concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree in toto with the court’s substantive legal analysis and the conclusions that it reaches, I write separately to note my disagreement with the standard of review that the majority adopts for the first time in this case. In holding that a district court’s application of most rules of evidence is reviewed de novo, the majority disregards a long line of cases from this circuit which holds that such determinations are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir.2004) (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1094 (8th Cir.2001) (Rule 702 reliability and relevance), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1029, 122 S.Ct. 1638, 152 L.Ed.2d 642, and cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1072, 122 S.Ct. 1949, 152 L.Ed.2d 852, and cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1087, 122 S.Ct. 1981, 152 L.Ed.2d 1038, and cert. denied, 537 U.S. 857, 123 S.Ct. 221, 154 L.Ed.2d 93 (2002); United States v. Bryson, 110 F.3d 575, 583 (8th Cir.1997) (Rule 404(b)); United States v. Coney, 51 F.3d 164, 165 (8th Cir.1995) (Rule 804(b)(5)); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1498-99 (8th Cir.1994) (Rules 404(b), 801, and 803), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1098, 115 S.Ct. 768, 130 L.Ed.2d 664, and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1195, 115 S.Ct. 1263, 131 L.Ed.2d 142 (1995); United States v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d 1463, 1465 (8th Cir.1990) (Rule 704(b)); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1328 (8th Cir.) (Rules 401, 402, and 403), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994, 106 S.Ct. 406, 407, 88 L.Ed.2d 357 (1985). Although I agree with the majority that we have never squarely addressed the proper scope of review with respect to evidentiary issues that involve both an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence and an application of the rules to the facts of a case, I would not abandon our discretionary standard of review as to the trial judge’s application of the rules in such cases.
Generally, we review matters of law de novo. Therefore, to the extent that a district court’s admission of evidence involves a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary and de novo. Cf. United States v. Weiland, 284 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir.2002) (stating that an error of law can always be characterized as “an abuse of discretion”). Once we determine that the district court properly interpreted the rules, however, we extend greater deference in reviewing the court’s ultimate decision to admit or exclude the evidence, principally because that decision can involve the careful balancing of competing factors. Thus, when the decision to admit or exclude the evidence involves only the application of a given rule of evidence to particular facts or a judgment call about such things as relevancy under Rule 401 or prejudice under Rule 403, we review solely for an abuse of *997discretion, see Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1328. Accord Blake v. Pellegrino, 329 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 897-98 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 944, 120 S.Ct. 358, 145 L.Ed.2d 280 (1999); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir.1992).
I respectfully dissent because I believe the court’s opinion fails to follow established Eighth Circuit precedent.