dissenting.
Because the court focuses too narrowly in its reading of the DMCA, overlooks certain plain language used by Congress, and fails to give effect to the statute as a whole, I respectfully dissent. The subpoena power created by Congress in § 512(h) does not limit the type of service provider for whom subpoenas may be issued in the fight against internet piracy. Section 512(h) authorizes a copyright owner or its representative to request a subpoena to a service provider in order to identify in-fringers, and the statutory definition of “service provider” in § 512(k) specifically includes conduit service providers such as Charter. Moreover, no other section of the statute imposes the limitation on the subpoena power urged by Charter.
In enacting the DMCA Congress sought to protect both the interests of copyright holders and of internet service providers concerned about their own liability for infringement by their customers. The legislative solution in response to these concerns significantly limited the liability of ISPs for infringement by their customers and provided copyright holders more direct means to attack digital piracy. The subpoena provision in § 512(h) is one of these means, and this provision is of special value to a copyright owner seeking to stop infringement through conduit service providers. That is because a conduit ISP does not store materials for downloading and is thus cannot directly remove or disable access to any infringing material. By using the § 512(h) subpoena power to learn the identity of conduit service subscribers who infringe, copyright holders are able to take steps to protect their interests, seek compensation for their misappropriated property, and stop infringement.
To interpret the statute in the way Charter urges, and the court adopts, is to block copyright holders from obtaining effective protection against infringement through conduit service providers. The repercussions of infringement via the internet are too easily ignored or minimized. Regarded by some as an innocuous form of entertainment, internet piracy of copyrighted sound recordings results in substantial economic and artistic costs. See Jeff Leeds, Music Industry Turns to Napster Creator for Help, N.Y. Times, December 3, 2004, at Cl (internet file trading networks permit fans to obtain “virtually any song at any time... gratis” while “ravaging CD sales and weakening the under*779pinnings of the industry”). It is not just faceless corporations who pay the cost. Local music retailers are also vulnerable to the allure of free music, see David Segal, Requiem for the Record Store; Doumload-ers and Discounters Are Driving Out Music Retailers, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2004 at A1 (sales of record retailers “hammered by Internet piracy” and now in “serious trouble”), and artists can lose economic incentive to create and distribute works.
Copyright laws were foreseen by the framers of the Constitution as “the engine of free expression.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985); see U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to “promote the Progress of.. .useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings”). Piracy substantially undermines this incentive. Annual losses to copyright owners even before the expansive growth in peer to peer file sharing were estimated to be $11 to $20 billion. H. Rep. No. 105-339, at 4 (1997). Since copyright holders are effectively unable to recover from the designers of file trading software, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.2004), cert. granted, 2004 WL 2289054 (2004), or from internet service providers, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d), action against identified in-fringers offers the only practical means to protect the interests of copyright holders.
The subpoena requested by the RIAA in this case was authorized by and in compliance with the DMCA, and the district court’s order enforcing it should be affirmed.
I.
The increasing use of peer to peer file sharing programs makes the DMCA subpoena power very significant. Such programs were already being developed at the time of the congressional hearings preceding the passage of the DMCA. See Electronic Piracy and the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm, on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 17-18 (1997) (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin DiGregory about the direct transfer of copyrighted material through electronic bulletin boards, file transfer protocol sites, and email). Peer to peer programs allow individual internet users to access infringing materials located on the personal computers of others and to download them onto their own equipment. These programs are used to transmit infringing materials through conduit services. Congress recognized the need to address infringement through conduit service providers in the DMCA, and its opening section applies to networks which transmit infringing materials at the direction of their users. § 512(a).
While copyright owners are now able to use special software to identify the internet protocol (IP) addresses and the service providers used by traders in copyrighted files, it is the ISPs who have the names and personal addresses of the infringers. The only viable way for copyright owners to vindicate their intellectual property rights in a timely manner when infringing materials are transmitted across peer to peer networks is to subpoena the ISPs for disclosure of the identities of alleged in-fringers.
The effectiveness of the § 512(h) mechanism may be seen in this case. Appellant RIAA, which represents the owners of copyrights to an extensive collection of sound recordings, used a tracking program to discover that ninety three of Charter Communication’s internet subscribers were offering more than 100,000 copyrighted recordings of its members for down*780loading. RIAA downloaded the files and confirmed that the offerings were illegal copies of copyrighted materials. It then requested a subpoena from the clerk of the Eastern District of Missouri to obtain from Charter the names, physical and email addresses, and telephone numbers of the infringing subscribers. The clerk issued the subpoena. After it was served on Charter, it filed a motion in the district court to quash it. The district court held a hearing before ruling, then issued an order denying Charter’s motion to quash. Although the court enforced the subpoena, it denied RIAA’s request for subscriber telephone numbers. Charter’s motion for an emergency stay was denied by this court, and Charter then provided RIAA with the subpoenaed information.
The statutory right to request a subpoena is not limited by the type of ISP. Any copyright owner or authorized agent “may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer.” § 512(h)(1) (emphasis added). A request is to be made by filing with the clerk the following: a copy of a notification containing information outlined in § 512(c)(3)(A), a proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration that the applicant’s purpose is solely to identify the alleged infringer to protect its statutory rights. § 512(h)(2). If the notification and declaration are in proper form, the clerk shall issue the subpoena “expeditiously.” § 512(h)(4). This permits a copyright owner to proceed directly against an in-fringer without delay and thereby avoid further losses.
Although Charter contends that the subpoena power in the DMCA is limited by the function of the ISP, such a limitation is not to be found in a plain reading of the DMCA. To the contrary, the statute defines “service providers” in § 512(k) as all “provider[s] of online services or network access,” including conduit providers who offer the “transmission... of material of the user’s choosing, without modification.” § 512(k)(l). If Congress had wanted to limit the type of ISP subject to a statutory subpoena, it could have easily specified that in § 512(h), but it did not. In the absence of such a limitation, the statute’s definition of “service provider” in § 512(k)(l) controls, and it includes Charter. See United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 213 F. 169, 173 (8th Cir.1914) (“[Wjhere the legislative body makes no exception to a general and clear declaration ..., the conclusive presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is not the province of the courts to do so.”).
Following the approach of the D.C. Circuit in Verizon, the majority relies on the § 512(h) reference to the notice provision in § 512(c)(3)(A) to read a limitation into the availability of subpoenas. One of the documents to be included in a subpoena request is “a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A).” § 512(h)(2)(A). The notification subsection is entitled “Elements of notification” and it lists six: (i) the signature of someone authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the infringed copyright; (ii) identification of the copyrighted work claimed to be infringed; (iii) identification of the infringing material; (iv) information reasonably sufficient to allow the ISP to contact the complaining party; (v) a statement of the complaining party’s good faith belief that the material is being used in an unauthorized manner; and (vi) a statement that the notification is accurate and the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner. See § 512(c)(3)(A).
The majority focuses on just one of these six elements to arrive at its position that § 512(h) subpoenas were not intended by Congress to be directed at conduit ser*781vice providers. Its focus is on the third notice element which requires identification of the infringing material. That subsection reads as follows:
Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and the information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). The majority claims that this language excludes conduit ISPs, but the language does not say that. The subsection defines the material to be identified in two ways: (1) material that is “claimed to be infringing” and (2) material that is “the. subject of infringing activity and that is. to be removed or access to which is to be disabled.” Id. In the statute, the two definitions are joined by the word “or,” a word commonly used to distinguish between alternatives. See United States v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir.1994) (“Terms connected by ‘or’ .. .normally are read to have separate meanings and significance.”); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir.1989) (“Normally, the word ‘or’ connotes disjunction.”). The majority’s reading of the subsection ignores the use of the disjunctive form in describing the infringing material (the subsection also contains a second use of the disjunctive form to distinguish “to be removed or... to be disabled”). Were we to disregard the disjunctive form in this case, we would fail in our “obligation.. .to give effect to congressional purpose so long as the congressional language does not itself bar that result.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 710 n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000).
The distinction within § 512(c)(3)(A) between material “claimed to be infringing” and material that is “the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled” appears to carry forward the initial distinction in the DMCA between § 512(a) conduit ISPs and §§ 512(b)-(d) storage ISPs. The copyrighted material stored on an ISP’s network becomes the subject of infringing activity when it is unlawfully duplicated by subscribers. In order to remove such material or disable access to it, a storage ISP needs it to be identified. On-the other hand, when a subscriber transfers copyrighted material through a conduit ISP, that service provider cannot remove the material from the network. It can, however, provide identifying information about the offeror of the material “claimed to be infringing.” . Indeed, as the government points out, the subsection’s two categories of material .are not mutually exclusive, and a.conduit ISP can indirectly disable access to material by terminating the accounts of an infringing subscriber.
Section 512(h), which creates the .subpoena power, ., only references § 512(c)(3)(A) -to indicate the kind of information which needs to be given to the clerk to request a subpoena. By referencing -the elements of the notification in § 512(c)(3)(A), Congress, avoided the necessity of repeating such notice details in § 512(h). The statutory requirement that storage service providers expeditiously remove or disable access to infringing materials in order to avoid secondary liability is not rooted in this notification provision, but rather in those sections of the DMCA which set out the obligations of storage providers. , See ■ §§ 512(b)(2)(E), 512(c)(1)(C), 512(d)(3)..
Charter’s restrictive view of the subpoena power rests entirely on its reading extra words-into § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) to limit its applicability -to storage ISPs. It reads the provision as if the subsection referred to material that is (1) “claimed to be infring*782ing” and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, or material that is (2) “the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled.” That is not what Congress said, however. To the extent that the § 512(h) cross reference to § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) is fairly seen to be subject to different interpretations, it is ambiguous, and any ambiguity must be resolved by looking to the intent of Congress in its enactment of the legislation. See Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 727 (8th Cir.1984).
The intent of Congress in enacting the DMCA was to address “massive piracy” of copyrighted works over digital networks without hampering technological development of the internet by the threat of third party liability for service providers. Sen. Rep. 105-190, at 8 (1998). ISPs were only shielded from monetary and injunctive liability in exchange for their assistance in identifying subscribers who engage in acts of piracy over their networks and in removing or disabling access of infringers to protected works when technically possible. Congress wanted to create “strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment,” while at the same time providing “greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their activities.” Id. at 40.
The majority’s interpretation of the statute undermines this structure. It denies copyright holders the ability to obtain identification of those subscribers who purloin protected materials through § 512(a) conduit ISPs. This interpretation also shields conduit ISPs from liability without requiring their assistance in protecting copyrights. The suggestion that copyright holders should be left to file John Doe lawsuits to protect themselves from infringement by subscribers of conduit ISPs like Charter, instead of availing themselves of the mechanism Congress provided in the DMCA, is impractical and contrary to legislative intent. John Doe actions are costly and time consuming. Nowhere in the DMCA did Congress indicate that copyright holders should be relegated to such cumbersome and expensive measures against conduit ISPs. The legislative history shows that the purpose of the subpoena power in the DMCA was to obtain the assistance of ISPs in an expeditious process to stop infringement. See Sen. Rep. 105-190, at 51 (1998) (“The issuing of the [subpoena] should be a ministerial function performed quickly for this provision to have its intended effect.”).
Had Congress wanted to limit the reach of the subpoena power to ISPs engaged in storage functions, it could have easily stated that. It did not, however. Instead, it provided that § 512(h) subpoenas could be requested for a “service provider,” and it defined “service provider” in § 512(k) to include conduit ISPs like Charter. A coherent reading of the text and structure of the statute reinforces the message of these sections, which is that the subpoena power created by § 512(h) was intended for use against all types of service providers. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) (statutory scheme should be read as “coherent and consistent”); U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (“Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor, and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.”) (internal citations omitted).
*783Since the subpoena to Charter complied with the DMCA and was authorized under it, the district court did not err by enforcing it, and its order should be affirmed.
II.
Based on its interpretation of the DMCA, the majority vacates the order of the district court without addressing the other arguments Charter raises against enforcement of RIAA’s -subpoena. It claims that the subpoena provision in the DMCA violates the case or controversy requirement of Article III and that such subpoenas may not constitutionally be issued by a federal court clerk. It also argues that the subpoena would violate the Communication Act, as well as First Amendment rights of its subscribers, and that the district court erred by ordering disclosure of email addresses. RIAA responds to all these arguments, while the intervening United States concentrates on refuting Charter’s constitutional attacks.
A.
Under Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power is limited to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. Whether a court is presented with a case or controversy is a question of substance, not form. To obtain constitutional jurisdiction there must be “an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy.” Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264, 53 S.Ct. 345, 77 L.Ed. 730 (1933).
Charter argues that since Article III courts only have jurisdiction if there is a case or controversy, a federal court clerk cannot constitutionally issue a § 512(h) subpoena in the absence of a case. RIAA responds that issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena is a ministerial act by the clerk which has been authorized by Congress and which does not invoke the judicial power. No case or controversy is therefore required it says. Intervenor United States points out that a § 512(h) subpoena would not be requested in the absence of a controversy between a copyright owner and an infringer so there is no Article III violation; RIAA makes a similar argument. We review the existence of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Simes v. Huckabee, 354 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2004).
Charter alleges that the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena requires a judicial act, and the majority suggests in dictum that § 512(h) “may unconstitutionally invade the power of the judiciary” by compelling a court clerk to issue a subpoena, “thereby invoking the court’s power.” Charter and the majority do not, however, explain why the clerk’s act of issuing a DMCA subpoena is judicial in nature. The terms of § 512(h) do not leave any discretion to the clerk nor do they require any action by the court. The clerk is required to issue a subpoena to an ISP when the desired information is included in a request. Such a request initiates a ministerial act by the clerk. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 71 U.S. 475, 498, 18 L.Ed. 437 (1866) (“A ministerial duty.. .is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.”). Here it was Charter which decided to invoke the judicial power, by filing a motion to quash. No judge was involved in issuance of the subpoena.
In the compromise Congress legislated between the interests of copyright owners and ISPs, it created a ministerial process through which information can be obtained without the necessity of a civil action. See S.Rep. No. 105-190, at 51 (1998) (“The issuing of the order should be a ministerial function performed quicMy for this provi*784sion to have its intended effect.”)- Ministerial acts have long been recognized as nonjudicial by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., 6 Cranch 233, 10 U.S. 233, 236, 3 L.Ed. 209 (1810) (statutory duty of court clerk to record jury inquisitions a “ministerial act” that “requires no exercise of judicial functions”).
Over the years Congress has enacted a number of other laws that similarly authorize district court clerks to issue subpoenas in the absence of judicial action or pending litigation. Congress has authorized clerks to issue subpoenas requiring witness testimony in such circumstances as election disputes, 2 U.S.C. § 388, patent and trademark contests, 35 U.S.C. § 24, railroad employment arbitrations, 45 U.S.C. § 157(h), and plant variety protection proceedings, 7 U.S.C. § 2354(a). There is no record that any of these statutory subpoenas have been held to violate the case or controversy requirement of Article III, and no good reason has been shown to hold that the clerk’s issuance of a subpoena under § 512(h) is barred by the Constitution.
Federal courts engage in a number of functions in both civil and criminal contexts that do not directly involve adversarial proceedings. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 n. 20, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (“[Fjederal courts and judges have long performed a variety of functions that.. .do not necessarily or directly involve adversarial proceedings within a trial or appellate court.”). In the criminal context, federal courts issue warrants, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 41, review applications for wire taps, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518, and assist grand juries in their investigative functions, Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n. 20, 108 S.Ct. 2597. In the civil context, federal judges are authorized to order depositions even in the absence of a filed case in order to “prevent a failure or delay of justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a)(3). District courts also oversee requests for discovery from foreign or international tribunals, regardless of whether there is a pending case in a United States court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; In re Letter Rogatory from the First Court of the First Instance in Civil Matters, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir.1995).
These precedents indicate that Congress may constitutionally create a subpoena mechanism like that in the DMCA and that the subpoena power of § 512(h) does not violate the case or controversy requirement of Article III.
B.
Charter contends that the disclosures obtained under § 512(h) subpoenas violate the Communications (Cable) Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551. Under the Cable Act, cable operators are prohibited from disclosing personal information that could identify subscribers without obtaining their prior written or electronic consent, and operators are required to take actions to prevent unauthorized access to such information. Id. § 551(c). Charter maintains that these privacy provisions conflict with the disclosure authorized by the DMCA because a § 512(h) subpoena does not require advance notice to an alleged infringer. It argues that a cable operator cannot comply with a DMCA subpoena without violating the Cable Act.
This argument overlooks what Congress did to protect operators from such a dilemma. The DMCA explicitly states in § 512(h) that a subpoenaed service provider must “expeditiously disclose.. .the information required by the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision oflaiv.” § 512(h)(5) (emphasis added). The “notwithstanding” provision in § 512(h) indicates that the DMCA subpoena power is *785intended to “supersede[] other statutes that might interfere with or hinder' the attainment of [its] objective.” See Campbell v. Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. ex rel City of Minneapolis, 168 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir.1999); see also Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 5.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) ( “As we have noted previously in construing statutes, the use of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override the conflicting provisions of any other section.”).
Section 551(c) of the Cable Act is thus superseded by the subpoena provision in the DMCA, and a cable operator can comply with a § 512(a) subpoena without violating the earlier statute.
C.
Charter recognizes that the First Amendment does not protect copyright infringement, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), but it argues that § 512(h) violates protected rights of subscribers by compromising their anonymity interests without procedural safeguards to ensure that they have in fact engaged in illegal file sharing. RIAA responds that there is no First Amendment interest at stake in this case and that § 512(h) provides significant procedural protections. The United States agrees and asserts that § 512(h) does not impose any restraint on speech, let alone a substantial burden on protected speech. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir.2002).
Charter contends that “internet speakers” have a “presumptively protected anonymity” and that § 512(h) permits the disclosure of subscriber identity based only on suspicion of infringing conduct. In support of this argument it cites Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971).6 In Blount, the Supreme Court overturned a federal statute authorizing the Postmaster General to refuse delivery of materials administratively determined to be obscene. 400 U.S. at 421-22, 91 S.Ct. 423. Since the statute permitted suppression of expressive material without a judicial determination of obscenity, it lacked the “sensitive tools” required to separate protected speech from that which may be regulated. Id. at 417, 91 S.Ct. 423. Here in contrast, there is no suppression of material based on its expressive content and the First Amendment is not implicated. Moreover, the DMCA has considerable procedural safeguards in its requirements for a subpoena request. These include identification of the work claimed to have been infringed and of the infringing material, statement of a “good faith belief’ that unlawful use has occurred, verification of the accuracy of the statements, and a sworn declaration that the information disclosed is sought for and will be used only to enforce ownership rights. See §§ 512(h)(2)(C), 512(c)(3)(A).
Charter has not shown that the DMCA restrains or censors speech or that it violates the First Amendment.
*786D.
In its final argument, Charter contends that the district court erred in ordering the disclosure of the email addresses of its subscribers because § 512(h) only requires disclosure of “information sufficient to identify” subscribers and their mailing addresses sufficiently meet that requirement. § 512(h)(3). RIAA counters that § 512(h) entitles it to disclosure of email addresses and that the statute’s purpose would be undermined without access to this quick and economical way to contact alleged in-fringers. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2003).
Section 512(h)(3) states that the subpoena shall authorize the ISP receiving it to disclose to the copyright owner or his agent “information sufficient to identify” the alleged infringer. While the subsection does not define what information is “sufficient” for identification, the disclosure provision is best read in the light of the statute’s “expeditious” requirement. See id.; § 512(h)(5). Since electronic mail provides the fastest and surest means of contacting individuals alleged to have engaged in digital piracy over the internet, email addresses are a most appropriate form of identification. Nothing in § 512(h) precludes the disclosure of email addresses, and the statute in fact includes electronic mail addresses as part of that “[Tin-formation reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party.” § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv). Finally, as noted by the district court, email is a less intrusive form of notification than the telephone. The district court did not err by requiring the disclosure of email addresses by Charter.
III.
Because the subpoena to Charter was properly issued and was authorized under the terms of the DMCA, and there being no constitutional or statutory impediments to its enforcement, the order of the district court should be affirmed.
. Blount does not mention any presumption of protected anonymity, but the Supreme Court has elsewhere recognized a right to communicate messages anonymously. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (pamphleteer's "decision to remain anonymous.. .is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment”). Even if Charter were determined to have standing to assert First Amendment rights of its subscribers, it has not shown that the DMCA suppresses the content of any messages.