dissenting.
The majority concludes that the length of a defendant’s criminal history should *1116not, on its own, support an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. It instead holds that the seriousness of a defendant’s convictions must be a significant factor in a decision to depart under § 4A1.3. This conclusion directly contradicts the plain language of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 1 and unnecessarily restricts a district court’s discretion in sentencing. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
As the majority correctly notes, we have held that a finding of either the seriousness of a defendant’s past conduct or the likelihood of recidivism can support an upward departure. United States v. Connelly, 156 F.3d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir.1998). There, we approved an upward departure “purely on the basis of Defendant’s likelihood of recidivism.” Id. at 985. We nevertheless noted, but declined to answer, the question of whether the uncounted acts of criminal conduct used to support an upward departure must “cross a threshold of ‘seriousness’ ” in all cases. Id. at 984; United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1002 n. 4 (9th Cir.2002). The majority now seems to answer this question by requiring such a threshold of seriousness. I cannot square the majority’s answer with the plain language of the Guidelines.
When interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, we apply the rules of statutory construction. United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.1996). Therefore, “[i]f the language of a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” Id. Here, the Guidelines are clear. Section 4A1.3(a) unambiguously states that, “[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) (emphasis added). This disjunctive language allows a court to consider either seriousness or a likelihood of recidivism. If the Sentencing Commission intended seriousness and recidivism, as the majority seems to interpret the Guidelines, it would have said so.
Our analysis should end here. See Avendano-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.2004) (“Canons of statutory construction dictate that if the language of a statute is clear, we look no further than that language in determining the statute’s meaning.”). The majority, however, ignores the plain language of § 4A1.3. It relies on several past cases and other sections of the Guidelines to rewrite § 4A1.3 in a misplaced effort to right what it perceives as a social wrong.
II
The majority relies, in part, on United States v. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d 316 (9th Cir.1993). In that case we concluded that a defendant’s past conviction of auto burglary was neither “serious” nor “large scale” enough to distinguish his conduct from that of other defendants in the same criminal history level. Id. at 322. The majority similarly depends on United States v. Brady, where we held that two prior tribal misdemeanor assault and battery convictions did not support an upward departure for a voluntary manslaughter defendant. 928 F.2d 844, 853 (9th Cir.1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 742 n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994), and United States v. Watts, 519 *1117U.S. 148, 155, 117 S.Ct. 683, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997).
In reaching these conclusions, both cases relied on illustrations of upward departures provided in § 4A1.3’s Application Notes. As the majority recites, these examples all refer to “serious” or “large scale” criminal conduct. These, however, are expressly examples of upward departures. Other sections of the Guidelines suggest that a sentencing court may consider non-serious prior convictions. E.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 8.2 Carrillo-Alvarez and Brady involved only one or two prior convictions; in such cases, recidivism is unlikely to be a consideration. With few convictions, the seriousness or scale of the crimes is a more logical factor for determining whether to apply an upward departure. Bad Marriage, by contrast, has thirty-five prior state court convictions.3
Similarly, our cases that emphasize “quality over quantity” do not support the majority’s rewriting of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Segura-Del Real, 83 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir.1996) (“The mere fact that a defendant has a long criminal record ... will not, of itself, support an upward departure”). These cases all involved defendants in the highest criminal history category (VI). Such an emphasis on the type, rather than the number, of convictions makes sense, as all category VI defendants have lengthy criminal records. “It is the very circumstance of their recidivism which puts them in this category. Therefore, to depart upward from category VI requires that the defendant’s conduct be significantly more serious than that of other defendants in the same category.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Bad Marriage is only assigned to category III, which generally encompasses defendants who have far fewer convictions than those assigned to category VI. Unlike the typical category III defendant, Bad Marriage has more than thirty prior state court convictions, not to mention an additional sixty tribal court convictions. If this is not a sure indication of recidivism, what is? 4
III
Courts should look at numerous factors when deciding whether to implement an upward departure. Some criminal histories may lack similarity or seriousness to a degree that outweigh their lengthiness. *1118Others may contain convictions so outdated as to have little bearing on the present likelihood of recidivism. Yet other criminal histories may be so egregious and similar to the present offenses as to outweigh all the other considerations. The variables are endless. Because of this, the sentencing court, which knows the defendant best, is in the superior position to determine whether a defendant is likely to recidivate.
In fact, we have already established a three-pronged balancing test for assessing a defendant’s likelihood of recidivism: “1) the quantity (or ‘repetitiveness’) of uncounted criminal conduct, 2) the similarity of uncounted criminal conduct to the offense conduct, and 3) the degree to which the defendant has been deterred by prior sentences.” Connelly, 156 F.3d at 985. As applied to the present case, all three prongs weigh in favor of an upward departure. First, Bad Marriage has received thirty-five state criminal convictions. Second, while the underlying crimes ranged from stealing nachos to assault, most of these convictions involved alcohol. Third, evidently none of Bad Marriage’s prior convictions had any deterrent effect.
The majority attributes Bad Marriage’s likelihood of recidivism to his substance abuse problem. This is undoubtedly true. Bad Marriage’s thirty-five light sentences, however, have done little to stem his alcohol problem or deter him from becoming entangled with the law. In fact, this case began when Bad Marriage was released from tribal jail to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. Instead of going to the meeting, he assaulted his girlfriend.
IV
Alcohol abuse is a devastating problem on Indian reservations. It is a problem, however, that the majority’s opinion does nothing to alleviate. Instead, the majority reaches a conclusion that contradicts the plain language of the Sentencing Guidelines and restricts the district court’s already limited discretion to sentence defendants. ,
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment.
. All further references to the “Guidelines” or "Sentencing Guidelines” refer to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
. As the majority discusses, this note refers to applying "evidence of similar, or serious dissimilar, criminal conduct” for which a defendant’s criminal history does not otherwise account. This note simply provides examples of crimes outside the applicable time period that a court may consider when calculating a defendant's sentence. Section 4A1.3, however, repeatedly refers to "the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” Id. (emphasis added). This language is broader than "similar” crimes.
. According to the Presentence Report, Bad Marriage has approximately sixty additional tribal court convictions. The district court, however, did not base its decision to depart on these tribal court convictions.
. Raising the specter of Blakely v. Washington. - U.S. -. 124 S.Ct. 2531. 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the majority inquires "whether the facts supporting such a departure must be found by a jury[.]” Its theorization advances without resolving the question of whether Blakely has implications for this case and the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Because the majority, as it notes, decides the case "on other grounds,” its discussion of Blakely amounts to speculation that unnecessarily blurs the seemingly confused landscape of federal sentencing laws. See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 973 n. 2, 974 n. 4 (9th Cir.2004) (observing a "split on the applicability of the Blakely rule to sentences imposed under the Guidelines,” and that Blakely states that "The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them”).