dissenting.
The majority acknowledges that the jury reasonably could have found that Plaintiff Marcus Noble’s former restaurant manager, Linda Lawrence, discriminated against him because of his race. The majority further acknowledges that Noble submitted evidence showing that Noble’s complaints about Lawrence’s discriminatory treatment were conveyed .to manager Anthony Fieorilli at the time Fieorilli decided to terminate Noble for purportedly failing to show up for a shift on April 17, 1999. The majority further acknowledges that the jury reasonably could, have found that Fieorilli fabricated his reason for terminating Noble because Noble never agreed to work the April 17, 1999 shift. Nevertheless, the majority holds that no reasonable jury could have found that Fieorilli acted upon Lawrence’s racial animus when be terminated Noble for a contrived reason. Instead, the majority substitutes its own inferences from the facts to eviscerate the jury’s verdict for Noble. Because the majority has usurped the jury’s role as the ultimate finder of fact, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Facts
Noble, an African-American, worked as a server at the Romano’s Macaroni Grill in Worthington, Ohio from June, 1998, until his termination on April 18, 1999. Defendant Brinker International, Inc. operates Macaroni Grill restaurants. Noble initially reported to general manager Linda Lawrence and Jeanne Osborne, the service manager. Osborne left the Macaroni Grill in the fall of 1998, .and thereafter Tim Wiseman became the seryice manager. In January, 1999, general manager Lawrence transferred to a Macaroni Grill restaurant in Maine.
At trial, Noble submitted evidence that, prior to Lawrence’s departure in early 1999, she subjected him to numerous acts of racial discrimination, including the following: (1) before Noble could begin serving and earning tips, Lawrence, on at least eight occasions, forced him (as well as another unnamed black employee) to repeat an hour-and-twenty-minute oral examination about the restaurant’s menu because Lawrence kept failing him (Noble passed the oral exam when he arranged for Osborne to administer the exam, which took about 15 to 20 minutes); (2) Lawrence prevented the hostesses from seating guests at Noble’s tables purportedly because he was not providing adequate service; (3) Lawrence “harassed” Noble about not providing his correct social security number on his employment application and for failing to indicate that he was working at a Chili’s, another Brinker-op-*733erated restaurant (Noble previously had advised an assistant manager of his employment at Chili’s and claimed that the incorrect social security number, which was off by one digit, was an inadvertent mistake); and (4) Lawrence suspended Noble for two weeks after she gave him three separate disciplinary write-ups on a single night for incidents that allegedly were precipitated by customer complaints about his service.
In addition, a former restaurant employee testified that she had heard Lawrence and two chefs laughing about black people and stating that black people “might not know much.” A former dishwasher who had worked under Lawrence testified that Lawrence made him shovel the snow and sweep the sidewalk, limited the areas in which he could take a smoke break, limited his ability to switch shifts, denied him free lunches, and denied him overtime pay, whereas white employees were not denied free lunches and were not limited as to where they could smoke. As noted by the majority, “Noble presented a great deal of evidence at trial which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, tended to show that Linda Lawrence may have harbored racial animosity toward Noble and other black employees at the restaurant.” Op. at 722 (emphasis omitted).
After Lawrence moved to Maine in January, 1999, Anthony Ficorilli became the general manager of the Worthington Macaroni Grill. Ficorilli and Lawrence met once after Ficorilli started working as the general manager, but they claim that they did not discuss Noble.
According to Ficorilli, on either April 15 or 16, 1999, Noble agreed to work a shift on April 17, but Noble did not show for the shift, nor did he call in to provide an excuse for not showing up. On April 18, 1999, Ficorilli instructed the assistant manager to terminate Noble, pursuant to the restaurant’s policy that an employee who violates the “no call/no show policy” can be terminated. Noble, however, denies ever agreeing to work the April 17, 1999 shift. He claims that, on April 16, 1999, he had provided a written medical excuse to be off work from April 14 to 19, 1999. He further claims that he gave a note from his physician to the service manager, Tim Wiseman, and Wiseman testified that he reealléd receiving a medical excuse from Noble prior to April 17, 1999. Consistent with this testimony, there is no document demonstrating that Noble agreed to pick up the April 17, 1999 shift, despite other testimony concerning the restaurant’s three separate systems- — the manager’s “Red Book,” a “shift pickup book,” and a computerized schedule — for documenting changes or additions to shifts. Further, former service manager Jeanne Osborne testified that it would not be appropriate to terminate an employee who had violated the no call/no show policy without some form of documentation that the employee had agreed to work the shift, such as a notation in the manager’s Red Book.
II.
Analysis
On review of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law we are required to consider all the evidence in the record, including those facts that are in dispute, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Noble), giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Based on the above-described facts, a reasonable jury was permitted to infer that Noble did not in fact violate the no call/no show policy as Ficorilli claims. Indeed, the majority acknowledges this point. Op. at 724.
*734The jury reasonably could have inferred that,Noble never agreed to cover the April 17, 1999 shift based on (a) Noble’s testimony that he had provided service manager Wiseman with a -medical excuse to be off work from April 14 to 19, 1999; (b) Wise-man’s testimony that he, recalled receiying a medical excuse from Noble prior to April 17, 1999; and (c) the absence of any documentary evidence that Noble had agreed to work on April 17, 1999, even though the restaurant had three separate systems for recording shift changes and even though Noble’s former service manager testified that it would be inappropriate to terminate an employee under the no call/no show policy without documentation. Because the jury was permitted to infer that Noble did not in fact violate the no call/no show policy, it further could have reasonably inferred that Ficorilli’s articulated reason for terminating Noble (violating the policy) was a lie or a pretext to cover-up some other reason. The central question is whether the evidence of Ficorilli’s mendacity, combined with any other evidence in the record, permitted the jury to find that Ficorilli’s reason was a pretext for race discrimination.
In Reeves, supra, the Supreme Court discussed the application of Rule 50 to employment discrimination cases and held that “a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is-false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Court announced this rule because, in general, “once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.” Id. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097; see also id. at 154, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Under this commonsense principle, evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen to give a false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant could be masking its actual, illegal motivation.”); id. at 154-55, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (noting that it- would be “atypical” to grant judgment as a matter of law where the plaintiff has submitted evidence establishing a prima facie case and that the employer’s proffered explanation for its action was false).
The Reeves decision teaches us that the district court correctly denied Brinker’s motion for judgment as a matter of law so long as Noble submitted evidence to the jury that was sufficient to demonstrate his prima facie case and that Ficorilli’s proffered explanation for terminating him was false. Noble was fired, so the elements of his prima facie case were: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for his job and did it satisfactorily, (3) despite his qualifications and performance, he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) he was replaced by a person- outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside his protected class. Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 583 (6th Cir.2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572-73 (6th Cir.2000); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992)). It is undisputed that Noble submitted sufficient evidence to prove the first three elements of his prima facie case. Thus, the question is whether Noble submitted evidence establishing that-.he was replaced by a non-black employee or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated non-black employee.
*735Noble has neither argued nor pointed to any evidence that he was replaced by a non-black employee after his termination. Instead, Noble argues that, whereas Brinker immediately terminated him for failing to show up for a shift on April 17, 1999 and failing to call to say that he would miss the shift, a similarly-situated white server, Michael Brahler, was not terminated under similar circumstances. Like Noble, Brahler worked for Anthony Ficorilli, the general manager of the restaurant who claims that he strictly enforces the no call/no show policy. Noble argues that Brahler violated the no call/no show policy by failing to appear for any of his shifts over a one week period, but was not terminated until after he had missed a full week of shifts.
The record is unclear regarding whether Ficorilli waited to terminate Brahler until he committed several violations of the no call/no show policy compared to Ficorilli’s termination of Noble after a single violation. Other evidence suggests that Ficor-illi did not rigorously enforce a zero tolerance approach.1 In any event, the real issue is whether Ficorilli should have applied the no call/no show policy to Noble in the first place. As discussed above, the jury reasonably could have found that Fi-corilli’s assertion that Noble had violated the policy was a lie. It follows that the jury reasonably could have found that Fi-corilli’s purported “equal” treatment of Noble and Brahler — i.e., not permitting either employee to return to work after violating the no call/no show policy — was not equal at all because Noble never should have been subjected to that policy; he never violated it. Ficorilli fabricated the very premise that ostensibly justified his application of the no call/no show policy to Noble.
A proper comparison between Ficorilli’s treatment of Noble and Brahler demonstrates that he did not treat them equally. Whereas Ficorilli terminated Brahler for violating the no call/no show policy after Brahler actually violated that policy, Ficor-illi terminated Noble for violating the policy even though Ficorilli knew (or so the jury could have found) that Noble had not violated it. This is the quintessence of disparate treatment and certainly was sufficient to demonstrate the fourth element of Noble’s minimal burden to produce evidence demonstrating his prima facie case. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). Because Noble submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate all elements of his prima facie case, as well as sufficient evidence to find that Ficorilli’s asserted justification for his termination is false, the jury was permitted to conclude that Brinker unlawfully discriminated against him because of his race. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The majority’s decision to the contrary is flatly wrong.
Moreover, Noble presented other circumstantial evidence that raised an inference of discrimination and, therefore, was sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of his prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (“The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification ... of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in *736every respect to differing factual situations.”); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1114 (9th Cir.2002) (“For the purpose of establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff is not restricted to providing the bare minimum of evidence required by the McDonnell Douglas test, but may rely also on other circumstantial evidence that tends to. raise an inference of discrimination.”) (citing McDonnell Douglas, supra). That same evidence also was sufficient for the jury to find that Noble was terminated because of his race. Specifically, Noble presented evidence directly linking his former manager Lawrence’s racial animus to Ficorilli’s decision to discharge him.
Service manager Wiseman, who worked for both Lawrence and Ficorilli, testified that Noble told him that Lawrence had been discriminating against him because of his race and that he intended to file suit. Wiseman further testified that he passed Noble’s comments on to Lawrence before she transferred to another restaurant. Wiseman also testified that, “at the time that [Noble] had missed a shift,” Wiseman told Ficorilli that Noble had “threatened to go to both the NAACP and the labor board and report racial discrimination or accuse [them] of racial discrimination.” In other words, contemporaneous with Noble’s alleged no call/no show on April 17, 1999, Ficorilli was apprised that Noble had' complained about race discrimination by his former manager and that he was prepared to take legal action. The very next day, Ficorilli terminated Noble.2
As noted above and by the majority, there was ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that Ficorilli did not fire Noble for his purported violation of the no call/no show policy. Therefore, if Ficorilli was not motivated by Noble’s alleged no call/no show, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the true motivating factor for the termination was the new information Wiseman had presented to Ficorilli only a day before the termination, namely, that Noble believed that Lawrence had discriminated against him because of his race. But for Lawrence’s racial animus toward Noble, (a) Noble would not have informed Wiseman of Lawrence’s discriminatory acts, (b) Wiseman would not have informed Ficorilli on or about April 17, 1999 that Noble believed that Lawrence had discriminated against him and might take legal action, and (c) Ficorilli would not have been motivated to fabricate Noble’s purported violation of the no call/no show policy to avoid a potential lawsuit. In this way, there was a direct causal nexus between Lawrence’s racially discriminatory actions against Noble and Ficorilli’s decision to terminate him.
An employer is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff has *737submitted evidence that a non-decision-maker’s discriminatory motives “somehow influenced” or “affected” the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor’s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers’ decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that summary judgment was improper even though the committee that formally terminated the plaintiff harbored no discriminatory animus; the plaintiffs manager, who harbored animus, had tainted the committee’s decision by characterizing the plaintiff as a poor performer, thereby rendering the committee a “conduit” of his prejudice).
There is no question that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Lawrence’s discriminatory animus somehow influenced Fieorilli’s termination decision. Because the jury was permitted to reject Ficorilli’s fabricated reason as the cause of Noble’s termination, it was entitled to infer that the true cause was the discriminatory animus of Noble’s former manager of which Ficorilli had just been apprised by Wiseman. Indeed, there appears to be no other explanation for Ficor-illi’s fabrication.
There is no doubt that legal liability may attach to Brinker as a result of the actions of Lawrence and Ficorilli. The Supreme Court has held that “a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). Thus, “it would be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape liability” when a supervisor subjects an employee to the tangible employment action of termination. Id. at 761, 763, 118 S.Ct. 2257. When, as herein, a reasonable jury could find that a supervisor not only acted as a conduit for a former’s supervisor’s discriminatory animus, but also knowingly based his termination decision on that animus, the employer is unquestionably subject to vicarious liability. For these reasons, there is absolutely no basis for the majority to hold that Brinker is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
III.
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment below.
. There also was evidence suggesting that Fi-corilli may have known of Noble's concerns about race discrimination months earlier. Al- . though Ficorilli and Lawrence claim that they never discussed Noble on the one occasion when the two managers met, it was for the . jury to determine the veracity of this claim, particularly because both Ficorilli’s and Lawrence's credibility was undermined at trial. Based on the totality of the evidence, it would haye been reasonable to infer that Lawrence, who harbored racial animus toward Noble, informed Ficorilli of Noble's prior complaints of race discrimination in order to negatively impact Noble’s employment under Ficorilli. Cf. Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458-59 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that the court must assume on summary judgment that the non-decisionmaker/harasser relayed the plaintiff's complaints about sexual harassment to the decision-maker, even though both the harasser and the decisionmaker denied this fact; the harasser was present at the meeting in which it was decided that plaintiff would be terminated, he had an incentive to pass on this information, and his credibility was in question as to other matters).