concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the part of the majority opinion denying Busch’s petition for review and granting the Board’s cross-application for enforcement as to the Rimauldo and Meany incidents. I dissent, however, from the majority’s denial of Busch’s petition for review and its grant of the Board’s cross-application for enforcement relating to the two Lamirande incidents.
I dissent for several reasons. Most important, the majority’s “Representation Rule” exceeds the scope of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 157. Also, under the particular facts of this case, Busch afforded Lamirande all the important protections that § 7 and the Weingarten rule were intended to provide. Moreover, the majority’s “Representation Rule” actually tends to undermine the protections afforded by the Weingarten rule.
I.
The majority’s “Representation Rule” impermissibly expands the right first announced by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 95 S.Ct. 959, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975).1 *282The employer in Weingarten accused one of its employees of stealing. The employer’s security agent interviewed the employee about the allegations. Although the employee repeatedly requested a union steward to assist her during the interview, the security agent refused. After verifying the employee’s defense, the security agent apologized to the employee and assured her that the matter was closed.
Relieved, the employee burst into tears and made a seemingly incriminating statement about a separate matter. The security agent immediately launched yet another investigatory interview. The employee again asked for a union steward, but the agent again denied the request.
The Supreme Court held that a union employee is entitled to have union representation during an investigatory interview that the employee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action. Id. at 262, 95 S.Ct. 959. This proposition has generally become known as the “Weingar-ten right” or the “Weingarten rule.” See, e.g., B. Glenn George, Visions of a Labor Lawyer: The Legacy of Justice Brennan, Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 1123, 1171 (1992). The Court in Weingarten based its conclusion on the provisions of § 7 of the Act, the same provision at issue in this case. Section 7 states in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ...
(Emphasis added). The Court reasoned that an employee’s right to union representation during an investigatory meeting is based on the guarantee that employees have under § 7 to act in concert “for mutual aid or protection.” Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260, 95 S.Ct. 959.
In wrestling with the seeming inconsistency between the statutory language, on one hand, which is aimed at “concerted” activity and “mutual” aid and protection, and the individual employee’s claim, on the other hand, that she had been deprived of union representation during an investigatory meeting, the Court explained:
The union representative whose participation [the employee] seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular employee’s interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly. The representative’s presence is an assurance to other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain his aid and protection if called upon to attend a like interview. Concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is therefore ... present here.
Id. at 260-61, 95 S.Ct. 959.
The Court found that providing a union representative during an investigative interview effectuates some of the primary purposes of § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151, of the Act.2 Id., at 262, 95 S.Ct. 959. Such pro*283tection, the Court reasoned, is consistent with the Act’s goal of eliminating the “inequality of bargaining power between employees ... and employers.” As Justice Brennan explained for a majority of the Court:
A single employee confronted by an employer investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview.
Id. at 262-63, 95 S.Ct. 959. Thus, the Court found that affording a “lone employee” a union representative during an investigatory interview in which the risk of discipline reasonably inheres falls within the protection of § 7 “read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.” Id. at 262, 95 S.Ct. 959.
By enforcing the Board’s decision in this case, the majority establishes a new right for individual employees that is untethered from § 7 of the Act and is not envisioned by Weingarten. Whereas the Weingarten rule and § 7 are designed to allow employees “to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection,” the majority’s “Representation Rule” fails to effectuate any collective right of employees. Instead, the majority’s holding guarantees each individual employee the right to choose a particular union representative he or she desires, even when, as is in the instant case, that particular representative is not as available as another competent and duly elected union representative and when the employee has no material basis for insisting on one particular representative over another.3 This new right that the majority creates does not advance the collective interests of the bargaining unit.
The majority asserts that granting an individual employee the right to demand one qualified, duly elected steward over another will help mitigate the inequality between employer and employee and will make the employee “generally feel more comfortable.” See ante at 275, n. 11. As for the first purported justification, if both stewards are competent and duly elected by the bargaining unit, allowing the individual employee to choose one over the other does not benefit the collective interests of the bargaining unit in the slightest. One competent, duly elected steward mitigates the inequality between employer and employee just as much as any other steward. As for the second purported justification, making an individual employee “gen*284erally feel more comfortable” is not the important type of right that § 7 and the Weingarten rule are intended to protect.4
The Weingarten rule stands for the weighty proposition that an employee should not be forced to undergo an investigatory interview without the assistance of a union steward, who ensures that both the employee and the bargaining unit are treated justly. The majority’s new rule does not advance the interests of the bargaining unit as a whole. Therefore, the “Representation Rule” exceeds the scope of § 7 of the Act and is an impermissible extension of the Weingarten rule.5 See Maislin Industries v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990) (“Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.”).6
II.
I also dissent because the facts of this case reveal that Busch afforded Lamirande all the important protections that § 7 of the Act and the Weingarten rule provide. Lamirande, who soon before this incident was elected as a union steward,7 was accused of endangering the safety of other workers at the Busch plant. Busch chose to interview Lamirande about the incident, even though it was not required to under the law. Instead, it could have immediately commenced a disciplinary proceeding. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 259, 95 S.Ct. 959.
Lamirande asked that Steward Finn be called to represent him during the interview. Instead, Steward Vogel was sum*285moned to the meeting to represent Lami-rande. Busch did not summon Steward Finn because he was scheduled to be at lunch. The ALJ found that Busch had a logical reason for not calling Steward Finn. He also found that both Steward Vogel and Steward Finn were competent stewards, and that Busch had no ulterior motive in wanting Steward Vogel to represent Lamirande rather than Steward Finn. Steward Vogel was duly elected by the workers in Lamirande’s department and had regularly represented workers during investigatory interviews.
Once Steward Vogel arrived, he was given an opportunity to speak privately with Lamirande. Lamirande told him that he preferred Steward Finn because he was already “aware of my situation.” J.A. 10. There is no evidence in the record, however, that Steward Finn was aware of Lami-rande’s situation until after the first interview. The ALJ also found that Lamirande never told Busch any reason why he wanted Steward Finn rather than Steward Vo-gel to represent him. As the ALJ found: “Lamirande asked for union representation and got it promptly.” J.A. 11.
The ALJ assumed that the interview began at 11:15 a.m. and that, had the interviewer granted Lamirande’s request for Steward Finn, the interviewer would have had to wait only 15 minutes until Steward Finn returned from lunch. The ALJ found that this “short delay” was not a sufficient reason to deny Lamirande’s request.8 The ALJ found that, even though Steward Finn was on lunch break, he was not any less “available” than Steward Vogel. J.A. 13.
The ALJ clearly erred in deciding that Steward Finn was not less “available” than Steward Vogel. The interview began before Steward Finn was scheduled to return from lunch. The interviewer was prepared to proceed when Steward Vogel was present but Steward Finn was not.9 Steward Finn was not “equally available” as Steward Vogel.10
*286At no time during the course of these interviews did anyone suggest that it was a Weingarten violation for Busch to provide Steward Vogel rather than Steward Finn. In fact, it was not until after the Region refused the union’s request to issue complaint over Lamirande’s suspension that the Weingarten issue was raised.
To suggest that Busch somehow tried to intimidate or overpower Lamirande or tried to disadvantage him during the two interviews by not allowing him to have Steward Finn as his representative lacks any support in the record. There was clearly no “mischief to be corrected” by having Steward Finn rather than Steward Vogel represent Lamirande. All the underlying policy reasons for the Weingarten rule were attained, i.e., Steward Vogel safeguarded not only the particular interests of Lamirande but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by ensuring “that [Busch did] not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly.” Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260-61, 95 S.Ct. 959. Because Lamirande was competently represented in both interviews by a duly elected steward, he was not the “lone employee” whom Weingarten and § 7 protect.
III.
Finally, the majority’s “Representation Rule” is inconsistent with the important protections the Weingarten rule was intended to foster. As the majority rightly notes, an employer is not obligated to summon a particular steward requested by an employee under any circumstance. Ante at 275, n. 11. Instead, the employer has the prerogative to forgo the interview process altogether and proceed to discipline the employee immediately. The Court in Weingarten understood the disadvantages of this scenario. By establishing the Weingarten rule, the Court attempted to create a policy that was “useful to both employee and employer.” Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262, 95 S.Ct. 959. The Court explained the benefit of the rule:
A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need riot transform the interview into an adversary contest. Respondent suggests nonetheless that union representation at this stage is unnecessary because a decision as to employee culpability or disciplinary action can be corrected after the decision to impose discipline has become final. In other words, respondent would defer representation until the filing of a formal grievance challenging the employer’s determination of guilt after the employee has been discharged or otherwise disciplined. At that point, however, it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and the value of representation is correspondingly diminished. The employer may then be more concerned with justifying his actions than re-examining them.
Id. at 263, 95 S.Ct. 959.
The “Representation Rule” adds an unnecessary complication to what the Court envisioned as a streamlined system of dispute resolution. Instead of “getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview,” the new rule announced today will inevitably give rise to new disputes like what constitutes an “extenuating circumstance” and how long must the interviewer wait before proceeding with the interview. These disputes will arise even in cases like this one, where the employee demanding a particular representative will *287receive no additional benefit from and has no material reason for making such a demand. Employers may well find it much more desirable to bypass the interview process and proceed to discipline. This result is inconsistent with the goals of the Weingarten rule and § 7 of the Act.11
IV.
Today, the majority coins the phrase “Representation Rule” to designate the new rule that it announces. This redesig-nation is warranted because the “Representation Rule” is an impermissible extension of the Weingarten rule.
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s denial of Busch’s petition for review and its grant of the Board’s cross-application for enforcement as to both of the Lamirande incidents. The majority’s new “Representation Rule” exceeds the reach of § 7 of the Act.
. The majority insists that the "Representation Rule” is the Board’s invention rather than its own. Ante at 285, n. 10. The majority’s insistence on this somewhat semantical point is curious. First, the majority, not the Board, coined the phrase "Representation Rule.” Second, even though the majority may not have "invented” the “Representation Rule,” the majority has placed its imprimatur on the new rule by finding it to be rational and consistent with the Act. Third, future litigants seeking protection or further extension of the "Representation Rule” will surely cite *282the majority’s opinion rather than the Board's order.
. The majority’s suggestion that § 1 grants an individual employee his personal choice of union representation, see ante at 275, is misplaced. Section 1 declares it the policy of the United States to eliminate hindrances to the "free flow of commerce" generally by encouraging collective bargaining and "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added). This right to designate representatives arises in the context of the collective activities of workers in a group. As Justice Marshall explained in a case decided *283the day before Weingarten, the NLRA, to secure the collective strength of the bargaining unit, establishes a regime of majority rule wherein the rights of some individuals might be subordinated to the interests of the majority. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 95 S.Ct. 977, 43 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975).
. There are, no doubt, instances when an employee would have a material reason for preferring one representative over a proffered representative. If, for instance, the employee and the proffered representative have a long history of animosity toward each other, the employer, after being informed of this circumstance, should replace the proffered representative with another representative. This replacement would be required not only because the proffered representative would be biased against the individual employee but also because the proffered representative’s bias could affect his ability to represent the interests of the unit as a collective whole during the investigatory interview. No such circumstance exists in this case. If it had, it would be consistent with the Weingarten rule and § 7 to require the replacement "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.”
. The majority also asserts that the "Representation Rule” is justified because it would allow an employee to choose a steward who is already familiar with his case. That simply is not the type of important right protected by Weingarten. In fact, the ALJ in this case found it unimportant that a particular steward might already be "up to speed.” J.A. 13. The type of prompt, nonadversarial interview envisioned by Weingarten does not require that a steward have in-depth knowledge about the incident under review.
. We are obliged to uphold the Board’s interpretation of a statute only if it is rational and consistent with the Act. See Sam’s Club v. N.L.R.B., 173 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.1999). Reviewing courts are not to stand aside and rubber stamp Board determinations that are contrary to the language or tenor of the Act. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266, 95 S.Ct. 959.
. Moreover, I dissent because the majority's "Representation Rule,” even if it could be construed as a permissible interpretation of § 7, cannot be enforced retroactively against Busch. An important consideration in determining whether to give retroactive application to a new rule is deciding whether the rule proposed is an "abrupt break with well-settled policy” or is merely an "attempt to fill a void in an unsettled area of law.” ARA Services, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 71 F.3d 129, 134 (4th Cir.1995).
The Board’s most recent pronouncement in a Weingarten rule case was Williams Pipeline Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 1 (1994). In Williams, the employee being investigated asked for a union steward who was not immediately available. In deciding the case, the Board reaffirmed its prior decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977). In Coca-Cola, the Board held that an employer is not required to postpone an investigatory hearing when the employee asks for a particular union representative who is unavailable, if there is another qualified union representative available.
Because Williams was the most recent decision by the Board prior to the Lamirande incident, Busch was entitled to rely on it and the prior Board decisions, like Coca-Cola, consistent with it. Therefore, even if the majority’s "Representation Rule” were a permissible interpretation of § 7, it constitutes an abrupt reversal of prior policy that may not be applied retroactively.
.His term as steward commenced the month after this incident.
. The ALJ also decided that Busch should have delayed the interview and that nothing about the circumstances required instant attention. Busch asserts correctly that these are legitimate prerogatives reserved to the employer under Weingarten.
. The majority contends that three prior Board decisions on which it relies require only that the requested representative be "reasonably” available. Ante at 277. This characterization is incorrect. In GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1989), the requested representative arrived at the interview before the representative proffered by the employer. In New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 277, 282 (1992), and Consolidation Coal Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 976, 978 (1992), the requested representatives were "equally available” and "present and ready to go forward.”
The majority’s mischaracterization is further evidenced by the Board's decision in LIR-USA Manufacturing Co., 306 N.L.R.B. 298 (1992). In that case, the Board did not give any weight to the employee's preference for one steward over another steward when the requested steward was not available within five minutes.
.The majority asserts that the ALJ was in a better position to assess the respective availability of the two stewards and therefore substantial evidence exists in the record justifying the ALJ’s finding that Steward Finn was not less "available” than Steward Vogel. Ante at 276, n. 14.
"Availability” has had a distinct meaning under the Weingarten rule cases. For example, a particular steward is “available” when he or she is "present and ready to proceed.” See cases cited ante at 274, n. 9.
The ALJ ignored this accepted definition. Instead, the ALJ found that Steward Finn was no less “available” because he could have been present after a "short delay.”
The only evidence in the record, however, is that Steward Finn was not present and ready to proceed when Steward Vogel was present and ready to proceed. Thus, there is no evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Steward Finn was no less "available.”
. The majority suggests that it lacks authority to stop such an undesirable result, because Congress has delegated such policy considerations to the Board. Ante at 277, n. 15. As previously explained, ante at 284, the court is not allowed to merely rubber stamp the Board’s interpretation of a statute. Instead, a court must judge an agency’s interpretation against the Supreme Court’s prior determination of the statute’s meaning. Maislin Industries, 497 U.S. at 131, 110 S.Ct. 2759. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court clearly promoted the investigatory interview as a prompt, efficient, desirable means of handling disputes for both the employer and the employee. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262-63, 95 S.Ct. 959. The “Representation Rule” might cause employers to bypass the interview process and thereby disadvantage employees. This potential further suggests that the “Representation Rule” is not a permissible interpretation of the Act.