concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the court’s opinion with the exception of Part III(B). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Ramirez’s parole for his 1989 rape conviction was not “revoked,” as that term is understood. in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k). I find two serious flaws in the majority opinion. First, the majority’s definition, relying almost entirely on state law, is irreconcilable with one of the primary purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, “avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(B). Second, the way the majority defines a “revocation of ... parole,” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k), is inconsistent with the fundamental purposes and policies of chapter 4 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The majority correctly states that the purpose of creating a uniform federal definition of terms within the Guidelines is to effectuate consistent nationwide application of federal legislation. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). I agree with the majority’s implicit proposition that this purpose should not necessarily deter us from defining a statute in a manner that conflicts with our sister circuits. When we do depart from our sister circuits and create our own definition of a federal statute, we should, at least, ensure that similarly situated criminal defendants in our own circuit are treated consistently. I fear that the majority’s almost complete reliance on state law will result in the opposite.
As the majority itself notes, the “inherently flexible and discretionary nature of the different state systems, which aim to consider the totality of the parolee’s history as well as the gravity of the violation, leads to discrepancies in the type of sanctions handed down for even the same minor violations.” Maj. Op. at 804 (emphasis added). Yet, under the majority’s definition, our court must defer completely to the individual states in our circuit in determining when parole will be revoked. Thus, two criminal defendants in our Circuit who have committed the exact same criminal conduct while on parole and have received the exact same term of confinement for a violation can and will be treated differently under the majority’s definition. Such an approach is inconsistent with the general purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
The approach is also contrary to Supreme Court precedent. In Taylor v. United States, the Court considered the meaning of the term “burglary” under a federal sentencing enhancement similar to the one here. 495 U.S. at 580, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Eighth Circuit had held that “burglary ... means ‘burglary’ however a state chooses to define it.” Id. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this approach, stating that “[i]t seems to us to be implausible that Congress intended the meaning of ‘burglary’ for purposes of [the sentencing enhancement at issue] to depend on the definition adopted by the State of conviction.” Id. at 590, 110 S.Ct. *8072143. The Court then went on to hold that a uniform federal definition of burglary was necessary in order to advance the interests of the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 595-96, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Like the majority here, the petitioner in Taylor argued that the rule of lenity required the Court to define the term “burglary” according to state law. The Court rejected this argument. “This maxim of statutory construction, however, cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute.” Id. at 596, 110 S.Ct. 2143. See also United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957) (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law”).
The majority justifies its decision by stating that it does not want to “usurp the discretion of the probation entity.” But I do not see how defining the term “revocation” differently from the state will usurp the discretion of a probation or parole entity. A federal court’s determination that a parole violation is a “parole revocation” under the Sentencing Guidelines certainly does not change the defendant’s parole status under state law. Moreover, state parole officers advance the interests of the individual states when deciding whether to formally revoke parole. The interests the federal guidelines seek to advance are not necessarily considered in a state officer’s decision.
I also do not believe that the majority’s definition advances the purposes and policies of chapter 4 of the Guidelines. Those purposes and policies are expressly laid out in the introduction to the chapter:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior must be considered .... The specific factors included in § 4A1.1 and § 4A.1.3 are consistent with the extant empirical research assessing correlates of recidivism and patterns of career criminal behavior.
Introductory Comments to Chapter 4 of U.S.S.G. It is with these considerations in mind that we must go about interpreting the meaning of the term “revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole or mandatory release.” USSG § 4A1.2(k). The guidelines are concerned with parole revocations because they seek to discourage recidivism and encourage rehabilitation of convicts after release from prison. The guidelines seek to advance certain federal interests and it is within these federal interests that the guidelines must be interpreted. Individual states have wide and varying reasons for why they may not formally revoke a particular convict’s parole or probation. The federal guidelines, however, are not concerned with such reasons. As the Second Circuit has declared, interpreting the term “parole revocation” to not include a parole violation plus a term of imprisonment would be “contrary to the Guidelines’ premise that repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation and aggravates the need for punishment with each recurrence.” United States v. Glidden, 77 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam).
The definition of parole revocation of the other circuits .and the one that I would adopt requires two conditions be met— 1) a formal finding of violation; and 2) a *808punishment of imprisonment because of such a finding.1 I do not believe that we should adopt this definition simply because our sister circuits have adopted it. We should adopt this definition because it advances the two major objectives that chapter 4 of the Guidelines advances— consistent application and discouragement of recidivism.
Defining “parole revocation” as a formal finding of a parole violation plus a return to a term of imprisonment serves these purposes. When the state has formally found that the defendant has violated the terms of his or her parole and has furthermore deemed that violation serious enough to return the defendant to imprisonment, this demonstrates that the defendant has engaged in behavior that chapter 4 of the guidelines specifically seeks to take into account. Moreover, this definition of parole revocation is straightforward, simple to apply, and treats similarly situated defendants the same. Also, such a definition is, in my opinion, entirely consistent with the plain and intended meaning of the term parole revocation. “The essence of parole is release from prison.” 59 Am. Jur.2d Pardon and Parole § 6 (1987). Notwithstanding the technical status of the person under state law, when a person has been returned.to prison, that person is not commonly understood to still be “on parole.”
The majority’s reliance on ' Supreme Court cases dealing with the requirements that must be met under the Due Process Clause before probation or parole may be revoked are simply inapposite. The issue dealt with in those cases is not involved in this case. Ramirez does not argue that a finding that his parole was revoked,' for purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would, in any way, deprive him of his federal due process rights.2 Nor does Ramirez argue that he was not accorded due process in his parole violation proceedings.3
The government points to two incidents that qualify as parole revocations. If either incident does so qualify, then we must reverse because the district court could not have applied the safety valve departure. It is my opinion that the first incident does not qualify as a revocation but the second one does.
The first incident involved- Ramirez’s speeding ticket and positive test for mari*809juana use. After Ramirez and his parole officer agreed to a corrective action plan (CAP), he spent thirty days in county jail. Ramirez was therefore returned to imprisonment. But there never appeared to be any formal finding of violation. The parole board signed off on the plan without ever saying there was probable cause for the parole officer’s determination or that there was an express violation. So the problem with Ramirez’s first incident is that it meets the second requirement, return to imprisonment, but fails the first, a finding of violation.
The second incident involved Ramirez’s being caught with a knife. Here, there is no doubt that there was an express finding of violation. Rather than coming from a CAP, here the allegations came from an allegation form that Ramirez had to answer. The board expressly found probable cause and ordered a hearing where Ramirez had a right to an attorney and a right to call witnesses in his favor. No hearing was held because Ramirez waived his right to such a hearing.4 The board then formally determined, that Ramirez violated his parole. The board ordered Ramirez to serve forty-five days in a juvenile confinement facility, similar to the one where Ramirez served four years of his fourteen year sentence pursuant to his rape conviction. The second incident therefore was a revocation of his parole— there was a formal finding of violation and a punishment of imprisonment for this violation.5
Since Ramirez’s parole was revoked, as those terms are understood in the Sentencing Guidelines, I would vacate Ramirez’s sentence and remand for resen-tencing.
I respectfully dissent.
. See Glidden, 77 F.3d 38 at 40 ("[W]hen a defendant has been ... placed on probation, and the court has thereafter, upon finding he violated probation, ordered him to serve a period of incarceration, we think it proper to view that order as at least a partial revocation of parole that falls within the scope of the Guidelines § 4A1.2(k)(1).”); United States v. Reed, 94 F.3d 341, 342-43 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding that a "finding of a probation violation coupled with a time-served imprisonment sentence and a resentencing to probation constitutes a 'revocation of probation’ ”); United States v. Glover, 154 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.1998) (U.S.S.G. " § 4A1.2(k)(1) contemplates that, in calculating a defendant’s total sentence of imprisonment for a particular offense, the district court will aggregate any term of imprisonment imposed because of a probation violation with the defendant’s original sentence of imprisonment, if any, for that offense.”).
. The majority’s statements that, under pre-Guidelines practice, a probationer may not have his probation reinstated following revocation without a formal resentencing process have little to do with this case. Maj. Op. at 802-803 & 804. Ramirez was not sentenced to probation but was paroled before serving his entire sentence of imprisonment.
. As noted below, when the Parole Board formally charged Ramirez with violating his parole, he was given the right to a hearing, the right to an attorney, and the right to call witnesses in his own defense. Ramirez waived those rights and admitted to the violation. Ramirez does not argue that his waiver was constitutionally deficient.
. Ramirez’s waiver seems to have been fully voluntary.
. Ramirez spent thirty days in county jail and forty-five days in a juvenile confinement facility. He was not free to leave either facility and was therefore deprived of his liberty by the state. Any contention that Ramirez was not "imprisoned” is simply wrong. See Black’s Law Dictionary 757 (6th ed.1990) (defining "imprisonment” as the "detention of a person contrary to his will.”).