Brian Francis Joyce seeks to challenge on First Amendment grounds the Internet access and computer use restrictions imposed as special conditions of supervised release following his conviction for possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The government argues that Joyce waived his right to appeal these conditions by signing a plea agreement that contained an express waiver of appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We conclude that Joyce validly waived his right to bring this appeal, and we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Joyce was indicted for possessing more than 600 images of child pornography on his computer. The parties entered a plea agreement in which Joyce waived his right to appeal his conviction and “any aspect of the sentence imposed.” After Joyce’s sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a 27-month term of imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and also specified five special conditions of supervised release. Joyce challenges as unreasonable the two conditions that limit his computer use.1
II
Before we can address the merits of Joyce’s challenge to these special conditions, we must first determine whether he waived his right to appeal them by signing the plea agreement. See United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir.1999) (“It would overreach our jurisdiction to entertain an appeal when the plea agreement effectively deprived us of jurisdiction.”). Joyce agrees that the appeal waiver he signed prevents him from challenging the 27-month term of imprisonment. Instead, he argues that the special conditions of release are not part of his “sentence,” and thus that the language of his appellate waiver does not bar this challenge.
Whether an appellant has waived his right to appeal is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Shimoda, 334 F.3d 846, 848 (9th Cir.2003). A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. See *923United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1996). Plea agreements are contracts between a defendant and the government, Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.2003), and we generally construe ambiguous language in favor of the defendant. United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.2002).
In this case, we do not find the plea agreement’s use of the word “sentence” to be ambiguous. The plea agreement states:
B. Waivers of appellate and collateral attack rights The defendant understands that by pleading guilty he waives his right to appeal his conviction. The defendant also understands and agrees that as consideration for the government’s commitments under this plea agreement, and if the court accepts this plea agreement and imposes a sentence within its parameters, he will knowingly and voluntarily waive his right, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 871.2, to appeal the sentence imposed. (Emphasis added).
This passage is located in Section II of the plea agreement, entitled “What the Defendant Agrees to Do.” Other agreements in that section include Joyce’s voluntary abandonment of his computer’s central processing unit and hard drive, payment of a $100 special assessment, and payment of a $3,000 fine during the three-year term of supervised release.
Section IX, entitled “Defendant’s Agreement and Understanding of the Terms of This Plea Agreement,” also refers to Joyce’s waiver of his right to appeal:
E. I am fully aware that if I were convicted after a trial and a sentence were imposed on me thereafter, I would have the right to appeal any aspect of my conviction and sentence. Knowing this, I voluntarily waive my right to appeal my conviction. Furthermore, I also knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive my right under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal any aspect of the sentence imposed in this case, if the court imposes a sentence within the parameters of this agreement, (emphasis added).
The use of the words “any aspect of the sentence” in this preceding passage eliminates any arguable ambiguity about whether “sentence” means what 18 U.S.C. § 3742 says it means, or means only time served in prison. By agreeing to waive the right to appeal “any aspect of the sentence imposed in this case,” and to waive his right “under 18 U.S.C. § 3742” (which is the only source of any right to appeal the sentence), Joyce waived his right to appeal “any aspect” of the sentence, including not only any term of imprisonment, but also fines and conditions of supervised release. Joyce relies on the fact that the language of the waiver does not specifically refer to supervised release or any conditions of restriction the court might impose. Instead, he deems it significant that the plea agreement repeatedly distinguishes between a “sentence” and “supervised release,” or uses the word “sentence” to refer only to the term of imprisonment.2 Citing this distinction, Joyce argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal the legality of the special conditions of release.
*924We disagree. The agreement clearly states that Joyce is giving up his right to bring an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Section 3742(a)(3) permits defendants to appeal if a sentence imposed by the district court
is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting condition of probation or supervised release under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(ll) than the maximum established in the guideline range[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3). This section notes that defendants usually have the right to appeal any “sentence” in which the district court gives a greater fine, prison term, period of supervised release, or stricter condition of supervised release than is authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines. A “sentence” thus clearly includes all those different forms of punishment.
The word “sentence” encompasses both prison time and periods of supervised release in other parts of Title 18 as well. See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that under the “plain language” of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), supervised release is “a part of the sentence”); see also United States v. Liero, 298 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.2002) (“[Section] 3583(a) clearly provide[s] that supervised release, just like a term of imprisonment, is ‘part of the sentence.’ Our cases dispel any doubt about what this means.”).
We do note, however, that in addition to this broad meaning in the statute, we have employed the noun “sentence” to refer specifically to the term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir.2003) (“The district court sentenced Lamont to twenty-four months with credit for time served, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Lamont has served his sentence and is currently on supervised release.”); United States v. Mendoza-Prado, 314 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (“The district court imposed a 127-month sentence, plus a term of supervised release and a $200 special assessment.”).
Despite the dual meaning of “sentence” in common usage, the statute that provides the only source of Joyce’s right to appeal is crystal clear. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), a “sentence” can include fines, periods of imprisonment and supervised release, and mandatory and special conditions of supervised release. That is the only statutory basis upon which Joyce may invoke the jurisdiction of this court to challenge any aspect of the sentence imposed, including an attack on specific conditions of his supervised release. Given this language, we hold that Joyce knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge the special conditions of supervised release on the grounds he now raises.
The dissent reasons that we are bound by our prior decision in United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.1991), to reach the merits of Joyce’s appeal. In Bolinger, a defendant challenged his 36-month term of imprisonment and a special condition of supervised release that forbade him from associating with motorcycle gangs. Id. at 479. Despite holding that Bolinger’s plea agreement validly waived his right to appeal, the court nevertheless proceeded to address the merits of his arguments regarding the special condition. Id. at 480. The court did so without any discussion about whether Bolinger’s waiver of his right to appeal his “sentence” included only terms of imprisonment and not conditions of supervised release. In the absence of any holding or explanation whatsoever on the specific issue Joyce *925raises, we do not find Bolinger to be instructive.3
Because Joyce validly waived his right to appeal any aspect of his sentence, including the district court’s imposition of special conditions of supervised release, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of his challenge to the computer and Internet use restrictions.
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
. Special condition 3 states: "The defendant shall not have access to any computer capable of accessing the Internet during the period of supervised release provided that if the defendant needs to use a computer in connection with his work the probation officer may after consulting with the defendant and his employer authorize such use[.]” Special condition 4 states: "During the period of supervised release, the defendant shall notify his employers of his conviction in this case if the prospective employment requires him to have contact with computers or minor children.”
. For example, Joyce points to the following section of the plea agreement: "The maximum statutory penalties for Possession of Child Pornography ... includes [sic ] 1) a maximum sentence of 5 years, 2) a $250,000 fine, 3) a $100 mandatory special assessment, and 4) a three-year term of supervised release.” The agreement also states that "[t]he parties agree that a sentence of 27 months is an appropriate sentence to be imposed in this case.” In each of these instances, the word "sentence” is used to mean "term of imprisonment.”
. We note that "[qjuestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925). In Bolinger, there is no indication that the defendant or the government brought this issue to the court’s attention, nor is there any indication that the court explicitly considered or decided it.