concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the district court’s order of summary judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. However, because I believe the issue of whether Canton’s cleaning barge is a “vessel” as defined by 1 U.S.C. § 3 requires a better developed record in light of Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005), I would remand the case to the district court and leave the issue to a finder of fact. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding that Canton’s cleaning barge is a vessel under 1 U.S.C. § 3.
The Jones Act provides that “[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law” under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 38, 63 S.Ct. 488, 87 L.Ed. 596 (1943) (quoting 46 U.S.C.App. § 688(a)). One of the predicate determinations for obtaining coverage under the Jones Act is whether the structure to which the worker is connected qualifies as a “vessel in navigation.” See Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 88, 112 S.Ct. 486, 116 L.Ed.2d 405 *875(1991) (quoting McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991) as noting that “[t]he key to seaman status [under the Jones Act] is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation”). Given the highly fact-intensive inquiry necessary to determine a structure’s status, we have generally left to the finder of fact the question of what qualifies as a vessel within the meaning of the Jones Act. See Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir.1974) (“[W]hat is a vessel and who is a crew member are ordinarily jury questions.”); see also Stewart, 125 S.Ct. at 1128 (noting that the inquiry into the status of the vessel “may involve factual issues for the jury”). As a result, and in spite of the riparian geography of our circuit, we do not have quite the ocean of case law on this issue that might be found in some of the other circuits.
In the order of summary judgment, the district court began its analysis of Canton’s cleaning barge by noting that it was not a standard barge but instead was more akin to a floating work platform. The district court therefore turned to the case law of other circuits, which “[s]ince the Slatton decision, ... have clarified the test for determining whether a special purpose structure is a vessel in navigation for Jones Act purposes.” Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-55-DJS, slip op. at 9 (E.D.Mo. Jan. 6, 2004). These cases generally recognized the legal difficulty of classifying a structure as a vessel and instead developed tests for determining whether the alleged vessel was actually “in navigation.”2 This approach generally focused on the primary purpose of the structure, the status of the structure at the time of the accident, and whether any transportation function was merely incidental to the structure’s primary purpose. Id. at 9. The district court, relying primarily on this “in navigation” jurisprudence, concluded that because “[t]here [was] no evidence that the cleaning barge was used for the transportation of cargo, equipment, or persons across navigable waters,” Bunch, slip op. at 8, “the only conclusion which a reasonable fact-finder could reach is that the moored cleaning barge is not a vessel in navigation under the Jones Act,” id. at 10.
In Stewart, the Supreme Court eschewed this focus on a separate “in navigation” requirement. Stewart, 125 S.Ct. at 1128 (“[T]he ‘in navigation’ requirement is an element of the vessel status of a watercraft ... [and] is relevant to whether the craft is ‘used, or capable of being used’ for maritime transportation.”); see also Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 418 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir.2005) (noting that Stewart su-percedes the Second Circuit’s three-part test in Tonnesen). Instead, the Supreme Court held that a watercraft qualifies as a *876vessel under the Jones Act if it is “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” Stewart, 125 S.Ct. at 1128 (adopting the definition of “vessel” found in 1 U.S.C. § 3). By contrast, “a watercraft is not ‘capable of being used’ for maritime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.” Id. at 1127. The focus, therefore, is not on whether the structure is actually engaged in transport, id. at 1128, but rather whether “the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of transportation on water’ is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one,” id. at 1128.
Now that the “in navigation” element relied upon by the district court has been effectively subsumed into the definition of “vessel,” the salient question before the Court is whether the cleaning barge in this case has been “permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.” Id. at 1127. Like the Supreme Court and our previous case law, I believe that unless the record supports only one conclusion, this fact-intensive inquiry is best left to the fact-finder. See, e.g., Johnson v. Continental Grain Co., 58 F.3d 1232, 1235 (8th Cir.1995) (“Seaman status is usually a fact-intensive inquiry properly left to the jury to resolve.”). We need only look to those cases cited by Stewart with approval to see the difficult factual nuances that arise when making such a determination. See, e.g., Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 22, 46 S.Ct. 379, 70 L.Ed. 805 (1926) (floating wharfboat secured to the shore with cables and connected to onshore utilities “was not practically capable of being used as a means of transportation”); Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627, 7 S.Ct. 336, 30 L.Ed. 501 (1887) (floating drydoek was a “fixed structure” that had been “permanently moored” to the mainland by chains and spars, rather than a vessel that had been temporarily anchored); Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 570 (5th Cir.1995) (floating casino was no longer a vessel where it “was moored to the shore in a semi-permanent or indefinite manner”).3 From these cases, we know that a vessel may be “permanently moored” simply by being “secured to the shore by four or five cables” and connected to onshore utilities. Evansville, 271 U.S. at 21, 46 S.Ct. 379. However, seemingly permanent moorings do not necessarily preclude the regular use of the structure as a means of transportation. Id. at 20-21, 46 S.Ct. 379 (“Each winter [the wharfboat] was towed to Green River harbor to protect it from ice.”); Pavone, 52 F.3d at 564 (“[T]he barge floats on navigable waters, its quite substantial dockside attachment to land is indefinite, if not permanent, save only for its ability to be unmoored and towed to sheltered waters in advance of approaching hurricanes or other violent weather.”). Also, that a structure “move[s] to conform to the stage of the river,” Evansville, 271 U.S. at 21, 46 S.Ct. 379, or “floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel,” Cope, 119 U.S. at 627, 7 S.Ct. 336.
Admittedly, the parties claimed at oral argument that there were no facts in dispute. At this juncture, however, I believe that the factual record regarding Canton’s cleaning barge is inadequate to reach the conclusion that it is a vessel under the Jones Act. More particularly, I believe the record is insufficient to judge as a matter *877of law whether the barge is permanently or semi-permanently moored. All we know is that the cleaning barge is a stationary staging platform for cleaning other barges. For this purpose, a generator, water pumps, vacuum tanks, cleaning tools and communication equipment are kept on the cleaning barge. It is incapable of independent locomotion and is presently anchored by massive steel piers that are driven through the deck and hull of the cleaning barge and into the Mississippi River riverbed. During Bunch’s year-long tenure with Canton, the cleaning barge was once hauled from the Illinois side of the Mississippi to the Missouri side. Otherwise, according to Bunch, “[s]ometimes strong currents can shift the barge.”
Summary judgment might be appropriate if we knew how often Canton moved the barge prior to Bunch’s employment, whether Canton ever intends to move the cleaning barge in the future, and how often other cleaning barges in the area are moved. Presently, we do not even know how difficult the cleaning barge would be to unmoor or if it would be seaworthy after the spuds were removed. I think it would also be useful to know whether the cleaning barge is registered or licenced with a governmental authority or otherwise subject to governmental inspection as a vessel. Further, I think it might be important for the parties to elaborate on whether the cleaning barge merely moves along the spuds with the rising tide or whether the current actually causes the spuds to bend or otherwise move off the cleaning barge’s mooring. Other relevant facts might include how far offshore the cleaning barge is moored and what legal arrangements, such as leases or mooring rights, Canton had to make to secure the cleaning barge’s present mooring. These facts, as well as others not easily anticipated at this stage of the case, may well prove indispensable in properly classifying Canton’s cleaning barge. Accordingly, I believe it would be prudent to allow the parties to develop the record in light of Stewart.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding that Canton’s cleaning barge is a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act.
. See, e.g., Howard v. S. Ill. Riverboat Casino Cruises, Inc., 364 F.3d 854 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that an indefinitely moored dockside casino is a vessel but, because it has no transportation function or purpose, it is not “in navigation"); Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 82 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.1996) (adopting, with minor modification, the Fifth Circuit’s test for whether a vessel is "in navigation”); DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1123 (1st Cir.1992) (en banc) (holding that "if a barge[’s] ... purpose or primary business is not navigation or commerce, then workers assigned thereto for its shore enterprise are to be considered seamen only when it is in actual navigation or transit” at the time of injury); Kathriner v. UNISEA, Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir.1992) ("Generally, floating structures are not classified as vessels in navigation if they are incapable of independent movement over water, are permanently moored to land, have no transportation function of any kind, and have no ability to navigate.”); Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 824, 829 (5th Cir.1984) (promulgating a three-factor test for whether a vessel is not "in navigation” for purposes of the Jones Act).
. See also Kathriner, 975 F.2d at 660 (floating processing plant was no longer a vessel where a "large opening [had been] cut into her hull,” rendering her incapable of moving over the water).