dissenting.
After admitting he claimed eight hours of pay for seven hours of work over a period of time, Reynolds alleged the only reason Kohler cared about his behavior was because he was black. Pressed on who else had behaved as he, Reynolds refused to name a single employee. From discovery through trial, the EEOC was also unable to produce a single similarly situated employee who had engaged in the same conduct. Thus, the resolution of this appeal hinges on the answer to this question: when an employee admits to cheating his employer, then claims discrimination, which upsets the decision maker, who soon thereafter discharges the employee, can the employee’s retaliation jury verdict stand without any evidence that a similarly situated employee was not discharged for the same conduct? Because an affirmative response does not faithfully follow precedent and would yield unwieldy results, I respectfully dissent.
To uphold the jury verdict, the majority provides three reasons: (1) the temporal proximity of Reynolds’s race allegation and discharge; (2) the decisionmaker, Dickson, became upset when Reynolds claimed discrimination after being confronted with cheating; and (3) Kohler’s lax enforcement of its zero tolerance policy. The critical issue is whether Kohler’s discharge of Reynolds differed from its treatment of similarly situated employees. Before addressing this quintessential question, I must first address the majority’s discussion leading up to its similarly situated analysis.
The majority believes the district court erred by discussing the third element of a prima facie case of retaliation (i.e., causal connection) in deciding to overturn the jury verdict. I do not agree. Last year, our court overturned a jury verdict because the employee failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by failing to show a causal connection. Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 896-98 (8th Cir.2002) (Arnold, J. Morris S.). Regardless of whether we analyze the case as the district court did10 and this court did in Kipp, or whether we use a sufficiency of the evidence standard, we are still searching for the same thing: does the evidence support a retaliation finding? No matter the analytical path, the evidence must support a reasonable inference that Kohler discharged Reynolds *778because of his race discrimination assertion. .
Before discussing the merits of the EEOC’s retaliation claim, we must remind ourselves the jury decided race was not a motivating factor in Kohler’s decision to discharge Reynolds, and the EEOC has not appealed that verdict.11 When confronted with his admitted cheating, Reynolds could have alleged any type of discrimination to escape a highly probable discharge. Our analysis would not change had Reynolds claimed discrimination based on religion, sex, national origin, disability or age. Race discrimination is not an issue on appeal-only retaliation.
A. Temporal Proximity and Dickson’s Response Do Not Establish Retaliation
The majority relies, in part, on temporal proximity as proof Kohler retaliated against Reynolds. Dickson confronted Reynolds with cheating the company by working seven hours while claiming pay for eight. Reynolds then countered the only reason Dickson cared was because Reynolds was black. Dickson discharged Reynolds later that day. To avoid an inference of retaliation, would the majority require Dickson to wait a day, a week or a month before discharging Reynolds? Reynolds’s discrimination allegation after being confronted with cheating simply did “not clothe [him] with immunity for past and present inadequacies.” Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich. Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 455 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted).
Our court has made it clear that, “[although contesting an unlawful employment practice is protected conduct, the anti-discrimination statutes do not insulate an employee from discipline for violating the employer’s rules or disrupting the workplace.” Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.1999). As the majority concedes, “a ‘mere coincidence of timing’ can rarely be sufficient to establish a submissible case of retaliatory discharge.” Kipp, 280 F.3d at 897; Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136 (“Generally, more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.”). Because the timing of the discrimination allegation and the ensuing discharge do not provide an inference of retaliation in this case, we must look to other facts to see if the EEOC presented sufficient evidence to uphold the jury verdict.
The majority states temporal “proximity, coupled with evidence that Reynolds’s discrimination allegation ‘upset’ Dickson, forms the basis for an inference that a causal connection existed between Reynolds’s claim and his termination.” This untenable principle would reward employees for claiming discrimination every time they get caught violating workplace rules.
What does the record show about Dickson becoming “upset?” The union representative who accompanied Reynolds to the January 6 meeting testified that, after Reynolds said he was being singled out based on his race, Dickson “acted like it bothered him.” When Dickson was asked about his response to Reynolds’s race discrimination accusation, Dickson said he *779“told John [Reynolds] that that was ridiculous and he knows better than that ... that that’s not a reason. John was a friend of mine. It had nothing to do with the fact that he was black.” Dickson said he was upset for three reasons: “One is that he said he cheated on his time. And secondly, as he told me, he’d been fired from his last job for the same thing. And then thirdly, he came up with that statement.” Dickson said Reynolds’s accusation “kind of upset me because he was throwing that out, as it appeared to me, just as kind of a last ditch effort to give cause for why we were terminating him, and it had nothing to do with it.” Becoming upset when charged with racism might be an appropriate reaction.
What response would the majority find did not raise an inference of retaliation? If Dickson remained stone-faced when Reynolds charged him with racial discrimination, would that have negated an inference of retaliation or would silence have allowed an inference Dickson did not dispute the charge? Notwithstanding the temporal proximity or Dickson’s response, this entire ease hinges on whether Kohler failed to discharge other similarly situated employees who had engaged in Reynolds’s conduct.
B. Retaliation Claim Hinges on Rigorous Similarly Situated Employee Analysis
The majority repeatedly intimates Koh-ler’s failure to investigate whether other employees had engaged in similar conduct allows an inference of retaliation. Nothing in our law requires an employer who confronts an admitted pay cheat to conduct an investigation to determine whether other employees had engaged in the same conduct. Furthermore, the conceptual difficulty with using Kohler’s failure to investigate other employees’ conduct as an inference of retaliation is Reynolds’s refusal to name a single employee whom he claimed had done what he did. According to Miller, Reynolds said he did not want to provide other names because he did not want to get anyone fired, which infers he believed he was on the verge of being discharged. Even the EEOC could not find a similarly situated employee who had consistently claimed eight hours of pay for seven hours of work.
The majority focuses on Kohler’s zero tolerance policy in general and Kohler’s lax treatment of other employees for similar conduct. The proper focus should be on Kohler’s treatment of similarly situated employees who engaged in the same conduct as Reynolds. Because the EEOC alleged Kohler’s discharge of Reynolds was inconsistent with Kohler’s treatment of other employees, the EEOC had the burden to prove those other employees were “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted). “Employees are similarly situated when they are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). “Specifically, the individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir.2000) (emphasis added). The majority recognized this rigorous test, see Harvey, 38 F.3d at 972, but then applied an unexacting analysis.
Kohler compensated its employees based on straight time or production. If an employee met his production quota, he did not have to work an entire eight-hour shift. If an employee could not meet his production quota, he was required to work *780the entire eight hours. Reynolds, who usually worked straight time, admittedly took an hour break at the beginning of his eight-hour shift, which resulted in him consistently working seven hours and claiming eight hours of pay. In deciding whether the trial court erred in overturning the jury verdict, we must ask whether the EEOC presented evidence that Dickson failed to discharge other employees who produced only seven hours of work for eight hours of pay. The EEOC did not.
To support its retaliation claim, the EEOC argued Kohler treated Senko, As-kins, Bailey and Alan Dickson differently. None were similarly situated to Reynolds. The EEOC points out these employees clocked in and out early, were seen in the breakroom during the workday, did not always meet production, and “may have claimed pay for hours they had not worked.” The EEOC had the burden to prove these employees were similarly situated in all relevant aspects, not that they “may have” been similarly situated.
Askins, Senko and Reynolds were not similarly situated in all relevant respects. The EEOC’s key testimony was Askins and Senko clocked in early and did not always go directly to work. However, Reynolds did not testify Askins and Senko worked seven hours to receive eight hours of pay or failed to meet production quotas. The unrefuted evidence shows, even though Askins and Senko clocked in early on a regular basis, they frequently worked more than eight hours and achieved eight hours of production. Even when Askins and Senko worked more than eight hours, they only claimed eight hours of pay if they only completed eight hours or less of production. Even though Miller knew Asians and Senko clocked in early, she had no evidence they did not work once they clocked in. Whether Askins and Senko clocked in or out early does not prove retaliation, because the real issue in the similarly situated analysis is whether As-kins and Senko claimed eight hours of pay for seven hours of work, the same conduct in which Reynolds had engaged. Because the record does not show they did, Askins and Senko are not similarly situated to Reynolds.
Reynolds testified Bailey came in early and went to his truck to sleep. Noting this conduct violated Kohler’s zero tolerance policy, the majority concludes this conduct reveals Bailey and Reynolds were similarly situated in all relevant respects. However, Reynolds did not testify Bailey failed to meet his production quota or work eight hours. Bailey testified he clocked in and normally began working. Bailey said he achieved his production quota most days, including enough for overtime on occasions. He acknowledged he slept in his truck or went to the breakroom when he met his production. The EEOC then asked Bailey if he ever went to the parking lot when he had nothing to do during the day, and Bailey replied that “there’s been a few times I’d go to the breakroom or something, but I’d come right on back and go to work.” The record simply does not show Bailey worked seven hours and claimed eight hours of pay. No inference can be made based on this record that Bailey was similarly situated to Reynolds.
Finally, Alan Dickson was not similarly situated to Reynolds because he never worked seven hours and claimed eight hours pay. Alan produced over eight hours of work and claimed overtime for it, even though the policy at the time required him to remain on the clock to receive the overtime pay. For instance, if his quota was 10 pieces an hour and he produced 100 pieces in eight hours, he still had to remain on the premises for ten hours to receive overtime. John Dickson *781referred to this as a ridiculous rule that has since been revoked. In order to be paid overtime, Alan could have hung out in the breakroom or slept in the parking lot after meeting his overtime production. Instead, he left the premises. Reynolds, on the other hand, went to the breakroom before working at all, then only worked seven hours without meeting his production, and then claimed eight hours of pay. Alan Dickson and Reynolds were not similarly situated.
C. Strikingly Similar Precedent Supports District Court
In Kipp v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, Kipp, a female maintenance crew worker, filed an EEOC complaint after she applied for and was denied a promotion. A friend of Kipp’s coworker learned of Kipp’s discrimination claim and sent a letter to Kipp’s employer informing them Kipp spent extended periods of time at the friend’s house instead of working. Kipp’s employer investigated the allegations and the district engineer, who knew about the discrimination complaint, terminated Kipp. Kipp sued her employer for gender discrimination and retaliation. The jury found for the employer on the discrimination claim, but for Kipp on the retaliation claim. Kipp, 280 F.3d at 895. The district court denied the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding, “because the proof in this case fails to raise an inference that [Kipp’s employer] acted out of a retaliatory motive in terminating her, Ms. Kipp failed to establish the causal link necessary to make out a prima facie ease of retaliation.” Id. at 898. As discussed above, our court easily rejected Kipp’s temporal connection argument. Thus, the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Kipp argued many of her co-workers left their jobs without authorization and did not face discipline, which arguably raised an inference Kipp’s employer retaliated against her. Id. at 897. We were unpersuaded by this argument because no evidence showed the executives terminating Kipp knew about those workers. Id. Thus, “a reasonable jury could not draw an inference that Ms. Kipp was singled out for discipline.” Id. As in Kipp, Miller and Dickson were completely unaware of employees who had acted as Reynolds had, even though they gave Reynolds an opportunity to name other employees. It is undisputed Reynolds refused their requests. Like Kipp, we should hold that, because Dickson was unaware of similarly situated employees when he discharged Reynolds, no inference of retaliation can be established.
Kipp also argued her retaliation claim was supported by the fact that she was not warned before her discharge, she had a solid work record, and her supervisor did not think much of her leaving work without authorization. Id. at 897-98. The court “discern[ed] no supportable inference of retaliation in these facts” and took “the occasion to reaffirm the principle that ‘federal courts do not sit as a super-personnel department that re-examines an entity’s business decisions.’ Although the jury may have believed that [Kipp’s employer] should have handled Ms. Kipp’s situation differently, that issue was not before it.” Id. at 898 (citations omitted); see also Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136 (“The employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination.”).
*782The majority repeatedly asserts we should not lightly overturn jury verdicts, and, of course, we should not. In this case, the evidence did not allow the jury to find retaliation because the EEOC could not show similarly situated employees had engaged in Reynolds’s conduct of claiming eight hours of pay for seven hours of work without being discharged. “In the absence of any evidence of discriminatory intent, however, it is not the prerogative of the courts or a jury to sit in judgment of employers’ management decisions.” Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136. The district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in Kohler’s favor should be affirmed.
. The district court may have regretted submitting the retaliation claim to the jury. When discussing Kohler’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of the EEOC's case, the district court stated "I am not impressed that the discharge case is very strong, and I think the retaliation case is even weaker.”
. The EEOC and the majority recite another foreman’s testimony that he heard Davis refer to Reynolds as a "dumb nigger." The record contains no evidence either Miller or Dickson knew about this comment. Reynolds testified he had never observed racial animus or discrimination by Miller or Dickson. Because the jury found no race discrimination, this highly inflammatory reference is absolutely irrelevant in this appeal involving retaliation alone.