dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Although ordinary prosecution for criminal activity is not considered persecution under asylum law, see Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir.1996), if the petitioner was not the target of any “legitimate government prosecution,” the petitioner is entitled to a presumption that at least one of the motives for the harassment is political. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir.1995); see also Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.1988); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 993-94 (9th Cir.1998).
*1046In this case, the petitioner was taken into police custody every month for an extended period of time, beaten, and threatened with death if he did not sign a false confession. He claims, without contradiction, that these beatings were motivated by a desire on the part of the police to discredit the former Ceausescu regime by trying to “find guilty people or invent them so the communists can justify their overthrow of the former president.” As Dinu explained on his original application for asylum:
After the revolution it had been decided by current Romanian authorities that the “Securitate” helped the former President Ceausescu and was against the revolutionaries. So, because I was part of Securitate unit they tried to find me guilty of crimes that others have committed.
The immigration judge speculated that this was mere heavy-handed, but legitimate, law enforcement. A close examination of the record belies this and demonstrates that the petition was entitled to the presumption that at least one of the motives for the beatings, threats, and interrogation was political. Specifically, the record reflects that:
• Dinu’s arrests and detentions began on the heels of one of the most momentous political upheavals in modern Romanian history.
• Dinu was conscripted involuntarily into the Securitate, which was the security force most closely associated with the deposed and murdered Ceausescu (although Dinu was never assigned to guard Ceausescu).
• The shootings took place in Craiova, yet Dinu’s unit was never stationed in that city.
• The police arrived at Dinu’s house in the middle of the night to arrest him, detain him, and beat him.
• Dinu was never formally charged by the police with a crime.
• Although, according to the State Department country report, the Penal Code requires that authorities inform arrestees of their right to an attorney at all stages of the legal process, and requires an attorney be appointed for indigent defendants, Dinu’s request to have a lawyer present at his interrogations was refused.
• The police repeatedly tried to force him to sign a prepared confession.
• The police threatened his life, and told him they would kill him if he reported their actions to anyone.
• Dinu retained a permanent scar on his face from the beatings.
• Dinu was finally released, only to be subjected to the same treatment every month or so, for more than a year.
In short, Dinu had an alibi to the accusations that could be easily verified by the authorities, yet he was repeatedly interrogated, beaten, and threatened with death over a lengthy period — more than a year. There is no explanation in the immigration judge’s opinion, nor is one offered by the government, as to why a legitimate law enforcement investigation would continue after the suspect produces a verifiable and unchallenged alibi. The failure to adhere to the procedures required by applicable law is also significant. One cannot say that refusing access to an attorney when one is requested and threatening to kill a defendant if he reports police actions constitute recognized hallmarks of legitimate law enforcement. Nor does the administration of repeated beatings over many months. Given the disregard of legal process, the absence of charges is significant. Dinu was entitled to the presumption that at least part of the motive for the persecu*1047tion was political. A contrary conclusion cannot be squared with our case law.
The immigration judge also failed to conduct a proper mixed-motive analysis. As we observed in Singh, “[pjersecutory conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one motive is one of the statutorily enumerated grounds, the requirements have been satisfied.” 63 F.3d at 1509-10. Here, the immigration judge assumed a legitimate law enforcement motive, and did not analyze whether the petitioner had “produce[dj evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied protected ground.” Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (quoting In re T-M-B, Interim Dec. No. 3307, 1997 WL 80988 (BIA Feb. 20,1997)).
In sum, the immigration judge failed to apply the presumption that the motive for persecution is political in the absence of a legitimate government prosecution and further failed to apply the proper mixed-motive analysis. I would grant the petition for review.