dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:
Because this habeas decision threatens serious interference with Texas’s treatment of sex offenders, and potentially of other parolees who are now required to undergo treatment or counseling, the case should have been reheard en banc. On the record he advanced, Coleman should not receive habeas relief entitling him to a hearing before he undergoes mandatory sex offender counseling.
The panel seriously erred on two fronts. First, it has extended liberty interest protection to Coleman and other sex offenders without Supreme Court imprimatur. Compare Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (explicitly refusing to decide whether sex a offender registration law violates a registrant’s liberty interest). Second, although couched as holding that the state courts’ ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the panel decision misapplied AEDPA and Teague v. Lane1 by making a new rule of law in a habeas case.
*671In a novel substantive holding for this circuit, the panel concluded that Texas violated Coleman’s procedural due process rights when it imposed sex offender registration and therapy requirements without giving him advance notice and the opportunity for a hearing on that specific issue.2 The panel cites numerous Supreme Court cases, but none is controlling. The panel relies most heavily on Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), in which the Court held that a prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being subjected, without pre-deprivation process, to an involuntary mental health commitment, if it entails both significant social stigma and mandatory behavior modification programs. Id. at 492-94, 100 S.Ct. at 1263-64. The Court noted, however, that “Many ... restrictions ... [at the mental hospital] might not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest retained by a prisoner.” Id. at 494, 100 S.Ct. at 1264. The Court’s decision was limited to treatment of the mentally ill and had to and did turn on stigmatizing consequences and mandatory behavior modification treatment. Id.
Even if it is logical to make the constitutional leap from treatment of the mentally ill, who are helpless as to their condition and its consequences, to sex offenders, who are predators, the twin factual constraints of Vitek — stigmatizing consequences and mandatory behavior modification — are lacking in this case. With due respect, the panel misstated that Coleman must register as a sex offender; the state dropped this requirement at Coleman’s request, and his name does not appear on the list (see generally Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Records Service, Sex Offender Database, https://rec-ords.txdps.state.tx.us/soSearch/default.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2005)).3 Further, the panel overlooked that the state expressly protects the confidentiality of sex therapy records. See Tex. OC&Code §§ 109.051-109.053. Coleman cannot argue “stigma” on this record.4
*672Equally troubling, the panel relied on “facts” outside those provided the state courts in asserting that Coleman would suffer invasive physical procedures. The only basis for this part of the panel opinion is its judicial notice of a state government website. The website discusses the use of “multifaceted” sex offender treatment regimes, which may or may not include the more invasive techniques the panel asserted as demonstrated fact. None of this discussion is probative as to Coleman, who never attended any therapy sessions, never experienced any invasive treatments, and did not and could not submit any evidence in state or federal court about the therapy sessions he would have been expected to attend.5 The panel’s conclusions about what his particular therapy regime would entail are pure conjecture. Thus, the second factual requirement of Vitek is absent from this record.
To achieve its desired legal result, the panel extended Vitek from the circumstance of inmates’ forced mental health treatment to that of forced sex offender registration and therapy. Moreover, the panel further extends the liberty interest created in Vitek from a “stigma-plus” due process decision to something approximating a per se procedural due process rule when, as here, registration was not even required, and invasive physical treatment is mere conjecture. That is, the state is required by this decision to grant pre-deprivation process whether or not the prisoner’s sex therapy will be publicized and thus stigmatizing, 'and whether or not invasive physical treatment of a particular prisoner is actually contemplated. By transforming the Paul v. Davis6 “stigma-plus” test into “plus=stigma,” see Panel Op. on Reh’g, the panel’s conception of a “liberty interest” stands current Supreme Court caselaw on its head. It bears repeating that only two years ago the Supreme Court expressly refused to decide whether a sex offender registration law violates a liberty interest. Doe, 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165.7
Vitek, moreover, ordered a predeprivation hearing to ascertain the prisoner’s *673mental state before the prisoner may be forcibly institutionalized (with concomitant stigma and invasive treatment). If the panel means to say that Coleman was entitled to initial release to mandatory supervision only after having a hearing concerning the imposition of sex offender conditions, then -the facts do not support the panel’s ruling. Coleman stipulated to those conditions at the outset of supervised release. See R. 91 (“I, Tony Coleman, acknowledge notification of Sex Offender Program Special Condition and the above components. Failure to abide by the above special condition and the initialed components is a violation of my conditions of release. I further understand that even if I refuse to sign the form special condition ‘X’ and the components that apply are still in effect.” (signed by Coleman, 4/3/01)); R. 222 (additional signature of Coleman agreeing to sex offender conditions, dated Mar. 23, 2001). He did not make a due process challenge at that time. Having so stipulated in order to gain “release,” Coleman is in an odd position now, four years later, when he backs off his agreement.
In these various ways, the panel relied on unproven facts and distortion of Vitek to reach its substantive conclusion. Its methodology also plays havoc with Congress’s carefully crafted limitations on federal habeas review. AEDPA authorizes federal courts to overturn only those state court decisions that represent an “unreasonable” application of constitutional law decided by the Supreme Court. An “unreasonable” decision must be not just wrong, but really wrong. See Brown v. Payton, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 1442, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1522, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). This panel’s decision cannot even be squared with the actions of the circuits supporting its constitutional adjudication. In Neal v. Shimoda, a § 1983 case cited favorably by the panel, the Ninth Circuit found that the liberty interest protected by the due process clause was implicated in a similar factual situation. 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir.1997). The court went on, however, to sustain the qualified immunity of individual defendants. The qualified immunity ruling is wholly at odds with what the panel had to find in order for Coleman to prevail under AEDPA. Neal stated:
No reasonable prison official would have reason to know that the classification of Neal as a sex offender or the requirement that Neal complete the [treatment] as a precondition to parole eligibility would implicate a protected liberty interest, let alone that the program violated his due process rights.
Id. at 832 (emphasis added); see also Chambers v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir.2000) (holding, on similar facts, that “[b]ecause the state of the law was not established when these actions were taken, the prison officials named in this lawsuit are entitled to qualified immunity”).8 While the AED-*674PA/Teague standard and the test for qualified immunity are “doctrinally distinct,” Williams, 529 U.S. at 380, 120 S.Ct. at 1506 n. 12 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion), we need not ignore their logical similarity. It is ¿¿logical to conclude that no “new rule” is made here when the panel (a) orders Texas prison officials, for the first time, to give hearings to sex offenders who were not explicitly convicted of sex offenses; (b) determines such prisoners are now entitled to hearings even if their sex offender treatment is fully confidential and amounts to “talk therapy”; and (c) the other circuits have agreed, through their qualified immunity conclusions, that Vitek supports but does not necessarily compel similar results.
In sum, the panel’s “new rule” was not “dictated by Supreme Court precedent.” See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (a “new rule” is one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States .... ”). It would be hard for any prisoner procedural due process innovation to be dictated by precedent given the inherent balancing involved in due process cases. That the panel’s decision was not “dictated” by Vitek, however, is ultimately reinforced by the Supreme Court’s refusal, in Doe, supra, to decide whether a liberty interest exists in not being classified as a sex offender.
As a way around its inability to cite “clearly, established” Supreme Court case-law, the panel invokes Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2151, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (“Certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt.”). See Panel Op. — F.3d at - (slip op. at 11 n.30). Yarborough is not on point. Moreover, the Court’s dicta were immediately followed by the statement, “This is not such a case, however.” Id. Further, Justice Kennedy cited no illustrative easelaw after making this broad statement. Yarborough’s dicta do not eliminate the longstanding rule that habeas is not the avenue through which a federal court may find new constitutional rights. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Williams, 529 U.S. at 379, 120 S.Ct. at 1505-06 (noting that Teague “remains the law” even after AEDPA, and that “[i]t is perfectly clear that AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that Teague requires federal habeas courts to deny relief that is contingent upon a rule of law not clearly established at the time the state conviction became final”).
The only thing more perplexing than the panel’s determination on the merits is what happens next — both for Coleman and the state correctional institutions in this circuit. The panel decision is neither fish nor fowl: Coleman “wins” and the district *675court is reversed, yet Coleman does not secure his release, and the panel does not offer any guidance to the district court as to the appropriate next step. This is without precedent. Should the district court hold a mini-trial? Or should the district court order Coleman “released” back into the halfway house, where he is still in custody under Texas law, until the state convenes yet another hearing and affords Coleman an opportunity to dispute his status and treatment regimen? Compare Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-96, 100 S.Ct. at 1264-65 (refusing to require states to provide counsel for predeprivation hearings). And what should prison officials do when they want a parolee to obtain counseling for drug abuse, alcoholism, or even depression? Surely stigma may attach to any of these labels, even, apparently, if the treatment is confidential. Must procedural process be afforded?
This opinion extends Vitek beyond recognition and vastly complicates the state’s attempts to rehabilitate troubled, as well as predatory, inmates. Equally unfortunate, it does violence to the deference that we owe state courts under AEDPA. The panel crafted a “new rule” of parole procedure where two other circuits, on whose opinions it heavily relied, granted § 1983 qualified immunity precisely because the law on this issue — the pre-parole process owed a sex offender — is not clear, much less “dictated by precedent.” This opinion opens the door to other judge-made “new rules” that undermine AEDPA’s statutory requirements.
I respectfully dissent.
. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
.While on parole for burglary, Coleman was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact; specifically, for sexually assaulting a twelve-year-old, mentally retarded girl. R. 282. Although the panel now attempts to question this reading of the record in its rehearing order, the panel does not challenge Coleman's precipitating conduct. He pleaded guilty to and was convicted of only misdemeanor assault. In exchange for this guilty plea, the state dropped most of the charges in the initial indictment; however, the first paragraph of the indictment was not dropped. R. 76 (waiving only "Count II and all habitual paragraphs and Count I Paragraph 11”). The preserved paragraph reads, in pertinent part, "Tony Coleman ... did then and there knowingly and intentionally cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of ..., a child younger than 14 years of age and not his spouse, by his penis.” R. 72.
When Coleman was moved to a halfway house, on supervised “release,” the state conditioned his transfer, inter alia, on Coleman’s registering as a sex offender and receiving therapy. The panel correctly dismissed Coleman's substantive due process claim founded on the state’s sex offender program.
. In its rehearing order, the panel finds it irrelevant that the registration requirement was dropped. Surely the panel cannot ignore the jurisdictional requirement that a live controversy exist at all stages of the litigation. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396-97, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208-09, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404 (1971) (“Even in cases arising in the state courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction.”).
. To be sure, Coleman would have to demonstrate that the requirements stigmatized him beyond his status as a felony convict and as someone convicted of misdemeanor sexual assault of a twelve-year-old, mentally retarded girl. See supra n. 2.
.Coleman never presented these "facts” to the state courts or requested judicial notice be taken of the website in state court. Although the panel is quick to invoke circuit rules to preclude the state from contesting this "fact” in its petition for rehearing, the state had no notice that the website would be cited by the panel. After all, the "facts” for habeas cases are required to be developed in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (referring to "facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings”); § 2254(e)(i) (applicant can rebut presumption of correctness of state fact findings by clear and convincing evidence); § 2254(e)(2) (no new hearing allowed to develop facts unless the factual predicate "could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”). Moreover, the state now claims (correctly) that Coleman is not in the sex offender database; as shown supra, brief consultation (equally worthy of judicial notice) of another website verifies this proposition, which supports the state’s claim of a jurisdictional defect (see supra note 3).
. 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160-61, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (damage to reputation alone insufficient to invoke procedural due process; loss of reputation must be coupled with some other tangible element to become protectable property interest).
. Moreover, one district court has found that there is nothing atypical or significantly harsh about a prisoner’s enduring sex therapy. (These are terms employed by the Supreme Court to explain more clearly the circumstances in which prison conditions could sustain liberty interest analysis. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).) See Jones v. Puckett, 160 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1023 (W.D.Wis.2001) ("Attending sex offender therapy is not atypical and significant compared to ordinary prison life. Prisoners are often required to participate in all types of counseling, not all of which is necessitated by their specific conviction.”).
. The other circuits' § 1983 decisions also raise a serious question whether the panel properly decided this as a habeas case. On January 17, 2001, Coleman was released on mandatory supervision on the condition that he reside in a halfway house until reemployed. “Mandatory supervision” is "the release of an eligible inmate so that the inmate may serve the remainder of the inmate's sentence not on parole but under the supervision of the pardons and paroles division.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.001(5) (Vernon 2004) (emphasis added) (quoted in Panel Op., - F.3d -, -(slip op. at 2 n.l)). The appropriate avenue for challenging the state's treatment of Coleman appears to be through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not habeas. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1250, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is one thing to say that permissible habeas relief, as our cases interpret the statute, includes ordering a ‘quantum change in the level of custody,' such as release from incarceration to parole. It is quite another to say that the habeas statute authorizes federal *674courts to order relief that neither terminates custody, accelerates the future date of release from custody, nor reduces the level of custody .... A holding that this sort of judicial immersion in the administration of discretionary parole lies at the ‘core of habeas’ would utterly sever the writ from its common law roots."); Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1994) (habeas corpus is solely available to challenge the "fact or duration of confinement"); Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting an attempt to challenge in habeas a "crime of violence” notification requirement imposed as part of supervised release because the requirement "in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement”). Notably, four other circuits have addressed issues similar to those posed to this panel in § 1983; none has considered the issue through habe-as. See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir.2003); Chambers v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (10th Cir.2000); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir.1999); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir.1997).