dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. After reviewing the record, I conclude that Philip has presented sufficient evidence showing that Ford treated similarly situated white employees more favorably than Philip.
Our cases require a plaintiff to show that he or she is similarly situated to employees offered for comparison in all relevant respects to meet the prima facie burden. Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir.2001); see also McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that a plaintiff need not show disparate treatment with an identically situated employee but only sufficient similarity to support the minimal inference that the differences in treatment “may be attributable to discrimination”); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 619 (7th Cir.2000) (requiring that comparable employees share the “common features essential to a meaningful comparison”). The set of relevant factors is not fixed; rather, courts must determine which factors are relevant to each case. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir.1998). While factors such as the supervisor, and the conduct engaged in, are relevant when a plaintiff alleges differences in disciplinary treatment, see. e.g., Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir.2000), they are not necessarily relevant to cases arising under other circumstances.
Philip contends that Ford’s failure to allow him to remain in the twenty-five mile driver position after it was reclassified was discriminatory because other employees whose jobs were reclassified were permit*770ted to remain in their positions. In opposition to summary judgment, he offered the affidavit of Nancy Schillinger, claiming that two white male employees were “grandfathered” into positions after they were reclassified. (Appellant’s App. at 34.) The affidavit clarifies that “grandfathering” refers to the practice of allowing an employee to remain in a job after reclassification rather than placing the job up for bid. (Id.)
Philip’s claim is not based on disciplinary action and there is no allegation that his performance was inadequate. Rather, Philip alleges that a portion of the company-wide collective bargaining agreement was applied to remove him from his position and was not applied to white employees whose jobs were reclassified in a similar fashion. Unlike disciplinary decisions, which may be made by an immediate supervisor, a policy dictated by a collective bargaining agreement will be implemented with some degree of uniformity. Applying the requirements of Runyon to non-disciplinary claims like Philip’s places an inappropriate burden on plaintiffs to show similarities irrelevant to their claims. The positions of Philip and the white employees offered for comparison were reclassified, and should have been opened for bid and awarded on the basis of seniority. These employees are therefore similarly situated in all relevant respects. Applying the requirements of Runyon to non-disciplinary claims like Philip’s places an inappropriate burden on plaintiffs to show similarities irrelevant to their claims. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings.