concurring:
I concur in Judge Brunetti’s excellent opinion, the logic of which is required by our precedent in United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630 (9th Cir.2000), United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir.1997), and United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir.1991). I agree with the panel opinion’s persuasive application of this precedent. However, were I to examine anew the issue whether law enforcement officials had probable cause to search Gourde’s room and home computer for downloaded images of child pornography, and were I free to look only at first principles and Supreme Court precedent, I would be more inclined to decide that there was probable cause for this search made upon a warrant.
Gourde took affirmative steps to subscribe for a $19.95 fee to a website whose name—“lolitagurls.com”—suggests its prurient focus on young girls. The site boasts of access to “hard to find pics” of “preteen girls,” and brags that it contains “over one thousand pictures of girls ages 12-17!” It is possible that Gourde subscribed to the “mixed” site solely because it hosted some legitimate adult content. But I doubt it. The evidence collected by law enforcement officers, and submitted to the magistrate who issued the warrant, was sufficient to show a “fair probability” that if police searched Gourde’s computer and room, they likely would find the contraband that they suspected lay within. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The probable cause standard does not require certainty, but only such a fair probability.
The advertised focus of this website, coupled with Gourde’s willingness to pay a nontrivial fee to access the site with its *1015sleazy and illegal photos of young girls, tends to show, as a matter of relevance and probability, that Gourde most probably downloaded illicit images and then stored them on his computer or elsewhere in his room. All that we know about human nature tells us to a high degree of probability that a person who subscribes to a website that is illicitly hawking child pornography for a monthly fee, and who remains a paying member for two additional months, probably has taken advantage of the paid subscription by downloading images from the site.1 This is especially true in light of the fact that the administrator of “Lolita-gurls.com” constantly refreshed the website with new photographs. And evidence submitted supporting the search warrant attested to the tendency of those addicted to child pornography to retain on their computers illicit materials once obtained.2 The evidence supporting the search warrant showed that consumers of child pornography operate somewhat like pack rats, hoarding what they find.
Were one to examine this case without the constraint of our precedent, instead using only the Supreme Court’s “fair probability” standard in the general probable cause context, in my view it would be permissible to conclude that law enforcement officials had adequate cause to gain the warrant to search Gourde’s computer and room. See, e.g., Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 841 (9th Cir.2003) (“Probable cause means more than a bare suspicion ... but less than absolute certainty that [a] search will be fruitful.”); United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir.1999) (“the requisite ‘fair probability’ is something more than a bare suspicion, but need not reach the fifty percent mark.”); United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.1983) (upholding a search of a suspect’s residence and car because “the standard of probable cause cannot imply ‘more probable than not’ ”; all that is required is “a fair probability that the premises will yield the objects specified in the search warrant.”); United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir.1979) (rejecting bomb suspect’s argument that “probable cause” can be “define[d] ... mathematically to mean ‘more likely than not’ ”; “The phrase is less stringent than that. The words ‘reasonable cause’ are perhaps closer to what is meant.”). A magistrate could reasonably conclude that a person such as Gourde would not likely pay money monthly for access to child pornography unless he expected to collect and preserve the unlawful images for later use.3
We should not require a more rigorous probable cause test for suspected evidence of possession of child pornography on the mistaken theory that child pornography is a victimless crime. To the contrary, we are gravely aware of the necessarily pred*1016atory nature of the child pornography market and those1 who traffic in it, as well as the dangerous effects of its proliferation. As I have expressed in the past, child pornography is not at all a victimless crime. See United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir.2004) (Gould, J., dissenting) (“We must recognize that the possession of child pornography, even by one who is not a purveyor, is harmful to child victims because it facilitates the illicit demand that leads to the exploitation and degradation of children for the benefit of child pornographers and those to whom they cater.”). To the extent that our legal system impedes legitimate law enforcement efforts to cut off the demand and thereby affect the supply of child pornography, we do a disservice to one of the most vulnerable segments of our society.
It is too bad that the Ninth Circuit’s prior precedents on searches for child pornography impose a more rigorous test for probable cause than that called for by common sense and common experience, and in my view more than should be required under the Supreme Court’s precedent of Illinois v. Gates. I join the court’s well-reasoned opinion under compulsion of our precedent in Weber, contrasted with Hay and Lacy. But it would be better if we rethought and reformulated the requirements of our circuit law.
.Had the government not commenced its sting operation two months after Gourde paid for his automatically renewable subscription, there is no telling how long Gourde would have remained a registered member of the site, or how long he would have consumed and kept its illegal contents. In any event, longer duration of access to the site for more than two months is not necessary to give confidence that Gourde downloaded and retained illicit materials.
. As the affidavit of the FBI agent reveals in Gourde's case, child pornography collectors are likely to amass materials without disposing of them, in part because they tend to trade information online with other child pornography collectors.
. Further, "while we insist that probable cause be shown, we give great deference to the decision of the magistrate who concludes that such a showing has been made.” United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir.1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).