dissenting.
Because the strictures of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, *905147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which expand our understanding of the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee, apply to an order of restitution, I respectfully dissent. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (announcing that any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
As mentioned by the majority, we addressed, although did not decide, the question of whether Apprendi’s jury guarantee applies to restitution once before in United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 608-10 (8th Cir.2002). In Ross, we stated, “Apprendi could only apply if the amount of restitution is based on (1) a ‘fact’ other than a prior conviction not submitted to the jury, (2) that is used to increase the ‘penalty’ for a crime (3) beyond a prescribed statutory maximum.” Id. at 608. In applying these three components, we found the first two suggested Apprendi may apply to restitution orders. Id. at 608-09. We found “the more difficult question [was] whether the third component applies to restitution, that is, whether restitution is a criminal penalty that can be ‘increased ... beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.’ ” Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348).
After the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), this question becomes no longer difficult to answer. In Blakely, the Court clarified “the statutory maximum for Ap-prendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 2537. With this clarification, precedent dictates a conclusion that any dispute over the amount of restitution due and owing a victim of crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, our nearly inconvertible precedent makes clear the determination of the amount of restitution is a “fact.” Ross, 279 F.3d at 609 (citing United States v. Bartsh, 985 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir.1993)). Furthermore, restitution must be considered a “criminal penalty.” Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir.1997)). In the present case, the district court imposed restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA). See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring the court to order restitution for an offense against property). In Williams, we analyzed the question of whether restitution imposed pursuant to the MVRA was criminal punishment and concluded it was. 128 F.3d at 1241. The majority correctly notes our analysis was dicta, nevertheless, the majority of the other circuits agreed with our conclusion. See United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1042 n. 4 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 213 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 89-90 (3d Cir.1998); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1141 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Baggett, 125 F.3d 1319, 1321-22 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1997). While these cases, including Williams, were admittedly decided in the context of the Ex Post Facto Clause, there is no principled basis on which to distinguish punishment for Ex Post Facto Clause and Sixth Amendment purposes.3 See United States v. Garcia-Castillo, 127 Fed.Appx. 385, 390-91 (10th Cir.2005) (unpublished).
*906Once we recognize restitution as being a “criminal penalty” the proverbial Apprendi dominoes begin to fall. While many in the pre-Blakely world understandably subscribed to the notion Apprendi does not apply to restitution because restitution statutes do not prescribe a maximum amount,4 see, e.g., United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1042 (6th Cir.2001), this notion is no longer viable in the post-Blakely world which operates under a completely different understanding of the term prescribed statutory maximum. To this end, Blakely’s definition of “statutory maximum” bears repeating again, “the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (emphasis added). Applying this definition to the present case, it dictates a conclusion that the district court’s order imposing a $26,400 restitution amount violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee because all but $8,000 of said amount was based upon facts not admitted to by Car-ruth or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, in contrast to the majority, I would vacate the district court’s restitution order and remand to the district court with instructions to impose a restitution amount consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
. Likewise, there is no principled basis on which to distinguish the Supreme Court's *906holding in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50-53, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) that restitution obligations are criminal penalties and not compensation for actual pecuniary loss even though the controlling question was dischargeability in bankruptcy proceedings. In other words, I fail to see how restitution can be considered a criminal penalty for bankruptcy and Ex Post Facto Clause purposes, but not Sixth Amendment purposes.
. In Ross, we found the statutory maximum or outer limits of a restitution order were controlled by the scope of the indictment. 279 F.3d at 609 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 196 F.3d 895, 900 (8th Cir.1999)). In view of Blakely, however, we now know the outer limits for Apprendi purposes are controlled by facts reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537