Richard C. Herrin appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.2 He argues that comments by the government during closing argument violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent and that his trial counsel’s failure to object to those comments constituted ineffective assistance. We affirm.
I.
Herrin was convicted of armed bank robbery and the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Herrin, 242 F.3d 377 (8th Cir.2000)(Table). He then filed a motion to set aside his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming violations of his constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. The district court found no prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel and found Herrin’s insufficient-indictment claim to be without merit. D. Ct. Order of Mar. 19, 2002. The district court issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument violated Herrin’s fifth amendment rights, and (2) whether Herrin’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to those comments. D. Ct. Order of Nov. 4, 2002 at 4.
At trial, the parties presented the two factual scenarios: either Herrin or his brother, Terry Herrin (Terry), committed the felony. Witnesses to the crime had difficulty identifying the man who robbed the bank because he wore a stocking mask over his head, with duct tape covering his mouth. Terry, the government’s principal witness, .testified that his brother told him the details of the robbery after the fact. The government’s trial strategy was to prove both that Terry could not have committed the robbery and that Herrin did commit the robbery. Herrin chose not to testify.
During his closing argument, the prosecutor focused on Terry’s testimony. He argued that Terry’s actions were inconsistent with guilt and that he was a credible *546witness, making the following comments during the course of the argument:
Now, I want you to consider the actions and the testimony of Terry Herrin, and ask yourself if those are the actions of a guilty man.
Is that what a guilty man does? No. A guilty man doesn’t say a thing, he just says I am not going to tell you anything. But instead Terry Herrin cooperates fully.... You are going to keep your mouth shut, that’s what a guilty person does, but Terry Herrin didn’t do that.
There is no evidence that anybody but the defendant has a police scanner. There is no evidence that anybody but the defendant knows how to use that police scanner. There is no evidence that anybody but the defendant had the gun. There is no evidence that anybody but the defendant knew how to use the gun.
In trials you have to deal with the evidence, that is the only fair way to do this.... I am stuck with what came to you from the witness stand, and it ought to be the other way around too.
Herrin’s trial counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument and did not raise the issue on direct appeal.
II.
Herrin’s prosecutorial misconduct claim and his ineffective-assistance claim present mixed questions of fact and law. Graham v. Dormire, 212 F.3d 437, 440 (8th Cir.2000). We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief by the usual standards of review, reviewing mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 692 (8th Cir.2002).
A.
Comments by a prosecutor on an accused’s failure to take the stand violate the accused’s fifth amendment right to remain silent. Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). Either direct or indirect references to defendant’s choice not to testify may establish a constitutional violation. Indirect comments rise to the level of a constitutional violation if the statements either (1) manifest the prosecutor’s intention to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or (2) are such that the jury would naturally and necessarily understand the comments as highlighting the defendant’s failure to testify. Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Smith, 266 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). Prosecutorial comments must be reviewed in context, Graham, 212 F.3d at 439-40, and we will reverse only if the defendant shows both that the comments were improper and that they resulted in prejudice. Stringer v. Hedgepeth, 280 F.3d 826, 829-30 (8th Cir.2002).
Because the prosecutor did not directly comment on Herrin’s failure to testify, the question is whether the indirect comments ran afoul of Herrin’s fifth amendment rights. We conclude that they did not, for when read in context the comments do not reflect an intent to call attention to Herrin’s failure to testify but rather constitute an argument that Terry could not be guilty, given his cooperation with the police. Likewise, the challenged comments, when taken as a whole, would not naturally and necessarily have been understood by the jury as a reference to Herrin’s failure to testify. Herrin argues that the jury would have understood the first *547comment about what “a guilty man does” as stating a general principle that applied negatively to Herrin’s silence as well as positively to Terry’s cooperation with the police. Taken alone, the statement “A guilty man doesn’t say a thing, he just says I am not going to tell you anything” might well constitute an impermissible comment. In the context of this closing argument, however, the jury would necessarily recognize the narrow focus on Terry, for, as set forth above, the prosecutor opened that section of his argument with “Now, I want you to consider the actions and the testimony of Terry Herrin.... ”
Finally, Herrin contends that the jury understood the remaining comments to imply that his failure to testify constituted an admission of his guilt. As we view the argument, however, those comments were a call to the jury to rely only on the evidence presented in determining whether it was sufficient to establish Herrin’s guilt and not a reference to his failure to testify.
B.
In light of our holding that the challenged comments did not violate Herrin’s fifth amendment rights, we need not consider his contention that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to them at trial and in not raising them as an issue on appeal.
The order denying the motion for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
. The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
. We grant Herrin's pro se motion that his August 21, 2003, correspondence with his appellate counsel be viewed and considered as part of the record on appeal.