concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree the district court clearly erred by reducing Campos’s sentence for acceptance of responsibility despite imposing an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. I also agree the district court erred in reducing the drug quantity for personal use amounts, because the reduction conflicts with the jury’s verdict. The government did not object to the district court’s drug quantity reduction at the time of sentencing, however, so I disagree the government preserved the issue for appeal, other than for plain-error review. In fact, the government not only failed to object, but led the district court to believe it could find a drug quantity, for sentencing purposes, lower than the amount the jury found. Because I do not believe the drug quantity reduction amounted to plain error, I respectfully dissent in part.
When the district court first asked for the government’s position on Campos’s objection to the drug quantity calculations in the presentence report (PSR), it is true the government initially stated it supported the PSR’s recommendations:
Court: Okay, Mr. Wehde, what’s your position on this [the PSR’s drug quantity calculations]?
Counsel: Your Honor, our position on this is, simply put, the quantity that the Court should take into consideration for drug quantity is the 50.6 grams based on, one, the jury verdict in regards to this particular case which was a beyond a reasonable doubt finding by the triers of fact. They did check the box of 50 grams or more in regards to their finding of the defendant’s guilt of possession with intent to deliver.
Sentencing Transcript at 7-8.
Later, however, the district court asked the government whether the jury’s verdict *1018conclusively ruled out the possibility that some amount could be attributed to personal use, and the government’s counsel was less than resolute in response:
Court: Well, I don’t remember how the verdict form was set up, and I haven’t gone back to look at it. Did the jury conclusively decide beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no personal use with regard to this quantity in your view?
Counsel: I don’t see there was anyplace for them to make that determination in regards to the jury instructions. The only thing that I could see that they did that I recall — and again, this is my memory of the jury verdict when I was working on the appeal — is that they did check 50 grams or more. But that is the only thing that I can recall which could be called a conclusive finding that could be argued against.
Id. at 9.
The district court continued to press, specifically asking the government whether it would be error to reduce the drug quantity for personal use amounts, and the government’s counsel equivocated even more:
Court: Let me ask you this: In your view would it be error for me to find some quantity of this for personal use?
Counsel: I’m not really sure. I think that it could be considered error based on the finding of the jury, but I think that there’s another — there is a plausible argument that he could be a user and that a portion of this was for use because — I mean, if you look back at the Eighth Circuit’s ruling and you look back at a lot of the arguments the parties made, there weren’t a lot of items of packaging. It was broken down into a couple of baggies and a couple of chunks. It was not divided out. That kind of cuts that he is not a major drug dealer, but it kind of cuts that he had enough of a quantity whether at a fire sale or what that he was going to use that to obtain something in return for it. But I’m not really answering the Court’s question, but I don’t really have an adequate -
Court: You’re doing the best you can. I appreciate that.
Counsel: It cuts both ways. Essentially we have before the Court only his testimony that he used in this type of situation and he used with a dollar bill or he could use in other methods. He did present testimony from a friend and from the house who said that he saw him at one time had lined-up lines which would be consistent with his method of use either with a pen casing or a rolled-up dollar bill, but he acknowledged on cross-examination he’d never actually seen him use. The girlfriend — I think the defendant even testified himself she had never seen him use. There’s basically no other corroborating feature to that. We’re left with his testimony which banking — you balance that with his other testimony which we feel is incredible. I think the Court made that finding, but then maybe his testimony about use was accurate.
Id. at 9-11.
As the colloquy between the district court and the government continued, counsel eventually agreed the evidence presented at trial supported a claim that some of the drugs were for personal use:
Court: And you’d agree with me, would you not, that the evidence is at least consistent with the fact that the defendant was a personal user?
Counsel: There is some evidence that would be consistent with that. It’s a *1019case where there isn’t a lot of evidence .... [T]here really isn’t a lot to show either way.
Court: But it’s not inconsistent with the evidence that there was some personal use.
Counsel: No. I cannot in good conscience say that. I mean, I can say I agree with you on that.
Id. at 11-12.
Following this colloquy, the government never objected when the district court announced it was reducing the drug quantity to reflect an amount for personal use. Id. at 13. In fact, the government helped the district court with the calculations to determine the corresponding base offense level. Id. at 14. Finally, just prior to the actual sentencing, the district court asked both counsel if they had anything else to add. The government’s counsel answered in the negative. Id. at 24, 25.
Based on this record, it is clear the government represented to the district court it could properly make a drug quantity reduction, and the government would not object. I would therefore review the issue for plain error. See United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir.2000) (reviewing issue raised by the government under plain error standard where “[t]he government not only failed to make this argument to the District Court, but actually made explicit representations from which we believe the court could only have concluded that the government conceded the issue.”); United States v. Redlin, 983 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir.1993) (“A party must raise a claim of error with the district court so the district court may correct itself and thus obviate the need for our review. It is simply unfair to reverse a trial court on the basis of an issue that it has not had the opportunity to consider.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Without the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, the district court’s drug-quantity calculation would have resulted in a final offense level of 26, calling for a Guidelines imprisonment range of 63-78 months, which is 34-43 months fewer than 97-121 months the Guidelines required absent the error. Applying our precedent to these circumstances, I cannot conclude the district court plainly erred.
In United States v. Filker, we held the fact a defendant received a sentence fifteen months lower than the sentence required by a proper application of the Guidelines did not “represent a miscarriage of justice” under the plain error standard of review. 972 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir.1992). The Guidelines called for a total offense level of 16 and a sentencing range of 33-41 months, but the district court without explanation used a total offense level of 10 and a sentencing range of 15-21 months, and imposed a sentence of eighteen months. Id. at 241. We upheld the sentence because the government failed to object. Id. at 242; see also United States v. Posters N Things Ltd, 969 F.2d 652, 663 (8th Cir.1992) (finding no miscarriage of justice under plain-error standard where government failed to object to sentence of 108 months and statute required 120 months); United States v. Ragan, 952 F.2d 1049, 1049-1050 (8th Cir.1992) (holding “a downward departure from the sentencing range, even if erroneous (a question we do not decide), did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and therefore was not plain error.”).
Although cases from other circuits hold it is plain error to sentence a defendant to less time than required by a correct application of the Guidelines,3 Filker, Posters N *1020Things, and Ragan still appear to bind us in this circuit. Perhaps these three cases can be distinguished on the ground the erroneous reduction involved here is larger than the reductions in those cases in absolute terms. But I believe the proportion of the reduction offers a better basis for comparison. The reduction in Filker, for example, is proportionately larger than the reduction involved here. In Filker, the fifteen-month departure represented 45% of the 33-month minimum required by the Guidelines. Here, the difference between the low ends of the erroneous and correct imprisonment ranges is just 35% of the 97-month minimum required by the Guidelines. Perhaps at some point an erroneous sentence can become so disproportionate we must conclude a gross miscarriage of justice has occurred, but I do not think this case has reached that point.
As the majority opinion notes, see ante at n. 1 (citing United States v. Marsanico, 61 F.3d 666, 668 (8th Cir.1995) (reversing under plain error standard when a defendant’s sentence was erroneously lengthened by 21 months)), our past cases clearly distinguish between what constitutes a miscarriage of justice when a defendant’s sentence is longer than it should be, and what constitutes a miscarriage of justice when a defendant’s sentence is shorter than it should be. See also United States v. Comstock, 154 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir.1998) (reversing under plain error standard when a defendant’s sentence was erroneously lengthened by 17 months). I, like the majority, am troubled by the different standard we apply when the government’s failure to raise an issue results in a shorter sentence. Absent action by the en banc court, however, I believe we are still bound by Filker, Posters N Things, and Ragan.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s drug-quantity calculation. I concur in all other aspects of the majority’s opinion.
. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 194 (2d Cir.2002) (finding plain error where district court imposed sentence of 97 months, and proper application of the Guidelines would have resulted in a sentencing range of at least 108-135 months and possibly 121-151 months); United States v. Clark, 274 *1020F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.2001) (''[D]istrict court plainly erred by imposing a 150-month sentence in light of the 240-month mandatory statutory minimum sentence”); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 517 (4th Cir.1997) (correcting unwarranted 52-month reduction in Guidelines sentence under plain error standard); United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 833 (6th Cir.1996) (finding plain error where district court imposed sentence of 8 months, and proper application of the Guidelines would have resulted in sentence of at least 57 months).