriality instruction, even in the absence of a properly formulated request. I believe that the answer is “no.”
In Gore, the Court accepted the Alabama Supreme Court’s interpretation of the jury’s verdict as reflecting a computation based largely on activities in other states. 517 U.S. at 573, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Yet, in some of those states, the defendant’s conduct was lawful. Id. at 569-71, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Alabama could not punish the defendant in accordance with its policy when its policy was not the same as other states’ policies. As the majority opinion correctly observes, that is the same situa*1028tion we face here. (Majority Opinion at 36-37.) Consequently, the majority’s speculation about whether Gore’s discussion of the scope of a state’s interest in punishing and deterring extraterritorial conduct would apply when the conduct is unlawful everywhere is purely dictum, playing no role in the outcome of this case.7 See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 n. 20, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (“Given that the verdict was based in part on out-of-state conduct that was lawful where it occurred, we need not consider whether one State may properly attempt to change a tortfeasor’s unlawful conduct in another State.”).
After examining the legality of the defendant’s conduct in some states, the Supreme Court considered what “guideposts” are required so as to ensure that a defendant receives fair notice of both the conduct resulting in punishment and the potential severity of the penalty. The three “guideposts” are the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered and the award, and the difference between the award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 574-85, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Significantly, however, the Court (1) discussed those factors as bearing on the excessiveness of the actual amount of the award, not as bearing on the procedures that had been followed in the Alabama trial, and (2) did not require a new trial even though it appears that the jury was either encouraged or allowed simply to multiply Dr. Gore’s actual damages by the number of cars sold nationwide. Id. at 585-86, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Instead, the Court held “that the grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit” a®,d that “the appropriate remedy” mig^he “an independent determination by *We Alabama Supreme Court of the awafcí necessary to vindicate the economic interests of Alabama consumers.” Id. In other words, the entire discussion was merely part of the analysis of exeessiveness, and the Court took pains not to require either a new trial or the giving of particular instructions. See id. at 602-04, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the logic of the majority opinion could suggest “that due process would require the assessing jury to be instructed ” on the scope of a state’s legitimate interests in imposing punitive damages relative to extraterritorial conduct, but concluding that the suggestion of a new instructional burden was a “false alarm”).
Cooper further confirms that due process does not require that a court order a new trial on punitive damages simply because the jury may have awarded punitive damages for an inappropriate reason due to misleading instructions. In Cooper, the punitive damages award may have been unconstitutionally excessive because it was based in part on an improper predicate due to erroneous jury instructions. 532 U.S. at 441, 121 S.Ct. 1678. The Court remanded the case to us to apply a de novo standard of review in an excessiveness analysis under Gore. Id. at 443, 121 S.Ct. 1678. Notably, despite its recognition that an improper purpose may have informed the jury’s decision, the Court did not hold that the defendant was entitled to a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. That result suggests that, even when a jury awards punitive damages for an im*1029proper purpose, the remedy is not a new trial, but instead is a reduction in the award so that it reflects only the state’s legitimate interests.
Because there was no instructional error, and because Defendant received procedural due process, I turn next to an excessiveness review.
F. Whether the Award is Excessive
The jury did award some punitive damages explicitly for out-of-state conduct. The jury’s original award was $150 million plus $884,000. The $884,000 apparently represented “one dollar for each Ford vehicle of this type sold in North America.” However, the district court reduced the award to $69,163,037.10. It computed that reduced amount by multiplying the compensatory damages by 30, on the theory that the largest punitive damages award approved by the Nevada courts had been 30 times the compensatory damages. The district court’s computation thereby cured the jury’s erroneous “bonus” for extraterritorial conduct.
Although the reduced award contains no extraterritoriality component, our work is not over. Cooper requires us to review de novo whether the reduced award is grossly excessive, applying the Gore factors: the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the disparity between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and the difference between the award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440, 121 S.Ct. 1678. The first factor is the most significant. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. It also “presents the most difficult question for an appellate court.” Leatherman, 285 F.3d at 1150.
In Gore, the Court identified the hallmarks of particularly reprehensible conduct. Nonviolent offenses are less blameworthy than those that involve violence or the threat of violence. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576, 116 S.Ct. 1589. “Similarly,’trickery and deceit’ are more reprehensible than negligence.” Id. (citation omitted). Conduct that causes economic harm alone is less reprehensible than conduct that injures (or risks injuring) the health and safety of others. Id. “[Rjepeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance.” Id. at 577, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
The conduct for which Defendant is liable here is a failure to warn. (Majority Opinion at 10-13.) Defendant knew of a potentially very dangerous defect. The defect risked injuring people, as well as causing economic harm. Yet, in part for reasons of economy, Defendant neither recalled its trucks for a 15 cent fix nor warned consumers. Defendant’s conduct in failing to warn consumers of a known danger was intentional. It must be remembered that the jury found against Defendant on Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional misrepresentation, so we must take it as a given that (as the district court recognized) Defendant’s suppression of information amounted to an implied misrepresentation of fact • as to the truck’s safety. Moreover, Defendant’s misconduct was not a single act of malfeasance, but was part of an ongoing pattern of failing to warn. The first factor thus weighs heavily in favor of a significant award of punitive damages.
“The second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S.Ct. 1589. If the harm to the plaintiff was fully realized, a court analyzes this factor by looking at the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Id. at 581, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Alternatively, if greater harm was likely to befall the plaintiff as a result *1030of the defendant’s conduct, the court examines “ ‘ “whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred.” ’ ” Id. (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 460, 113 S.Ct. 2711, quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21, 111 S.Ct. 1032). In Haslip, the Court approved an award that was four times the amount of compensatory damages. Id. In TXO, the Court compared the award of punitive damages with “the harm to the victim that would have ensued if the tor-tious plan had succeeded. That difference suggested that the relevant ratio was not more than 10 to 1.” Id.
Nevertheless, the Court has
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award. Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of the noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.
Id. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (citation omitted). That being said, the Court in Gore characterized the ratio at issue — 500 to 1 — as “breathtaking,” and sufficient to arouse judicial suspicion. Id. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
Here, the ratio of the remitted award of punitive damages to the compensatory damages is 30 to 1. Although that ratio is not as “breathtaking” as the 500 to 1 ratio in Gore, it is substantially larger than the ratios approved by the Court in Haslip and TXO. Moreover, this is not a case in which a higher ratio is justified because Defendant’s egregious conduct resulted in a low award of compensatory damages. Although it is difficult to conceive of a loss more terrible than the death of a child— and it is hard to value a child’s life — the jury awarded Plaintiffs a substantial amount in compensatory damages: $2,305,434.57. Thus, this is not a case in which compensatory damages fail meaningfully to address a defendant’s egregious conduct; nor is it a case in which it was exceptionally difficult for the jury to compute non-economie damages. Finally, because the harm to Plaintiffs has been fully realized, we need not take into account potential but unrealized harm when examining the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.
The first two factors counsel that the Constitution requires a lower ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages than the ratio that the district court applied. The factors justifying a higher ratio are not present. Under the circumstances, I believe that the ratio approved by the Court in TXO — 10 to 1- — would be appropriate here.
The third factor — sanctions for comparable misconduct — also weighs somewhat in favor of Defendant. As amicus points out, under the National Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the maximum civil penalty for selling defective motor vehicles is $800,000. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a). Of course, Defendant is hable in this case not for the statutory wrong of selling a defective motor vehicle but, instead, for the tort of failing to warn of the potentially devastating consequences of the particular defect. Nevertheless this statute has some bearing on comparability. Of more import are other similar tort cases. In Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 564 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), the court held that a jury’s $58 million punitive damages award against *1031this same defendant in a products liability action was constitutionally excessive, but that the remitted punitive damages award of $13.8 million was constitutional. The compensatory damages in that case amounted to about $4.4 million, making the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages about 3 to 1; the unremitted, excessive ratio was about 13 to 1. But see Romo v. Ford Motor Corp., 99 Cal.App.4th 1115, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 165-67 (Ct.App.2002) (upholding as constitutional a punitive damages award of $290 million where the compensatory damages were about $6.2 million, a ratio of about 45 to 1). A search of recent jury awards reveals a $120 million punitive damages award against Ford Motor Company, based on a holding that its 1988 Ford Ranger pick-up truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous; the compensatory damages amounted to just under $25 million, for a ratio of about 5 to 1. 13 Nat’l Jury Verdict Rev. & Analysis 8, Robinson v. Ford Motor Co. (West 2002) (1998 WL 2020336).
Applying all these factors- — -a concededly unscientific exercise — I conclude that a punitive damages award of $23,054,350 (10 times the compensatory damages) is the constitutional maximum here. The degree of reprehensibility of Defendant’s conduct is high — Defendant intentionally failed to warn consumers of a defect that foresee-ably could result in the death of a person. That failure to warn did, according to the jury’s finding, result in the death of Walter White. However, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is high when compared to the ratios approved by the Supreme. Court; its cases suggest that a 10 to 1 ratio is appropriate here.
Finally, the magnitude of the award when compared to awards in similar cases and analogous statutory sanctions is large, suggesting that a smaller award is appropriate. An award of $23,054,350.00 is in line with the awards in similar cases and provides a constitutionally acceptable relationship between punitive and compensatory damages.
G. Conclusion
The jury instructions on punitive damages were sufficient under Nevada law. The instructions also were sufficient to meet the requirements of procedural due process, in the context of the available procedures for review. Substantive due process does not necessarily require an instruction on nonextraterritoriality; rather, that is a factor to consider in excessiveness review. The punitive damages award in this case was excessive as a matter of substantive due process. In my view, the constitutional maximum is $23,054,350.
For the foregoing reasons, the majority’s analysis of punitive damages is wanting, and it reaches an incorrect result. Accordingly, I dissent from Part 4 and from the order remanding the case for further proceedings.
. The Supreme Court may give additional guidance on the issues presented here when it decides Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., No. 981564, 2001 WL 1246676 (Utah Oct. 19, 2001), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2326, 153 L.Ed.2d 158 (2002). Meanwhile, however, I believe that the majority has strayed from the messages sent by the Supreme Court to date.
. Special Verdict Question Fifteen provided: "Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Ford acted with oppression or malice in the conduct upon which you base your finding of liability for the death of Walter White?”
. Defendant also contends that it suffered harm from the court's failure to give its requested instruction because, even if the jury award falls within the range allowed by due process, the award might have been lower had the jury been so instructed. The argument that a failure to instruct the jury on the limitations imposed by due process violates due process, even if the resulting award in fact comports with due process, is not persuasive. As will be discussed below, a defendant’s procedural due process interest is protected if punitive damages are awarded in a manner that complies with due process. A defendant’s substantive due process interest is protected if the size of the award is not excessive. So long as neither of those harms occurs, a defendant has not been harmed, in a constitutionally cognizable way, by the failure to instruct. In other words, a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a "lower” award within the range of awards that complies with due process. Cf. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that usually a new trial is not required when an award of punitive damages exceeds constitutional limits. "That conclusion usually follows from the fact that a plaintiff would not be entitled to any greater award on remand and therefore cannot be aggrieved.” The implicit corollary to that conclusion is that a defendant against whom a permissible verdict was entered would not be entitled to any lesser award on remand as a matter of due process, and likewise could not be aggrieved.).
. Specifically, the instructions provided:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the word discretion, I say you don't even have to find fraud, you wouldn't have to, but you may, the law says you may award an amount of money known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary damages, which means to malte an example. So, if you feel or not feel, but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon them and as a direct result they were injured and in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means you don’t have to award it unless this jury feels.that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032.
. Defendant did object to a reference to Plaintiffs’ grief and to an argument that Defendant knew that children would be the victims of its failure to warn. On appeal, Defendant continues to contend that those arguments preju-dicially appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury.
. I question whether the principles articulated in Gore extend to a situation in which the conduct at issue is unlawful everywhere. In that circumstance, there would be no conflict with the policy goals of any state, and exces-siveness review would prevent the unfairness of multiple recovery for the same wrong. As noted in text, however, we have no occasion to decide this issue.