dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision as to the juror-misconduct issue. The trial judge erred grossly in allowing jurors to make up their minds before hearing all the evidence.
Faced with a serious and credible allegation that a juror had, in open court, mid-trial, expressed to another juror her conclusion that Gianakos was guilty, the trial judge denied Gianakos’ request to investigate that juror’s misconduct and any similar misconduct by the other members of the jury. Rather, the judge compounded the problem by indicating to the jurors that they could all make up their minds before hearing all the evidence. Then the judge refused to dismiss the juror who overtly had demonstrated bias against the defendant.
The trial judge erred at all three stages. However, the judge’s culminating error makes the proper outcome of this appeal immediately clear: Did the juror’s expression, midway through the trial, of a premature conclusion as to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence constitute juror bias? On our long-standing and well-reasoned *1080precedent, it did. Has the government shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge’s refusal, over Gianakos’ objection, to dismiss a biased juror was harmless? No.
Our duty, then, is clear: The judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for retrial.
Facts
During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, on the fourth day of a nine-day trial, a police detective witnessed one juror turn to another during the trial and mouth the words “He’s guilty.” Tr. at 513.
In response, before asking counsel how they wanted to proceed, the trial judge said,
I don’t consider this a matter of great significance. I have a feeling that every jury that’s ever been empaneled reaches some conclusions at some point of the case. I will, however, make this record just to establish that this incident did occur and that it was brought to our attention, and I will chew on them [the jury] when I send them home tonight, once again emphasizing the admonition to maintain an open mind until all of the evidence is received, and further pointing out that should someone have reached a conclusion that no amount of defense testimony could change a conclusion as to guilt or innocence, then, for God’s sake, keep it to yourself until the matter is submitted to the jury for deliberation. And that’s basically my intention.
Is that a sufficient record? Mr. Henderson [defense counsel]?
Id. at 514. Defense counsel requested a modest investigation:
MR. HENDERSON: Your Honor, I would request that you do give a very detailed admonition to the jurors, and with no disrespect intended to the Court at all, I think some people could interpret the way that you’ve been repeating the admonition as almost kind of winking at the admonition, and I would request, first, that the Court inform the jurors that it’s very important not to talk about the evidence....
The other thing that I — and this is just a matter of style, and I’m trying to tread lightly here.
The other thing that I would request is that you ask the jurors if anyone has made any comments to you that you felt were inappropriate, that you could advise the bailiff of that, and that it would be a responsible thing for a juror to do.
There have been cases of jurors, you know, who have kind of lobbied during the trial, trying to lobby other jurors to, you know, reach a conclusion. I don’t want that to happen here. So I think it would be appropriate to tell them that if you feel that someone’s trying to communicate with you inappropriately, you can advise the bailiff of that, and just leave it at that.
THE COURT: I would be glad to say that for someone who’s not on the jury.
MR. HENDERSON: Well, even if a member of the jury was trying to engage other jurors in a discussion of the case at this point, that would be inappropriate and it would be the right thing for the juror to do, to advise the bailiff so the Court could inquire further.
THE COURT: Very well.
Id. at 515-17.
At the end of that day’s proceedings, in sending the jury home for the weekend, the judge admonished the jury as follows.
Members of the jury, we’re going to break now for the weekend, and it becomes really critical that if someone asks you what the case is about, don’t tell them, because I don’t want you recounting testimony or explaining the *1081parties’ positions because that might fix one version or one set of facts in your mind to the detriment of the defense, who have not yet been able to put on the full case.
So I’m going to say to you, again: Don’t talk about the case or anyone connected with it until I finally chase you off to the jury room to decide the matter. And if, based on the testimony you’ve heard so far, any one of you has reached a conclusion as to guilt or innocence and decided that there’s no way that can be shaken, if that’s happened, don’t share it %vith anybody, unless and until you finally get into the jury room to decide the case; and then that’s the time to share those convictions and beliefs. So you’re leaving for the weekend, so the previous admonition of the Court is reinforced and made stronger.
Id. at 645-46 (emphasis added).
Gianakos did not specifically object to this admonition and did not follow up on his request for limited investigation of juror misconduct. Nonetheless, the judge did not — as he had apparently agreed to do — instruct the jurors to tell the bailiff if other jurors had expressed their views of the case.10
At the end of the trial, before the case was submitted to the jury, Gianakos revisited the issue of juror #4’s misconduct:
MR. HENDERSON: There is a juror — I think it’s juror number 4 — ... who made the comment that we believe — -where she mouthed the words “he’s guilty” last week during trial ....
We request that that juror be dismissed. We have an alternate juror. I think that juror has shown prejudice, and there is cause to dismiss juror number 4 and have her replaced by the alternate at this point. And we formally move the Court for that relief.
THE COURT: Does the government have any position on that? I don’t know. It’s — I’m not sure that’s what happened. It’s what the detective indicated he believed he thought he saw.
MR. MYERS [the prosecutor]: We would oppose that motion, Your Honor. This has been addressed earlier by the Court. We’ll leave it at that.
THE COURT: Why don’t you couple that comment in the alternative, just, again, to protect yourself and protect the record, with a motion for mistrial, if not granted.
MR. HENDERSON: Okay. Your Honor, if the Court does not decide not to dismiss juror number 4,we do ask for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Very good. And now your record is protected on that point, as well.
Id. at 1211-12. The judge denied both motions.
Before leaving this presentation of the facts, I must comment on the trial judge’s late insinuation — which the majority opinion adopts, maj. op., supra, at 1075 — that we don’t really know whether there was any juror misconduct here. Let there be no mistake: The sole evidence in the record concerning the alleged misconduct is the police detective’s statement that he saw the juror mouth the words “He’s guilty” to another juror. There is no countervailing evidence, no challenge to the detective’s credibility, and no basis for any determination except that the misconduct happened. The trial judge accepted that the incident happened as the detective saw it, saying, “I will ... make this record *1082just to establish that this incident did occur ...Tr. at 514 (emphasis added).11 Only at the end of the trial did the judge— having failed to inquire into the alleged misconduct — equivocate.
The trial judge’s failure, against the defendant’s wishes, to conduct the necessary inquiry cannot be held against the defendant. On the evidence in the record, we must accept that the misconduct did occur.
Requirements for a jury trial
A criminal defendant has a right to a trial before an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The burden of proof is on the government. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994).
To ensure that the burden of proof stays on the government, jurors must not make up their minds about guilt or innocence until they have heard all the evidence and can consider it all together. See Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir.1945). See also United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 688-89 (3d Cir.1993); MaNual Op Model CRIMINAL Jury Instructions For The District courts of the eighth CIRCUIT, r. 1.08 (2002); Kevin F. O’MALLEY Et Al., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & Instructions § 5.10 (5th ed.2000). The prejudice caused by drawing conclusions prematurely is exacerbated if jurors prematurely express those conclusions to others. See Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328.
When a juror makes up her mind before hearing all the evidence, the burden of proof is effectively shifted, so far as that juror is concerned, onto the defendant. This effect is all the greater if the juror expresses her mind to others. As we said in Winebrenner sixty years ago:
Such an opinion once formed could only be removed, if at all, by evidence. This in effect shifted the burden of proof and placed upon the defendants the burden of changing by evidence the opinion thus formed. A juror having in discussion not only formed but expressed his view as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, his inclination thereafter would be to give special attention to such testimony as to his mind strengthened, confirmed or vindicated the views which he had already expressed to his fellow jurors, whereas, had there been no discussion and no expression of tentative opinion, he would not be confronted with embarrassment before his fellow jurors should he change the tentative opinion which he might entertain from hearing evidence.
Id. at 328.
A juror who makes up her mind before hearing all the evidence is biased. She is biased in that she effectively holds the defendant to an impermissible burden of proof. Bias need not result from personal animus. Juror bias is simply the inability to decide the case properly and impartially on all of the evidence. A juror’s shifting the burden to the defendant precludes the juror from properly, lawfully deciding the case.
The trial judge’s error
Fundamentally, the trial judge simply did not think it was important whether jurors made up their minds before hearing all the evidence. Nor did he think it was important whether they talked about the case before hearing all the evidence. The judge is wrong on both counts. This simple, fundamental misunderstanding is behind each of the judge’s three errors.
*1083 The principal issue is juror # ITs individual bias.
The trial judge’s error relates principally to juror # 4’s bias. Only a single issue presents itself as to juror #4: Whether the trial judge took proper action regarding juror #4’s misconduct. The judge’s error came in three stages, however, at Gianakos’ three requests for relief: (1) investigate her conduct (refused), (2) give proper instructions to correct misconduct (admonition given made a bad situation worse), and (3) strike juror # 4 or grant a mistrial (refused).
The final request to strike the juror or grant a mistrial was the culmination of Gianakos’ efforts to avoid a tainted jury. This final effort necessarily called into question and included an effort to correct the judge’s failure to investigate juror #4’s misconduct and the judge’s further error in giving an admonition that validated # 4’s bias.
Gianakos’ motion to dismiss juror # 4 or for a mistrial preserved for appellate review the judge’s mishandling of juror # 4’s bias at all three stages.12 Thus, as to juror # 4, the trial judge’s mishandling is reviewable under the harmless error standard.
Apart from juror # 4’s bias, the judge’s errors at the first two stages also relate to the jury at large. Gianakos’ request for investigation extended to the speculative (though reasonable) fears that other jurors had engaged in misconduct as juror # 4 did and that #4 had contaminated other jurors by lobbying them for a guilty verdict. The judge’s refusal to investigate relates to these general speculative issues. Similarly, the judge’s erroneous admonition invited all members of the jury to make up their minds before hearing all the evidence. Because Gianakos’ motion to dismiss juror #4 and alternative motion for a mistrial addressed only that one ju*1084ror, the motions did not preserve for review the judge’s errors with respect to the jury at large. With respect to the jury at large, therefore, the plain error standard applies.
The majority opinion, in treating the judge’s errors at the first two stages, does not consider them with respect to juror # 4’s individual bias. Rather, the majority opinion conducts only a cursory plain error analysis, determining that the matter did not require investigation, and (in a footnote) that the judge’s admonition was good enough, though erroneous. See maj. op., supra, at 1074.
In discussing the trial judge’s final ruling, denying Gianakos’ motion to dismiss juror # 4, the majority opinion does touch briefly on juror # 4’s bias. It does so, however — as I explain below — without addressing the Winebrenner problem of a juror shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, by making up her mind before hearing all the evidence.
The trial judge erred by refusing to dismiss a biased juror.
The trial judge’s errors with respect to juror #4 personally — as opposed to the errors with respect to the jury at large— culminated in the judge’s refusal to dismiss juror # 4 at the end of the trial. I address this final ruling first, because it most clearly and simply determines the proper outcome of this appeal. The trial judge erred, and the government has not shown the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial judge has discretion in addressing allegations of juror misconduct or juror bias. United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954, 955 (8th Cir.1996). The judge commits error only by abusing that discretion. Where the issue was preserved for review by a timely objection, such error requires reversal unless the government can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). If the issue was not preserved for review, we can reverse only if there is plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
The issue of the judge’s refusal to dismiss the juror was preserved for review. The trial judge explicitly said so, see Tr. at 1212, and the majority opinion appears to acknowledge this, see maj. op., supra, at 1075. We therefore review this ruling under the abuse of discretion and harmless error standards. The majority opinion says the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to dismiss juror # 4. I strongly disagree.
In the course of trial, before the defense case had even begun, juror # 4 turned to a fellow juror in open court and announced a conclusion as to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence: “He’s guilty.” Informed of this, the trial judge did nothing — nothing to remedy the bias created by the juror’s premature decision-making, which shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The judge’s sole response was to give an admonition that did not correct the problem, but rather made it worse. The judge’s jury admonition indicated that it was perfectly OK for # 4 to make up her mind before hearing all the evidence.
The judge had discretion in deciding how to deal with the problem. An appropriate response to an allegation of juror misconduct is suggested by United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1078-80 (8th Cir.2001). There, we determined that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in retaining a juror. The judge had interviewed the juror, after allegations of improper mid-trial discussion, and received sufficient assurance that the juror would hear all the evidence before deciding whether the defendant was guilty or innocent. Here, by contrast, the trial judge *1085indicated to the jurors that they could make up their minds before hearing all the evidence. The trial judge here abused his discretion by choosing to put the court’s seal of approval on the juror’s bias.13
Addressing the problem of juror #4 contaminating the rest of the jury (as opposed to #4’s own bias), the majority opinion says the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, because juror #4’s “communication” was not necessarily prejudicial. Maj. op., supra, at 1075. But the issue as to juror # 4’s personal bias is not that she may have tainted another juror by what she said. The principal issue is that # 4 had made up her mind before hearing all the evidence and thus shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. When a juror makes up her mind before hearing all the evidence and thus shifts the burden to the defendant, the defendant is prejudiced. See Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328.
The majority opinion’s response to the principal issue of the judge’s mishandling of juror # 4’s bias is simply that there is no evidence that juror # 4 acquired any extrinsic information and, “We have held that there is nothing wrong with a juror being influenced by prior testimony.” Maj. op., supra, at 1075 (citing Evans, 272 F.3d at 1079-80). Juror # 4’s making up her mind before hearing all the evidence therefore did not require further action by the trial judge, the majority opinion says, because “The concern with bias is that a juror will decide a case on the basis of a pretrial predisposition against the interest of a party rather than on the basis of the evidence presented during the trial.” Maj. op., supra, at 1075. This analysis misses the mark for two reasons.
First, our holding in Evans does not support the majority opinion. To the contrary, Evans throws into relief the trial judge’s gross error here. Evans does not concern a juror prematurely deciding guilt without hearing the defendant’s side. In Evans the trial court investigated allegations of improper jury discussion and received sufficient assurance that the juror in question could render a fair and impartial decision.
The trial judge in Evans asked, “Have you made a decision as you sit right now on guilt or innocence?” and the juror answered, “That would not be fair. No.” The judge asked, “So you haven’t done that?” The juror answered, “No.” The judge asked, “And you’re going to reserve making a decision on guilt and innocence until all the evidence is done?” The juror answered, “To the best of my ability.” Evans, 272 F.3d at 1078. In Evans we held merely that the final answer, though not an unequivocal “Yes,” was sufficient assurance that the juror would render an impartial decision. See Id. at 1080 (“Therefore, we conclude that the District Court’s decision to accept the juror’s assurance of impartiality as sufficient was within its discretion.”).
This case is nothing like Evans. Here the judge failed to obtain any assurance that juror # 4 had not made a decision as to guilt. The judge failed to obtain any assurance that juror #4 could reserve making a decision “until all the evidence is done.” Most strikingly, the judge indicated that it was OK for juror #4 — and every other juror as well — to make up her mind before hearing all the evidence.
Second, it is wrong to say “The concern with bias is that a juror will decide a case on the basis of a pretrial predisposition against the interest of a party rather than *1086on the basis of the evidence presented during the trial.” Maj. op., supra, at 1075. That is not the only concern pertaining to bias. Another concern — the one presented by this case — is that when a juror makes up her mind before hearing all the evidence, the burden of proof is effectively shifted improperly to the defendant. See Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328.
The majority opinion simply does not address the Winebrenner problem that we face here.
Presented with a problem of juror bias, the trial judge rejected remedial action. Instead, the judge reinforced the bias and refused to dismiss the biased juror. Without question, the judge acted improperly and abused his discretion.
Was the judge’s error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? No. The presence of a juror with demonstrated bias can never be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Jury deliberations are a black box. We cannot know what effect the bias had on the biased juror herself, nor can we know what influence the biased juror had on the rest of the jury. The government says only that the jury deliberated for a lengthy period, so it must have deliberated properly. To the extent this observation is even relevant, it cuts against the government — suggesting that the decision for the jury may have been close and difficult, and that juror #4’s bias may therefore have been decisive in getting a guilty verdict. We cannot say there is no reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Quite the reverse. There is little doubt that the error was harmful.
The trial judge erred by allowing jurors to make up their minds before hearing all the evidence.
After juror # 4 expressed a premature conclusion as to the ultimate question of Gianakos’ guilt or innocence, the trial judge admonished the jury as follows: “[I]f, based on the testimony you’ve heard so far, any one of you has reached a conclusion as to guilt or innocence and decided that there’s no way that can be shaken, if that’s happened, don’t share it with anybody .... ” Tr. at 645-46. The judge thus confirmed to juror # 4 that it was OK for her to have made up her mind four days into a nine-day trial, during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, before hearing the defense case. The judge validated # 4’s bias, which effectively shifted the burden of proof, so far as # 4 was concerned, to the defendant. See Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328. See also Resko, 3 F.3d at 688-89.
More, the instruction indicated to other jurors that it was not improper for them to make up their minds before hearing all the evidence.
The majority opinion acknowledges that the trial judge thereby erred as a matter of law. Maj. op., supra, at 1074 n. 5. The judge thus abused his discretion. Insofar as the erroneous instruction applied to juror # 4, Gianakos preserved the error by moving for the dismissal of that juror. The judge’s error as to juror # 4 requires reversal, then, unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. As I have already discussed, that is not clear. We must, then, reverse.
The majority opinion simply does not address the judge’s error as it relates specifically to juror # 4 (by ratifying and reinforcing her demonstrated misconduct). The majority opinion addresses the error (in a footnote) only as a plain error issue relating to the jury at large. See Id.
Insofar as the judge’s error affected the jury at large, it was not preserved for review. Regardless, in this respect, too, we should reverse. The error — effectively misallocating the burden of proof — is in the narrow category of errors that affect the entire structure of the trial and therefore require reversal even if not preserved *1087for appellate review. Cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
The trial judge erred by refusing to investigate the scope of juror misconduct.
Gianakos specifically requested the trial judge to investigate — by instructing the jurors to tell the bailiff if other jurors had made inappropriate comments about the case — whether there had been jury discussion of the case other than the single known instance. Despite the request, the judge did nothing to investigate.
The trial judge abused his discretion by failing to investigate the problem of premature discussions among jurors. The duty to investigate serious, credible allegations of misconduct is precisely that, a duty. See United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir.1985). See also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1393 (3rd Cir.1994).
The judge had discretion to assess the gravity of the situation and to respond with reasonable measures. This includes the discretion reasonably to determine that an allegation is not credible or serious enough to pursue. See United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir.1996) (cited in maj. op., supra, at 1074) (holding that defendant was not entitled to a new trial or to a post-trial evidentiary hearing concerning potential misconduct on the basis that a juror gave an incorrect answer to a vague question on voir dire).
Faced with a serious, credible allegation that a juror had in open court, during trial, expressed a conclusion as to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, the judge had no discretion to refuse to investigate at all. The judge abused his discretion. The judge chose to do nothing because he believed that premature decision-making and discussion by the jury is “not a matter of great significance.” As our precedent makes clear, the judge was wrong.
Insofar as the trial judge’s refusal to investigate pertains only to juror # 4, the error was preserved and we review it under the harmless error standard. Again, we cannot say that the refusal to investigate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we must therefore reverse.
The majority opinion considers the refusal to investigate only as it pertains to the jury at large, and therefore reviews for plain error. As to the jury at large, the refusal to investigate presents a close question under the plain error standard — a question I do not address. Again, the majority opinion simply does not address the judge’s refusal to investigate as it pertains specifically to juror # 4, who engaged in misconduct in open court.
Conclusion
Faced with a serious, credible allegation that a juror had announced a conclusion as to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence before hearing all the evidence, the trial judge, despite the defendant’s request, took no action to determine the extent or nature of jury misconduct. The judge then indicated to that juror and to all other jurors that they could make up their minds before hearing the evidence. At the conclusion of trial, the judge refused to dismiss the juror who had demonstrated that she had made up her mind prematurely. The trial judge simply did not think that premature decision-making and discussion is an important problem in a jury trial. The judge was gravely mistaken.
Gianakos has twice been convicted of a brutal murder, and in my view it is unfortunate that the case demands that we send it back for a third trial. Such a disposition, while regrettable, is necessary. Had the trial judge taken appropriate remedial measures toward demonstrated juror misconduct — and had the government not opposed such measures — this situation could *1088have been avoided. An appropriate response, within the judge’s discretion, would not have been unduly burdensome. Timely voir dire and additional instruction of juror #4 might (or might not) have provided sufficient assurance that she could serve impartially. In any case, an alternate juror was available, for just such situations as this, to replace juror # 4. The government stated no reason why juror # 4 should not be replaced. The trial judge gave no reason for refusing to dismiss the juror — except meritless equivocation about the previously accepted fact of juror misconduct, after having declined to investigate it.
Our system of justice relies heavily upon procedural protections to ensure that we get the right person, that we do not punish people for crimes they did not commit. Fundamental to these procedural protections are an impartial jury and the rule that the burden of proof is on the government. Gianakos has been sentenced to life imprisonment on the basis of a tainted jury verdict. In our system of law, such a verdict should not stand.
. The trial judge did not say he would not instruct the jury to do this. The record, however, shows no such instruction, and Giana-kos asserts on appeal — without contradiction by the government — that the judge failed to give this instruction. See Appellant’s Br. at 53; Appellee's Br., passim.
. Detective Bryan Green, who was assisting the prosecution, is to be commended for advising the court and counsel of this incident.
. The majority opinion states that Gianakos' motion to dismiss a biased juror before the case was submitted to the jury was untimely. Slip op., supra, at 14, n. 6. Ordinarily, we deem an objection timely and sufficient to preserve an issue for review if it is made at such a time "that the trial court has an opportunity to prevent or correct error,” United States v. Wolk, 337 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir.2003). Additionally, the objection must be made early enough to avoid excessive waste of time and resources. Cf. United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir.1994) (An objection to jury selection process is untimely if not made before the venire is dismissed and trial begun). As to juror # 4’s personal bias, Gianakos meets our usual standard of timeliness, because the motion to dismiss juror # 4 came before the case was submitted to the jury, when juror # 4 could readily have been replaced by an alternate juror — on hand for just this sort of contingency.
The majority opinion applies a different standard to this case, however, quoting Yannacopoulos v. General Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298 (8th Cir.1996) for the proposition that "When a party waits until the end of a case to complain of juror misconduct, ... the objection is waived.” Maj. op., supra, at 1075, n. 6. Yannacopoulos is not comparable to this case. In Yannacopoulos, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury requested a dictionary definition. The judge called the jury in to say he could not give them a definition. A juror said aloud to another juror, "I'll look up that word ... tonight.” The judge immediately responded by admonishing the jury not to do outside research. Yannacopou-los was silent on the issue. The next morning, the judge revisited the matter on his own motion, to explain the reason for the ban on outside research. Yannacopoulos again was silent on the matter. The jury continued deliberating and returned a verdict. After the verdict, Yannacopoulos for the first time requested investigation to determine whether any juror had checked a dictionary. In ruling on Yannacopoulos' appeal, we said, "When a party waits until the end of a case to complain of juror misconduct, as Yannacopoulos did, the objection is waived.” 75 F.3d at 1304 (emphasis added).
I agree with Yannacopoulos. But of course Gianakos did not wait as Yannacopoulos did. All through the trial Gianakos sought appropriate relief.
. It is a form of bias or prejudice to hold a defendant to an impermissible burden of ' proof. It would make no difference, however, if we called this burden-shifting by another name. Whatever we call it, this burden-shifting is impermissible, and a juror who does it should be disqualified.