dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. My disagreement with the majority exists on three levels. First, factually, I do not agree with the majority that Schuster’s statement to Hart that “honesty wouldn’t hurt” constitutes a nullification of Hart’s Miranda warning and waiver, considering, as we must, the totality of the circumstances. Second, as a matter of law, there is not clearly established law of the Supreme Court of the United States as to whether a post-waiver statement, such as the one at issue in this case, nullifies an earlier, correctly given Miranda warning and waiver. Third, the state court’s application of the law, regardless of whether it may be considered as “clearly established,” was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.
I. Schuster’s Statement Taken Properly in Context
In considering whether Hart’s confession was coerced, we must evaluate the totality of the circumstances. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). There is little disagreement about the facts regarding what transpired in this case. The majority concedes that the police went to “great lengths” to apprise Hart of his Miranda rights. The officer carefully explained each of the rights to Hart, and Hart indicated both that he knew all about his rights from his prior case, in which Hart was represented by counsel, and that he understood each of the rights before agreeing to answer any questions. After explaining Hart’s rights to him, detective Mauer told Hart to initial a place on the Miranda waiver form if he wished to talk to the police without an attorney present, which Hart did. The trial court found that Hart was alert, that he had slept six to seven hours the night before, and that he was able to understand what was explained to him. Hart then signed the waiver, witnessed by both Mauer and Sergeant Perez. After being asked about the homicide, Hart initially denied any knowledge (a lie). After being told that a witness had identified him, Hart requested that Schuster be called to the police station. Upon arrival, Schuster was informed by Mauer that Hart had already waived his Miranda rights. Hart’s signed, written Miranda waiver form was on the table. Schuster testified that her purpose for interviewing *897Hart was to obtain a statement from him.1 Schuster told Hart that she was obligated to repeat anything Hart told her, and Hart said “let’s get started” after Schuster returned from giving him additional time to think about getting an attorney. The trial court found Hart never asked for his grandmother, or for an attorney, to be present during his interrogation. Finally, after describing all that had taken place, Schuster testified in the suppression hearing that she told Hart that “honesty wouldn’t hurt him.”2 Hart then confessed to Schuster. Hart was later re-Miran-dized before he made his taped confession. When considered in context and in light of the total circumstances, I believe it is reasonable to interpret Schuster’s statement of “honesty wouldn’t hurt” to mean that, knowing Hart had already waived his Miranda rights, and already willingly agreed to talk to the police, but had already lied to the police, then whatever he said should be truthful. The majority contorts its meaning from a recommendation not to lie into a trick to get Hart to talk about the homicide. Hart knew that he had been identified by an eye-witness to the crime. He had told Detective Mauer that he knew all of his Miranda rights from his prior arrests, but Mauer reviewed his rights again, in detail. Hart had willingly agreed to talk to the police without an attorney present before Schuster even arrived. Hart had already been told that he might face the death penalty if convicted as an adult. The signed Miranda waiver form was on the table in front of Hart throughout his entire conversation with Schuster. Hart had already been told that he was in “the biggest trouble possible”; it was evident that any further lies would only compound his “trouble.” Hart knew that he could request a lawyer at any time and that anything he told Schuster would be used against him.3 Hart understood an attorney’s role in our criminal justice system because he had been represented by an attorney in his recent credit card theft case.4 Schuster’s statement to the effect that “honesty wouldn’t hurt him” did not compel Hart’s incriminating statement because Hart had already agreed to talk to the police.5 Honesty is the cornerstone of *898our system of justice. Witnesses testify under oath because they are required to tell the truth, and dishonesty is not tolerated. In criminal trials, cooperating witnesses testifying for the government are routinely admonished to “tell the truth.” It is ironic that the majority finds a statement recommending honesty to be a Miranda nullification. Hart was fully advised of his Miranda rights; his decision to answer the officers’ questions was un-coerced; he knew he could request a lawyer at any time and that any statement he made to Schuster would be used against him.
Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). The majority apparently believes that Hart took Schuster’s statement literally and confessed because he truly believed he would not be prosecuted if he confessed, despite all of the information Hart had previously been given about the implications of confessing. There is no evidentia-ry support for that conclusion. All of the facts of this case point to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of Hart’s rights, supporting the rulings of the three prior courts which have reviewed the Miranda challenge in this case. Those courts did not feel that it was necessary to even address Schuster’s statement to Hart that “honesty wouldn’t hurt him” for the simple reason that it was apparently not raised as a distinct issue in the state courts.6 Because I conclude from the totality of the undisputed evidence in the record that Hart’s statement was “uncoerced,” that he knew at all times that he could “stand mute and request a lawyer,” and that he understood the consequences of his confession, Hart’s waiver of his Miranda rights was “valid as a matter of law.” Id. The state court’s factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted with “clear and convincing” evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Factually, the state trial judge considered all of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and concluded, after a lengthy analysis, “that Hart’s statements were freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” The majority’s conclusion that the state courts had not “analyzed whether Hart’s colloquy with Schuster resulted in a waiver that was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” is obviously at odds with the record.
II. Clearly Established Federal Law
I also disagree with the majority that Supreme Court precedent is “clearly established” on this issue. Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254(d)(1) requires that, in order for a federal court to grant a *899writ of habeas corpus, the state court’s decision must be contrary to or be an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” (emphasis added). Clearly established federal law for the purposes of Section 2254 is not the law of lower federal courts, including this court.7 Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 691 (11th Cir.2002).
Only the holdings of the Supreme Court constitute clearly established federal law for the purposes of Section 2254. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The Miranda warning requirement and its contents are certainly clearly established. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966). That a valid Miranda waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently is also clearly established.8 Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421.
What post-waiver statements amount to retroactive nullification of a prior valid Miranda waiver, if that is even possible, has not been clearly established by the Supreme Court. In fact, a suspect’s un-coerced, fully informed decision not to assert his Miranda rights is a valid waiver as a matter of law, even when followed by some coercion in the interrogation process. Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at 422-23, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 422. “[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.” Id. at 427, 106 S.Ct. at 1144, quoted in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). “A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having the right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted.” Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at 460-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). “[A] careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings [even] serves to cure the condition that rendered [a prior] unwarned statement inadmissible,” allowing a subse*900quent post-warning confession to be admissible. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
Even if one assumes, as the majority seems to do,9 that Schuster’s statement was made while still in the Miranda waiver process, there is no “clearly established” Supreme Court decision that indicates such a statement constitutes nullification.10 See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 205, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2881, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, 178 (1989)(holding that telling suspect he would be provided a lawyer if and when he went to court did not contravene Miranda); Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at 424, 106 S.Ct. at 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d at 422 (deliberate or reckless withholding of information from suspect in custodial interrogation is only relevant to constitutional validity of Miranda waiver if it deprives the suspect of knowledge “essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.”). Failure to administer the Miranda warnings at all only raises a presumption of involuntariness. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The majority cites no Supreme Court case where post-warning misrepresentations by police nullified a Miranda waiver. In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically declined to consider whether an affirmative misrepresentation by law enforcement would invalidate an otherwise valid waiver: “In this case, we are not confronted with an affirmative misrepresentation by law enforcement officials as to the scope of the interrogation and do not reach the question whether a waiver of Miranda rights would be valid in such a circumstance.”11 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987)(holding police officer’s failure to inform suspect of all possible subjects of interrogation was not relevant to determining whether waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent). Because Supreme Court precedent is not clearly established on the issue of whether or what post-waiver representations can nullify a prior valid Miranda waiver, granting the writ is prohibited by Section 2254(d).
III. The State Court’s Decision was not Contrary to Supreme Court Precedent
I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s decision was “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained the framework of Section 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The appropriate test was described by Justice O’Connor as follows:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habe-as court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to ... clearly estáb-*901lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. at 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d at 430 (O’Connor, J., concurring, and writing for the majority of the Court as to Part II of the opinion which deals with this issue.)
Under the “contrary to” clause of Section 2254(d)(1), therefore, a writ of habeas corpus may only be granted where the state court decision either “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or the state court “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”12 Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389. The “contrary to” clause in Section 2254(d)(1) “suggests that the state court’s decision must be substantially different .. .’opposite in character or nature’ [or] ‘mutually opposed’ ” to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 405, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (citing the definition of “contrary” in Webster’s Third New International DiCtionary 495 (1976)).
As long as the state court applies the “correct legal rule,” the federal courts cannot substitute their own judgment to reach a different result under the “contrary to” clause, as we have held:
Although a state court’s decision that “applies a rule that contradicts” the governing Supreme Court precedent is “contrary,” a state court decision that applies “the correct legal rule” based on Supreme Court law to the facts of the petitioner’s case would not fit within the “contrary to” clause even if the federal court might have reached a different result relying on the same law.
Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.2001)(internal citations omitted); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914, 929 (2002) (because state court identified correct legal rule “we find no' merit in respondent’s contention that the state court’s adjudication was contrary to our clearly established law.”)
The record reflects that the state court did identify and apply the correct governing legal rules.13 Where the Supreme *902Court has articulated a multi-factor balancing test or all-encompassing “totality of the circumstances” test and the state court applies that test, it is especially difficult for a federal court to conclude that a state court’s decision was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. When applying such a test, I agree with our colleagues in the First Circuit that reversing the state court under the “contrary to” clause must be only in a case where the legal application requires a particular result. See Kibbe v. DuBois, 269 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir.2001)(quoting O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.1998)). Where the Supreme Court has distilled constitutional principles into a “channeled mode of analysis specifically intended for application to variant factual situations,” a state court’s decision that is not based on facts materially indistinguishable can only be “contrary to” clearly established federal law where the application of the articulated framework “can fairly be said to require a particular result in a particular case.” Id. Only if the application of the totality of the circumstances test necessarily required a determination that Hart’s confession was involuntary would I find that the state court’s decision, which was not based on materially indistinguishable facts, is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. This is not such a case.
The majority concludes that the decisions of the state courts were contrary to Supreme Court precedent because “Neither court ... analyzed whether Hart’s colloquy with Schuster resulted in a waiver that was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”14 But the trial judge, who heard all of the evidence, including Schuster’s testimony, specifically concluded, “This Court finds that Hart’s statements were freely, voluntarily and intelligently made and his motion to suppress these statements is denied.” I fail to understand how the majority apparently believes that the trial court did not analyze and consider the totality of the circumstances in making this determination.15 The record plainly reflects that the trial court did, in fact, eon-*903sider the “totality of the circumstances.” Addressing Hart’s claim that his grandmother should have been present during the interrogation, the trial court stated, “This court finds that the totality of the circumstances indicate that Hart had no desire to see his grandmother and his decision to waive his rights was not contingent upon his meeting with her.” As support for this statement, the trial court cited Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1980), wherein the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with a lower court’s statement that:
The United States Supreme Court has held that the admissibility of a juvenile confession depends on the “totality of the circumstances” under which it was made. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). The more immature the juvenile may be, the greater the likelihood exists that his confession will be deemed inadmissible. The fact that a juvenile’s confession was given before he had the opportunity to talk with his parents or an attorney is certainly a factor militating against its admissibility. But, the existence of this fact does not preclude a finding of volun-tariness depending upon all of the other circumstances surrounding the confession.
Doerr v. State, supra, 383 So.2d at 905-907 (quoting with approval Doerr v. State, 348 So.2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)).
The trial court also cited State v. Paille, 601 So.2d 1321, 1324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), which noted: “The test of admissibility of a juvenile confession is the totality of the circumstances under which it was taken.” (emphasis added). It is clear that the trial court identified the correct governing legal rule — that the admissibility of a confession (“voluntary, knowing, and intelligent”) is to be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.
Further, the trial court made a number of findings in evaluating the circumstances surrounding Hart’s confession.16 The trial court found that Hart was calm, alert, intelligent, knowledgeable about the criminal justice system, capable of understanding his rights, and that he had six to seven hours of sleep the night before the interrogation. Contrary to the majority’s assumption, Hart understood (and told Mauer that he understood) his right to an attorney because he was represented by counsel in his recent credit card theft case. There is no evidence that the interrogation was excessively long. The police even ordered pizza for him to eat. “Any statement [by the suspect] given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990)(quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694).
According to the majority’s version of the totality of the circumstances, Schus-ter’s statement to Hart that “honesty wouldn’t hurt him” and her opinion as to the pros and cons of getting a lawyer compelled Hart to involuntarily confess and made his waiver a product of her deception.17 Miranda’s prophylactic purpose is to guard against coerced confessions obtained in violation of the Fifth *904Amendment. Subtle coercion inherent in the interrogation process is remedied by-prior advisement and understanding of Miranda rights, which give the suspect the power to halt the interrogation. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has held that a knowledgeable Miranda waiver is not nullified by such coercive interrogation: “[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.” Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at 427, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410. “Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
Schuster’s conversation with Hart was not the type of coercive police activity that “threatened, tricked or cajoled” him into confessing. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Schus-ter told Hart she could not make the decision whether to seek a lawyer for him. When Hart asked about the pros and cons, Schuster gave Hart her opinion, but Hart’s inquiries do not mean that he failed to understand his right to counsel. He certainly understood that right because he had an attorney in another case. Nor does it mean that he was uncertain about whether his statements could be used against him. Instead, it is apparent that Hart was simply trying to figure out the best way to minimize the “big trouble” he was in. Schuster’s discussion with Hart and her statement to Hart that “honesty wouldn’t hurt him” was certainly not, in light of the totality of the circumstances, coercive to the point that it compelled Hart to confess against his will. The state court’s decision was not “contrary to” any Supreme Court precedent, and granting of the writ is improper.
IV. The State Court’s Decision was not Unreasonably Erroneous
Finally, I also want to address why the state court’s decision was not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522, 146 L.Ed.2d at 429 (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly' established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. ”)(emphasis added). This court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus simply because it would have decided the case differently. Woodford v. Visciotti, - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)(per curiam)(reversing Ninth Circuit for substituting its own judgment for that of state court). The 1996 amendments to Section 2254 create a heightened standard on collateral review, increasing the deference to state court resolutions of arguable constitutional questions. The appropriate analysis is to first determine whether the state court’s decision was incorrect and, if so, then to determine whether the state court’s error was objectively unreasonable.18 Id.; Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001); Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.2001)(“It is ob*905jective reasonableness, not correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to decide.”); Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir.2001)(state court decision’s application of Supreme Court precedent must be “so erroneous as to be unreason-aWe.”)(emphasis added). Justice O’Con-nor’s portion of the plurality opinion in Williams v. Taylor explained that a state court’s decision would be unreasonably erroneous where the decision correctly identified the governing clearly established legal rule, but unreasonably applied' that rule to the facts of the case.19 See Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. at 1520-21, 146 L.Ed.2d at 427.
In seeking to suppress his confession, Hart testified in the suppression hearing and argued to the state court that his confession was not freely and voluntarily given because it was obtained through police threats and direct or implied promises of leniency or benefits. The trial court concluded Hart’s statements were freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given. As discussed earlier, this was predominantly a factual conclusion, within the Miranda legal framework as properly identified by the trial judge. For the same reasons that I conclude the state court’s decision was not “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent, I also conclude the state court’s denial of suppression was neither an “unreasonable application” of the law nor an “unreasonable determination” of the facts. The state court identified the governing legal rule, considered the totality of the factual circumstances, and correctly applied that rule to the facts of this case. We are prohibited by Section 2254(d)(1) from second-guessing the state court as to the factual application of a legal issue which is far from clearly established. “[I]f it is a close question whether the state decision is in error, then the state decision cannot be an unreasonable application.” McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir.2002). I believe that consistent application of the unreasonable application standard leads to the inescapable conclusion that there can be no “unreasonable application” of the law in this case. The trial court’s decision was also not an “unreasonable determination” of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Because neither the majority nor I can identify clearly established Supreme Court precedent which would mandate nullification of Hart’s Miranda warning and waiver, we are left without an external basis, other than our own subjective opinion, for evaluating the state court’s decision. Taking Schuster’s statement properly in factual context, I conclude that the trial court correctly evaluated the facts before it, but even if it did not, the trial court’s decision definitely was not an objectively “unreasonable” determination of the facts. Nor was the trial court’s ruling “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” I believe that we are required by Section 2254(d)(1) to affirm the district court’s decision.
. Which makes sense because Hart had already signed and waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to the police.
. We do not know Schuster's exact words to Hart. The suppression hearing was conducted more than a year after the interrogation, and the portion of the interrogation where Schus-ter made her statement was not recorded. Hart also testified at length during the suppression hearing. Importantly, it does not appear that he mentioned anything about any "honesty” statement from Schuster. Plainly, he did not indicate that he had been misled or deceived by such a statement from Schuster.
. Schuster apparently reiterated this right to Hart when she reminded him that anything he said to her would not be kept in confidence.
. The credit card theft case was still pending when Hart was questioned in relation to this case because the police told Hart the credit card theft case was the subject of the initial interrogation. In his motion to suppress, Hart argued to the trial court that the police should have contacted the attorney that represented him in the credit card theft case before questioning him in the murder case and that the failure to do so violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court reject ed this claim, and correctly so.
.Both the trial court and the district court found that Hart had clearly waived his Miranda rights before he spoke to Schuster. Of course, Hart could have ceased the interrogation at any time, even after his waiver, by asserting his right to remain silent or to seek counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Unless that assertion is unequivocal, the police could continue questioning Hart. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). The state court found Hart’s inquiries were not *898unequivocal, and Hart does not challenge that finding on appeal.
. In a very thorough order (totaling nineteen pages for all defendants), the trial judge ruled on the three Miranda issues raised by the defendant in the suppression hearing: (1) "whether the deceptive means of bringing the defendant in for questioning should nullify compliance with the standards for free and voluntary confessions mandated by Miranda (2) "what duty do the police owe a juvenile to have a parent present for questioning?"; and (3) "was there a clear and unequivocal request for counsel?” After deciding against Hart on all three of these issues, the trial judge concluded: "This Court finds that Hart’s statements were freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made and his motion to suppress these statements is denied.”
. I also disagree with the majority when it fails to see any "significant difference between the facts presented in Beale and the facts presented in the instant case.” Majority Opinion, supra, at 894. Beale involved the authorities inducing a barely literate Spanish-speaking suspect to sign a Miranda waiver by telling him that signing the waiver would not hurt him. Beale is thus a case of fraud in the inducement to sign a waiver, where the suspect was misled as to the waiver's effect. Further, the only relevant Supreme Court case cited by Beale, other than Miranda itself, is California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981), for the general proposition that Miranda warnings should not be misleading. See United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1435 (11th Cir.1991). Thus, Beale does not illustrate how clearly Supreme Court precedent is established. In this case, unlike Beale, there is no dispute that Hart was alert, intelligent, and fully informed of his rights prior to both the execution of the Miranda waiver and the making of his incriminating statement. The police painstakingly informed Hart of his rights prior to questioning him, and he clearly acknowledged that he understood his rights. There can be no doubt from the record that Hart understood his Miranda rights and that he freely, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
. The majority's contention that it can "derive clearly established law from these general principles rather than waiting for bright line rules,” Majority Opinion, supra, at n. 16, undermines the clearly established law requirement and masks the de novo review the majority really is applying to this case. It also further undermines the "materially indistinguishable facts” aspect of the "contrary to” clause analysis, which also contemplates application to multi-variant factor analyses.
. Contrary to the findings of both the state court and the district court.
. Assuming Hart had not yet waived his rights, I interpret Schuster's statement as reasonably meaning that, if Hart was going to talk to the police, he should tell the truth.
. Hart raised this exact issue to the trial court by arguing that the police tricked him into coming to the police station for questioning about his credit card theft case. The trial court properly relied upon Florida case law to resolve this issue against Hart.
. Justice O’Connor provided an example of a decision that would be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. Where a state court required a different evidentiary burden to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim than that expressly identified in governing Supreme Court case law, the state court would apply a rule contradictory to governing law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389.
. The issues presented to us were also thoroughly briefed to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of the district court without opinion. The trial court’s reliance upon the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512 *902U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), was most appropriate. Davis is the governing Supreme Court precedent on ambiguous invocations of the right to counsel. Having determined that Hart made his statement to the police freely, voluntarily, and intelligently, the only alternative basis for suppression presented to the trial court was that Hart had, in his discussion with the police, invoked his right to counsel. On its facts, Davis, is actually similar to this case, except that, as the trial court correctly concluded, Hart did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. See id. at 455, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (suspect advised of rights, waived rights orally and in writing, later made equivocal statements about getting a lawyer, and eventually clearly invoked right to counsel).
. The exact issue presented to the trial court was not focused on just three words (“honesty wouldn't hurt”) in the lengthy interview described in the record, but rather on the totality of the circumstances. Hart argued generally that his confession was involuntarily obtained because it was obtained through police threats and direct or implied promises of leniency or benefits. Hart did not testify or argue that Schuster's statement to Hart that "honesty wouldn’t hurt him” coerced his confession.
. The majority seems to mean that the trial court did not consider what the majority, on de novo review, now concludes is the most important of the totality of the circumstances, Schuster's isolated statement. The majority's de novo approach to the review of the volun-tariness of Hart's confession typifies the pre-1996 approach to habeas corpus review of such confessions. Compare Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110-11, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, § 104, federal courts are required to apply a more deferential standard for habeas review of state court decisions.
. See Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)(factors for evaluating juvenile confession include the suspect's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, capacity to understand the Miranda warnings, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights).
. Of course, Schuster could not have coerced Hart to sign the Miranda waiver form because she was not yet present when Hart signed the form.
. The former is an analysis of the law: whether the decision was erroneous as a matter of law. The latter externally considers the concreteness with which the law has developed as a guide to state court decision-making: whether the decision was so erroneous as to be objectively unreasonable under the facts of the case. Bifurcating the analysis allows principles of constitutional law to continue to be clarified through the habeas system by purely evaluating the correctness of the state court’s decision, akin to harmless error review.
. In Williams, Justice O’Connor also noted that extending a legal principle to a new context, or a failure to do so, may present “problems of precision” under the "unreasonable application” clause. The Supreme Court declined to decide how that type of case should be treated under Section 2254(d)(1). Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 408, 120 S.Ct. at 1521, 146 L.Ed.2d at 427.