dissenting.
I agree with the district court and this court that for summary judgment purposes Richard Foelker established that he had a serious medical need. However, contrary to the court’s opinion, the district court correctly held that the evidence and its reasonable inferences, when construed in favor of Foelker, do not amount to deliberate indifference on the part of Brian Schertz or Diane Mandler. At most, the evidence shows that Schertz and Mandler were negligent in dealing with Foelker’s serious medical need. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
To be deliberately indifferent, Schertz and Mandler must have “had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.2002) (internal quotation omitted). Under this subjective standard, Foelker “must proffer evidence demonstrating that [Schertz and Mandler] were aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to [Foelker] but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from a known danger.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The evidence, viewed in favor of Foelker, merely shows that Schertz and Man-dler should have done more to recognize, understand, and alleviate his deteriorating condition: Schertz and Mandler should have been more mindful of Foelker’s risk of serious withdrawal; Schertz should have done more to obtain methadone; he should have done more to obtain information from Foelker’s methadone provider; he should have understood Foelker’s defecating on himself and the floor as an indication of a serious medical need and responded to it better; and Mandler erred in recommending additional monitoring of Foelker at the jail rather than hospitalization. Yet none of this amounts to deliberate indifference.
Schertz and Mandler did not ignore Foelker’s needs. They afforded him medical monitoring and treatment. Based on his nursing notes made at 1:15 p.m. on Saturday, April 29, 2000, Schertz clearly is not being deliberately indifferent.
“Inmate Rechecked in holding cell. V/S taken B/P 148/78, AP 78 & regular, Resp — 24. Continues [with] mild tremors but ambulates with a steady gait. He is selectively oriented to person, place & time. Skin is warm/dry. Color is pink. Has No physical complaints & appears in No distress. Plan is to continue to keep inmate in monitored holding cell for close observation. S/Sgt. Behrent was advised inmate may be placed in general population if the holding cell is needed by someone else. Encouraged inmate to push fluids.”
An hour later Behrent informed Schertz that Foelker had defecated on himself and the floor. Given the very recent medical examination, it would not be unreasonable for Schertz to speculate that Foelker was “gaming the system.” Nevertheless, rather than deliberately ignoring Foelker’s needs, he arranged for Mandler to examine him.
Mandler, a social worker from the County Department of Social Services, went to the jail to evaluate Foelker. Her training was in social work, not medicine. Perhaps when he told her that he was off his methadone for several days and that he did not recall defecating on himself and the *515floor, she should have alerted the officials that he needed immediate attention. Instead, she determined that he was not experiencing acute distress and simply needed continued observation. That conclusion may have been negligent, but it was not deliberate indifference amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.
On Sunday, April 30, 2000, Schertz was not on duty.. Mandler was on call, but no one called. In hindsight, both should have done more. But “not every instance of poor medical treatment amounts to a federal constitutional violation.” Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 176 (7th Cir.1996). Moreover, while circumstantial evidence can be enough to survive summary judgment, the circumstantial evidence here shows, at most, that Schertz and Mandler were negligent in failing to recognize how serious Foelker’s needs were or negligent in failing to do enough to address those needs.1
A reasonable jury cannot translate such evidence of misjudgment or negligence into deliberate indifference. It would require much speculation to conclude that Schertz and Mandler had a culpable state of mind, i.e., that they intentionally or recklessly withheld treatment so as to inflict punishment. It is well established, however, that “[inferences ... supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir.2004). Future plaintiffs should not be able to survive summary judgment by merely establishing a serious medical need and then claiming that a defendant’s failure to do more to recognize or treat that need amounted to deliberate indifference.
Although Foelker suffered some personal indignities and some serious medical problems due to the unnecessary withdrawal from his drug addiction, there is not sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Schertz and Mandler were deliberately indifferent to Foelker’s medical needs. Therefore, for these and the reasons set out in the district court’s opinion, I respectfully dissent.
. In this regard, Foelker’s case is analogous to numerous other deliberate-indifference cases that we have precluded from going to trial. See, e.g., Matos v. O'Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 557-58 (7th Cir.2003); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir.2001); Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 500-01 (7th Cir.2000); Zentmyer v. Kendall County, 220 F.3d 805, 811-12 (7th Cir.2000); Higgins v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 178 F.3d 508, 511-13 (7th Cir. 1999) ("An error in judgment does not imply a deliberate act.”); Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 956 (7th Cir.1999); Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989-91 (7th Cir.1998); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374-75 (7th Cir.1997); Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261-63 (7th Cir.1996); Steele, 82 F.3d at 178-79.