dissenting.
In order to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to seek section 212(c) relief, the majority examines whether IIR-IRA and AEDPA had a retroactive effect on the petitioner’s decision to go to trial. The majority’s analysis appears flawless, but I respectfully suggest that it focuses on the wrong question. The statutes in question eliminated section 212(c) relief for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. The pertinent question, therefore, is whether those statutes retroactively impose additional disabilities on aliens who, prior to the statutes’ enactments, were convicted of an aggravated felony. Applying the familiar retroactivity analysis to the past event of conviction, rather than the past decision to go to trial, reveals that IIRIRA and AEDPA imposed an obvious additional legal consequence on those previously convicted of an aggravated felony, i.e., certain, instead of possible, deportation. Although no one in the petitioner’s position could point to any reliance associated with the past event of conviction, reliance is simply not a prerequisite to a determination that a statute operates retroactively. Accordingly, I conclude that IIRIRA and AEDPA apply retroactively to any person convicted of an aggravated felony prior to the statutes’ enactment, and I must therefore respectfully dissent from the holding in this case.
*168I. Identifying the Relevant Past Event
The touchstone of retroactivity analysis is Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Landgraf both confirmed the strong presumption against applying statutes retroactively, absent express legislative intent to the contrary, and established the analytical framework for determining whether a statute operates retroactively. The Supreme Court held that a statute applies retroactively if “the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Id. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Determining whether a statute attaches new legal consequences to a past event, and thus whether the statute operates retroactively, is not a mechanical exercise. Rather, it involves “a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The determination is one on which “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.” Id.
Under Landgraf then, one must determine the “relevant past event” in order to undertake retroactivity analysis. IIRIRA and AEDPA’s elimination of section 212(e) relief for aggravated felons could conceivably attach new legal consequences to any of at least four past events:1 (1) the criminal conduct; (2) the agreement to plead guilty (for convictions obtained by plea); (3) the decision to go to trial (for convictions obtained by verdict); and (4) the conviction. The Second Circuit has, at various times, analyzed the retroactivity of IIRIRA and AEDPA with respect to three of these four events — all but conviction. The Supreme Court has, as yet, considered only one event--the guilty plea.
This Court first considered criminal conduct as the relevant past event in St. Cyr v. I.N.S., 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir.2000). St. Cyr observed in dicta that the elimination of section 212(c) relief attached no new legal consequence to criminal conduct because, “it is the conviction, not the underlying criminal act, that triggers the disqualification from § 212(c) relief.” Id. at 418 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This dicta became law in Domond v. I.N.S., 244 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting St. Cyr). Domond’s holding was reaffirmed, on the same grounds, in Khan v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 521, 523-24 (2d Cir.2003). In both cases, the Court also rejected the argument that considerations of reliance required it to deem the elimination of section 212(c) relief a new “consequence” of the criminal conduct. The Court observed that “it would border on the absurd” to argue that an alien would not have committed a crime had he known that he would be denied the possibility of section 212(c) relief.2 Do-*169mond, 244 F.3d at 86; see also Khan, 352 F.3d at 523 (“it cannot reasonably be argued that aliens committed crimes in reliance on such a possibility [of 212(c) relief]”).
The guilty plea as the relevant event3 was considered by both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court in the St. Cyr decisions. This Court held that elimination of section 212(c) relief did attach new legal consequences to the decision to plead guilty: “it is likely that a legal resident would, because of the possibility of receiving a lighter sentence, only decide to concede guilt to a crime that renders him or her removable in order to be eligible for relief from removal.” St. Cyr v. I.N.S., 229 F.3d at 419. The Supreme Court agreed and added the observation that “[n]ow that prosecutors have received the benefit of these plea agreements, agreements that were likely facilitated by the aliens’ belief in continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief, it would surely be contrary to familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations to hold that IIRIRA’s subsequent restrictions deprive them of any possibility of such relief.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323-24, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The decision to go to trial — the alternative to the decision to plead guilty — was considered as a relevant past event in Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.2003). In Rankine, the Court concluded that the elimination of section 212(c) relief attached no new consequence to that decision. “The petitioners decided instead to go to trial, a decision that, standing alone, had no impact on their immigration status. Unless and until they were convicted of their underlying crimes, the petitioners could not be deported.” Id. at 99. The Court also rejected the argument that the “consequence” was the upsetting of petitioners’ settled expectation or reliance interest that section 212(c) relief would be available despite the decision to go to trial. “Here, petitioners neither did anything nor surrendered any rights that would give rise to a comparable [to St. Cyr ] reliance interest.” Id. at 100. This latter point— that the upsetting of a reliance interest was not a new “consequence” — was categorically affirmed in Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2004).
II. The Relevance of Conviction
Not one of the decisions cited above addressed the question whether the elimination of section 212(c) relief has a retroactive effect on the past event of conviction. In my view there is no doubt that the elimination of such relief attaches a new legal consequence to the event of conviction. The law, after all, renders deport-able “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii), and IIRIRA and AEDPA *170eliminated section 212(c) relief for any alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Moreover, St. Cyr, Domond and Rankine expressly acknowledge that it is conviction that triggers elimination of section 212(c) relief. St. Cyr, 229 F.3d at 418; Domond, 244 F.3d at 85-86; Rankine, 319 F.3d at 99.
Elimination of section 212(c) relief imposes obvious legal consequences on the past event of conviction. As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]here is a clear difference for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The latest possible moment that either of these consequences — i.e., certain deportation or possible deportation — can attach is at the time of conviction.4 The instant before the jury returns its verdict, the defendant is subject to no immigration consequence; the instant after, he is subject to an immigration consequence. Which consequence a defendant ultimately suffers depends on whether statutes passed after his conviction apply to him. Therefore, application of a “new” law to the past event of conviction results in a different consequence than would otherwise apply — the precise concern of Landgraf.
It is true that, because conviction is an event that occurs to, and not an action taken by, the defendant, considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance and settled expectations are not particularly useful guides to whether the statutes retroactively affect the consequences of conviction. That fact in no way affects the Landgraf analysis.
On several occasions, including in Land-graf itself, the Supreme Court reached the ultimate issue — whether new legal consequences attach to a past event — without the need to resort to these guiding principles. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 282-84, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting fair notice considerations “muted,” but finding that increase in civil liability for past conduct was a retroactive effect); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (holding imposition of new legal liabilities for past conduct was retroactive); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 948-49, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997) (holding statute that expanded cause of action and thus increased liability had retroactive effect). In each of these cases the Supreme Court found it sufficiently obvious that the association of new or expanded legal disability with a past event' altered the legal consequences of that event. The situation is not substantially different here; the new laws expand the disability associated with conviction from possible deportation to certain deportation.5
Moreover, although the “familiar considerations” identified in Landgraf may not be applicable in the present situation, one of the fundamental concerns of the Land-graf Court informs the analysis. The Supreme Court noted a particular concern raised by retroactive statutes, namely, that *171because “[t]he Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration.... it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that immigrants are particularly vulnerable to the unintended retroactive effects of legislation. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 n. 39, 121 S.Ct. 2271.
Finally, this Court has expressly acknowledged that the elimination of section 212(c) relief attaches new legal consequences to the event of conviction. In both Domond and Rankine, when rejecting arguments pertaining to other past events, the Court held that the consequence of elimination of section 212(c) relief did not attach until conviction. In Domond the court held that, “it is the conviction, not the underlying criminal act, that triggers the disqualification from § 212(c) relief.” Domond, 244 F.3d at 85-86 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Rankine the Court observed that, “Unless and until they were convicted of their underlying crimes, the petitioners could not be deported.” Rankine, 319 F.3d at 99 (emphasis added).6
Undeniably, there is some tension between the Rankine decision and my opinion in this ease. The petitioners in Rankine, like this petitioner, were convicted prior to the elimination of section 212(c) relief. Nevertheless, the Rankine decision does not discuss the retroactive effect on the event of conviction, and it offers no explanation why — if conviction is viewed as the relevant event — the elimination of section 212(c) relief is not retroactive. Consequently, given the analysis provided by the Supreme Court in Landgraf and St. Cyr, along with the fact that Domond and even Rankine itself acknowledge that conviction is the point at which immigration consequences attach, I see no other possible conclusion than that Rankine must be read narrowly as holding only that the elimination of the availability of section 212(c) relief does not attach new consequences to the decision to proceed to trial.7 See Restrepo, 2004 WL 652802, *5, 369 F.3d at 636 (“Rankine resolved the narrower question of whether an alien detrimentally relied on the continued availability of 212(c) relief in deciding to go to trial rather than accepting a plea.”).
III. Reliance as a Guide
One possible reason that conviction has never been considered as the past event in analyzing the effect of the elimination of section 212(c) relief is that, ever since the Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Cyr, there has been an overwhelming tendency in immigration retroactivity cases to focus on the question of “detrimental reliance.” If reliance is the central issue, then retroac-tivity analysis must focus on some action taken, and a passive event, like conviction, *172can easily be overlooked. Although there is no denying that considerations of reliance are often illuminating in making ret-roactivity determinations (indeed, the presence of reliance may very well provide the most compelling indication of unfair retro-activity), “detrimental reliance” is not the sine qua non of retroactivity analysis.8
On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has concluded that statutes operate retroactively without considering reliance by the affected parties. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483; Rivers, 511 U.S. 298, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274; Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135. Conversely, in at least one case the Supreme Court has held that a statute did not operate retroactively even when there appeared to have been reliance by the affected party. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 361, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999).
Similarly, in this Court’s principal immigration cases, although the presence of reliance has been considered when evaluating retroactivity (as in St. Cyr), the absence of reliance, standing alone, has not compelled the conclusion that a statute lacks retroactive effect. As discussed above, reliance was discussed in Domond, Khan, and Rankine, but only in the negative, i.e., to rebut the petitioners’ arguments that their reliance constituted a sufficient reason for finding retroactive effect. The affirmative reason given in those cases for why there was no retroactive effect on the events considered was, as noted before, that deportation consequences do not attach until conviction. In other words, there is no support for the proposition that a showing of reliance is a necessary condition to a finding of retroactive effect.9 See generally Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 947, 117 S.Ct. 1871 (noting Landgraf described sufficient, not necessary, conditions for establishing impermissible retroactivity). St. Cyr does not hold otherwise. The existence of reliance supported the holding *173in St. Cyr, but the holding in St Cyr does not require the existence of reliance.
IV. Conclusion
The elimination of section 212(c) relief is retroactive under Landgraf in that it attaches a new legal consequence to the past event of conviction. Because I see nothing in any of this Court’s precedent that compels a contrary conclusion, I conclude that the application of IIRIRA and the AEDPA to this petitioner10 — and any other alien convicted prior to the enactment of those statutes — would have an impermissibly retroactive effect.11 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Recently, this Court considered a fifth potential past event, the decision "to forgo the immediate filing of a 212(c) application based on the considered and reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to file a stronger application for 212(c) relief at a later time.” Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 634, 2004 WL 652802, * 4 (2d Cir. Apr.1, 2004).
. As an aside, I note that this oft-quoted passage is one that conflicts with my “sound instincts” as a judge. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. If it is, indeed, absurd to suggest that a person contemplating the commission of a crime considers the potential consequences of criminal conduct, then Congress and the Sentencing Commission surely are misguided in their attempts to deter crime through increased sentences. I respectfully suggest that it is far from absurd to believe the prospect of certain deportation, rather than possible deportation, might well deter a significant number of aliens from committing aggravated felonies. Cf. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323, 121 S.Ct. 2271 ("Preserving the client's right to remain in the United *169States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”) (citing 3 BENDER, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)).
. In truth, when a defendant pleads guilty, there are at least three possible events that could be considered the relevant past event: (1) the decision to plead guilty, (2) the agreement to plead guilty, or (3) the court's acceptance of the guilty plea, i.e., when the alien is convicted pursuant to the plea agreement. No court has yet had the need to address the question of exactly when the consequences attach. Cf. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (" § 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like respondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements”) (emphasis supplied); id. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271 ("two important legal consequences ensued from respondent's entry of a guilty plea”) (emphasis supplied); St. Cyr, 229 F.3d at 418 ("our analysis focuses on the decision to enter a guilty plea”) (emphasis supplied).
. As noted above, supra n. 3, the consequences may attach earlier for retroactivity purposes — such as at the time of the decision to plead guilty. That a consequence could attach earlier in one case than in another is merely a function of the fact that the determination when a consequence ''attaches” is not a formalistic one, but a common sense, functional judgment that looks to considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance and settled expectations. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483.
. Although deportation is not a punitive consequence, see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952), that simply means that retroactivity analysis, rather than ex post facto analysis, applies.
. The St. Cyr decisions, of course, had no need to reach any conclusion concerning the event of conviction because they held that a consequence attached to the guilty plea. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's opinion recognized that, at the very latest, deportation consequences attached at the time of conviction. See St. Cyr, 229 F.3d at 418 ("it is the conviction, not the underlying criminal act, that triggers the disqualification from § 212(c) relief.”).
. This reading does not render Rankine ineffectual. An individual who decided to go to trial prior to the elimination of section 212(c) relief, but was not convicted until after its elimination, would not be eligible for that relief. Cf. Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 145, 155 n. 3 (2d Cir.2004) (applying Rankine to petitioner indicted in 1995, prior the passage of AEDPA or IIRIRA, but convicted in 1996, after the passage of AEDPA and IIRI-RA).
. Others have remarked that reliance is not always the appropriate guidepost to use in the immigration context. See, e.g., Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir.2002) (Goodwin, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority’s rejection of Chambers's argument that he relied on the availability of § 212(c) when he decided to go to trial .... [but] reliance is merely one way to prove an unfair retroactive effect”); Mohammed v. Reno, 205 F.Supp.2d 39, 44 n. 7 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (Gleeson, J.) ("I respectfully suggest that Landgraf requires a different approach entirely than one that is premised on notions of actual reliance.”); Nancy Morawetz, Determining the Retroactive Effect of Laws Altering the Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1743 (2003) (arguing that considerations of fair notice, rather than reliance, provide the best guidance for determining consequences of a criminal conviction). Interestingly, all these authors thought AEDPA and IIRIRA attached new legal consequence as early as the time of the initial criminal conduct, a view that I adopted when the issue was still open. See Zgombic v. Farquharson, 89 F.Supp.2d 220, 233 (D.Conn.2000), vacated by 69 Fed.Appx. 2 (2d Cir.2003); see also Pottinger v. Reno, 51 F.Supp.2d 349, 362 (E.D.N.Y.1999) ("The operative act in the instant case is ... commission of the offense which rendered him deportable”). That conclusion has been rejected in Domond and Khan, but only because those cases determined that deportation consequences attach at the time of conviction.
. The arguable exception to this statement is Rankine, where the Court noted: "it is difficult to conclude, as we must to find impermissible retroactivity, that the petitioners chose to go to trial in reliance on the availability of § 212(c) relief.” Rankine, 319 F.3d at 100 (emphasis supplied). I read this statement only as a rebuttal of the Rankine petitioners’ argument that a reliance interest in that case gave rise to a retroactive effect. I do not think it possible, in light of the discussion above, to read Rankine as holding that a showing of reliance is the only way to demonstrate retroactive effect.
. I do agree with the majority, however, that the petitioner in this case is not likely to be granted section 212(c) relief due to the seriousness of his crime of conviction.
. The majority decision mentions that, even absent the applicability of IIRIRA and AED-PA, section 212(c) relief is not available to the petitioner in this case because he is ineligible under the five-year bar imposed by the 1990 Immigration Act — a bar that, the majority notes, applies to pre-1990 convictions under the holding in Buitrago-Cuesta v. I.N.S., 7 F.3d 291 (1993). This reasoning does not provide an alternative ground for denying relief. Buitrago-Cuesta, it is true, was affirmed after Landgraf and St. Cyr, but it was affirmed on the strength of Rankine. See Theodoropoulos v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2004); Reid v. Holmes, 323 F.3d 187, 188 (2d Cir.2003). Consequently, it does not have a broader scope than Rankine itself, meaning if Rankine is read narrowly — as I believe it must be — Buitrago-Cuesta must be given the same reading.