concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In this lawsuit, Kelly Dillery essentially sought relief on two grounds: (1) the City of Sandusky’s failure to comply with the requirements of the ADA and (2) the City of Sandusky’s treatment of her in response to her decision to ride her wheelchair in the street. The district court ruled in Dil-lery’s favor on the first ground and against Dillery on the second. In this case, we have affirmed both rulings. I write separately because I believe the district court erred in refusing to award attorney’s fees based on Dillery’s successful suit for in-junctive relief.
As the majority writes, “the district court determined that Sandusky violated the ADA when it ‘illegally failed to properly install or maintain curb cuts and ramps when resurfacing streets and altering or installing city sidewalks.’ ” The district court issued an injunction in this case that has the force of law behind it. The City of Sandusky concedes that the court adopted portions of the Ability Center decision “ordering [the city] to repair the ramps that were installed improperly.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. Yet the district court found that the plaintiff who successfully sought this relief was entitled to no attorney’s fees at all. It appears quite clear that Dillery is a prevailing plaintiff at least with regard to the suit for injunctive relief for ADA noncompliance. By obtaining an enforceable judgment on the merits against the defendant, Dillery qualifies as a prevailing party. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992): “If the plaintiff has succeeded on ‘any significant issue in litigation which aehieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,’ the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind.”
Under the ADA, a “prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); accord Vitale v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 82 Fed.*571Appx. 873, 876 (5th Cir.2003); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.2002); see also Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, FSB, 345 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir.2003) (“Fees should be awarded [under the ADA] to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course.”).
The only reason that the district court and the majority give for rejecting attorney’s fees in this case is that the injunction issued for plaintiff Dillery mirrored an injunction that was issued in a previous decision. See Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 133 F.Supp.2d 589 (N.D.Ohio 2001), aff'd 385 F.3d 901 (6th Cir.2004). In Ability Center, a non-profit center and others successfully brought a class action suit seeking an injunction ordering ADA compliant sidewalks in San-dusky. Thus, when the injunction was issued in Dillery’s case, another injunction making the same demands was already in effect. By the district court’s and the majority’s argument, the second injunction achieved by Dillery had no real effect on the city’s behavior, but was merely redundant.
While Dillery’s injunction was issued subsequent to the Ability Center decision, her complaint against the city was filed first. Dillery brought suit challenging the non-compliance of Sandusky’s sidewalks in June of 1999, almost three months prior to the class action plaintiffs. The subsequent class action complaint makes nearly identical claims on nearly identical theories concerning Sandusky’s sidewalks. At several points, the class action complaint points to the exact same intersections as Dillery’s complaint. During the pendency of Dil-lery’s suit, the class action was resolved in the class’s favor. Thus, when the court finally resolved Dillery’s suit, there was already an injunction in place. It seems bizarre that the slower progress of a case through the judicial process should control the awarding of attorney’s fees.
Moreover, as the majority acknowledges, “[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). The majority errs in suggesting that Dillery’s victory did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties. Of course it did. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, a “material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs [when] the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 566. When the district court issued its decision, Dillery, separate and apart from any membership in the Ability Center class, was vested with the right to enforce the terms of the injunction against the city. Cf. Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.2002) (determining that plaintiff who could enforce settlement agreement against defendants was a prevailing party under the ADA).
The district court’s ruling for Dillery is not diminished because it adopts the findings and reasoning of another opinion. Had this Court vacated the Ability Center decision of the district court on procedural grounds, the legal force of Dillery’s case would still oblige the city’s compliance with the ADA. Moreover, if Dillery is harmed by Sandusky’s non-compliance with the injunction (for example, if the city should fail to follow the injunctive order in the repair of streets near Dillery’s house), she can return to the court to enforce her judg*572ment even if the Ability Center plaintiffs are perfectly happy with the city’s response. Dillery’s victory is neither merely technical nor de minimis.1 This judgment of a United States district court imposes quite serious and quite costly obligations on Sandusky, which may partially explain why the city appealed the district court’s decision.
, Permitting the district court to reject attorney’s fees on these grounds is a dangerous precedent for fee-shifting provisions like that included in the ADA. Fee-shifting provisions are intended “to promote vigorous enforcement” of laws by private plaintiffs regardless of their ability to pay for representation. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). A rule that awards fees only to the first lawyer to the finish line may actually operate as a disincentive for attorneys to take on cases for injunctive relief. Alternatively, such a rule could promote slipshod and hurried representation when attorneys become aware of similar pending cases. The fee-shifting provisions of the ADA are meant to generally reward the plaintiff when courts vindicate their rights and award them relief unless such reward would result in injustice. As Dillery is legally and equitably entitled to attorney’s fees, I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the majority opinion.
. The Supreme Court has indeed found that "[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally "prevails” ... should receive no attorney’s fees at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. In Farar, a plaintiff who had sought $17 million in compensatory damages from a range of defendants was awarded nominal damages of $1 from one defendant. Id. at 106-108, 113 S.Ct. 566. The court found nominal damages in this quest for large compensatory damages to be a technical victory, but a practical defeat. Id. at 114-15, 113 S.Ct. 566. See also Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (reversing attorney’s fees premised solely on a declaratory judgment); Booker v. Waters, 1998 WL 252744, at *4 (6th Cir.1998) (rejecting attorney’s fees where only success was court order directing TVA to conduct a search to determine if at-home work might be available for a disabled plaintiff); Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443, 451 (6th Cir.1989) (rejecting award to plaintiffs whose suit resulted in a judicial opinion suggesting greater caution and procedural safeguards for prison drug-testing where opinion denied actual injunctive relief) ("We, therefore, conclude that the points on which plaintiffs prevailed, if any, were de minimis .... ”). The present case, where the plaintiff was awarded injunctive relief is quite different from these examples of technical or de minimis victories.