dissenting.
This is undeniably a difficult case. James Ward clearly had mental deficiencies. Because he suffered from aphasia, a condition resulting from blunt head trauma, he had to be tested to determine if he was competent prior to his trial for the murder of his wife, Evelyn. At his fitness hearing on February 21, 1996, the parties stipulated to the contents of a DMHDD (“Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities”) report stating that Ward was fit to stand trial. The report concluded that:
*709Defendant understands the reason for his charge and its seriousness and is ready and motivated to return to court. He has sufficient knowledge about the court system as it pertains to his case. He understands the role functions of the court officers and is now able to cooperate with counsel in his defense. We consider him psychologically fit to stand trial.
A finding of competency requires that a defendant may not possess a mental condition “such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). Without a doubt, Ward falls at the low end of the spectrum of competency. His report cautioned that “one must exercise patience and listen closely to what [Ward] is saying, as a result of his severe handicaps due to his earlier brain injury.”
The question now on appeal is whether Illinois state courts were reasonable in finding that during the trial Ward knew what he was doing and agreed to waive his right to testify. The Illinois trial court determined that when Ward responded “I guess, I don’t know,” during an in camera discussion, he was expressing his assent to his waiver of his right to testify.1 On appeal the Illinois appellate court then deferred to this finding when deciding whether or not this statement justified a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver.2 The district court disagreed and granted Ward’s petition for habeas corpus, holding that because Ward lacked a basic understanding of the right to testify, the Illinois Appellate Court erred in finding that his waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent. However, because the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied relevant federal law to the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the district court’s grant of habeas corpus.
Under the AEDPA federal courts give deference to state courts with respect to claims that were adjudicated on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To procure ha-beas relief under the AEDPA, a petitioner is required to show that state court determinations under review are either “contrary to” or employ an “unreasonable application of’ federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).3 The Supreme Court *710has explained that under the unreasonable application standard,
a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [a Supreme Court case] incorrectly. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Williams, supra, at 411, 97 S.Ct. 1232. Rather, it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied [that case] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam). In determining whether or not the state court’s application of the law to the facts of a case was objectively unreasonable, state court factual findings are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).4 The court concedes that the Illinois Appellate Court followed the correct law, i.e., a waiver must be knowing and intelligent, but holds that it did so unreasonably because it relied too heavily on Ward’s counsel’s strategic decision of precluding Ward’s testimony and improperly credited Ward’s ambiguous statement, “I guess, I don’t know,” as a waiver of his right.
When a waiver is made in the presence of the court, such as the waiver was in this case, deference to the trial court’s determinations, as mandated by AEDPA, is clearly important because the court has made credibility and state of mind determinations that it is in the best position to make. See Lewis v. Huch, 964 F.2d 670, 674-76 (7th Cir.1992) (noting that a state trial court judge is in the best position to determine a criminal defendant’s state of mind when executing a waiver of his constitutional rights after being questioned by the court). Deferential review of this type of fact intensive question is warranted when it appears that a trial court is “ ‘better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.” Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).
As noted earlier, the report on Ward’s competency to stand trial cautioned that “one must exercise patience and listen closely to what he was saying due to his severe handicaps.” In this case the trial court exercised that patience, despite Ward’s attorney’s in-court waiver of his client’s right to testify, and held an in camera session to verify Ward’s decision. The specific issue of whether or not Ward possessed the mental faculty to express a waiver of his right to testify was determined at the outset by the trial court and is not at issue in Ward’s habeas petition. The finding by the trial court of Ward’s fitness to stand trial was never appealed in Illinois state court, nor was the issue raised in federal court. Even if it were at issue, competency determinations are definitively factual determinations which are presumed correct. See Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir.1992).
Therefore, the limited issue on appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court was not whether Ward was competent to stand trial, but *711whether his waiver to testify was knowing and intelligent.5 The Illinois Appellate court reasonably deferred to the trial court’s finding on this issue because a trial court judge’s determination of whether Ward understood his rights and knowingly waived them is due deference pursuant to Supreme Court precedent. The trial court judge was required to parse Ward’s statements and demeanor in order to determine his state of mind, which is the specific province of the trial court. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 113, 106 S.Ct. 445. The trial court was therefore in the best position to resolve Ward’s often conflicting and vague statements, a resolution that should not be redetermined by a federal court on collateral review unless presented with clear and convincing evidence. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983). Neither the district court nor the members of this court had the opportunity to view Ward in person, nor hear his words when it examined the record of his conduct before the trial court. Only the trial court was in this position. Given the initial determination that Ward was competent to stand trial, it was reasonable for the Illinois Appellate Court to defer to the trial court’s finding of a waiver to testify considering that the resolution of the issue depended “heavily on the trial court’s appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111, 116 S.Ct. 457.
Because the state court’s finding of waiver can be reasonably described as a determination of fact, it should have been “presumed to be correct” for purposes of a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A habeas court may not disregard this presumption unless it expressly finds clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The court concedes that it cannot overcome this standard as it notes that “Ward’s aphasia prevents a conclusive interpretation of the facially ambiguous statement, “I guess, I don’t know.” ” Supra p. 707. Similarly, in light of the fact that Ward’s statement of assent is inconclusive, we cannot hold that the Illinois Appellate Court applied Supreme Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable fashion. It is not our duty to displace the finding of a state court under habeas review due to a mere disagreement with the result. Instead our province is restricted to finding “whether the determination is at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.” Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.1997). In this case, the state court’s finding achieves that result.
I would, therefore, reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to deny the petition for habeas corpus, and I respectfully dissent.
. At a post-trial proceeding, the trial court judge conducted a hearing as to whether Ward had executed a knowing and intelligent waiver. After hearing arguments, the trial court specifically concluded that Ward understood what his attorney was asking him and that he assented to the waiver.
. The Illinois Appellate Court found that the proper standard of review was whether the trial court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence, citing the Illinois Miranda waiver cases, People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill.2d 349, 150 Ill.Dec. 155, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990), and People v. Scott, 148 Ill.2d 479, 171 Ill.Dec. 365, 594 N.E.2d 217 (1992).
. A petitioner may also attack a state court’s adjudication on the grounds that it is based "on an unreasonable determination of the facts," § 2254(d)(2), but such attacks are accompanied by a rigorous burden of proof: state court factual findings are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with "clear and convincing" evidence. § 2254(e)(1).
. Section 2254(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
. Voluntariness is not at issue in this case. The issue as framed by the court is whether or not "Ward lacked a basic understanding of the right to testify.” See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause”; action under an insane delusion may be voluntary).