concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Until today, the special needs exception to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment had been conservatively applied to emergency situations, to commercial enterprises and public facilities governed by regulatory schemes, and to the living spaces of parolees. “Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever permitted warrantless administrative searches of a person’s residence unless: exigent circumstances exist, business was conducted in the home, or the search was directed at convicted felons still serving sentences of probation or parole.” Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir.2002); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291-92, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984)(reaffirming the view that administrative searches generally require warrants unless no significant privacy interest is implicated, exigent circumstances exist, and the purpose of the search is not primarily to gather evidence of criminal activity); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 540, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)(holding that warrantless inspection of a private residence for possible housing code violations did not comport with the Fourth Amendment).7 In the cases where war-rantless searches have been sanctioned, either immediate and weighty public needs require a citizen to sacrifice temporarily the Fourth Amendment’s protections, see e.g. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 641 (fire fighters may enter a burning building to “fight the blaze”), or citizens trade a portion of their Fourth Amendment protections in exchange for the privilege of engaging in activities that implicate significant public concerns and warrant close, regular, and, in some instances, spontaneous government scrutiny.8
Today the majority expands the narrow “special needs” exception to cover non-*88exigent searches of private messuages9 belonging to citizens who neither have nor are suspected to have committed any crime at all. This is an extraordinary step and it represents an aggressive shift in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence away from the rights of individuals to maintain control of their homes toward the privilege of government agents to invade without either receiving consent or casting their claims of need into the crucible of judicial review. Nothing in the facts of this case or in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demands or permits that this step be taken.
Because I have no difficulty concluding that (i) no legitimate governmental interest would have been sacrificed by respecting the full array of Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights in the curtilage surrounding his home; and (ii) the defendants’ warrant-less physical entry into Palmieri’s curtilage in order to conduct an inspection was a significant Fourth Amendment intrusion; and (iii) the special needs exception does not excuse defendants’ conduct, I respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority opinion that hold the contrary. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the District Court properly dismissed Palmi-eri’s § 1985 claim.
I. The Special Needs Balancing Test
The majority does not dispute that defendants entered the curtilage surrounding Palmieri’s home through a closed gate without permission10 and without a war*89rant or probable cause. However, as the Supreme Court explained in Griffin v. Wisconsin, in the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351, 105 S.Ct. 733 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). In applying this “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court has stated that courts must balance three factors: (i) “the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised,” (ii) “the character of the intrusion,” and (iii) the “nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns and the efficacy of the [inspection policy] in meeting them.” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830, 832, 834, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002). On the present facts, none of these factors supports an extension of the special needs exception to cover this invasion of Palmieri’s home. The right to exclude government agents from the home and the curtilage surrounding the home is eclipsed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, if at all, only by the protections afforded to the bodies of citizens. By invading the curtilage surrounding Palmieri’s house the DEC agents violated this core Fourth Amendment right. The purpose they served by this entry, inspection as part of a permit granting process, was neither weighty nor immediate. In these circumstances, the DEC cannot claim that it had a need, special or otherwise, to ignore posted signs, closed gates, and specific directions to not enter into Palmieri’s yard without permission or a warrant.
For purposes of clarity in marking my departure from the majority, I consider the last of the Earls factors, the nature and immediacy of the governmental interest at stake, first.
II. No Immediate Governmental Interest Would Have Been Compromised if the Defendants Had Respected Pal-mieri’s Fourth Amendment Privilege to Exclude Government Agents from his Home and Curtilage
Application of the special needs exception requires a weighing of immediate and weighty governmental interests against an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Here, no interest of the DEC would have been compromised had defendants not conducted the inspection. It follows that Agent Lynch and her cohort had no immediate need to enter the curtilage surrounding Palmieri’s home against his expressed wishes and without a warrant. In these circumstances even the slightest of Fourth Amendment interests would be sufficient to deny application of the special needs exception. That core Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the DEC inspectors tilts the balance away from granting the novel and far-reaching extension of the special needs exception endorsed by the majority.
Governmental interests that generally provide for application of the special needs exception to the warrant requirement are a function of either “the Government’s need to discover latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development,” Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989)), or immediate necessity, see, e.g., Clifford, 464 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 641 (“[a] burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze.”). Neither category of interest is implicated in this case.
*90That the first category does not warrant application of the special needs exception to the present case is evidenced by the fact that the DEC can state, and the majority can cite, no legitimate governmental need that would have been compromised had the agents not conducted their unwarranted inspection of Palmieri’s property. The majority attempts to create such a need by describing the agents’ entry as “an attempt to perform a regulatory inspection.” Ante at 75. This description implies that the purpose of the entry was to service governmental interests in, for example, “protecting the natural resources and the public beaches and waterways.” Ante at 85 (quoting the District Court below). While I might agree that protection of fragile wetlands is a significant public interest, for the majority’s logic to carry through it must be the case that this interest would be compromised in some way by affording Palmieri’s . home and curtilage full Fourth Amendment protection. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 122 S.Ct.' 2559 (“A search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impraeticable.”)(inter-nal quotation and citation omitted). This was not the case.
Though the majority implies the contrary, see ante at 86, the inspection that Agent Lynch was attempting to conduct was not for the purpose of monitoring or discovering some latent condition on Pal-mieri’s property that might affect the surrounding wetlands. It was, rather; an inspection made pursuant to a permit application submitted by Palmieri seeking permission to construct an addition to a dock extending from his property into the bay.11 The only possible purpose of the application scheme in general, and this inspection in particular, was to prevent construction of any edifice that might affect the environmental integrity of the Great South Bay. Service of this interest in no way required violating Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights. That this is so is evidenced by the simple fact that had the DEC agents rung Palmieri’s bell, found nobody home, seen the “No Trespassing Signs,” respected the wishes there expressed, and left without conducting their search, the permit would not have been granted,12 Palmieri could not have constructed his dock, and the Great South Bay would have remained pristine. By refusing requests by the DEC to conduct the inspection in the manner they chose the only interests that Palmieri affected were his own. His recalcitrance in no way threatened harm to the Great South Bay.
The majority makes much of the DEC’S interest in conducting its permit application inspections “in the manner of its choosing.” Ante at 83, 85. The majority is particularly concerned about the potential administrative inconvenience of conducting such inspections-by visual inspection from the Great South Báy. See ante at 85 (surmising that the DEC may not have had an adequate supply of boats to conduct inspections from the water and assuming that the searches by boat would “entail[ ] *91additional burdens of cost and time”). This ado comes to nothing on the present facts.
I do not need to, and so do not, suggest that the DEC could not make an on-site inspection a requirement in its permit-granting process. I do not dispute that state regulatory agencies, may, as a general rule, establish reasonable guidelines for conducting on-site inspections pursuant to their legislative grants of authority. I acknowledge that “[w]e should not allow applicants to interfere, without good reason, with the DEC’s ability to fulfill its statutory and regulatory mandate in a reasonable manner of its choosing.” Ante at 83. These issues simply are not before us, however.
While Palmieri might have preferred that the DEC conduct its inspection from a boat, I in no way suggest that the Fourth Amendment gave him the power to dictate this term to the DEC. The point I am making, and the only point that need be made, is that the DEC, at all times, had the power to withhold the permit until a satisfactory inspection could be performed. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 325, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (holding that a welfare recipient could be denied benefits for refusing to consent to a home visit by a caseworker). Since this authority could have been exercised without violating Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights I see no danger or inconvenience for the DEC in holding that it should deny applications submitted by individuals who will not submit to inspections on reasonable terms rather than bull its way onto private property when specifically directed not to.
If it was necessary for agents to enter Palmieri’s property to conduct the permit inspection, then the DEC should have made this clear. More importantly, when Palmieri gave notice, both in direct communication with the DEC and by posting prominently “No Trespassing” signs on his fences and closed gates, that government agents were not welcomed into his home and curtilage, the DEC should have respected his invocation of his Fourth Amendment right to exclude. Faced with this stand-off, the DEC would have been well within its authority to deny the permit application. As a state actor subject to the Fourth Amendment, however, Agent Lynch had no right whatever to lead a governmental incursion into the private areas of the curtilage surrounding Palmieri’s home. I would so hold.
Turning to the immediacy arm of the third Earls factor, the majority appears to concede, as it must, that the DEC “lacked an immediate need to inspect [Palmieri’s property].”13 Ante at 85-86. I cannot understand, however, how the majority can concede this point but not also admit that *92no governmental purpose would have been frustrated by the agents’ respecting Palmi-eri’s Fourth Amendment rights. After all, the logic underlying both conclusions is the same. ■
Palmieri merely applied for a permit to extend his dock into the tidal wetlands. There is no suggestion that he had begun construction or was otherwise engaged in conduct that could potentially damage the wetlands. It was understood by all parties that Palmieri could not begin construction until he was granted the permit. Furthermore, the DEC had the authority — indeed, as the majority chronicles, it exercised its authority — to refuse to grant the permit until DEC officials could conduct a satisfactory inspection. The inspectors could have left and come back, left and scheduled a later appointment, left and come back to inspect the area from the water, or left and never come back at all. In none of these circumstances would the government’s interests have been harmed in the slightest because Palmieri simply would not have been allowed to build his dock if the DEC was not able to conduct a satisfactory inspection. Therefore, no argument can be made that exigency created a need for an immediate search. Neither, for that matter, can an argument be made that the government had to conduct this search at all, rather than simply deny the application when Palmieri failed to provide DEC agents with the opportunity to conduct the inspection at whatever time and in whatever manner the agency thought appropriate.
I do not understand how, on these weak premises, the majority can conclude that “the third special needs factor weighs entirely and heavily against Palmieri.” Ante at 85 (emphasis added). Indeed, I do not find that this factor weighs in favor of restricting Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights at all. It is entirely possible that future cases may present us with more pressing environmental concerns that would warrant the application of the special needs exception to an inspection of a residential property. I do not, then, foreclose one of the majority’s proposed holdings, “allow[ing] courts to use the balancing test to determine the reasonableness of particular search activity in the enforcement of environmental regulatory schemes.” Ante at 86. However, it is axiomatic that our mandate is limited to deciding the case before us and the facts presented here do not require us to ford this Rubicon because the regulatory interests and needs of the DEC in this case could have been vindicated without compromise by simply denying Palmieri’s application when he refused to admit DEC agents for an on-site inspection.
III. By Entering Palmieri’s Yard, the Agents Violated Significant Fourth Amendment Rights
Having concluded that respecting Palmi-eri’s Fourth Amendment rights did not *93compromise in the least any governmental interest, the lightest of privacy interests and the most minimal of invasions would serve to tilt the scales against application of the special needs doctrine in this case. However, the privacy interests implicated on these facts are not light and by physically invading .the heavily protected curti-lage around Palmieri’s home, the agents perpetrated a significant violation of core Fourth Amendment rights.
Much of the majority’s decision rides on its wedded conclusions that Palmieri had a diminished right of privacy in his yard and that any violation by the DEC inspectors was, at worst, de minimis. Their arguments to these conclusions, however, fail to take account of the Fourth Amendment distinction between visual searches and physical entries. When this distinction is recognized and properly accounted for it is evident that the majority’s holding in this case simply does not follow from an application of well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the facts of this case.
A. As the Curtilage Surrounding His Home, Palmieri’s Yard Was Entitled to the Most Stringent Fourth Amendment Protection
The first Earls factor requires evaluation of the privacy interest at stake. As the majority rightly notes, “ ‘the sanctity of private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.’ ” Ante at 81-82 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). The areas of Palmieri’s property that the agents entered were a side yard that runs along his house and a back yard patio that has direct access to Palmieri’s livingroom. In addition to being closely proximate to Palmieri’s home, evidence in the record discloses that these areas were enclosed by a system of fences, rendering them invisible to all but his neighbors and those traversing the waterway directly behind his home, and that these were areas used predominately for private and domestic purposes.14 Given these facts, Palmieri’s side yard and back yard can only be characterized as part of the curtilage surrounding his home. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (reciting proximity, enclosure, use, and steps taken to protect the area from observation as the four main factors used to distinguish curtilage from open fields).
The curtilage around Palmieri’s home is afforded the same “stringent” Fourth Amendment protection as the home itself. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (factors determining status of property as curtilage establish “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection”); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (stating that curti-lage is afforded the same “Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home”).15 It is beyond contest that within the penumbra of Fourth Amendment pro*94tection is the right to exclude.16 Both the District Court and the majority concede that Palmieri took all reasonable steps to subjectively manifest his expectation of privacy by constructing physical barriers between his yard and surrounding areas. See ante at 81-82.17 Given these facts, there can be no doubt that Palmieri had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his yard and, more specifically, a reasonable expectation that the Fourth Amendment would protect him against unwarranted intrusions by government agents.
B. The Agents Physically Invaded the Curtilage Surrounding Palmieri’s Home
The majority attempts to minimize the intrusion that occurred by characterizing it as an “attempted visual inspection.” Ante at 84. This description of what occurred omits most of the facts critical to a Fourth Amendment analysis. The defendants entered Palmieri’s backyard through a closed and latched gate that was part of an opaque stockade fence. That gate was posted with a “No Trespassing-Private Property” sign. Defendants walked directly alongside Palmieri’s house, winding a path through a dense collection of storage containers, recreational equipment, and home maintenance materials. They passed through a second chain link fence. Finally, they climbed a stairway up to Palmieri’s backyard and patio. The majority’s attempt to characterize what transpired as a “merely ‘visual observation’ ” ignores the plain fact that the defendants were standing in the middle of Palmieri’s patio without any authority for being there. Their presence there, as opposed to their merely looking from someplace else, raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns that cannot be characterized as de minimis. See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (“even the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority”).
C. The Agents’ Physical Invasion of the Curtilage Surrounding Palmi-eri’s Home Constituted a Significant Violation of His Fourth Amendment Rights
The majority does not appear to deny that the agents here perpetrated a physi*95cal violation of Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights in the curtilage surrounding his home. Rather, my brethren argue that Palmieri had a diminished expectation of privacy in the curtilage around his home because activities he conducted there were visible to some of his neighbors and to others who might happen to float by on the Great South Bay. This conclusion fails to afford sufficient weight to the fact that the DEC inspectors physically entered upon Palmieri’s property and did not merely conduct a visual inspection from a public road, a public waterway, public airspace, or some other location where they “ha[d] a right to be.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986).
It is beyond contest that portions, of Palmieri’s back yard were visible from a public waterway. As such, he did not merely have a diminished expectation of privacy in activities conducted there, he had no expectation of privacy in those activities.18 That this is so, however, is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment question posed to us by the facts in this case. In my view, the issue presented here is neither that the DEC inspectors looked nor what they saw, but rather, where they went to do their looking.
All parties agree that the DEC inspectors could conduct a visual inspection of Palmieri’s property from the public waterway or the public road that border his property. The DEC had previously conducted inspections of Palmieri’s nautical installations from the waterway. Palmieri, far from objecting, has expressed a preference that DEC inspections be conducted from the waterway. I certainly recognize that such inspections by government agents, for whatever purpose, fall well within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment as described in the line of curtilage jurisprudence, which includes United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983), California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986), and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986), that stands for the proposition that private areas of the home or curtilage that are visible to members of the public standing in public places are not protected from governmental inspection by agents positioned where they have a right to be. Critical to my agreement, however, is the caveat that the privilege to visually inspect from public space does not diminish the right to exclude. That a living room can be seen from the street by passers-by through a glass window does not diminish the owner’s right to prevent entry by government agents. By the logic of the majority’s decision, the Court today holds otherwise.
Applicable Supreme Court and circuit precedents make clear that physical entry *96to search property is more intrusive than visual searches conducted from the periphery. See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237, 106 S.Ct. 1819 (finding that aerial inspection of area in question was permissible but stating that “[a]ny actual physical entry by [the] EPA into any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions”); United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1198 (10th Cir.2003) (explaining that if the officer had “physically invaded the curtilage to make his observation, that would have constituted a search subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment”) (emphasis added); United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir.1997) (“Visual inspection from a lawful vantage point, however, is quite different from the physical assault on defendants’ backyard that occurred in this case.”); United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1279 (2d Cir.1996) (noting the fact that information was gathered “only after the officers invaded the area” put that case in “stark contradistinction to the situation in Dunn, where the officers stood outside the protected curtilage ”) (emphasis added); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“[T]he home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion .... As a general proposition, the police may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’ ”) (quoting Cir-aolo, 476 U.S. at 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809) (alteration in original) (emphasis added); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be ... ”) (emphasis added).
My colleagues’ overly dismissive view of the physical intrusion that occurred in this case as “ ‘at worst ... a trespass,’ ” ante at 84, (quoting the District Court below) further trivializes the importance of the Fourth Amendment protections at stake. The fact that the inspection at issue in this case involved a trespass does nothing to excuse the constitutional violation, as my colleagues posit, but rather exacerbates it. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 531, 87 S.Ct. 1727 (“the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security”). I have found no case — nor, apparently, has the majority — that suggests that a trespass, de minimis or otherwise, into an individual’s messuage does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. This is so because, as the law stood before today’s decision, where these most carefully protected places were concerned, “any unauthorized physical penetration [was] a search.” Reed v. Schneider, 612 F.Supp. 216, 220 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The distinction between surveillance from public space and physical invasion is no mere philosopher’s quibble. The distance, measured in the number and character of rights lost, that lies between accession to surveillance and permission to physically intrude is continental in dimension. By failing to take account of this distinction the majority implies that wherever government agents can see, they may go. That it was a yard in this case provides no security in logic or law that tomorrow it will not be a living room or bedroom seen through a glass window. This marks a radical departure from Supreme Court and Second Circuit case law, forcing homeowners to shutter windows and completely enclose yards or else di*97minish the privacy they enjoy in their homes and curtilage. I simply cannot imagine that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment dictated such dark and cloistered lives for citizens. I dissent today because I too cannot.
D. The Brevity of the Intrusion Does Not Diminish the Fourth Amendment Violation Perpetrated by the Agents
Finally, the majority, citing Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.2004), claims that the government’s intrusion did not rise to a constitutional level in part because it “came to an end before [Lynch] was able to conduct the inspection of the dock and its adjoining areas” and because “Lynch departed the premises as soon as Palmieri instructed her to leave.” Ante at 84. This argument is mystifying and the authority is unavailing. Either the agents violated Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights or they did not. That the agents left when asked is not relevant. Vega does not provide authority in opposition to this view. In Vega we found that parole officers’ reliance on information that their target parolee lived in Moore’s house was reasonable “until they were presented with convincing evidence that the information they had relied upon was incorrect.” Vega, 371 F.3d at 118. There is no analogy between Vega and the case at bar. Here the DEC did not mistake Palmieri’s property for another parcel upon which it had a right to enter, it entered Palmieri’s property without authority, knowing that the land was his, and in the face of his clear expressions of refusal for any unauthorized entry.
IV. Conclusion
The majority rightly points out that “it is wise for courts to be cautious in applying the special needs doctrine, given that it allows for a degree of governmental intrusion into concededly private areas.” Ante at 80-81. The rule established by the majority today does not exercise the restraint and discretion required of us when we permit government agents to invade the private lives of citizens. Instead, by our decision today we open our neighbors’ doors to government agents who can claim even the most remote and gossamer of state interests as license to go wherever their eyes may roam. For this, and for reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the DEC inspectors violated Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment privilege to exclude government agents from his messuage. In so holding, however, I would recognize that Palmieri does not appear to have proven any significant damages. That his damages might be nominal, however, does not excuse the government’s behavior. Neither do I.
. The majority provides a fine summary of this "heartland” of special needs cases, see ante at 78-80, and also ultimately recognizes that today's decision represents an extension of the doctrine past these familiar borders, see ante at 85.
. Unwarranted searches in the public school context cannot fairly be made to fit this mold. In these cases, however, the Supreme Court has been careful to limit the privilege of conducting searches to school officials acting in their special relationships to minor students as defined by state regulations and guidelines aimed at the unique concerns germane to students' health and security. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).
. I employ this term in its modern, rather than its more archaic, usage, meaning a "dwelling house together with the curtilage, including any outbuildings.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (7th ed.1999).
. The majority does not — and could not— rely on any allegation that Palmieri somehow consented to the search by submitting the permit application. As a threshold matter, nothing in the permit application could be construed as any form of acceptable consent. The permit application was entirely silent as to the need for any inspection of the property.
At oral argument, defendants, for the first time, contended that Palmieri's application for a new permit was, in part, an application for a modification of existing permits, thereby implicating those previous permits in Lynch's search. However, this contention by counsel does not comport with the record. Agent Lynch’s only stated purpose in entering Pal-mieri's yard was to conduct an inspection in reference to Palmieri’s application for an additional permit. See October 8, 2002, Lynch Declaration.
Even if the previous permits had been an issue in this case, they could not provide sufficient warrant for this invasion of Palmi-eri’s Fourth Amendment rights. The prior permits obtained by Palmieri merely stated that “the permitted site ... is subject to inspection at reasonable hours and intervals by an authorized representative of the [DEC] to determine whether the permittee is complying with this permit" The permits' bare references to inspections at reasonable hours and intervals should not be held to encompass unannounced inspections conducted without the property owner’s expressed consent. Indeed, in Anobile v. Pelligrino, we held that the plaintiffs’ signatures on horse racing license applications, which contained an expressed waiver of the right to object to searches conducted at the raceway, did not constitute an effective consent to residential searches. 303 F.3d 107, 123-25 (2d Cir.2002).
Furthermore, even if the permit application or the prior permits were somehow deemed to be consent to some sort of inspection, Palmi-eri could not have been more clear that he intended to exercise his Fourth Amendment right to exclude DEC agents from his home and yard. In addition to enclosing his property in layers of fences and installing large, colorful, and otherwise prominent "Private Property — No Trespassing” and "Beware of Dog,” signs, he, on several occasions, issued specific written directions to the DEC to stay off of his property. See ante at 76. This certainly qualifies as an unmistakable (and legally enforceable) revocation of any initial, implicit consent. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.”).
. Agent Lynch so states in her October 8, 2002, Declaration. She also explained to Pal-mieri that this was her purpose in traversing his yard when he confronted her on his patio.
. The record makes clear that Agent Lynch was aware of this option when she trespassed upon Palmieri's property. In her October 8, 2002, affidavit, Agent Lynch avers that she told Palmieri on the day' of the incident in question that because she was not able to conduct the inspection she would not be able to issue the permit he sought. The video recording of their confrontation made by Pal-mieri confirms Lynch's report.
. In those cases where it has applied the special needs exception, the Supreme Court has consistently focused on this question of immediacy, emphasizing that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant might not only frustrate the governmental interests at stake but might defeat those interests altogether. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) ("[T]he need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use provides the necessary immediacy for a school testing policy.”); Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662-63, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (finding “immediacy” where the school district’s alcohol and drug abuse problems were approaching "epidemic proportions”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Skinner v, Ry. Labor Executives' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (holding that "the Government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest when, as here, ‘the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search' ” and further explaining that because "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, ... blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances *92were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.... [As a result,] the delay necessary to procure a warrant ... may result in the destruction of valuable evidence.”) (internal citations omitted); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (emphasizing that "the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (applying the special needs exception to work-related intrusions by public employers onto government employees’ Fourth Amendment rights after specifically noting that "[t]he delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and ultimately to the public interest").
. The video shot by Palmieri during his confrontation with the DEC agents depicts children's toys, recreational equipment, lounge chairs of the type used for sunbathing, a Jacuzzi, a gazebo, an outdoor dining area, storage containers, home maintenance supplies, and various other items of a domestic nature arranged in a comfortable disarray that speaks of use in the midst of private daily life, as opposed to Palmieri's front yard, which is a study of orderly discipline clearly designed and maintained to present a public face.
. Given that the space invaded by the agents in this case is classified as curtilage, the majority's frequent reliance upon cases applying the open fields doctrine is misplaced. See, e.g., ante at 84 (citing Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, *94864-65, 94 S.Ct 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974)).
. The majority suggests that this may not be so by suggesting that "[Palmieri’s] privacy interest in [his yard] [was] somewhat analogous to the diminished level of privacy interest typically recognized to reside in other regulated zones of activity in the public sphere.” This is an extraordinary claim and it finds little support in the majority's reference to United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972). That case concerned the right of a state firearm control agent to inspect the stock of a licensed dealer. Critical to the Supreme Court’s decision in that case, however, was the closely regulated nature of commercial firearm sales and the consent to search given by purveyors of these dangerous weapons when they accept their licenses to sell. Palmieri was not conducting a business. Construction of a dock does not raise issues anywhere approaching the level of concern raised by the sale of deadly firearms. Most importantly, however, the application for a permit in this case did not grant consent to search and did not implicate any existing condition or ongoing activity that affected a state interest.
. These efforts provide all of the reasonable steps that one could reasonably look for in evaluating whether Palmieri has expressed a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In particular, the fences and signs provide notice, as clear as walls and closed doors, that he expected government agents not to enter upon his land. The majority agrees. See ante at 81-82.
. The majority's reference to our decision in United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313 (2d Cir.1997), ante at 81-82, supports this point. There we found that seizure of evidence obtained when police officers observed defendants bagging crack cocaine in front of an unshuttered window was appropriate under the "plain view” doctrine. However, contrary to the majority’s implications to the contrary, that doctrine does not apply in this case. There is no allegation that Palmieri was involved in any criminal activity. There were no instruments of criminality within plain view that were subject to seizure. Therefore the plain view doctrine has no application in this case.
The majority's reference to our decision in United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d. Cir.2002), ante at 81-82, is inapt for the same reason. There we upheld the seizure of marijuana plants grown in a portion of a parolee’s yard that was visible from public spaces. Of course, Palmieri was neither a parolee nor was he engaged in any illegal activity that would have provided reason for agents to enter his home or property.