dissenting.
While I agree that Anthony Riecardo did in fact exhaust his administrative remedies, I disagree with the majority’s decision to overturn the judgment in this action as a reasonable jury had ample evidence to find that Lieutenant Larry Rausch was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm Riecardo faced *529by being celled with Juan Garcia. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
On May 30, 1997, while celled with Juan Garcia, a known member of the Latin Kings, Riccardo’s head was forcibly shaven by Garcia such that Riccardo was “bleeding pretty bad.” Tr. I at 81-82. Garcia then attempted to sodomize Riccardo; however, he was able to resist. Tr. II at 50. After Riccardo resisted, Garcia ejaculated on Riccardo’s feet. Tr. I at 83-84. Riccardo was then forced to perform oral sex on Garcia for 15 to 20 minutes. Id. The assault ended when an officer walked by the cell. As the majority notes, the events which give rise to Lt. Rausch’s liability are limited to the happenings on the evening of May 28, 1997, when Lt. Rausch replaced Lt. Alemond1 as the lieutenant in charge of the segregation and receiving units at Centraba prison.2
On appeal, Lt. Rausch contends, and the majority agrees, that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to support a finding of liability under the Eighth Amendment. To sustain overturning a jury verdict, the record must demonstrate no “legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party.” Payne v. Milwaukee County, 146 F.3d 430, 432 (7th Cir.1998). While undertaking this assessment, we analyze the “the totality of the evidence,” Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir.1999), and are obliged to leave the judgment undisturbed unless the moving party can show that “no rational jury could have brought in a verdict against him.” EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir.1994). It is not within the province of the appellate courts to “reweigh the evidence.” Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1332 (7th Cir.1996). Lastly, and most importantly, all reasonable inferences must be analyzed in the light most favorable to Riccardo as the non-moving party. Sheehan, 173 F.3d at 1044.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) the Court bifurcated the standard for Eighth Amendment liability into an objective element and a subjective element. First, the potential harm to the inmate must be objectively serious. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)). Second, under the subjective prong, the prison official must “deliberately disregard” this potential harm by being “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [also] drawing] the inference.” Id. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
The second inquiry is a question of fact, sustainable through circumstantial evidence, id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970, mandating an “inquiry into a prison official’s state of mind.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321). “A prisoner normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir.1991) (reasoning that the scienter requirement is satisfied when a prison guard, “[s]uspect[s] something is true but shut[s][his] eyes for fear of what [he] will *530learn” or “[goes] out of [his] way to avoid acquiring unwelcomed knowledge”).
The Supreme Court also cautioned that an “Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Likewise, a claimant need not prove that a prison official was aware of the specific type of harm which befell the prisoner, only that the prison official was aware that a substantial risk, of some type of danger existed. See Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 643 n. 33 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S.Ct. 1970) (upholding jury verdict for $1.65 million based on a finding that prison guards were deliberately indifferent by failing to respond to a prisoner’s repeated request to be removed from cell when his cellmate set fire to cell causing the cellmate’s death and plaintiffs severe burns). Thus, it was Ric-cardo’s burden to show that Lt. Rausch actually knew that there was a substantial risk that Garcia would harm Riccardo. Id. However, Lt. Rausch would be shielded from liability if no objectively serious risk existed, he was unaware of the impending risk, McGill, 944 F.2d at 349, or he took reasonable steps to abate it, whether 'successful or not, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Admittedly, there is evidence in the record to support a finding that Garcia did not objectively pose a substantial threat to Riccardo — namely, the fact that Garcia was also placed in segregation for “enemy protection,” allegedly from the Latin Kings, and that Garcia had no history of sexual assault. However, that is not the standard by which this case should be reviewed. The standard is whether there exists a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Riccardo. Payne, 146 F.3d at 432.
A jury could have reasonably believed that Lt. Rausch was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm to Riccardo. It is undisputed that Garcia was a member of the Latin Kings. In then-first interaction, Riccardo privately pulled Lt. Rausch aside and expressed his fear of being celled with Garcia. Thus, Riccardo has presented sufficient evidence to support the finding that Lt. Rausch was made aware of the potential harm. See McGill, 944 F.2d at 349. The jury could have further found that Lt. Rausch’s decision to question Riccardo in front of Garcia was not a reasonable way to abate the potential danger to Riccardo. Moreover, Lt. Rausch admitted that “[i]f [Riccardo] would have told me he feared for his life, if he refused housing or thought there was a threat to his safety[,] he , would not have been placed — they would not have been placed together.” Tr. Ill at 73. Thus, a jury could have determined that Lt. Rausch’s admission, coupled with his prior statements to Riccardo on May 28 that Riccardo could not turn down a housing assignment in segregation, and that Ric-cardo could not be moved to another cell due to a lack of space, amounted to Lt. Rausch “deliberately” avoiding learning that Riccardo was in danger.3 Such an *531analysis avoids the use of ex post occurrences, such as the fact that Garcia did in fact assault Riccardo, to sustain a finding of deliberate indifference. Moreover, the fact that Lt. Rausch is able to point to evidence in the record to support his position does not mandate reversal of the jury’s verdict. Our sole duty as an appellate court is to analyze whether the record supports the jury’s determination. It is not our function to reweigh the evidence. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1332.
I am further troubled by the majority’s reliance on Riccardo’s second statement to Lt. Rausch (made in front of Garcia) to sustain overturning the jury’s verdict. As it stands, the deliberate indifference inquiry is an inherently factual determination, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970, which requires an “inquiry into a prison official’s state of mind,” id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.4 Thus, whether this second statement is used to support the assertion that there was no “objective” risk to Ric-eardo or that Lt. Rausch was stripped of his “subjective” knowledge of the harm, it is clear that Lt. Rausch’s credibility and sincerity are integral components to the usefulness of this interaction. In essence, the majority accepts Lt. Rausch’s assertion that his second discussion with Riccar-do in front of Garcia was a sincere investigation of the potential risk to Riccardo. However, the jury found otherwise. Further, when asked to review the defendant’s Rule 50 motion, the district court aptly stated,
[TJhere is ample evidence from which to conclude that Rausch’s attempt to ascertain the seriousness of the threat was mere pretense, and that because he did not want to go to the extra effort to find different accommodations for Garcia, he recklessly disregarded what he knew to be a dangerous situation. That decision to essentially disregard the threat is where liability lies. A jury could have reasonably inferred that Rausch crossed the line from gross negligence to deliberate indifference based on, the ludicrousness of “asking” each inmate if he had a problem with the other. Credibility had to have been the key to the jury’s analysis, thus the Court cannot interject its own credibility determinations; and if it could, having observed both parties’ testimony, it may well have reached the same conclusion as the jury. [...]
[A] prison official will only be freed from liability if he responded reasonably to the risk. As mentioned ' above, Rausch’s method of questioning could be
*532perceived as deliberately forcing plaintiff to make a Hobson’s choice.
Riccardo v. Rausch, No. 99-CV-372-CJP, at 15 (S.D.Ill. Mar. 7, 2002) (order denying F.R.C.P. Rule 50(b) motion) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). By taking Lt. Rausch at his word, the majority’s decision has the effect of immunizing prison officials from liability based on potentially unreasonable or contrived actions, and sanctions Lt. Rausch’s admittedly unreasonable behavior.
In an attempt to break the causal link between Lt. Rausch’s actions and the harm to Riccardo, the majority asserts that “the risk that Riccardo professed to fear (a ‘hit’) did not come to pass.” Majority opinion at 526. The inquiry, however, is not whether “a hit” was actually put out on Riccardo as that would constitute the sort of impermissible ex post determination eschewed by the majority. Rather, the focus is solely on whether Rausch was made aware that a substantial risk of some type of danger existed prior to the actual event. See Haley, 86 F.3d at 643 n. 33. Under the majority’s analysis are we to presume that Riccardo’s pleas for protection would only guard against murder or physical beating? For the purposes of an Eighth Amendment inquiry, in the prison context, I find no real distinction between “a hit” and a sexual assault.
The majority also frees Lt. Rausch of liability based on the assertion that Lt. Rausch was under no duty to foresee that Riccardo would not complain to other prison officials between May 28, the date of Lt. Rausch and Riccardo’s interaction, and May 30, when the assault actually took place. The record reveals, however, that Garcia closely watched Riccardo’s actions impeding Riccardo’s ability to have a private conversation with prison guards outside of Garcia’s presence. Tr. I at 76-82; Tr. II at 42^13. Further, when Riccardo attempted to alert prison officials, Garcia responded with escalating violence. Tr. II at 46-47. In light of Riccardo’s reasonable belief that he .could not refuse his housing assignment and that there was no other available cell, see note 3, supra, Riccardo did not realistically have the ability to complain to other guards without alerting Garcia and incurring his wrath.
The majority’s decision to question the adequacy of Riccardo’s pleas for protection by requiring evidence concerning the overall number of sexual assaults at Centralia prison is also curious. See Lewis, 107 F.3d at 556 (Flaum, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he majority’s emphasis upon the adequacy of Lewis’s pleas for protection strikes me as inappropriate.”) The prison recognizes that “some prisoners are manipulative and cry ‘wolf,” majority opinion at 525, and has created a procedure to deal with this recurring possibility. A prisoner’s request for a cell transfer is always honored if the prisoner alleges a fear for his personal safety, Tr. I at 44, but the prison deals with potential frivolity by treating every request as a potential disciplinary violation. Id.5 Thus, the prison has created a procedure whereby a prisoner is moved first, and questions concerning the sincerity of the request are asked later. In addition, the inquiry under the Eighth Amendment is an individualized one, i.e., Riccardo was required to prove, based on the individual facts of his case, that he was subjected to an objectively serious harm and that Lt. Rausch was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed].” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
*533Finally, though unpursued by the majority, defendant argues that should a constitutional violation be found, he is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. According to Rausch, previous case law must show that “no reasonable prison official would have believed it was constitutional either to cell an inmate with someone who gave conflicting answers when asked (in the other inmate’s presence) if he had a problem with that inmate, or to rely on a policy requiring review of all placement decisions for suitability within hours.” Appellant’s Brief at 33. However, the Supreme Court in Hope v. Pelzer, expressly rejected the notion that in order for a right to be “clearly established” previous case law must contain facts which are “materially similar” to the facts contained in the underlying action. 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); see also Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 944-45 (7th Cir.2000). Rather, the Court focused on'Whether the prior case law would place officers on notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. It is clear that Farmer put prison guards on notice that they have a duty, under the Eighth Amendment, to protect inmates from being gratuitously beaten or raped by other inmates. See id. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970; see also Haley, 86 F.3d at 646 (rejecting qualified immunity defense in light of Farmer decision which further elucidated “deliberate indifference” standard).
In light of the aforementioned, I must agree with the trial court that a reasonable jury had ample evidence to sustain this verdict and thus I respectfully dissent.
Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and POSNER, EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, MANION, KANNE, ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.†Plaintiff-appellee filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on March 12, 2004. In response to this petition, the panel has amended its opinion; the amendments are reflected in the immediately preceding revised opinion. A majority of the judges on the panel voted to deny rehearing. A judge called for a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc, but a majority of the active judges did not favor rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the petition is denied.
. Riccardo previously complained to Lt. Ale-mond that he feared being celled with Garcia because he was a Latin King, however, the record reveals that this previous complaint was not voiced to Lt. Rausch and therefore may not support a finding of liability against him.
. Lt. Rausch testified that he had no recollection of the events which transpired on May 28. Tr. Ill at 68. Thus, the jury was left with Riccardo's testimony concerning the events of that evening.
. Significantly, Riccardo was actually housed in tire receiving unit as opposed to the segregation unit during the assault. The jury heard testimony that the receiving unit is only used to house inmates when the segregation unit is full. Tr. I at 24. Thus, Lt. Rausch’s statement to Riccardo that there was no place else to house him carried even greater weight. The jury also heard testimony that it would have required more work for Lt. Rausch to move Riccardo from a cell in receiving to a cell in segregation due to the time of the alleged refusal and the occupancy of receiving and segregation, Tr. Ill at 75-77; further *531supporting Riccardo’s belief that any additional complaints about his cell assignment would have been futile. Finally, the jury was told a prisoner may be moved from one cell to another at any time. Tr. I at 25. Therefore, the jury had ample evidence to support its finding that Lt. Rausch's actions rose to the level of deliberate indifference.
. The Supreme Court's discussion only further highlights the propriety of allowing a jury to make this determination:
When instructing juries in deliberate indifference cases with such issues of proof, courts should be careful to ensure that the requirement of subjective culpability is not lost. It is not enough to merely find that a reasonable person would have known, or that the defendant should have known, and juries should be instructed accordingly.
Id. at n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 1970; accord Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 556 (7th Cir.1997) (Flaum, C.J., concurring) ("In view of the Supreme Court, the safeguard against jurors whose outrage at prison violence might lead them to sanction officials in the absence of an Eighth Amendment violation is not a relaxed summary judgment standard, but jury instructions that properly convey the applicable law. Lower federal courts, in my view, should exhibit a similar faith in the willingness of juries to follow the law.”).
. Major Lawrence Jefferson was clear that "if [a prisoner is] just refusing housing just to refuse housing with no reason, then we'll ■move him for that, but he'll get a ticket for that." Id.