OPINION OF THE COURT
ROTH, Circuit Judge.This appeal arises out of reciprocal attorney disciplinary proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had suspended appellant Robert Surrick from the practice of law for a period of five years after it concluded that he had violated a provision *227of the Rules of Professional Conduct by falsely accusing two lower court judges of “fixing” cases. Following an independent review of the state disciplinary proceedings, the en banc District Court held that reciprocal discipline was warranted but limited the term of Surrick’s suspension to thirty months, or half that imposed by the state court. On appeal, Surriek argues that the imposition of reciprocal discipline was inappropriate because the state proceedings upon which the District Court relied violated his rights of due process and free speech. Because we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in electing to suspend Surriek for a period of thirty months, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
The facts relevant to Surrick’s underlying state court suspension are drawn from the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Report and Recommendation issued by the initial District Court panel. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 561 Pa. 167, 749 A.2d 441, 442-443 (2000) (Surrick I); In re Surrick, No. MISC. 00-086, 2001 WL 120078 (E.D.Pa. Feb.7, 2001) (Surriek II). Surriek and his wife were defendants in Leedom v. Spano, Case No. 89-12977 in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, a case which involved the foreclosure of a mortgage for which they were sureties. By stipulation of the parties, the issue of liability was submitted to the court. Judge Harry J. Bradley entered judgment against Surriek and his wife in July 1992.
On appeal to the Superior Court, Sur-rick entered an appearance as co-counsel and, in August 1992, filed a motion for the recusal of certain judges prior to the designation of the appellate panel. This motion stated, in relevant part:
It is believed and averred by Movant Surriek that Judge Bradley was “fixed” by the Delaware County Republican Organization as a result of a deal between that organization and Justice Larsen whereby Justice Larsen would again exert his political influence on behalf of Judge McEwen who was again seeking to fill a vacant Supreme court seat and, in return, the Delaware County Republican Organization, through its control of the Delaware county Judges, would fix this case.
In litigation arising out of the termination of the Surrick/Levy law practice ... Upon appeal to the superior court, judge Olszewski dismissed the appeal not on the basis of anything in the record or any issue raised by opposing counsel but on the basis of an alleged procedural defect in the record. Even the most cursory examination of the record will reflect that the alleged defect in the Record relied upon by Judge Olsz-ewski does not and did not exist. It is the belief of Movant Surriek that the decision of Judge Olszewski was based upon outside intervention, as it could not have resulted from any rational legal analysis of the Record.
749 A.2d at 443 (ellipses and emphasis in original).2
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel investigated Surrick’s allegations and, as a result, filed charges against him and convened a Special Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board. After due deliberation, the Special Hearing Commit*228tee issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that all charges should be dismissed. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel objected to the Report and Recommendation and sought oral argument before the Disciplinary Board. On October 17, 1997, the Board issued an opinion and order rejecting the arguments asserted by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and dismissing the charges against Surrick.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court remanded the case to the Disciplinary Board on April 14, 1998, with instructions that the Board reconsider its prior recommendation in light of the then-recent decision in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, 552 Pa. 223, 714 A.2d 402 (1998).
On remand, the Disciplinary Board determined that Surrick had violated Rule 8.4(c)3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) in making his allegations against Judge Olszewski but found no violation in the allegations against Judge Bradley. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then granted the parties’ cross-petitions for review and directed both sides to file briefs addressing the applicability of its more recent decision in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Price, 557 Pa. 166, 732 A.2d 599 (1999). After consideration of the parties’ arguments, a unanimous Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Surrick had violated RPC 8.4(c) with respect to his charges against both Judge Olszewski and Judge Bradley. Surrick I, 749 A.2d at 447-49. The court therefore suspended Surrick’s license to practice law in the Commonwealth for a period of five years, effective March 24, 2000. Id. at 449.
Pursuant to Rule 11(B)(2) of the Rules of Attorney Conduct (RAC) for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,4 the District Court, in response to the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, issued an order on May 10, 2000, requiring Surrick to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed upon him pursuant to RAC 11(D). In his reply, Surrick asserted that reciprocal discipline was inappropriate because the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court lacked proof and violated his rights of procedural due process and free speech. On February 7, 2001, a three judge panel of the District Court, following its review of the state disciplinary proceedings and the arguments of the parties, issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that no reciprocal discipline should be imposed on Sur-rick. See Surrick II, 2001 WL 120078. This recommendation was rejected by a majority of the non-recused active and senior judges of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the matter was referred to a new three judge panel for consideration of the proper punishment. Following a hearing, this second panel issued an Amended Report and Recommendation on June 12, 2001, concluding that Surrick should be suspended for a period of thirty months retroactive to April 24, 2000.
On June 21, 2001, by a vote of seventeen to nine, the twenty-six non-recused active and senior district judges adopted the second panel’s Amended Report and Recom*229mendation. See In re Surrick, No. MISC. 00-086, 2001 WL 1823945 (E.D.Pa. June 21, 2001) (Surrick III). Surrick’s thirty month suspension was made retroactive to April 24, 2000, the date of his state court suspension. The suspension expired on October 24, 2002.
Surrick appealed his District Court suspension.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court has the inherent authority to set requirements for admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it. See In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d 1179, 1183 (3d Cir.1990); In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir.1975). We have jurisdiction to review the final order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review district courts’ decisions regarding the regulation of attorneys who appear before them for abuse of discretion. Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1386 (3d Cir.1972). Our review of the District Court’s interpretation of legal precepts is plenary. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir.1994).
III. Discussion
A. Mootness
Because “ ‘[t]he existence of a case or controversy is a prerequisite to all federal actions,’ ” Philadelphia Fed’n of Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 322-23 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir.1994)), we must begin by examining our jurisdiction to consider the matter before us. Although it is well-established that “bar admissions, bar disciplinary actions, and dis-barments are essentially judicial in nature and thus present a case or controversy under Article III,” In re Calvo, 88 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir.1996), we must determine whether Surrick’s appeal was mooted when the term of his District Court suspension expired on October 24, 2002.
As we have previously held, “[a] case will be considered moot, and therefore nonjusticiable as involving no case or controversy, if the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” In re Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1128 (3d Cir.1982) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Our analysis of whether a case is moot “traditionally begins with ‘the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” ’ International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971)). The existence of a case or controversy, in turn, requires “ ‘(1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that, affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual predicate for reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.’ ” Id. at 915 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 605 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1979)).
Furthermore, “[i]n addition to its threshold constitutional dimension, mootness doctrine incorporates prudential considerations as well.” International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 815 F.2d at 915. “Thus, in applying the mootness doctrine, courts, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Article III, ‘must answer the more policy-oriented question whether the parties before it have, at the time for decision sufficient functional adversity to sharpen *230the issues for judicial resolution.’ ” Id. (quoting Dow Chem., 605 F.2d at 677-78). Accordingly, “‘the central question of all mootness problems is whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1985)).
In addressing such questions, we have recognized three exceptions that should be considered prior to any determination of mootness:
(1) whether the appellant has expeditiously taken all steps necessary to perfect the appeal and to preserve the status quo before the dispute becomes moot, (2) whether the trial court’s order will have possible collateral consequences, and (3) whether the dispute is of such a nature that it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Kulp Foundry, 691 F.2d at 1129.
We need not address the applicability of first and third exceptions noted above, as the continuing stigma resulting from his suspension places Surrick’s appeal squarely within the second. See Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224, 228 (5th Cir.1998) (finding that the appeal of an attorney who was disbarred and then reinstated was not moot because even temporary disbarment is harmful to a lawyer’s reputation, and “the mere possibility of adverse collateral consequences is sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also In re Hancock, 192 F.3d 1083, 1084 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Dailey for the proposition that a suspended attorney’s appeal was not mooted by his payment of the imposed sanction and subsequent reinstatement); Kirkland v. National Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that attorney’s appeal of the revocation of his pro hac vice status was not moot following dismissal of the underlying case because “the ‘brand of disqualification’ on grounds of dishonesty and bad faith could well hang over his name and career for years to come”); Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1200 n. 14 (11th Cir.1985) (noting that “the brand of disqualification was not lifted at the close of the proceedings. The disciplinary action and consequent disqualification may expose counsel to further sanctions by the bar and portends adverse effects upon counsel’s careers and public image. The effects of disqualification will linger long after the closing of the case. The controversy thus remains live and demands consideration.”). Further, Sur-rick’s suspension has a continuing effect on his ability to practice before the District Court, as RAC VII(A) provides that attorneys suspended for more than three months must apply for reinstatement.5 Thus, we conclude that Surrick’s claim satisfies the collateral consequences exception to the doctrine of mootness and that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal.
B. Reciprocal Disciplinary Proceedings
The starting point for our review of federal district court disciplinary proceedings is the recognition that individual district courts, “like all federal courts, ha[ve] the power both to prescribe requirements for admission to practice before that court and to discipline attorneys” who appear before them. Abrams, 521 F.2d at 1099; see also In re Kramer, 193 F.3d 1131, 1132 *231(9th Cir.1999) (citing cases for the proposition that “[t]here is little question but that district courts have the authority to supervise and discipline the conduct of attorneys who appear before them.”)- “This includes the inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers,” provided such power is “exercised within the parameters of due process.” Kramer, 193 F.3d at 1132 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
A reciprocal disciplinary proceeding such as the one at issue here, in which a federal court initiates action against a member of its bar based on the outcome of a state disciplinary proceeding against that attorney, requires federal courts to conduct an independent review of the state disciplinary proceeding prior to imposing punishment. Indeed, it is well-settled that, although state bar membership is required of those seeking admission to practice before the federal district courts of a given state, “disbarment by the [s]tate does not result in automatic disbarment by the federal court.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). Rather, although the decisions of state courts in such matters are “entitled to respect,” they are “not conclusively binding on the federal courts.” Id.
However, “[i]n striking the appropriate balance ... district courts must not operate in a vacuum. If the disciplinary proceedings derive from state court action, federal courts are not totally free to ignore the original state proceedings.” Abrams, 521 F.2d at 1099-1100 (citing Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957)). Instead, they must “examine the state proceeding for consistency with the requirements of due process, adequacy of proof and absence of any indication that imposing discipline would result in grave injustice.” In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917)). More specifically, as the Supreme Court has held, federal courts should impose reciprocal discipline unless “an intrinsic consideration of the state record” indicates one of the following infirmities:
1. That the state procedure, from want of notice or opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process; 2. that there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts found to have established the want of fair private and professional character as to give rise to a clear conviction on [the part of the federal court] that [it] could not, consistent[] with [its] duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3. that some other grave reason exist[s] which should convince [the federal court] that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon [the court] not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and justice, [it is] constrained so to do.
Selling, 243 U.S. at 51, 37 S.Ct. 377; see also Theard, 354 U.S. at 282, 77 S.Ct. 1274. RAC 11(D), which governed the proceedings below, was enacted on the basis of this ruling. See In re Pawlak, No. 94-211, 1995 WL 723177, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Dec.l, 1995).6
*232Moreover, attorneys subject to reciprocal discipline in federal court bear the burden of demonstrating, “by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the Selling elements precludes reciprocal discipline.” In re Kramer, 282 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir.2002) (citing cases). Thus, there is no entitlement to a de novo trial before the District Court. See In re Alker, 307 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir.1962); see also Calvo, 88 F.3d at 967. Rather, the District Court need only “determine whether the record underlying the predicate state disbarment reveals the kind of infirmities identified in Selling. ” Calvo, 88 F.3d at 967 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Finally, as we noted in Abrams, “we perceive our role in reviewing the district court’s action to be extremely limited.” 521 F.2d at 1101. In particular, it consists of the following:
(1) To recognize and reinforce an absolute and unfettered power of the district court to admit and to discipline members of its bar independently of and separately from admission and disciplinary procedures of (a) the state courts and (b) this court.
^
(3) To recognize that an absolute and unfettered power of the district court to discipline lawyers may be circumscribed to the extent the district court, in imposing its disciplinary sanctions, relies upon a state’s legal or factual determinations. Stated otherwise, the district court’s action may be circumscribed to the extent it depends in whole or in part on a state’s actions, either for the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings or for a stated basis in the determination of the sanction imposed.
Id. It is against this backdrop that we consider the proceedings at issue here.
C. Surrick’s Due Process and First Amendment Arguments
The issue before us on this appeal is whether the en banc District Court abused its discretion in relying on the state court proceedings as the basis for its decision to impose reciprocal discipline upon Surrick. In rejecting the conclusion of the initial panel and adopting the Amended Report and Recommendation, the District Court noted that it was required to impose reciprocal discipline “unless it ‘clearly’ appeared to the court” that at least one of the four elements of RAC 11(D) was satisfied. Surrick III, 2001 WL 1823945 at *1.
Following its review of the state disciplinary proceedings, the District Court determined that none of the RAC 11(D) conditions were met in this case. In support of this conclusion, the District Court noted that (1) not even the first District Court panel, which opposed the imposition of reciprocal discipline, concluded that the state disciplinary proceedings violated Surrick’s right to due process; (2) there was no infirmity of proof, particularly in view of the fact that Surrick admitted during the *233state disciplinary proceedings “that he had no objective factual basis for the accusations he made in his sworn affidavit to the state court about purportedly corrupt conduct by a state judge”; and (3) the Amended Report and Recommendation, issued by the second District Court panel, took into account the fact that the five year suspension meted out by the state court exceeded that of other comparable cases, and therefore recommended a suspension of only half that duration. Surrick III; 2001WL 1823945, at *1.
In asserting that the District Court abused its discretion by so concluding, Surrick contends first that the District Court erred in failing to find a due process violation in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s retroactive application of Anonymous Attorney A and of Price to his case. He next argues that the District Court’s conclusion that a second evidentiary hearing would be futile was based on an improper reading of the initial panel’s Report and Recommendation. Finally, Surrick asserts that the imposition of reciprocal discipline violates his First Amendment rights and therefore constitutes a grave injustice. We address each argument in turn.
In considering Surrick’s due process argument, we begin by reiterating our prior observation that, although attorney disciplinary proceedings “ha[ve] consequences which remove [them] from the ordinary run of civil case[s],” they are “not criminal in nature.” Abrams, 521 F.2d at 1099. It therefore follows that the protections normally afforded criminal defendants are not required here. See In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Buffalo “does not require courts to employ the procedures of the criminal law in disbarment matters”); In re Cordova0-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d 1334, 1336 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that, “[although attorney discipline proceedings have been called ‘quasi-criminal,’ In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the due process rights of an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding ‘do not extend so far as to guarantee the full panoply of rights afforded to an accused in a criminal case.’ ”) (quoting Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir.1984)); Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Cal., 910 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that “[a] lawyer disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. As a result, normal protections afforded a criminal defendant do not apply.”) (citations omitted).
With this background in mind, we consider Surrick’s due process argument. In Anonymous Attorney A, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, although it had not expressly decided the issue of the mental state necessary to establish culpability for misstatements made in violation of RPC 8.4(c), it would follow the lead of other states with identical versions of the rule that had rejected a requirement of actual knowledge. 714 A.2d at 406-07. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in accordance with existing decisions in other jurisdictions, held that “a culpable mental state greater than negligence is necessary to establish a prima facie violation of [RPC] 8.4(c),” and that “[t]his requirement is met where the misrepresentation is knowingly made, or where it is made with reckless ignorance of the truth or falsity thereof.” Id. at 407. Surrick now asserts that the District Court erred in failing to conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s retroactive application of this ruling to his case was a violation of due process that precluded the imposition of reciprocal discipline.
We disagree. It is well-settled “that a judicial alteration of a common law *234doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive effect, only where it is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’ ” Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964)).7 Although Surrick contends that “no one could reasonably have anticipated” the legal standards applied to his case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, even a cursory review of the state of the law at the time of the conduct in question reveals otherwise. Indeed, while it is true that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not formally addressed the issue prior to its decision in Anonymous Attorney A, it was nevertheless well-settled at the time of Surrick’s conduct that liability under the standards of DR 1-102(A)(4), the predecessor to RPC 8.4(c), extended to reckless misstatements. See ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (Revised) (1982); see also People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950, 953 (Colo. 1992); Committee on Legal Ethics of the W.V. State Bar v. Farber, 185 W.Va. 522, 408 S.E.2d 274, 284-85 (1991); Dowling v. Alabama State Bar, 539 So.2d 149, 152 (Ala.1989); In re Silverman, 113 N.J. 193, 549 A.2d 1225, 1238 (1988); In re Zang, 154 Ariz. 134, 741 P.2d 267, 280 (1987); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Hurd, 360 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Iowa 1985). Further, it was well-established in Pennsylvania at that time that the term “misrepresentation” — one of the types of misconduct prohibited by RPC 8.4(c) — included statements made with reckless disregard for the truth. See, e.g., Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 27 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that reckless statements are sufficient to maintain a claim for misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law); Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffmann Co., 397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d 363, 366 (1959) (holding that “[a] material misrepresentation may be found whether [Defendant] actually knew the truth or not, especially where, as here, it was bound to ascertain the truth before making the representation.”).
We therefore reject Surrick’s contention that prior to Anonymous Attorney A, nothing in the history of RPC 8.4(c) had stated or even foreshadowed that reckless conduct could violate it. Indeed, in view of the foregoing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Anonymous Attorney A was neither “unexpected” nor “indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded Attorney A’s case for application of the purportedly new standard despite the fact that, as here, the conduct at issue plainly occurred prior to its ruling in that case. See Anonymous Attorney A, 714 A.2d at 407. Thus, we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that the application of the ruling in Anonymous Attorney A to Surrick’s case was consistent with the requirements of due process.
Similarly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in rejecting Sur-*235rick’s due process argument regarding the application to his case of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Price. Sur-riek contends that the decision in Price established a new burden of proof that is unconstitutional both in design — because it purportedly violates the presumption of innocence to which he is entitled — and as retroactively applied to his case. However, the Price court was careful to note that the burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence rests, as it always has, with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. See Price, 732 A.2d at 603. The ruling in Price simply made clear the fact that, once a prima facie case of false allegations in a court pleading has been established, the burden shifts to the respondent to demonstrate “that the allegations are true or that he had an objective reasonable belief that the allegations were true, based upon a reasonably diligent inquiry.” Id. at 604.
This holding in Price was in no way “unexpected” or “indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693, as it was already “well-established” prior to the decision in Price “that every court pleading containing an averment of fact not of record is required to state that the assertion is true based upon the pleader’s personal knowledge, information or belief,” and that such averments must “be supported by oath or affirmation or made subject” to certain penalties. Price, 732 A.2d at 603. Thus, at the time Surriek made the allegations contained in the recusal motion, Pennsylvania law already required attorneys to “bear[ ] the burden of establishing a factual basis” for allegations contained in pleadings submitted to the courts of the Commonwealth. Id.
Indeed, although the justices differed as to the appropriate punishment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was unanimous in its application of the purportedly new ruling to Price himself despite the fact that, as in this case, the record in Price had been developed prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s express articulation of this burden of production. See id. at 604-OS.8
Surrick’s next argument — that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that a second evidentiary hearing would be futile — is closely related. Specifically, he asserts that, in view of the purported changes in the requisite mental state and burden of proof that resulted from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decisions in Anonymous Attorney A and Price, he should have been provided a second evidentiary hearing at which he could have addressed the issues raised by these decisions. However, despite having advance notice that the ruling in Price might be applied to his case, Surriek never requested either an evidentiary hearing or the reopening of the record during the state proceedings. Thus, any due process violation that might have resulted from the failure to hold a second hearing was waived. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (holding that “ ‘[n]o procedural principle is more familiar ... than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely *236assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ”) (quoting Yakus v. United, States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944)).
Further, even if this claim had not been waived, Surrick has failed to identify any evidence not presented in the first hearing that would have led to a conclusion that he had an objectively reasonable basis for the allegations contained in his recusal motion. Indeed, despite his claim that he bore no burden of production prior to the ruling in Price, Surrick voluntarily offered extensive testimony during the three-day proceedings regarding his purported bases for the statements contained in the recusal motion. In light of this, it is difficult to imagine that he could or would have come forward with any additional information if provided the opportunity to do so in a second hearing. In addition, both the Disciplinary Board and the District Court found, based on the testimony and evidence already in the record, that Surrick’s statements were unsupported. See Surrick III, 2001 WL 1823945, at *1 (“Mr. Surrick admitted at state disciplinary proceedings that he had no objective factual basis for the accusations he made in his sworn affidavit to the state court about purportedly corrupt conduct by a state judge.”); Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at 29-30 (noting Surrick’s admission that the charges leveled against Judge Olszewski were based on conjecture and theory). In view of the foregoing, we simply cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in electing to impose reciprocal discipline despite the absence of a second state court hearing, particularly when such a hearing was never requested by Surrick in the first instance.
Moreover, we note with respect to each of Surrick’s first two arguments that no member of the District Court — including the original three member panel which recommended that no reciprocal discipline be imposed — concluded that the state disciplinary proceedings failed to satisfy minimal due process requirements. See Surrick III, 2001 WL 1823945, at *1 (“The court determined that there was no clear deprivation of due process of law. Significantly, while critical of the approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, even Judge Poliak, the author of the panel report of February 7,-2001, acknowledged that the report had not concluded that Mr. Surrick was deprived of his federal constitutional right to due process.”).
We further note that Surrick’s reliance upon Ruffalo is misplaced. In Ruffalo, an additional charge of misconduct was brought against the attorney in question following the completion of his testimony in the state disciplinary proceedings. See 390 U.S. at 546 — 47, 88 S.Ct. 1222. That new charge served as the sole basis for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision to impose reciprocal discipline. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the addition of a new charge at that stage of the state court proceedings violated Ruffalo’s right of due process, thereby making the imposition of reciprocal discipline inappropriate. Id. at 550-551, 88 S.Ct. 1222.
Contrary to Surrick’s contention, we conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of its rulings in Anonymous Attorney A and Price did not amount to a new charge, and therefore is not functionally equivalent to the actions held violative of due process in Ruffalo. Cf. Committee on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances of the Virgin Islands Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169, 172-74 (3d Cir. 1971) (applying Ruffalo to situation in which disciplinary charges were amended based on the testimony of the attorney in question); see also In re Slattery, 767 A.2d *237203, 210-11 (D.C.2001) (noting that “we understood Ruffalo as holding that due process was violated because the bar association failed to give Ruffalo prior notice that his conduct would amount to, in the words of the Supreme Court, a ‘disbarment offense,’ with the consequence that Ruffalo was trapped into admitting that he had committed a disciplinary violation.... Ruffalo rests on the premise that the amendment of charges created an impermissible trap since, at the time of the proceedings, the attorney could not have known that the defense he asserted would subject him to disbarment”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Thus, we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that the state disciplinary proceedings complied with minimal due process requirements. As a consequence, it did not abuse its discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline as required by its local rules in the absence of a due process violation. See RAC 11(D).
We need not address the merits of Surrick’s third and final argument — that the state court’s ruling violates his First Amendment rights and therefore constitutes a grave injustice pursuant to RAC 11(D) — as he failed to adequately raise it before the District Court. See Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir.1991). Further, to the extent that Surrick’s reply brief may be read to challenge the District Court’s finding of waiver with respect to the First Amendment argument that was asserted below, we conclude that his failure to identify or argue this issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of this argument on appeal. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.1993). Moreover, even if Surrick’s objection to the District Court’s finding of waiver had been properly presented in his opening brief, we have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion.
Finally, we note that the question whether the imposition of either state or reciprocal federal discipline was appropriate under the circumstances of this case is clearly one over which reasonable jurists may disagree. However, even conceding that we would view some of Surrick’s arguments as presenting close issues if called upon to examine them in the first instance, we have no difficulty in concluding that the District Court en banc did not abuse its discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
. Surriek has a well-documented history as an outspoken critic of the Pennsylvania judiciary dating back to his appointment to the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board in 1980. Because these facts are discussed in detail by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Surriek I, 749 A.2d at 446-49, we find it unnecessary to repeat them here.
. RPC 8.4(c) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
. The Rules of Attorney Conduct (RAC) are codified in Rule 83.6 of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's Local Rules of Civil Procedure. For ease of reference, Pennsylvania's Rules of Professional Conduct will be referred to throughout this Opinion as "RPC”, and the Rules of Attorney Conduct contained in Local Rule 83.6 will be referred to as "RAC”.
. Surrick is presently living in Florida and not practicing law, but, as his attorney stated at oral argument, he may some day decide to return to Pennsylvania and to resume his law practice.
. RAC 11(D) provides as follows:
D. Upon the expiration of 30 days from service of the notice issued pursuant to the provisions of (B) above and after an opportunity for any attorney contesting the imposition of the identical discipline or prohibition to be heard by one or more judges designated by the Chief Judge, this court shall impose the identical discipline unless the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or this court finds, that upon the face of the record upon which the discipline or prohibition in another jurisdiction is predicated it clearly appears:
*2321. that the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
2. that there was such an infirmity of proof as to give rise to the clear conviction that this court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
3. that the imposition of the same discipline or prohibition by this court would result in grave injustice; or
4. that the misconduct or other basis established for the discipline or prohibition is deemed by this court to warrant substantially different action.
Where this court determines that any of said elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate.
. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Rogers, by its terms, applies only to criminal proceedings. However, we see no basis for refusing to apply the same rationale here. As we noted, supra, the full panoply of rights provided in criminal proceedings are not required in attorney disciplinary proceedings. Thus, it necessarily follows that attorneys involved in disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to any greater protection from the retroactive application of judicial rulings than that afforded to criminal defendants.
. To the extent that Surriek asserts that the decision in Price, which involved RPC 3.3(a)(1) and RPC 8.2(b), may not be applied to his violation of RPC 8.4(c), we reject this argument. Not even the first District Court panel found any basis for this claim. See Surriek II, 2001 WL 120078 at *14 (holding that "[w]e see no ground for questioning the [Pennsylvania Supreme Court's] judgment that the Price procedural regime was properly transferable to RPC 8.4(c) proceedings.”).